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A N O T E O N S O U R C E S 
This work deals with the diplomatic activity brought about by the 
Belgian and Polish revolutions during the years 1830 and 1831. 
Of the extensive literature dealing with the first problem I men-
tion only the studies by Fl. de Lannoy, W. von Franqué, and C. 
Smit, the last-mentioned work being based on printed sources only. 
The French viewpoint is presented by E. de Guichen, and, more 
adequately, by R. Guyot, while the writer of a recent monograph 
on Palmerston's policy, Sir Charles Webster, used the invaluable 
private papers of the British Minister which had not so far been 
available. 
The diplomatic history of the Polish movement of 1830 is yet to be 
written. There are important contributions by J . Dutkiewicz with 
regard to the Polish policy of Austria and France, and by M. Kuldel, 
who examines the outbreak of the revolution. R. F. Leslie's recent 
account of the Polish revolution and its social implications hardly 
touches on the diplomatic problems involved. 
The only attempt to connect the Belgian and Polish events of 1830 
together is made by Mme Perelman-Liwer; in her study Belgian 
internal affaires are by far the principal subject, while British 
sources are almost entirely disregarded. 
With regard to the sources of the period, one has to bear in mind 
that Belgian affairs were a public concern of the Great Powers since 
their intervention had been requested by the King of the Nether-
lands; Polish affairs were not, for the Emperor-King made no 
request of this kind. Hence, in France and in Britain, but especially 
in Britain, little information is to be expected in official corre-
spondence about the attitude of the respective governments with 
regard to the war on the Vistula. I have used the records of the 
Foreign Office and of the Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, being 
aware that there is little relevant information to be found in them. 
Of the chief printed sources I would mention the Dutch Gedenk-
stukken which contain a selection of diplomatic reports of the period 
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as well as semi-official and private correspondence of outstanding 
personalities in the Low Countries. With regard to the latter I have 
almost invariably found that the editor omits the portions of 
documents which refer to Poland - mainly accounts of military 
events - which are to be found in almost all documents written by 
the Dutch representatives in London. Pallain's reprints of Talley-
rand's reports from London are necessary, as also the Russian 
Recueil by Martens ; the latter unfortunately consists for the greater 
part of précis of documents. In view of the scarcity of Russian 
sources, the letters of Nicholas and the Grand Duke Constantine, 
his elder brother, printed by the Société Impériale d'Histoire de 
Russie, are quite invaluable. 
For more relevant information I have referred to memoirs and 
the publications of private correspondence; I accumulated some 
evidence from English and French sources of this kind. The corre-
spondence of Grey with Mme Lieven proved very valuable. For 
German material of this kind I relied on secondary works, except 
for a few occasional references, as this problem had received full 
treament in Franqué's monograph on Luxemburg; I have used, 
however, the publications of Metternich's and Gentz's archives. 
My research for relevant archives was done almost exclusively 
in private collections in England and in Holland. The Lieven MSS 
at the British Museum proved to be amine of information, as were 
the Bagot MSS at Levens Hall, though the latter relate much more 
closely to the Netherlands than to Poland. Much was found in the 
Broadlands MSS of Palmerston and in the Howick MSS of Grey. 
The Granville MSS contain interesting letters from Lord Holland. 
The Wellesley MSS of the first Lord Cowley, at the Public Record 
Office, contain no item for the period 1830-31 referring to Vienna. 
The Peel, Aberdeen and Wellesley (of the first Duke of Wellington) 
MSS yielded no information for my purpose, nor did the correspon-
dence between Sir Frederick Lamb, from 1832 Ambassador in 
Vienna, and Palmerston, kept in Panshanger MSS in Hert-
fordshire County Record Office. Letters from Mme Lieven to Lady 
Cowpcr, part of which are already published, in the Lamb MSS at 
the British Museum contain no item of importance. 
In Holland I examined all the private collections of the period 
available at the Algemeen Rijksarchief in The Hague, as well as the 
Van der Hoop-Van Zuylen correspondence in the MSS of the Royal 
Library. The Enghuizen Collection in Arnhem yielded no infor-
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mation with regard to the Netherlands Minister in St. Petersburg, 
Baron Van Heeckeren tot Enghuizen. The most important evidence 
in Holland is found in the semi-official correspondence of the Dutch 
representatives at the London Conference with the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs (designated Conferentie Londen, B.Z. Nos. 1695 
and 1696). 
In France I tried unsuccessfully to obtain access to the Lieven-
Guizot correspondence which I understand is now being edited. The 
MSS of the Bibliothèque Polonaise in Paris contain some material 
relating to international relations, including the papers of the 
Grand Duke Constantine, seized in Warsaw. 
My research in the Lieven MSS resulted in my obtaining some 
material relating to the Orangist movement in Belgium; part of it 
is included in the present work as relevant to the problem, since 
I believe that Lieven's conscientiousness would have produced 
some results for the Orangist cause if his efforts had not been 
paralysed by his fear of an Anglo-French agreement directed 
against Russian interests in Eastern Europe. 
J. A. B. 
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I N T R O D U C T I O N 
The great strain which the Napoleonic wars brought to all govern-
ments in Europe made them agree to the necessity for the existence 
of a supreme institution which would watch and control the 
development of the international situation. The idea was embodied 
in the Holy Alliance of the monarchs of Austria, Prussia and Russia, 
and, more properly, in the Quadruple Alliance of 20th November, 
1815, to which, besides these three, Great Britain was a party, and 
which thus constituted an association of the Four Powers which 
had overthrown Napoleon. France was soon admitted to the 
concert of the Great Powers, when the foreign troops had been 
removed from her territory in virtue of the Aix-la-Chapelle Protocol 
of 1818. Castlereagh encouraged this, as it tended to promote the 
return of the old European equilibrium and especially to counter-
balance Russia: to this end, at Vienna, Prussia had been strength-
ened in the West, Norway united to Sweden, and Austria given a 
free hand in Italy. The three pillars of the Holy Alliance did not 
oppose the inclusion of France, since the legitimate dynasty had 
been restored in Paris. 
The years following witnessed the gradual dissolution of this 
organization. I t was Britain who kept herself away from commit-
ments for the future, and in Castlereagh's opinion the obligations 
resulting from the Quadruple Alliance did not extend beyond a 
guarantee of the territorial settlement of 1815 for twenty years, and 
the exclusion of the Bonapartes from all power in Europe. France's 
aims were also opposed to the interests of the three. 
At the Congress of Troppau in 1820 the principle of intervention 
in the internal affairs of the European States, should their develop-
ment menace the legitimate monarchical order, was only adopted 
by the three Eastern Governments; it had been previously resolved 
at Aix-la-Chapelle that intervention was only possible with the 
consent of the State on the territory of which it was to take place. 
The French intervention in Spain in 1823, though it had the consent 
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of Vienna, Berlin and St. Petersburg, aroused indignation in Britain. 
In the Portuguese crisis of 1826 Britain mastered the situation 
according to her own wishes. 
It was the Greek question which at one and the same time 
united the Powers and became an apple of discord. Almost every-
where in Europe there was sympathy with the Greek struggle for 
freedom, which subsisted in difficult circumstances from 1821 
onwards and commanded varying kinds of support from peoples 
and governments. Next to the principle of legitimacy, the Greek 
question involved that of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire 
and access to the Straits leading to the Black Sea. The chief rivals 
here were Great Britain and Russia, the latter apparently in a 
stronger position to work her will owing to her direct contact with 
the Turkish frontiers and her connections of race and religion with 
the peoples of the Balkans. 
When soon after his accession, in 1826, Nicholas threatened 
Turkey, claiming to protect the Balkan principalities, Wellington 
was sent to St. Petersburg to negotiate the means of affording 
freedom to the Greeks without, at the same time, letting Russia 
advance southwards too much. By the Anglo-Russian agreement 
of 4th April, 1826, the recognition of some sort of independence of 
Greece was established for the first time; while Russia admitted 
on the one hand British mediation between the Sultan and the 
Greeks, she promised not to seek advantages in Turkey, should she 
be required to support such mediation. Yet Nicholas succeeded in 
imposing upon Turkey the Treaty of Akerman in October, 1826. 
On the initiative of Britain the negotiations in the Greek question 
were extended by the admission of France, and, after the tripartite 
Treaty of London, of July, 1827, which provided for an offer, or 
rather, an enforcement of mediation, a fleet of the three Powers 
was sent to the Mediterranean; and in an almost accidental 
engagement in the Bay of Navarino the Turkish fleet was completely 
destroyed in October of the same year. Action once undertaken, it 
was continued by the landing of the French in Morea, and by 
Russia starting hostilities in the Balkans in 1828. It was only the 
appearance of the Russian army at Adrianople - after a hard-
fought campaign in which the Russians suffered great losses -
which brought the Sultan to terms in September, 1829, making 
him agree to the independence of Greece, previously established 
by the Three Powers at their London Conference in March. 
INTRODUCTION 21 
Throughout the negotiations Metternich vainly attempted to step 
in. 
In the solution of the Greek question Russia played a far more 
important rôle than that which had been intended for her by the 
agreement of 1826. It was Britain which had brought France into 
the negotiations to counterbalance Russian influence, and yet in 
the advanced stages of the negotiations, in 1829 and 1830, quite 
cordial relations existed between Paris and St. Petersburg, to the 
detriment of British policy. At the time of the Turkish war France 
even attempted to bring forward a fantastic plan for re-modelling 
Europe, whereby the King of the Netherlands would be "trans-
ferred" to Constantinople, and his former possessions divided 
between France and Prussia. The Algiers expedition of 1830 was 
encouraged by Nicholas and disapproved of by Britain. 
While diplomacy was engaged in the affairs of a distant corner of 
Europe, the liberal movement, more or less suppressed in every 
state of Europe for the previous fifteen years, matured sufficiently 
to change the face of politics and to shake the existence of the 
Quadruple Alliance. 
The outbreak of revolution in Paris in July, 1830, initiated a 
series of other similar movements, of which two, one in the Southern 
Netherlands and the other in Poland, were destined to engage 
general attention during several months. The union between the 
Southern and the Northern Netherlands, and the estabUshment 
of the Kingdom of Poland were both included in the Treaty of 
Vienna, but in the first case a change in the existing state of things 
presented no direct threat to any possessions of the Great Five, 
besides their interests in the question were opposed ; consent to the 
establishment of the Kingdom of Poland, in 1815, was only grudg-
ingly given by the two co-partitioners of Poland, Prussia and 
Austria, as being the only means of preventing a simple annexation 
by Russia of what had been the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. Through 
a passing mood of Alexander it became possible for the Kingdom 
to obtain a more liberal constitution than that of France,1 which 
tended to strengthen its separate existence and made the link with 
Russia still more difficult to maintain. The interest of the two 
1
 In the France of Charles X there were 80,000 electors, while in the Kingdom 
of Poland, with a population less than one-fifth of that of France, there were 
some ιοο,οοο. G. Weill, L'éveil des nationalités et le mouvement libéral, 1930, p. 124. 
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Western Powers in the existence of Poland hardly went beyond 
sympathy, though in the establishment of an independent Polish 
State Castlereagh would have seen a desirable weakening of 
Russia and it seems that, at Vienna, his appeal for consideration 
for Polish nationality was made solely to that purpose. 
The new régime established in France, a constitutional monarchy 
under Louis Philippe, was recognized by the neighbouring states 
within a few weeks. No plan to restore the Bourbons was contem-
plated, but a new wave of revolutions was feared, and it seemed 
likely that France would support them. The representatives of the 
two Powers most opposed to such a course, Metternich and the 
Russian Vice-Chancellor, Count Nesselrode, who happened to be 
spending their holidays in neighbouring places in Bohemia, drew 
up, at the first news of the revolution in Paris, the famous agree-
ment, the "chiffon de Carlsbad", which stipulated that while no 
intervention in France would be undertaken, French intervention 
elsewhere would not be endured. It was then understood that the 
Imperial Government of Russia also reconciled itself to the new 
state of things in France. 
The disturbances in Brussels followed closely on those in Paris. 
I t was believed at first, however, that no serious consequences were 
to be anticipated. The King of the Netherlands received a delega-
tion from this southern capital and summoned the States General 
which on 13th September pronounced the advisability of the 
administrative separation of the two parts of the Kingdom. Before 
giving effect to this decision the King wished to restore order. His 
attempt failed in 4 days' fighting in Brussels, 23rd to 27th September, 
and the King appUed to the Powers of the Quadruple Alliance for 
assistance. 
There seemed to be little likelihood of the Powers embarking 
upon a military expedition on his behalf. The most friendly 
monarch, Frederick William I I I , trembled for his Rhenish prov-
inces, and Austria had to reckon with the influence of the French 
revolution upon the oppressed Italians. Though neither Prussia 
nor Austria was a constitutional state, their governments - both 
the sovereigns and the principal advisers of the Crown - were 
mindful of the consequences of harsh measures. The influence of 
public opinion, however small, and barely allowed to express itself 
through the Press, was taken into account. The great agitation 
which prevailed in some parts of the Prussian and Austrian do-
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minions after the Paris events, together with serious disturbances 
in some of the minor German states, made the two governments 
anxious to avoid the application of force in that part of the former 
French possessions which, after July, France seemed least likely 
to have forgotten. Lastly, Britain, which had showed a disinclina-
tion for intervention before, was - apart from all other considera-
tions of both foreign and internal policy - unable to intervene on 
her own. 
There was no time for delay. Before any news could be obtained 
from the Russian capital, the other Powers offered mediation, and 
a Conference, from which Great Britain thought it impossible to 
exclude France though William I's appeal was not addressed to 
her, was called to assemble in London on 4th November. This was 
a meeting of the representatives of two constitutional states and three 
absolute monarchies, who had to agree in working out a solution 
of the conflict between a constitutional sovereign and his revolted 
subjects in an area where moreover many international interests 
had been involved for centuries. 
Of all the parties Russia was the least interested in the affairs 
of the Low Countries and yet most opposed to the solution 
proposed. Her ruler, Nicholas I, was a convinced believer in the 
divine right of princes to govern as they pleased, and he fully 
applied this principle in his own empire. He possessed little personal 
culture: all his interests were concentrated on military affairs. 
Though he had, before his accession, travelled in Western Europe, 
he hardly understood the enormous difference between his own 
subjects and other peoples; aware of the existence of constitutional 
forms of government he could not see a constitution in any other 
light than as a voluntary cession of some of his rights by a sovereign. 
Born in 1796, Nicholas never knew until 1823 that he would 
occupy the throne, and even after that time he was not introduced 
to the affairs of state. His accession was preceded by a military 
conspiracy which he mercilessly suppressed. 
He had consequently shown great reluctance, which was only 
increased by the news from Brussels, in recognizing Louis Philippe. 
The Netherlands Crown Prince, the Prince of Orange, was his 
brother-in-law and a personal friend. And though Nicholas had 
recognized Louis Philippe, this act was soon followed by the widely 
pubhcized mobilization of the Russian army. 
It seemed, therefore, that the London Conference would not 
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be kept together for long, the more so as, on the one hand, the 
development of affairs in the Southern Netherlands did not tend to 
make its task any easier, and on the other, the attempt at a solution 
of such difficulties by means of an ambassadorial conference was 
a new venture, and therefore unlikely to succeed in what seemed to 
be a very complicated problem. For the Powers of the Quadruple 
Alliance the creation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands had pro-
vided a barrier against France, and to this end a line of fortresses 
had been erected along its Southern frontiers. It was clear that 
were the ties between Belgium and Holland loosened or severed, 
the fortresses would pass, if not to France herself, at any rate into 
the care of people most likely to be her friends. But the demolition 
of the fortresses was, to the French Government, the sine qua non 
achievement to follow the dissolution of the Kingdom of the Nether-
lands ; it was of such paramount importance that Louis Philippe 
announced their demolition in his speech at the opening of Parlia-
ment in July, 1831, though no public act of the Powers made such 
an announcement possible : the April protocol of the Four Powers in 
London on the subject had been communicated confidentially to the 
French representative, but it was not before December of that 
year that a convention of the Four Powers with the King of the 
Belgians provided for the demolition of some of the fortresses 
without - as was only natural, but much to the damage of the 
prestige of the Paris Government - any French participation in 
the proceedings. 
Lastly, one more factor indicated difficulty in continuing the 
Conference: its unhomogeneous composition. Here the balance 
favoured France. The French representative, Talleyrand, whose 
appointment to the London Embassy was one of the first public 
acts of the French King, possessed, apart from more than ordinary 
abilities, an experience second to none in the Conference. Shortly 
after the opening of the Conference the change of government in 
Britain brought in another important personage, Palmerston, of 
whose qualities Talleyrand also was soon aware. Both these men 
would, for different reasons, be at times opposed to the interests of 
the Belgians; but they would always object to unequivocally 
favouring the King of the Netherlands. Of those from whom the 
most stubborn opposition was to be expected one, Prince Lieven, the 
Ambassador of Russia, was a nonentity - and all the members 
of the conference were aware of this : in the eighteen years of Lieven's 
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London Embassy there was ample opportunity to arrive at this 
conclusion even for those who only met the Russian Ambassador 
outside England ; the other, Baron Biilow, Minister of Prussia, was 
tied down to his instructions, which required him to avoid a conflict 
at all costs. Personal factors influenced the activities of the remaining 
members of the Conference to a greater degree than could be 
expected, to the detriment of the policies followed by their Courts. 
Wessenberg, the second Austrian representative, "did not like the 
Belgians",2 but as an able diplomat he contributed much to 
bringing together opposing standpoints in the Conference ; Matusze-
wic, Lieven's deputy, when in opposition, which on account of his 
abilities could be considerable, was unwillingly half-hearted, being 
convinced that the wishes of The Hague, whether corroborated by 
his instructions or not, were not realizable.3 The Austrian Ambas-
sador, Prince Esterhazy, remained grandly detached. It remains 
to be noted that a not inconsiderable influence was exercised in 
London by the spirited wife of the Russian Ambassador; it did not, 
however, penetrate the intricacies of the Conference's business, and 
whatever her influence with Grey - and it does not appear that 
Grey allowed himself consciously to be so led in any public question 
- it seems to have been next to none with Palmerston. 
After their successful defence of Brussels against the Royal troops 
the Belgians elected their national assembly, the Congress, pro-
claimed their independence, and, contrary to advice sent even from 
Paris, voted late in November the deprivation of the House of 
Orange from all its powers. This was a tremendous challenge to 
the three Eastern Powers who represented the principle of legitimacy. 
However, before they could resolve on a reaction, to which Nicholas 
wanted to give a decidedly military character, the outbreak of the 
revolution in Warsaw on 29th November drew their attention 
elsewhere. The initiative now passing unequivocally to the Western 
representatives, that is to Talleyrand and to the new Whig Foreign 
Secretary, Palmerston, the Conference declared on 20th December 
that in future Belgium should exist as an independent State, and 
on 20th and 27th January, 1831, it set out in its Protocols the bases 
2
 F. de Lannoy, L'histoire diplomatique de l'indépendance belge, 1930, p. 55. 
s
 Cf. especially Matuszewic to Nesselrode, 21 Oct. 1831, H. T. Colenbrander, 
Gedenkstukken der Algemene Geschiedenu van ffederland iyg§-i84o. Part X, 
Vol. III, 496. 
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for the separation of Belgium and Holland. Additionally encouraged 
by this result in the international field, the Belgians proceeded to 
elect the Duc de Nemours, younger son of Louis Philippe, as their 
king; but as this was unacceptable to most of the Conference Powers, 
they contented themselves with a Regent. 
The King of the Netherlands accepted the January Protocols, 
but the Belgians did not, and, contrary to the Conference's stipula-
tions, throughout the earlier half of 1831 they claimed the whole of 
Luxemburg, Limburg and Zealand Flanders (the left bank of 
the Scheldt); the Regent publicly challenged the Conference 
Powers, the German Federation and the King of the Netherlands 
by declaring that Luxemburg was a part of Belgium and would 
remain so. 
It should be noted, on the other hand, that the acceptance of the 
"Bases de séparation" by The Hague had given rise to false inter-
pretations outside Holland. Even St. Petersburg was au courant of 
the general desire in the northern part of the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands for a separation from Belgium. But this never meant that 
Holland - and least of all the King - was prepared to treat the 
Belgians as equal partners. Moreover the Conference Powers were 
themselves not clear about the rôle of the Conference: should it 
mediate between the two parties concerned or enforce the decisions 
taken in London upon t h e m - the latter course certainly inadmissible 
to the Eastern Powers - or put pressure upon the Belgians only -
difficult and dangerous when Paris was to be taken into considera-
tion. The Powers at least tried to achieve an appearance of 
impartiality by refusing to admit the Netherlands plenipotentiaries 
to the Conference room, in flagrant violation of the Aix-la-Chapelle 
protocol and of common sense, which would require the country 
demanding intervention in its affairs to be represented. This in 
itself would be sufficient argument for William I to oppose the 
Conference; if his political sense equalled his other undoubtedly 
exceptional qualities, he might be able, by withdrawing from the 
Conference, to save his dignity at least with regard to his most 
faithful ally, the Emperor of Russia, who moreover, at this time, 
to most observers seemed about to free himself from the complica-
tions of the revolution in Poland. However, the ambiguous, half-
hearted and at times petty way in which William's two pleni-
potentiaries, the London Ambassador Falck and the second delegate, 
Baron van Zuylen van Nyevclt, Ambassador to Turkey, were trying 
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to influence the decisions of the Conference in his favour - of which 
the protocol of 27th January on the subject of the debt is 
outstanding evidence - easily created the impression with the other 
Powers that the King had acquiesced in the fait accompli of the loss 
of his sovereignty in Belgium. Palmerston, at any rate, soon reached 
the conviction that Falck followed the King's instructions very 
unwillingly. All the more incomprehensible, to the Foreign Secretary 
as well as to the British Ambassador at The Hague, Sir Charles 
Bagot, was William I's insistence on his sovereign rights in his 
Southern capital, as strong in the beginning as at the end of 1831, 
and at either time seemingly out of touch with the reality in the 
Low Countries. 
Not until May, however, did the Conference propose suspending 
relations with the provisional Government of Belgium as a means 
of bringing it to terms; even so their representatives at Brussels 
delayed the measure. It had been thought that a king might 
stabilize the situation in Belgium, and after a vain search over some 
months the person of Prince Leopold of Saxe Cobourg, in many 
ways agreeable to those concerned, offered such a guarantee; but it 
appeared that nothing would induce the Belgians to adhere to the 
January Protocols. Encouragement was given to them not only by 
French, and, to a lesser degree, by British public opinion, but also by 
the French Government which throughout February and March 
refused its consent to agreements signed by Talleyrand; and later 
their resistance was also stimulated by the prolongation of the 
revolution in Poland. 
The Polish revolution was, unlike the Belgian, essentially a 
military affair. "Au lieu des émeutes bourgeoises de Bruxelles ou 
des conspirations à huis clos du carbonarisme italien, c'étaient de 
formidables ba ta i l l e s . . . " involving " . . .des armées de cent mille 
hommes." 4 This was a war which for over half a year engaged 
the attention of foreign military observers. 
Although there were many reasons for dissatisfaction in the 
"Congress"-Kingdom of Poland, the leading personalities never 
seriously considered recourse to arms as a means of obtaining an 
improvement. The movement began with a military conspiracy, 
and its outbreak was almost accidental; moreover it greatly 
embarrassed both the senior officers and the officials of the Govern-
ment. When order was re-established, the Grand Duke Constantine, 
* P. Thureau-Dangin, Histoire de la monarchie de juillet, 1884-1892,1, 166. 
28 INTRODUCTION 
Commander-in-chief of the Polish army, who during the attack on 
his palace narrowly escaped with his life, was allowed to depart 
with the Russian regiments; in the negotiations which preceded his 
departure he uttered a promise to intervene with the Emperor and 
King in order to obtain mercy for the guilty as well as to bring 
about an improvement in the governmental practices. This aroused 
curiosity as Constantine's behaviour was generally considered, 
abroad especially, as the main cause of the military rising. The 
Polish Diet was summoned for the middle of December and in the 
meantime dictatorial powers were entrusted to General Chlopicki, 
then in his late sixties, a popular and able soldier, but a convinced 
opponent of war with Russia. Soon after its first meeting the Diet 
declared that the events in Warsaw initiated a national movement 
justified by the violation of the constitution,5 but no offensive action 
was undertaken by the troops and no attempt made to rouse 
Lithuania, although the return of the Polish provinces which 
had been incorporated in Russia, was claimed by public opinion 
and constitued one of the aims of the revolution. I t was not before 
the return of the delegation sent - even before the meeting of the 
Diet - to the residence of Nicholas that hopes of a peaceful settle-
ment had to be entirely abandoned: Nicholas would not hear of 
anything but a submission, as demanded in his proclamation of 
17th December, which included only a very general promise of 
pardon and no reference to any political measures in the Kingdom. 
The Diet replied a few days later by voting, on 25th January, the 
dethronement of the House of Romanov, a declaration regretted 
by friends and enemies of Poland abroad, as well as by many Poles 
themselves. 
The Russian army under Field-Marshal Diebitsch, the victorious 
commander in the late Turkish war, entered the Kingdom early in 
February, and, after two minor Polish victories, the extremely 
bloody battle of Grochów, fought on 25th February in the vicinity 
of Praga, the right bank suburb of Warsaw, seemed to have brought 
the revolt to an end. The Poles fell back upon Praga, and during the 
night crossed the river into Warsaw. Owing to the indecision of the 
Russian commander and the great losses of his army, the Poles 
were not pursued. After an unsuccessful attempt to persuade them 
to submit, Diebitsch retreated eastwards. 
5
 This declaration, under the title of Manifesto of the Polish Estates, is translated 
into English in the Annual Register for 1831, Chronicle, pp. 407-414. 
INTRODUCTION 29 
During the winter months of 1830/31 the end of the Polish move-
ment was generally anticipated, either brought about through 
negotiations, as seemed possible at first, or through a military 
defeat - hence the engagement at Grochów was taken for granted 
as a decisive Russian victory from the first news of the battle. Yet 
under the influence of the Polish spring offensive and of reports from 
Lithuania, from April onwards the events on the Vistula presented 
a different picture to the Western Governments. At the first news 
from Warsaw in December, 1830, the French Government was 
already in an embarrassing position with regard to Poland: 
Louis Philippe desired peace in order to stabilize his external and 
internal situation, but public opinion was loud in condemning 
the inactivity of the Government, the more so as it was generally 
believed that the Polish revolution was the main obstacle which 
prevented Nicholas from attempting to restore the old order in 
France. Nor were the French satisfied with the Government's 
Belgian policy: if a "reunion" of Belgium to France, as the extrem-
ists claimed, was not practicable, France should unconditionally 
support the Brussels authorities against dictation by the London 
Conference. But apart from confidential soundings in London 
nothing was done by the Government with regard to Poland, and, 
if the Cabinet of Laffitte, in power until March, showed a certain 
leaning towards the Poles, the improvement of their military 
position coincided with the appointment of the new moderate 
premier in France, Casimir Périer. 
English society sympathized with the Poles, but the Government 
professed itself unable to favour them politically as this would 
inevitably lead to a breach with Russia and perhaps with the other 
two Eastern Powers; being opposed to France over the Belgian 
question, Britain could not afford to lose their support. Never-
theless, some representations concerning Poland were made at St. 
Petersburg by both Western Governments. 
Austria and Prussia were opposed to the Polish revolt, both on 
account of their Polish provinces and of the repercussions in 
Germany, of which there was ample evidence. But they were not 
likely to act militarily: Vienna had to watch developments in 
Italy, which, especially during February and March, 1831, 
produced a great danger of war with France; and besides, since the 
Greek crisis, Metternich was not easy about his relations with St. 
Petersburg. The Prussian Government still feared for the fate of its 
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Western possessions, being moreover vitally interested in the ulti-
mate settlement of the frontiers of Belgium, where important 
strategic positions might fall in the hands of its potential enemies. 
The agitation in Belgium and the fear of annexationist ambitions 
of France brought the Conference in June to concessions for the 
benefit of the Belgians: the "Bases de séparation" having been 
abandoned, a new project was drawn up which provided for the 
possibility of assigning Luxemburg to Belgium. This project - the 
X V I I I Articles of 25th June, 1831, - was accepted by the Belgians, 
and Prince Leopold, having shortly before accepted the Belgian 
crown, went to Brussels in July. 
After the completion of these negotiations the main obstacle to 
a more active interest of France and Britain in the affairs of Poland 
seemed to have been removed. The Poles had in the meantime 
sustained a major defeat at Ostrolenka on 25th May, but the 
Russian army was suffering considerably from cholera, lack of 
provisions and desertions ; early in June Diebitsch died. The con-
tinuance of Polish resistance was in itself an argument for Polish 
success and it was supplemented by the rising in Lithuania, the 
extent of which remained fairly obscure. Following constant 
representations by Polish agents, who, though not enjoying diplo-
matic status, were in contact with Western Ministers, both Britain 
and France protested in Berlin against Prussia's breach of neutrality in 
the Polish war by help of various kinds afforded to the Russian army. 
Similar protests were made in Vienna with regard to the internment 
of a Polish corps which took refuge on Austrian territory. These 
representations, however, carried little weight since they were 
accompanied, or followed, by the news that the French démarche to 
Britain, concerning a joint diplomatic intervention at St. Petersburg 
in order to bring about a suspension of hostiUties on the Vistula, 
had been refused. Until that time, Berlin, St. Petersburg and Vienna 
had watched with obvious anxiety the concern of the Western 
nations over the Polish war, and feared an intervention, perhaps 
of a more serious character. 
Before it could be judged whether this refusal was absolute, the 
situation in the West changed entirely: the King of the Netherlands, 
who long before had shown offence at the lenient attitude of the 
Conference towards Belgian resistance, appeared to be freshly 
stimulated in his annoyance by the concessions made to the Belgians 
as well as by the usurpation of the throne in what he considered to 
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be the southern part of his dominions; on 2nd August the Royal 
troops renewed hostilities. Had it not been for the French armed 
intervention, with great reluctance approved by the Conference, 
Belgium might well have been overrun by Dutch troops within a few 
weeks. Since, rightly or wrongly, the French considered themselves 
bound to protect Belgium by the prolonged presence of their forces 
in that country, new problems were created both for the French 
and for the British Government. At the same time, the Polish 
movement was slowly expiring. The military action was brought 
almost to a standstill - partly at least under the influence of news 
from France of an alleged diplomatic intervention, which would 
make an unsuccessful military engagement especially dangerous — 
and the whole movement was virtually brought to an end by the 
taking of Warsaw on 8th September, 1831. 
Almost simultaneously the French gave way in the matter of 
withdrawing their army from Belgium. The project of a setdement 
between Holland and Belgium was then revised once more; it 
turned in favour of Holland when compared to the X V I I I Articles 
of June , though it was much less favourable to this country than 
were the January "Bases de séparation". This new project, the 
X X I V Articles, was accepted by the Belgians conscious of their 
defeat, and the Conference signed the Treaty with the King of the 
Belgians on 15th November, 1831. But the King of the Netherlands 
was still not disposed to agree, and it soon appeared that for this 
reason the Emperor of Russia would not agree either. On hearing 
of St. Petersburg's decision both the Austrian and Prussian Govern-
ments withdrew their consent; the situation resembled that of a 
year earlier, when the two Powers, but especially Metternich, 
regretted their early recognition of Louis Philippe after learning 
that Nicholas was against it. Eventually, by the time prescribed, 
only France and Britain presented their ratifications. 
The object of the present work is to describe the consecutive 
relevant stages of the international situation, as far as the two 
revolutionary movements, in Belgium and Poland, were concerned, 
and as far as the one influenced the attitude of the Powers towards 
the other. No comprehensive survey of events in either country is 
given, not even of the diplomatic history of the two movements : 
these are subjects in themselves and the reader is referred to the 
note on sources and to the bibliography. As far as Poland is con-
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cerned, no attempt is made to correct all the diplomatic informa-
tion quoted, unless it is too obviously in conflict with the facts as 
known: it was this information, correct or not, which inspired the 
movements of the diplomats. Similarly, no reference is made to the 
Press, which again would involve research out of all proportion 
with the scope of this study. Since, however, there is no compre-
hensive monograph on the diplomacy and on the repercussions 
abroad of the Polish revolution, some general observations are 
necessary. 
The Press in France and in Britain, as well as in Germany and 
elsewhere, was pro-Polish, and therefore likely to exaggerate any 
information in favour of the Poles. It seems that it was quite a 
powerful factor in their favour, since there was little 6 or no official 
and reliable information from Poland. On the other hand, there 
was plenty of information about Poland. During 1831 news con-
cerning Poland constituted the greater part of diplomatic reports 
from Vienna, Berlin and St. Petersburg; this was especially true in 
the case of Chad, the British Minister in the Prussian capital. I t is 
impossible to assume that the private opinions of the writers did not 
influence the selection of the sources on which they based their 
reports. 
Since all diplomatic activity with regard to Poland had to be very 
confidential, as the Kingdom was Nicholas' concern only, the 
personal relations of those who might strongly influence the proceed-
ings one way or the other were of a more than usual importance. 
A review of the people concerned may conveniently start with 
Berlin. Of all the Powers Prussia was most interested in a solution 
of both the Polish and the Belgian questions; one reason was her 
common frontiers with the two countries. The King, whose chief 
aim, after more than thirty years of a troublesome reign, was to keep 
clear of all troubles, might well be expected to lend a willing ear to 
propositions tending to promote peace. I t seemed even possible 
that he would be prepared to sacrifice his new Rhenish provinces to 
this end. "Si les Français ne vont que jusqu'au Rhin", he is reported 
to have said, "je ne bouge pas." 7 If this was not exactly the view 
of his closest advisers, there was a war party in Prussia as well, and 
Ancillon, the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, seemed to side 
with it. Members of the diplomatic corps complained about the 
• There were Prussian, French and Austrian consuls in Warsaw. 
7
 A. Débidour, Histoire diplomatique de l'Europe, 1815-1878, 1919, I, 275. 
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effects of the illness of the more statesmanlike Minister Bernstoff, 
for whom Ancillon frequently deputised, withholding at times 
quite simple and otherwise available information. The French and 
British missions in the Prussian capital were led by men of little 
influence, Mortier, the nephew of the Napoleonic Marshal, and 
Mr. George William Chad, a country gentleman brought into the 
diplomatic service by the Duke of Wellington, who himself had 
no very high opinion of his protégé.8 
When Palmerston took over the Foreign Office, he and Grey 
immediately began to plan the removal of the Tory diplomats, but 
the necessary delay in effecting this change lasted beyond the year 
1831. Lord Heytesbury was kept in St. Petersburg at Nicholas' 
request, and it will be seen that Palmerston believed that this might 
be more effective in Polish affairs than to bring in a man perhaps 
not entirely to the taste of the Russian capital. Yet both Heytesbury 
and Lord Cowley, the Ambassador in Vienna, the former perhaps 
not versatile enough for the delicate task assigned to him with 
regard to Poland, showed none of the aversion which the most 
liberal Whig Minister Lord Holland kept for the Belgians; on the 
contrary, Heytesbury's aversion to Russia would have made him 
sympathetic toward the Poles,· had it not been for his concern 
with the Belgian poUcy of France. 
French diplomats in the three Eastern capitals were not likely to 
achieve much for the Polish cause. To begin with, being a French-
man from Orleanist Paris in itself constituted a liability. Maison, 
who had to leave the Foreign Ministry having hardly taken office, 
only succeeded, through his colleague at Constantinople, in creating 
a major diplomatic incident. Mortemart on a special mission to 
Nicholas was anxious to avoid war, but he and Flahaut, on a similar 
mission in Berlin, might have done better, were it not for the 
renewal of hostilities in the Low Countries. Bourgoing and Mortier 
were Chargés d'affaires, without special position; the former, more-
over, was much impressed with Russian strength. 
All these considerations are to be borne in mind in an examina-
tion of what appears to be the diplomatic failure of the Polish 
8
 Little is known about Chad. Cf. The Conversations of the First Duke of Wellington 
with George William Chad, edited by the 7th Duke of Wellington, 1956. 
8
 Cf. Heytesbury's opinion on the Polish revolution in his dispatch of 20th 
December, 1830, F. O. Russia; also Mortemart to Sebastiani, 4 June, A.é. 
Russie. 
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revolution. A number of facts already established may be summa-
rized beforehand. There existed a strong tendency at St. Petersburg 
to press at almost all costs the legitimate cause of the House of 
Orange in Belgium. The outbreak of the revolution in Poland led to 
the first step towards Belgian independence: the London Protocol 
of 20th December, 1830. Though tied up for the time being by 
Warsaw events, the three Eastern Powers maintained a fairly strong 
line as regards Belgian developments throughout the winter of 
1830/31, supported by the general anticipation of a Polish defeat, 
but above all, by Britain; Britain had been opposed to armed 
intervention, but now she gave the lead in opposing the French 
candidate to the Belgian throne. But the prolongation of the 
revolution and some successes of the Poles increased the intrac-
tability of the Belgians, and made the Eastern Powers unable to 
prevent concessions being made to the Brussels authorities. Contrary 
to expectation, the King of the Netherlands had recourse to arms in 
defence of his rights ; the Conference summoned at his request had 
abandoned his cause. William's determined action prejudiced both 
the willingness and the ability of the more or less friendly Western 
Governments to try to prevent the defeat of the Poles, which followed 
in September, 1831. After the termination of the Polish contest 
the Eastern Powers adopted a stronger attitude and contributed 
much to the advantage of the Dutch in the new negotiations, but 
the King of the Netherlands refused his consent to the new proposals. 
It was known that Russia was very much exhausted by the Polish 
war and would be unable to support William I's claims. But 
Nicholas not only considerably delayed his ratification of the 
Treaty, but also made Prussia and Austria delay theirs. Circum-
stances created by the negotiations on the fortress question were 
such that this delay alone - seen, moreover, as a refusal - caused 
much irritation in London and Paris. 
CHAPTER I 
R U S S I A , T H E R E C O G N I T I O N O F 
L O U I S P H I L I P P E A N D T H E B E G I N N I N G O F 
T H E B E L G I A N R E V O L U T I O N 
After the establishment of the Orleans monarchy in Paris Britain 
was the first of the great Powers to recognize the new state of things 
in France ; her intention to do so was known to the members of the 
diplomatic corps in London about August 20th. 
The three Powers of the Holy Alliance had to choose between 
following the example of London or maintaining the principle of 
legitimacy. As to Prussia, Frederick William I I I was most interested 
in the tranquillity of his Western provinces, and to him the govern-
ment of Louis Philippe represented a guarantee of stability in 
France. The Austrian Chancellor, being himself opposed to the 
recognition of the revolutionary throne, seemed to have yielded to 
Nesselrode's opinion, but he regretted this afterwards.1 A somewhat 
similar situation could be observed in London about this time: 
although Biilow, the Minister of Prussia, and Matuszewic, the 
Chargé d'affaires of Russia, had expressed their belief that their 
governments would recognize the new régime in France, they 
withdrew their statements on hearing of the hesitation of Prince 
Esterhazy, the Austrian Ambassador.2 
Within the first decade of September Louis Philippe was re-
cognized by his most important neighbours; he had yet to obtain 
the placet of the Emperor of Russia. The uneasy proceeding which 
led to this step, as well as the fairly hostile attitude of Nicholas 
towards the King of the French, in consequence of the Belgian 
events, is the subject of the present chapter. 
I 
The heads of the Russian missions in Paris and London were very 
much inclined to promote the establishment of friendly relations 
1
 Mettemich to Nesselrode, ι Sept., Nesselrode to Metternich, 5 Sept., 
Lettres et papiers du Comte Charles de Nesselrode, 1904-1912, VII, 151 sq. 
2
 Falck to Verstolk, 27 Aug., Falck Papers, R. Α. 
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between their Court and the Palais Royal. The part played by 
Pozzo di Borgo, the Ambassador in Paris, has been amply described 
by the French historian de Guichen.3 Matuszewic expected England 
to recognize the new régime in France ; unlike Pozzo's arguments, his 
dispatch of 5th August, in which he advocated the policy of co-
operation with England and warned against harsh measures with 
regard to the revolution, was fully approved by Nicholas.4 Never-
theless, before that, as soon as the first news from Paris reached him, 
he gave orders that Bourgoing, the French Chargé d'affaires, should 
be handed his passport and he issued restrictive regulations for 
French subjects.5 Pozzo was advised to leave the Embassy and to 
order Russians staying in France to leave the country. ' Both the 
French Chargé d'affaires and the Ambassador, anxious to reduce 
tension, ignored these instructions. At the same time Lord Heytes-
bury, the British Ambassador, had an interview with the Emperor, 
in which Nicholas showed himself disinclined to enter into the French 
internal complications, being also aware of the general unrest in 
Europe. He was uneasy "for Spain, for Italy, and, above all, for 
Belgium." " H e had received", wrote the British Ambassador, "a very 
uncomfortable letter from his brother-in-law, the Prince of Orange, 
who told him that he been taken completely by surprise and could 
not assemble his means of resistance in less than two months." 7 
Nicholas stressed these apprehensions in a letter to his brother, 
the Grand Duke Constantine; he feared that France would attempt 
to recover her old frontiers, and that this would create a very precar-
ious situation. To be ready against all eventualities, therefore, some 
military measures had been taken.8 
In London it was believed at this time that Nicholas would 
undertake nothing before consulting Nesselrode who was still in Ger-
3
 E. de Guichen, La révolution de juillet 1830 et l'Europe, 1917, pp . 107-138. 
4
 Matuszewic to Lieven, 5 Aug., F . F . Martens, Recueil des traités et conventions 
conclus par la Russie, 1874-1909, X I , 434-6, also X V , 101 (concerning Pozzo); 
the latter point is stressed by Th . Schiemann, Geschichte Russlands unter Kaiser 
Nikolaus I., 1913, H I , 13. 
6
 T h . Schiemann, "Die Sendung des Feldmarschalls Diebitsch nach Berlin, 
Sept.-Nov. 1830", Zeitschrift fur Osteuropäische Geschichte, I, (1910-1911), 5-6. 
β
 de Guichen, p . 136. 
7
 Heytesbury to Aberdeen, 20 Aug., F . O . Russia, quoted by de Guichen in 
a French translation, p p . 155-6. 
8
 Nicholas to Constantine, 18 Aug., La Correspondance de l'Empereur Nicolas 1er 
avec le Grand Duc Constantin, Transactions of the Société Impériale d'Histoire de 
Russie, Vol. 132 (1911), p . 36. Quoted as Correspondance. 
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many and who had given evidence of his pacific inclinations; having 
learnt of Heytesbury's report, however, the Netherlands Ambassa-
dor considered the Russian Emperor much more affected by events 
in Paris than it would have appeared from the attitude of his repre-
sentatives, and he therefore thought it likely that the special envoy 
of Louis Philippe would have to wait at the Russian frontier for his 
permit to enter the country.9 
A few days after Heytesbury's audience Nicholas saw the French 
Chargé d'affaires. In a long conversation Bourgoing was told that the 
recognition of Louis Philippe would be a matter for joint consid-
eration with other Powers. Following Bourgoing's plea for the 
necessity of a more liberal régime in France the Emperor made the 
following statement: "Je ferai ce queje pourrai, mais n'attendez pas 
que je sacrifie mon honneur. Le tems, l'avis des autres cours, la 
tournure que les choses prendront en France, voilà ce qui pourra 
me déterminer. Mais je le répète, je ne transigerai jamais avec mon 
honneur." Shortly afterwards measures against French subjects were 
withdrawn.10 
In the meantime, however, measures of a different kind were 
under consideration. To face a possible French expansion Nicholas 
thought it expedient to act in concert with his allies. For this pur-
pose Count Orlov, his principal aide-de-camp, and Field-Marshal 
Diebitsch, commander of the Russian forces in the late Turkish war, 
were sent respectively to Vienna and Berlin.11 
The King of Prussia apparently expected some more pronounced 
steps on the part of his son-in-law. As soon as the Paris news reached 
him he ordered a staff officer, Major von Thümen, to proceed to 
St. Petersburg with instructions to counteract any such steps. Von 
Thümen, however, failed to obtain from Prince Lieven (at that 
time deputizing for Nesselrode) even an affirmation that Louis 
Philippe would be recognized by Russia, and on 24th August the 
Prussian Minister in St. Petersburg reported that the mission of 
Diebitsch had already been decided upon. In vain did Frederick 
William order him to try and stop this expedition; two days later 
Diebitsch's instructions were signed.12 
• Falck to Verstolk, 7 Aug., 7 Sept., Falck Papers, R.A. 
10
 Bourgoing to Mole, 24 Aug., A.é. Russie; Schiemaim, Die Sendung 
Diebitschs, p. 7. 
11
 Nicholas to Constantine, 29 Aug., Correspondance, p. 46. 
12
 Schiemann, Die Sendung Diebitschs, p. 9. 
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The principal document concerning this mission, the memo­
randum, as well as covering letters and dispatches of the same 
time, all underline the same threefold theme : ι. the intention not to 
intervene in French internal affairs 2. the intention to prevent a 
French intervention elsewhere 3. the desire for unity of action of 
the three Powers and, if possible, of England as well, and for 
measured language with regard to France. Should Louis Philippe 
ask for recognition, all the Powers would inform him that this would 
be a subject for joint consideration. If a negative answer were to be 
decided upon, this should be " u n e déclaration collective mais 
conçue dans les termes les plus concilians." Lastly, "une position 
particulière" of England was mentioned, coupled with the expression 
of an anxious hope that she would join the others in this European 
question.13 
The other important document, the dispatch to Count Alopeus, 
the Russian Minister in Berlin, stated that the Imperial Cabinet ap-
proved entirely of the Carlsbad agreement and that they wanted to 
keep the unity of the three Powers in the same way as did the other 
two. The immediate result of this attitude was to make the recogni-
tion of Louis Philippe subject to joint deliberation; should the 
Powers see themselves compelled to abandon the principle of legit-
imacy, they would require from the King of the French a guarantee 
that he would recognize the territorial settlement of Vienna and the 
Protocol of Aix-la-Chapelle, of 1818, in return for their consent to 
the new state of things in France. In the meantime, he would be 
known as the lieutenant-general of the Kingdom. In view of the 
urgency and importance of the situation Field-Marshal Diebitsch 
was being sent to Berlin. The Emperor realized that the choice of 
this person might be considered as intentionally offensive, but the 
circumstances were precarious enough: only the conviction that a 
meeting of the Sovereigns themselves might produce an even worse 
impression made him abandon the idea of making such a propos-
al.1* 
11
 There is an account of the contents of this memorandum in de Guichen, 
p. і г і , reference being made to Nesselrode to Pozzo, 15 Aug. This account 
coincides with that of the Carlsbad agreement. Nesselrode, who was still in 
Germany, may have sent his draft to Pozzo and Lieven at the same time, but it 
would not be final before Nicholas' approval. 
1 4
 "Copie d'une dépêche au Comte Pozzo di Borgo en date de St. Pétersbourg 
le 18 Août", same to Matuszewic, and the Mémoire, in A.é. Russie; Lieven to 
Alopeus, 13/25 Aug., B.P.; It appears from the text that the first two are dated 
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The memorandum bears the date of 20th August, but Diebitsch 
did not leave for Berlin until 31st August, the day on which General 
Athalin, the special envoy of the King of the French, arrived in the 
Russian capital. This mission was of particular concern to Louis 
PhiUppe, who himself made alterations in Mole's draft of the letter to 
Nicholas in order to soften some expressions, and also chose his fa­
vourite aide-de-camp to be charged with it. 1 5 
The Emperor of Russia decided to receive Athalin in the capacity 
of a representative of the Lieutenant-General of France, the title 
conferred upon the Duke of Orleans by Charles Χ. 1 β The first re­
port of Athalin from St. Petersburg was not very promising. He was 
glad that his departure from France had been delayed, as the order 
allowing French travellers into Russia had reached the frontier post 
through which he had to pass only a few hours before his arrival 
there. A few days later he was seen by Lieven, who appeared fa­
vourably disposed towards the new régime in France, although he 
told Athalin that the Emperor's intention was to undertake nothing 
except by previous agreement with his allies.17 
On 6th September Nicholas received the French envoy in private 
audience. Athalin noted "une bonté et une grâce toute parti-
culière" shown to him during the interview, which lasted two hours. 
Yet Nicholas regretted that Louis Philippe did not content himself 
with the title of Lieutenant-General of the Kingdom. He most cat-
egorically denied any intention on his part to intervene in French 
affairs. He seemed pleased to hear that relations between Charles 
X and the ex-Duchess of Orleans remained the same as before 
the revolution. At the end of the audience Nicholas somewhat hesi-
tatingly informed the French envoy that an answer would probably 
not be given before at least ten days.18 
On 15th September Athalin learnt from Lieven that nothing had 
been decided as regarded the recognition of Louis Philippe by 
Russia, but that the news of the revolution in Brussels, which reached 
Berlin after the King of Prussia had resolved to recognize the 
according to the old style, unlike the Mémoire. These are some of the papers of 
the Grand Duke Constantine, seized by the Poles after the revolution in Warsaw. 
See below, p. go. 
16
 H. de Noailles, Le comte Mole, 1922-1930, V, 91 sq. 
1
' Nicholas to Constantine, 29 Aug., Correspondance, p. 46. 
17
 Athalin to Mole, 1, 4 Sept., A.é. Russie. 
18
 Athalin to Mole, 7 Sept., A.é. Russie. 
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King of the French, "est venu remettre tout en question." In Berlin, 
however, the hesitation appeared to be only slight. The news of 
Diebitsch's mission speeded the execution of the measure already 
decided upon.19 
Nesselrode arrived in St. Petersburg on 22nd September. Three 
days later he told the French Chargé d'affaires that he had passed 
through Berlin two days after the envoy of the King of the French, 
Count Lobau, left the Prussian capital "emportant la reconnais-
sance et après avoir reçu du Roi de Prusse l'accueil le plus flatteur." 
Yet Nesselrode was most non-committal with regard to the possibility 
of a similar decision on the part of his Imperial master, to whom the 
decision of his father-in-law was very displeasing. The Vice-
Chancellor had difficulty in explaining to Nicholas the necessity 
for acquiescing in the revolutionary change. Indeed, on Nessel-
rode's memorandum he wrote: "Je me rends à votre raisonnement, 
mais j 'atteste le ciel que c'est et sera toujours contre ma conscience 
et c'est un des plus pénibles efforts que j ' a ie jamais fait." According 
to the Russian historian Martens Nesselrode would not dare risking 
another step so much opposed to his master's view.21 
The first consequence of this important decision was the letter of 
the Vice-Chancellor to the Grand Duke Constantine in which he 
informed the Cesarevitch that the advice given to the French 
Consul in Warsaw, Durand, to take the oath of allegiance to the 
19
 Mortier to Mole, 4 Sept., de Guichen, p. 173; Athalin to Mole, 18 Sept., 
A.é. Russie. 
20
 Bourgoing to Mole, 26 Sept., A.é. Russie; A. Masure, "La reconnaissance 
de la monarchie de juillet", Annales de l'école des sciences politiques, 1893, pp. 83-5, 
quotes the opinion of Lobau who met Diebitsch and Nesselrode on 8 September 
at a dinner at Charlottenburg, after he had obtained the King's answer to 
Louis Philippe. Lobau ascribed to the influence of those Russian officials that 
Werther, the Prussian Chargé d'affaires, did not obtain his new credentials until 
5 October, nearly one month later. In G. E. v. Natzmer's Unter den Hohenzol-
lern. Denkwürdigkeiten aus dem Leben des Gen. Oldwig von Natzmer, 1887-g, I, 
250, this dinner is placed on 11 September. 
21
 Schiemann, Geschkhte Russlands, I II , 42; Martens, Recueil, XV, 118-119; 
G. Lacour-Gayet, Talleyrand, 1926, III , 238, believes that Talleyrand's appoint-
ment for the London Embassy made Nicholas recognize Louis Philippe, as 
Nicholas thought that Talleyrand would not associate himself with an unsteady 
régime. Reference is made to Monsieur de Talleyrand, a contemporary biography 
by the publicist C. M. Catherinet de Villemarest, I, 168, where it is said that 
Athalin was given a reply after Nicholas obtained a copy of the "Moniteur" 
which reported Talleyrand's appointment. There is no indication that this 
news influenced Nicholas; in any case, the reply to Athalin was given not two 
weeks after his arrival, as stated by de Villemarest, but another fortnight later. 
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new King had obtained the approval of his Imperial brother.22 
In the latter half of September Nicholas learnt of the progress of 
the revolution in the Netherlands and of the various revolts in 
Germany. He especially sympathized with William I. The Nether-
lands Chargé d'affaires even believed that Nicholas would therefore 
take the peace-assurances of the French Government at their face 
value and help them by recognizing Louis Philippe. This he also re-
ported to be the opinion of the British Ambassador.23 Nicholas him-
self presented a different view : writing to his brother he refused 
to believe that warlike feelings in France would be reduced by the 
recognition of Louis Philippe.24 
Accordingly, the Emperor of Russia did not conceal his real 
attitude towards the Orleans monarchy. Athalin did not obtain his 
audience of leave and in the reply which he carried with him to 
Paris the protocolar "monsieur mon Frère" was omitted, a fact 
which came quite unexpectedly to Athalin and Bourgoing, and 
deeply offended the King of the French.25 
The French Chargé d'affaires observed with uneasiness the obvious 
change in the attitude of Nicholas after the Brussels and Dresden 
riots. This observation was confirmed by Nesselrode, who also 
expressed his belief in the probability of Prussian or English troops 
being sent to Belgium.26 
The Russian representatives in Berlin, Vienna and London were 
informed that Louis Philippe was recognized after the Emperor 
had learned of his recognition by the other Courts. "Mais S.M. 
ne se dissimule point tout ce que tel encouragement, fourni à la ré-
volution peut avoir de conséquence funeste." In spite of this unfa-
vourable beginning the Emperor hoped that now appropriate 
instructions be sent by the three governments to their represent-
atives in Paris to extract from the French Government adequate 
declarations regarding its intention to respect the territorial set-
tlement of 1815.27 
î a
 Nesselrode to the Grand Duke Constantine, 29 Sept., B.P. 
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 "Les troubles survenus dans le Royaume ont vivement affecté la famille 
impériale. Il devait y avoir un bal à Yelagmine, ces tristes événemens y ont fait 
renoncer." O'Sullivan de Grass to Verstolk, 16 Sept., 22 Sept., R.A. 
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 Nicholas to Constantine, 27/8 Sept., Correspondance, p. 49. 
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 Athalin to Mole, 1 Oct., A.é. Russie; Broglie, A.L.V.C. duc de, Souvenirs, 
1886, IV, 27; cf. Martens, Recueil, XV, 124-5. 
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 Bourgoing to Mole, 2 Oct., A.é. Russie. 
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 Nesselrode to Matuszewic, Alopeus and Tatistcheff, 5 Oct., B.P. 
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I I 
If Nicholas was doubtful about the choice of his own policy, he 
soon arrived at the conviction that he had to take decisive steps 
himself. On ist October Athalin was given a favourable reply, and 
on the 12th and 13th respectively St. Petersburg learned of the fail-
ure of Prince Frederick of the Netherlands in his attempt to 
restore the King's authority in Brussels, and that Diebitsch remained 
unsuccessful in convincing the Prussian Government of the necessity 
of intervening in the Low Countries by Prussia and Russia on their 
own. Nicholas then resolved to mobilize his armed forces and to 
notify the other Powers that he felt compelled to check the revolu-
tion, and according to the Aix-la-Chapelle stipulations he offered 
his 60.000 men for joint action.28 
At the same time, as he expected the King to ask the Powers 
of the Quadruple Alliance for armed assistance, the Netherlands 
Chargé d'affaires went to enquire with Nesselrode about the views of 
the Imperial Government in this respect. The Vice-Chancellor 
assured him that the King of the Netherlands had "non seulement 
le droit de compter sur l'appui de ces puissances [signatories of the 
Alliance] mais même celui de l'exiger." Nesselrode represented this 
as the opinion of the Prussian and even of the English Courts. These 
views of the Russian Minister were also reflected in Bourgoing's 
report, with the important addition, however, that the assistance 
in question would not be asked for, "qu 'à la dernière extrémité." 29 
The Dutch representative equally noted that Lord Heytesbury 
"paraît incliner entièrement vers la guerre et la considère non pas 
comme une éventualité probable mais comme un remède néces-
saire" to uphold the social order in Europe. A prompt armed inter-
vention would enable the Powers to control the situation before France 
could assemble her forces, the other Powers being all prepared.31 
28
 Schiemann, Die Sendung Diebitschs, p. 18. 
29
 O'Sullivan de Grass to Verstolk, ia Oct., R.A.; Bourgoing to Mole, 
13 Oct., A.é. Russie. 
30
 O'Sullivan de Grass to Verstolk, 12 Oct., R.A. Yet, Heytesbury seemed 
somewhat uneasy when he reported that, according to Matuszewic's dispatch, 
"Yr. Lordship admitted the right of the King of the Netherlands to call upon 
the members of the Alliance to assist him in his endeavours to maintain existing 
engagements, and any attempt to prevent foreign interference under such circum-
stance would be a legitimate cause of war." (to Aberdeen, 13 Oct., F.O. Russia). 
A subsequent dispatch of Matuszewic, of 8 October (see Appendix I) , set the 
matter right. 
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It is worth noting that at the same time both Lord Heytesbury 
and Jonkheer O'SulIivan de Grass reported Russian military unpre-
paredness. The British Ambassador describes the spreading of 
cholera, which rendered recruiting almost impossible, and concludes : 
"Russia may almost be considered as hors de combat for the mo-
ment." His colleague does not think Russia to be fit for distant 
foreign expeditions, now less than ever. Later, he surveys the state 
of the Russian and Polish armies, pointing out that both the capital 
and the Kingdom of Poland must not be left without appropriate 
garrisons, but adds that "malgré ces considérations le comte Nessel-
rode ne paraît pas reculer devant la possibilité d'une guerre." 31 
The official request of the King of the Netherlands for military 
assistance arrived in St. Petersburg on 15th October. The Emperor 
was eager to comply with it. " . . .ce qui est hors de doute", he 
wrote to his brother, "c'est qu'il faut se mettre sur pied de guerre". 
Accordingly, he advised the Grand Duke as to the choice of the 
officer to be left in charge of the part of the Polish army which was 
to be left in Warsaw. At the recommendation of Nesselrode the 
answer to King William's request was delayed until the arrival of 
news from other Courts, but Nicholas did not change his mind when 
he learnt of their attitude - he was determined either to make them 
follow his example or "himself suffer an honourable defeat". Future 
development he took quite seriously: "Ce n'est pas la Belgique que 
je crois combattre là-bas", he wrote on the margin of Nesselrode's 
report, "c'est la révolution générale qui de proche au proche et plus 
vite qu'on ne le pense, nous menace nous -mêmes, si l'on nous voit 
trembler devant." 32 
The official letter to William I informed him of the mobilization 
of troops, but declined any isolated Russian steps which Nicholas 
considered excluded by the very fact that the King had applied to 
all four Courts.33 
Nesselrode seemed to have taken a less serious view: the interven-
tion in the Netherlands need not mean war. In the words of the 
Dutch representative, Nesselrode believed "que la France, qui se 
31
 O'SulIivan de Grass to Verstolk, 12 Oct., R.A.; Heytesbury to Aberdeen: 
" . . . and the Polish army . . . would be of a very doubtful fidelity if opposed to 
an army of the French." 18 Oct., F.O. Russia. 
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 Schiemann, Die Sendung Diebitschs, p. 19; Nicholas to Constantine, 
18 Oct., Correspondance, p. 55; Martens, Recueil, VIII , 166. 
33
 Nicholas to William I, 25 Oct., Ged., I l l , 404. 
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sera levée en masse contre une invasion, restera paisible lorsqu'il 
s'agira d'une attaque." Hence the Vice-Chancellor would welcome 
the landing of a British army in the Netherlands, a landing which 
would not be opposed by the French as they feared a rupture with 
England. Nesselrode knew that that could only be a small detach-
ment, "que c'est de la Prusse que doit venir le nombre, mais que 
l'effet moral serait très s a lu t a i r e . . . " This proposition was included 
in the instructions to Lieven and Matuszewic, together with the 
offer of 60.000 men by Russia.34 
A somewhat doubtful point concerning the advance of Russian 
military preparations, is whether Nicholas also informed the Prus-
sian King of his intention of embarking immediately 10.000 men for 
Belgium. The Netherlands Minister in Berlin regretted to inform 
The Hague that Frederick William I I I lost no time in sending a 
special courier to his son-in-law with an urgent request to stop 
this expedition. The incident, however, is reported neither by 
Martens nor by Schiemann.35 
In the meantime the succession of events in the Southern Nether-
lands perhaps furnished some material for reflection in the Russian 
capital. St Petersburg was kept fully informed of the course which 
the Royal Government had adopted. To the Russian Minister at 
The Hague the situation presented a pretty grim picture. He re-
presented the cause of the House of Orange as very precarious 
and did not approve of the expedition of the Prince of Orange to 
Antwerp, nor of the re-installation of the Minister Van Maanen, un-
popular in the South, the two steps being contrary to one another. 
No success, he believed, could be expected from the establishment of 
a centre of government in Antwerp, in opposition to that of Brus-
sels, because the dominating trends in Belgium were definitely 
hostile to the House of Orange. Whatever chances the Prince of 
Orange in Antwerp might have, were spoilt by the King, who 
withdrew his son's powers. Incidentally, the Prince himself wrote 
to his Imperial brother-in-law as if he hardly saw a way out of his 
situation. Gourieff, however, tried to comfort him by referring to 
the possibility of an armed intervention of the Powers, a possibility 
not excluded, he wrote, from the last instructions Talleyrand had 
received. This would, of course, be something entirely different 
31
 O'SuIlivan de Grass to Verstolk, 18 Oct., R.A.; Nesselrode to Matuszewic, 
13 Oct., Martens, Recueil, XI, 438. 
** de Perponcher to Verstolk, 13 Oct., R.A. 
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from the Prince's attempt in Antwerp, while the Russian Minister 
thought it wiser to remain silent about the real motive of the 
British Government in abstaining from such a solution, its internal 
weakness, although he must have been familiar with this through 
his correspondence with Matuszewic. Britain did not use force, he 
wrote, because she had proposed the conference and had to wait 
until negodations reached "un certain degré de maturité." ** 
The Belgian news is reflected by Nicholas in his correspondence 
with the Grand Duke Constantine, and in Van Heeckeren's re-
port of his audience with the Emperor on 14th November. 
Nicholas was astonished that the command of the Brussels expedi-
tion was given to a Royal Prince (i.e., Prince Frederick), and 
equally surprised, that the powers given to Prince of Orange 
confidentially were later withdrawn publicly, indeed to the aston-
ishment of all the foreign governments. Nesselrode too pointed out the 
inadvisability of the restoration of Van Maanen.37 
The autumn months of 1830 witnessed some confusion both about 
the views of the Court of St. Petersburg abroad, and vice-versa, 
caused not only by the distance between the Russian capital and 
those of the other countries, but chiefly by earlier opinions of Nessel-
rode, Pozzo and Matuszewic in contrast with those of Diebitsch. 
Whatever Nesselrode might have said in Berlin before his return to 
Russia, Diebitsch wrote on 8th September, having scarcely 
arrived, that the Prussian King wholly shared in the apprehensions 
of a general war and therefore wished him to open talks with 
Generals Witzleben and Krauseneck "au sujet d'une action mili-
taire commune contre la France." Subsequently, before even the 
recognition of Louis Philippe by Russia was known in Berlin, it was 
reported that Diebitsch had moderated his views under the in-
fluence of the Prussian statesmen. Again, slightly later, the Russain 
Minister in Berlin informed his Court that "le gouvernement prus-
sien était persuadé qu'une guerre européenne était inévitable." 38 
A more modest and matter-of-fact statement is delivered by the 
Russian Minister in The Hague : "Je crains bien que l'hésitation que 
a
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les puissances témoignent à intervenir dans la Belgique ne leur devien-
ne funeste. Elles veulent éviter la guerre et délibèrent, la France se 
fortifie de progrès de la propagande." This is Britain's fault as 
London is influenced by Talleyrand. "Si dans le premier moment 
l'Angleterre s'était déclarée avec force, je ne puis pas en douter que 
la France se serait résignée à l'intervention aussi dans les affaires de 
la Belgique." Unlike on later occasions, there is here a marked 
coincidence of views with those of St. Petersburg itself.39 
This situation found an echo in the observations made by the 
Western diplomats as well. Early in October Talleyrand believed 
that, Prussia and Austria having made no promises of armed 
assistance to the King of the Netherlands, it was most likely that 
Russia would follow the same course. News from England, where 
Charles X was reported to have obtained an unlimited credit with 
an Edinburgh banker which was attributed to the support of the 
Russian Emperor, soon made the French Ambassador consider the 
situation in less bright colours. Not only the Emperor of Russia "ne 
voit que l'emploi de la force pour arrêter l'envahissement des doc-
trines de désordre", but there is also a war party in Prussia, ob-
served the Ambassador. "C'est une époque critique que les évé-
nements de Belgique ont bien compliquée." 40 
Talleyrand believed that Metternich was for peace, but this was 
not exactly the case. Much in the same way as Nicholas, the Austrian 
Chancellor deplored the lack of a uniform attitude of the Powers 
towards Louis Philippe. When at the end of August he learned of the 
Russian measures against French subjects, he was very much 
surprised as they did not conform to the letter of the "chiffon"; but 
he followed, though with some hesitation, the example given by 
Prussia and approved by Nesselrode. When, however, it became 
known that Nicholas was against the recognition of the Orleans 
King, he "again lamented that Count Nesselrode had not consented 
to suspend all measures relating to France until the great Continen-
tal Powers determined upon some definite plan for their guidance." 
Nevertheless, both the Chancellor and the Austrian Ambassador 
39
 Gourieffto Nesselrode, 19 Oct. , Ged., I l l , 410. 
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in Paris adopted an uncompromising attitude with regard to the 
French Government.41 
I l l 
In the meantime there was a new development in Belgian affairs. 
The provisional authorities in Brussels declared Belgium independ-
ent and summoned a congress to work out a frame of government 
for the new state. In London on 4th November a conference of the 
representatives of the five Powers assembled with a view to a settle-
ment for the Netherlands, an armistice being considered to be the 
first task. The Russian Chargé d'affaires, Matuszewic, took part in this 
meeting, a step later approved by the Imperial Cabinet.42 But 
GouriefF in The Hague observed disapprovingly that, apart from 
military considerations, the proposal of adopting the old frontier 
line between the Dutch Republic and the Austrian Netherlands as 
a demarcation line for the armistice, embodied by the Conference 
in its first protocol, might easily create the impression as if it con-
cerned two distinct political units.43 
The Russian government was far from accepting this view. 
They regretted that the English government renounced - at least for 
the time being - the idea of armed intervention and proposed a con-
ference to which France was also to be a party. The Vice-Chancel-
lor's dispatch of 31st October surveys the difficulties connected with 
this project, stressing: "que cette négociation, loin de décider 
immédiatement la question principale, celle de la soumission des 
insurgés de la Belgique, ne fait que l'ajourner; qu'elle absorbera un 
tems précieux qu'il aura été essentiel d'employer efficacement; 
qu'elle mettra les rebelles à même de consolider leur coupable en-
treprise, fournira un funeste encouragement aux révolutionnaires des 
autres pays et ajoutera ainsi aux difficultés et obstacles que nous 
aurons à combattre lorsqu'en dernière analyse il sera d'un commun 
accord jugé indispensable de faire intervenir la force des armes." 44 
11
 F. von Gentz, Tagebücher, 1920, p . i86; Cowley to Aberdeen, 9 Sept., to 
Palmerston, 19 D e c , F .O . Austria. The latter dispatch, from which the quota-
tion is taken, surveys Austrian policy with regard to France from the beginning 
of the Ju ly revolution. 
42
 Nesselrode to Lieven, 30 Nov., Ged., I l l , 426. 
43
 Gourieff to Nesselrode, 11 Nov., Ged., I l l , 421. 
44
 Nesselrode to Matuszewic, 31 Oct., Ged., I l l , 412, reprinted from the 
Mémoires of Talleyrand, I I I , 363. T h e editor of the Gedenkstukken corrected the 
apparent error of Talleyrand (or de Broglie's), who had repeated the original 
date, 19 October (old style). 
4 8 RUSSIA AND THE BELGIAN REVOLUTION 
Nevertheless, for the sake of unity among the Powers, the Emperor 
acceded to the idea of the conference, its aim being described as "la 
pacification du Royaume des Pays Bas, moyennant un changement 
dans les conditions de l'union de la Belgique avec la Hollande, mais 
avec le maintien de l'intégrité de cet Etat sous la domination de la 
maison d 'Orange." The settlement arrived at would be supported 
by the four Powers, and "quelle que soit d'ailleurs l'opposition de la 
France, elles emploieront même la force des armes, s'il était néces-
saire, pour mettre l'engagement convenu à l'exécution." The in-
structions for Matuszewic mention further the objections which 
may be raised by France and which should be met with an adequate 
answer. Lastly, the Russian Government feels that, if Britain "se 
voit hors d'agir à présent," it is essential that she use the time devot-
ed to the negotiations for improving her armed forces.45 
For the rest, it seemed that the Imperial Cabinet hoped that Britain 
might, if she would not join the intervention, at least not oppose it.4· 
To GouriefF Nesselrode put the case even more clearly. The 
Emperor is prepared to offer to the King of the Netherlands mil-
itary assistance. "Pour sa part, l 'Empereur est tellement pénétré 
de cette conviction, qu'il n'a point hésité . . . même à ordonner dès 
à présent, ainsi qu'il en informe S.M. [Néerlandaise], la réunion 
d'une armée, qui sera prête de franchir les frontières de l'Empire 
dès que sa coopération sera jugée nécessaire." This step is, however, 
delayed by the conference now to be held, while the King of the 
Netherlands himself appears to be trying other means to appease his 
Southern subjects. Both measures, the project of the Lieutenant-
Generalship of the Prince of Orange in Belgium as well as the 
Conference itself "n'offrent malheureusement que peu d'espoir de 
succès." Nevertheless Nicholas would act in common with the other 
Powers; only the "étrange prétention du gouvernement français" to 
oppose all armed intervention would never be admitted.47 
46
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Bourgoing as usual pictured the situation in brighter colours. The 
Russian Government welcomed the Conference because, as Nessel-
rode had told him, St. Petersburg being too far away from the the-
atre of events, no proper judgment about their development and 
consequences could be formed. Yet, according to the Vice-Chan-
cellor, the main problem to be solved by the conference was: the 
maintenance of the rights of the House of Nassau, as well as the 
maintenance of the political connection between the two parts of the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands. The possibility of an armed interven-
tion, regretted the French Charge d'affaires, however distant, "n'est 
point, toutefois, perdue de vue." 48 
On 8th November the Netherlands Minister, Baron van Heecke-
ren, to whom Bourgoing ascribed considerable influence with the 
Russian Court, returned to St. Petersburg after two months spent in 
Holland, and two days later went to see Nesselrode.49 
The Vice-Chancellor began his interview by pointing out that in 
his opinion only an armed intervention could restore order in the 
Belgian provinces, but the course of events rendered the isolated 
action of one Power impossible. He nevertheless believed that the 
Conference should open by declaring that its members were pre-
pared " à faire respecter leur décision par la force des armes." If 
France were to oppose such a declaration or measures undertaken 
as its result, it could only be considered as a declaration of war. 
Russia would take that risk, and the Imperial Government believed 
in the concurrence of its allies, including England, as all reports 
from London confirmed Wellington's intention of keeping to the 
letter of the treaties.80 
In his two following dispatches the Netherlands Minister tried 
to give an appreciation of Russian preparedness. Nicholas had 
declared to him that all decisions taken in London should be support-
ed by military force; he added that he had given evidence of this 
determination by ordering that publicity be given to the announce-
ment of the Russian mobilization.61 The Emperor further believed 
that all his allies, Wellington, "ce plus timide de tous", included, 
shared this opinion. "Si nous avions partout des amis aussi chauds 
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que les Russes", observed the Dutch Minister, "nos affaires seraient 
bien plus avancées." Б 2 He did not, however, omit to report less 
favourable circumstances. He gave a lengthy description of an 
incident between Polish and Russian officers in a Warsaw the­
atre, with the anxious comment that even the smallest spark was 
likely to cause a blaze. Fortunately, van Heeckeren thought, the 
Grand Duke Constantine caused all the officers concerned, Polish 
and Russian, to be arrested.8 3 
Bourgoing at this time considered the military preparations all 
over Europe. "Les affaires de France en elles-mêmes n'ont jamais donné 
à personne l'idée d'une intervention armée," he wrote, "mais à plusieurs 
reprises la tournure que prenaient les choses en Belgique en a fait 
aborder la possibilité". This was particularly true with regard to 
Emperor Nicholas. The French Charge d'affaires reviewed the in-
creasing difficulties which Nicholas would experience in trying to 
assemble an army of 150.000 to 200.000 men, which he had promised 
as the Russian contingent in case of a general war. Yet, "pour qui 
connaît le caractère personnel de l'Empereur, il ne peut s'élever 
aucun doute sur la certitude de le voir persévérer dans ce qu'il a 
promis de faire, quelque grand que puisse devenir le sacrifice." 5 1 
It should be added to these remarks that Nicholas was not 
unaware of the cautious policy of the Powers who were his allies in 
a possible conflict with France, and of the attitude of Frederick 
William I I I in particular. The King of Prussia could very eas-
ily help his cousin in the Netherlands by increasing his forces 
in Luxemburg (the capital of which, as a Federal fortress, always 
possessed a small Prussian detachment), on either King William's 
or the Federal German Diet's request, without being obliged to ask 
the consent of the other Powers. But the Berlin Government, aware 
of the disapproval of Russian re-armament not only by France but 
also by Britain, thought it wise to refuse any measures which might 
be considered warlike; this was regretted by Nicholas who thought 
that even the occupation of Maastricht, in agreement with The 
Hague, would not require the consent of the other Powers. 5S 
The embarrassing mission of Diebitsch in Berlin continued and its 
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echoes made their way to Paris and London. There was no doubt 
in Paris that the Russian envoy was negotiating some decisive step 
with regard to France, and though it was believed that he would be 
influenced by the more moderate attitude of the Prussian Govern-
ment, the news of re-armament in Russia could not fail to alarm 
France. Firstly, Prussian good offices were to be employed to get to 
know, if the Russian armaments "annoncent de projets sérieux de 
guerre ou seulement intention de prendre une attitude militaire 
propre à donner à la Russie plus d'influence dans les affaires des 
Pays Bas." The French representative in the Russian capital was 
also instructed to get information on the subject but carefully to 
avoid creating the impression of demanding explanations "plutôt 
qu 'un désir bien naturel de s'éclairer sur des faits qui doivent 
attirer si vivement notre attention." This was not all that trou-
bled the French Government; Talleyrand also observed the in-
creasing danger to peace in the intrigues of Metternich, whereas 
Diebitsch had dealings of his own with the Prussian war party.56 
Eventually, the direction of Russian policy seemed irrevocably 
established when the official news of the Russian mobilization spread 
in the West. By that time, the end of November, 1830, the French 
Government had already made various efforts to calm down nation-
al exasperation in Belgium. Louis Philippe may have realized that 
the revolution in Belgium undermined his throne, yet he could not 
prevent the French supporting the Belgians in every possible way.57 
This was not the unanimous opinion of the contemporaries : there 
were diplomats in Paris who maintained that the French Govern-
ment would be able to control its unruly subjects in case of a British 
landing in the Southern Netherlands, a landing which could have a 
salutary effect on the developments there.68 The British Government, 
however, was not prepared to take this course. Further proof, there-
fore, was required from the French Government, if it wanted its 
neutrality to be believed, while in the meantime the Powers would 
5e
 Maison to Mortier, ig Nov., to Bourgoing, 22 Nov., A.é. Prusse, A.é. Russie; 
Tal leyrand to Maison, 20 Nov., Pallain, p . 86. 
57
 For the par t taken by the French agents in the early stages of the Belgian 
revolution see R .E . Dinger Hatt ink, De Brusselsche opstand, 1930. T h e opposing 
opinions on this controversial question are once more reviewed by Professor 
Demoulin in "L'influence française sur la naissance de l 'Etat belge", Revue 
historique, C C X X I I I (1960), p . 13. 
58
 Fagel to Verstolk, 4, 8 Oct. , Gerretson, I I , 364; K. Hillebrand, Geschichte 
Frankreichs, 1878, notes on pp . 144-6. 
52 RUSSIA AND THE BELGIAN REVOLUTION 
behave as if France was not neutral. This was the meaning of the 
answer given by Nesselrode to Bourgoing on the latter's enquiring 
what was the purpose of the Russian mobilization. The Vice-
Chancellor turned the question to the corresponding movements in 
France and elsewhere, but, moreover, to the troublesome presence 
in Belgium "d'une multitude de Français, publiquement recrutés à 
Paris." A public disavowal of this proceeding by the Government 
was required, Nesselrode said.69 
Before this report reached Paris, further concessions were made 
by the French Government for the sake of foreign relations. Thus 
Marshal Maison, only just installed in the Foreign Ministry, was 
replaced by Count Sebastiani, and the new Minister made a special 
effort to prevent the vote of exclusion of the House of Orange by the 
Belgian Congress.60 
So far the French Government could congratulate itself: the 
establishment of the London Conference put off the danger of im-
mediate intervention in Belgium. But this did not necessarily mean 
the dissolution of the union between the Southern and Northern 
Netherlands, as loudly claimed by public opinion in France; nor 
did the Conference in its first protocol make any provision for 
special treatment of Bouillon and Marienbourg, two places lost by 
France after the "Hundred Days", whose reunion with France was 
equally part of the current public demand. The occupation of these 
places, incorporated by King William in the Grand Duchy of 
Luxemburg, whether effected by the Prussian troops, as proposed 
by the German Federal Diet, or by others would produce the worst 
of impressions in France, whilst moreover "les députés du duché de 
Luxembourg qui assistent au congrès [de Belgique] sont tous des 
orangistes zélés", as Sebastiani observed. 
All these matters were present in his mind, when he regretfully 
stated that in the present circumstances, the French Government 
was yet bound to support the candidature of the Prince of Orange for 
the Belgian throne. He surveyed the state of affairs in Belgium and 
*· Van Heeckeren to Verstolk, ю Nov., R.A.; Bourgoing to Mole, n Nov., 
A.é. Russie. 
*
0
 Mole to de Barante, 17 Nov. : "Le Maréchal Maison est outré et on illumine 
à l'Ambassade de France à Londres et à celle de Londres à Paris. Quant à la 
Russie et son ambassadeur, il faut chercher la mesure de leur satisfaction dans les 
colonnes des "Moniteurs" renfermant la politique du général Sebastiani." 
P. de Barante, •Souven:», 1890-1901, IV, 15. The rôle of Maison in the Guilleminot 
affair will be shown in Chapters III and IV, see below, p. 98 and 14г. 
RUSSIA AND THE BELGIAN REVOLUTION 53 
concluded that there was a possibility of the Prince's success, where-
as there was none for putting forward the candidature of a French 
prince. Before, however, Sebastiani was able to close his dispatch to 
Talleyrand he received word that the Belgian Congress was inclined 
to pronounce the vote of exclusion of the House of Nassau.91 
This the French Government could not allow to happen: the 
other Powers were sure to intervene in such a case. A special 
envoy, Langsdorff, was sent off immediately to Brussels with 
instructions to make the Belgians understand "que cette déclara-
tion . . . serait une mesure imprudente, impolitique et tellement 
grave que leur indépendance même s'en trouverait compromise. . . . 
La guerre serait la suite presque inévitable d 'un acte aussi décisive 
et la France ne veut pas y être entraînée malgré elle." e2 
Langsdorff's mission did not prevail : on 24th November the vote 
of exclusion was passed in Brussels. But the effort of the French 
Government had not been made in vain, Talleyrand thought; the 
other Powers did notice it. The Ambassador's views were, however, 
not optimistic : a few days earlier he observed "L'Europe est certaine-
ment, en ce moment, dans un état de crise. Eh bien, l'Angleterre est 
la seule puissance, qui, comme nous, veuille franchement la paix." e3 
Sebastiani had read this opinion when he set himself the task of ap-
peasing St. Petersburg in a squeer way, by means of his instructions 
to Bourgoing, dated ist December. Langsdorff's mission was first 
to be discounted. The vote of the Belgian Congress is qualified as 
"une décision fâcheuse", which "d 'autant plus [a] affligé le Roi qu'il 
s'était efforcé de la prévenir et qu'il n 'a cessé de faire des voeux 
sincères pour l'élection d'un prince de la famille de Nassau." The 
main theme of the dispatch is, however, the Russian mobilization, 
which is commented on in a tone varying from apologetic reproof to 
astonishment. The re-armament of France's neighbours might be 
explained by their anxiety with regard to developments in France, 
but this argument would not be valid for Russia, safe through her 
distant situation, unless the assumption was made that a new anti-
French coalition was being created. The French Government hoped 
that Emperor Nicholas would save Europe from the horrors of a new 
war; similarly France would do all "ce qui sera compatible avec 
l'honneur et la dignité de la France" for the same purpose. 
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If the above reasoning differed form what used to be the official 
French attitude towards Russia, the remainder of this dispatch was 
nothing else but a threat : 
"Nous aimons, d'ailleurs, nous en rapporter à l'assurance, qui 
nous a été exprimée par M. de Nesselrode, que les armemens de la 
Russie n'annonçaient aucun projet d'attaquer la France. Mais de 
même qu'il vous a dit que ces armemens ne seraient destinés contre 
nous que du moment où les armées françaises dépasseraient nos 
frontières, vous voudrez bien, Monsieur, lui déclarer aussi, que, si 
les armées russes quitteront leur territoire pour entrer en Prusse ou 
dans tout autre Etat de l'Allemagne, la France alors se verrait 
forcée de regarder l'état de paix comme rompu et n'aurait plus de 
prendre conseil que de son honneur et ses intérêts." 
The comment with which the French Chargé d'affaires is instructed 
to supplement his momentous declaration adds but little, if anything, 
in the way of softening it : 
" . . .ce ne sont nullement des menaces que nous voulons faire 
entendre, qu 'un semblable langage nous est naturellement inspiré 
par un caractère de franchise qui ne se démentira jamais par un 
ferme désir de prévenir tout ce qui pourrait troubler ou compro-
mettre la paix. La politique du Roi est toute de vérité et de bonne 
foi, et l'on peut être fermement persuadé en Russie que la tranquilli-
té générale est le plus cher de nos voeux." 64 
It is difficult to assume that this step of the French Government 
could have passed in St. Petersburg without causing a major 
upheaval, and, indeed, perhaps sealing the Emperor's determina-
tion. As it happened, the dispatch arrived in the Russian capital 
when circumstances had entirely changed. 
Towards the end of November Nesselrode seemed satisfied with 
the course of events around the Belgian question. He spoke approv-
ingly of the first pronouncements of the French cabinet which took 
office on 2nd November. The opening of the British Parliament gave 
rise to the following comment: "Si le duc de Wellington se main-
tient au Ministère, on ne doute pas que l'Angleterre ne consente à 
intervenir à main armée, si les révoltés de Belgique refusent de se 
soumettre aux décisions des conférences de Londres." This state-
ment carried some weight as in his instructions to Lieven (at that 
time en route to London) the Vice-Chancellor expressed his belief 
Sebastiani to Bourgoing, ι Dec, A.é. Russie. 
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that Wellington's government, "une fois engagé dans une inter-
vention collective" - which term probably denoted the London 
Conference only - could not, "malgré les doctrines professées en 
Angleterre", refuse his share in all measures which the pacification 
of Belgium would render indispensable. Unfortunately there was a 
possibility of Grey's entering the Government, in which case armed 
intervention was almost impossible. This opinion was written after 
Grey had actually taken office.'5 
The Imperial Cabinet maintained their views on the solution of 
the Belgian problem. In view of the information that the French 
Government inclined towards the complete independence of Bel-
gium, with a separate crown, Nesselrode told the Netherlands Minis-
ter that new instructions were being sent to Lieven which distinctly 
forbade him to consent to such an arrangement. These instructions 
indeed were clear-cut: "la seule combinaison admissible. . . serait 
que la Belgique eût un gouvernement séparé de celui des provinces 
Hollandaises, mais soumis au même sceptre ; que le Roi continuât à 
rester souverain des deux pays, et que l'héritier de la couronne de-
vient son lieutenant dans les provinces du midi." β β 
O n this subject the French Charge d'affaires had a difficult inter­
view with Nesselrode. The Vice-Chancellor continually returned 
to the idea of supporting the Prince in the Southern provinces by 
force of arms. Yet Bourgoing found the feeling in St. Petersburg 
less hostile to France. The French reply to the Russian projects for 
a settlement in the Netherlands was well received. Moreover, Nessel­
rode himself gave evidence of an accommodating attitude by request­
ing Bourgoing to suppress the sentence " L a France ne renoncera 
qu'en désespoir de cause à ce moyen [i.e., the lieutenant-generalcy 
of the Prince of Orange in Belgium] de conciliation" in the copy of 
Sebastiani's dispatch which was to be presented to Nicholas. On the 
other hand, the spirit of Bourgoing's instructions remained unac-
ceptable in St. Petersburg : the Vice-Chancellor pressed Bourgoing 
to name an alternative to force for making the Belgians listen to 
projects unanimously approved by the conference. From the con-
versation on this subject which ensued, the French Chargé d'affaires 
drew the conclusion "que cette question d'un premier emploi de la 
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force, sans être entièrement abandonnée, sera du moins reléguée 
parmi les partis extrêmes auxquels on ne voudra recourir qu'après 
longue et mûre réflexion." e7 
In reality the situation seemed much more serious and the 
moment was approaching when military action would not be 
merely a menace. On i8th and 21st November respectively the 
Minister for War - for the Russian troops - and the Grand Duke 
Constantine for the troops of the Kingdom of Poland and the Western 
provinces of Russia, formerly belonging to Poland — reported to 
Diebitsch, who still stayed in Berlin, that their armies would be 
ready to march by ist January, 1831. Earlier the Secretary of State 
for the Kingdom of Poland informed the Minister of Finance in 
Warsaw of the Emperor's satisfaction with the progress of the military 
and other measures connected with the war. No marching orders, 
however, had been issued to the troops ; this would be done after the 
return of Diebitsch. " I l a ordre de se diriger à son retour de Berlin 
par Varsovie pour se concerter avec S.A.I. Mgr. le Grand Duc 
Césarevitch sur tout ce qui concerne le mouvement des armées." β β 
The Prussian king preferred to expose himself to accusations of 
sharing Diebitsch's warlike opinions rather than to let him return 
to Russia. I n spite of the Field-Marshal's renewed requests Frederick 
William kept him in Berlin. The execution of the Russian plans 
could not but end in war : if credit is to be given to Bourgoing's opin­
ion of Nicholas, the Emperor would have been able to overcome the 
opposition of the majority of his advisers who were against the war. 
But the issue did not materialize. O n 3rd December Berhn learnt 
of the outbreak of a mihtary rising in Warsaw. Diebitsch, no longer 
wanted, hurriedly left for St. Petersburg via the shorter route 
through East Prussia.69 
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CHAPTER II 
T H E O U T B R E A K OF T H E R E V O L U T I O N 
I N P O L A N D A N D T H E 
I N D E P E N D E N C E OF B E L G I U M 
It has been observed earlier that the Netherlands Minister in St. 
Petersburg, impressed no doubt by the state of affairs in other parts 
of Europe, attributed some importance to a mere incident between 
the Russian and Polish officers in a Warsaw theatre. A more serious 
matter was reported from Berlin in the latter half of November: a 
military plot had been discovered in Warsaw, followed, the report 
stated, by a most rigorous inquiry. The Netherlands Minister in 
Berlin, Count de Perponcher, commented on this report as follows : 
"Je dois à cette occasion porter à la connaissance de V.E. que des 
agens du comité directeur de Paris parcourent l'Allemagne." 
Besides, doubts as to the fidelity of the Polish troops in a fight 
against the French had been expressed by the British Ambassador in 
Russia already in October.1 
But the Warsaw riots came unexpectedly even to the higher 
circles in Poland. During several weeks the Warsaw events must 
necessarily, to foreign observers, have left uncertainty as to their 
ultimate course and, even after the Polish Diet had declared on 20th 
December that the outbreak of 29th November had initiated a 
national movement, the possibility of a settlement without recourse 
to arms still existed; envoys, sent from Warsaw to the Russian 
capital, did not come back until January. 
The impact of the revolution in Poland upon the state of affairs 
elsewhere - and especially upon the London Conference on Bel-
gian affairs - was primarily caused by the very first news of its 
outbreak. The Conference had already achieved its first object in 
establishing a suspension of hostilities between the Royal forces and 
the insurgents, but complaints were continually made by both sides 
as to its observance, and the Scheldt was kept closed by the Dutch 
navy, much to the annoyance of British and other merchants. The 
1
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riots which took place in Warsaw on the evening of 29th November 
were known in Berlin on 3rd December, in Vienna on the 6th, and 
in London and Paris on the 10th, while Nicholas leamt about them 
late at night on the 7th; on 8th December the news became public 
in the Russian capital. It must be borne in mind, therefore, that, 
when Talleyrand began his campaign in the Conference for the 
recognition of the independence of Belgium, he knew that the 
Russian Ambassador, aware of the change in the political configura-
tion brought about by the Polish news, would not be able to 
ascertain his Imperial master's reaction to it. 
Far from bringing about a concrete result, the Protocol of 20th 
December created a series of new problems, foremost that of the 
frontiers of the new state, in which the special position of the Grand 
Duchy of Luxemburg had to be considered, while the second im-
portant question demanding an immediate solution was that of the 
Belgian Crown. 
I 
Even before the Warsaw riots were known in St. Peterburg, this 
news arrived in Berlin and Vienna. Frederick William I I I received 
it as he was writing to his daughter, the Empress Nicholas, and could 
not find words strong enough to describe his anxiety. But the British 
Minister at Berlin, Chad, reporting the event two days later, stressed 
the point that the proclamation issued by the authorities the day 
after the riots was made in the name of Nicholas, Emperor of 
Russia and King of Poland ; Chad considered this to be a promising 
circumstance.2 Again, the Netherlands Minister in Vienna qualified 
the movement as "émeute"; this was positively not the view of 
Metternich as imparted to the Prussian representative. The 
Austrian Chancellor called it the most disastrous blow which could 
have been struck at the three Eastern Powers, and concluded 
that Belgium was now to be left to her own fate.3 
!
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Within the next few days after the first news diplomatic reports 
from the three Eastern capitals were filled with reflections on the 
state of affairs in the light of events in Poland. 
A subsequent report from Berlin said that in the Prussian capital 
the rising in Poland was considered as the result of the announced 
mobilization of the Polish forces and of the probability of their 
being employed to fight the French. Chad even believed that, on 
his departure, Diebitsch obtained a personal message for Nicholas 
from the Prussian King amounting to a statement that sovereigns 
themselves were the cause of revolts. In any case, the British Minister 
was told by Ancillon, the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, that 
the warlike speech of French Prime Minister Laffitte was the result 
of the military preparations ordered by Nicholas. Ancillon hastened 
to add that the dispatch from Sebastiani to the French mission in 
Berlin was "of the most satisfactory nature." Meanwhile, he some-
what surprisingly continued, the Russian measures "had no object 
[in view]. The Emperor does not wish for war, nor can Russia act 
without Prussia and Austria - we all desire peace, and the French 
Government is beyond all doubts sincere in its professions on that 
subject; yet if every Power adopts precautionary measures those 
measures may come in contact with each other and themselves 
produce war." 4 
This unexpected declaration is, however, counterbalanced by a 
contrary statement made to Mortier, the French Chargé d'affaires. 
Ancillon said that the Russian military preparations had been justified 
and the Polish revolution furnished evidence to this effect. Mortier 
noted Prussian military measures with regard to Poland: 60.000 
men had been sent to Prussian Poland, to which force, if necessary, 
another 30.000 would be added. In conclusion, the French Chargé 
d'affaires wrote that Ancillon and other Prussian observers admitted 
that France was going to exercise a much stronger influence in Belgian 
affairs, and that on her now depended the peace of Europe. Similar 
K. Hillebrand, Geschichte Frankreichs, I, 158. The relative, characteristic, passage 
of Hillebrand runs: "Am morgen des 30. November war Rusland vom übrigen 
Europa durch einen gewaltigen Militaraufstand tatsachlich getrennt; Preussen 
genötigt seine Aufmerksamkeit und seine Mittel zwischen die West- und Ost-
grenze zu theilen, Oestcrreich vereinzelt und durch die Furcht der Ansteckung 
seiner ausserdeutschen Besitzungen gelahmt. 'Das ist der verhängnisvollste 
Schlag, der den drei Höfen beigebracht werden konnte', rief der Staatskanzler, 
'mann wird nun Belgien seinem Schicksal überlassen mussen.' " 
4
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opinions were attributed by Mortier to other members of the diplo-
matic corps in Berlin.6 
In Vienna the French Ambassador found that the Austrian 
Government had known as long as two months before that a vio-
lent movement was to be expected in Poland. Consequently, the 
Chancellor dismissed with a mere "mais la Pologne!" any discussion 
on Russian re-armament. For the Dutch observer there would be 
"incalculables conséquences... de cette sanglante catastrophe" in 
Poland : the whole of Germany and most other countries were in an 
excited state. France, then "résistera-t-elle à la séduisante tentation 
d'un agrandissement, si vivement désiré, même si hautement réclamé 
et qui semble à présent lui tomber à soi même dans les bras?" It 
seems that the feeling prevailing in Vienna did not produce only 
this opinion; if Metternich was convinced that all revolutions 
originated from France, the influential Gentz saw in the Polish 
events, above all, a check to the great danger of the Russian plans 
for intervention.6 
Of the three convinced supporters of the King of the Netherlands 
the warmest and at the same time the one most affected by the Polish 
insurrection, was the last to learn of it. Nicholas appeared calm 
while himself announcing the news to the troops on the morning of 
8th December, and, satisfied with the spirit shown by his soldiers, 
seemed confident to the members of the diplomatic corps, who 
surrounded him during the levée, of a speedy crushing of the revolt.7 
His primary concern was for the safety of his brother from whom he 
had had no news for several days. His great anxiety is, however, 
reflected in his letter to his sister, the Princess of Orange, in which 
he appeared unable to say anything about the support which the 
Royal family eagerly expected from him. "Voilà donc que la 
révolution et tout ce qui s'en suit nous a atteints aussi comme je Ie 
prévoyais", he wrote. He soon received proof that he had not been 
wrong about the origin of all revolutionary troubles : the King of 
Prussia sent him an intercepted letter from a Polish leader, Jelski, 
to the French Premier Laffitte. Writing to his brother, Nicholas 
• Mortier to Sebastiani, 14 D e c , A.é. Prusse. 
• Maison to Sebastiani, 12 D e c , A.é. Autriche; V a n Spaen to Verstolk, 
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Gentz to Prokesch von Osten, 8 D e c , Aus dem Nachlasse des Grafen Prokesch-Oslen. 
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quoted Jelski's words: "C'est pour la seconde fois que la Pologne 
suit l'exemple de la France; en sera-t-elle la seconde fois la vic-
t ime?"; "C'est clair et positif", commented the Emperor.8 
In the meantime, the Polish rising bore its first fruits in Russian 
diplomacy. In his first interview with the Vice-Chancellor after the 
event the French Chargé d'affaires expressed his regret to hear of it, 
and his hope that a peaceful settlement might be achieved ; Nessel-
rode, however, doubted the possibility of such a solution; all 
measures taken at St. Petersburg, and especially the Imperial 
proclamation to the Poles, indicated that Nicholas was resolved 
only to accept unconditional submission. But only two days after the 
interview Bourgoing was shown a dispatch to be sent to Pozzo di 
Borgo with regard to Polish affairs. It recalled the French assertion 
that armed intervention in Belgium was the most certain way to war 
as the French nation would not allow foreign armies to operate 
against a kindred people; but in their anxious desire to avoid war 
the French Government had been exerting themselves to keep 
public opinion quiet. The Imperial Government, therefore, urged 
France to show "la même loyauté dans la question de Pologne 
qu'elle l'a faite dans celle de la Belgique." When showing this dis-
patch, Nesselrode added a verbal declaration to the effect that the 
best way of gaining the confidence of Russia was "by abstaining 
from all interference, whether open or secret, in Polish affairs." · 
The French Chargé d'affaires confided both the contents of the 
dispatch and the words of the Vice-Chancellor to Baron van Heecke-
ren who passed them on to the British Ambassador. The two diplomats 
had nothing but severe criticism for the Russian démarche. " I cannot 
think this declaration very prudent or very likely to produce the 
desired effect at Paris", wrote Heytesbury. " I t savours too much of 
alarm." 10 The Dutch comment was even more outspoken. The 
Russian démarche "n'empêchera rien si la France est mal inten-
tionnée, et dans le cas contraire, elle donne à celle-ci beau jeu pour 
faire valoir sa neutralité comme un immense service, rendu à la 
Russie, et pour exiger plus tard qu'elle s'en montre reconnaissante." 
In any case it constituted a proof of great weakness with regard to 
8
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France, an attitude of which the Russian Government had been 
extremely critical, where other governments were concerned. Inci-
dentally, Bourgoing himself, who for the rest was convinced of the 
superiority of the Russian forces in an approaching contest, was 
very modest in recounting this occasion.11 
A few days later new instructions were sent to Lieven. A survey 
of Russian policy so far, according to the principle: "Conserver ces 
traités [of 1815] et défendre l'état de possession qui en résulte" is 
followed by this commentary on the Polish revolution: "Cet événe-
ment, quelque grave qu'il soit en lui même", the dispatch runs, 
" . . .ne change point l'attitude que S.M. a prise dès origine, à l'égard des 
affaires générales de l'Europe." On the contrary, the defeat of the 
rebels "servira à décourager d'autres contrées des tentatives crimi-
nelles" and thus would contribute to the cause of peace. Russia's 
principles as to Belgian policy still remain: " 1 . de conserver la 
possession de la Belgique à la maison de Nassau. 2. de consentir, en 
revanche, à une séparation complète que les Belges et les Hollan-
dais réclament avec une égale insistance, pourvu que la demande en 
soit formellement exprimée par le Roi des Pays Bas 3. de ne point 
admettre une combinaison qui placerait la Belgique sous la domination d'une 
dynastie étrangère à celle qui l'a gouvernée pendant un règne de 
quinze ans, sous la garantie des traités." Were the Conference to 
proceed to abandon the rights of the House of Nassau, the Russian 
representatives should refer to the Emperor who would then concert 
with other Courts on ultimate measures. Then follows a disquieting 
passage: "I l serait prématuré d'en tracer la ligne, aussi longtemps 
que nous ne connaissons pas les voeux que S.M. Néerlandaise serait 
dans le cas d'émettre pour le maintien de ses droits, ni les sacrifices 
qu'elle pourrait préférer peut-être de porter à la tranquillité générale." In the 
meantime, "nous avons l'espoir certain de rétablir en Pologne le 
calme et la sécurité et de combler ainsi l'abîme que les révolution-
naires ouvraient sous nos pas."12 
A copy of the instructions to Lieven was sent to GourieíT at The 
Hague. The covering dispatch runs: "Au milieu des occupations 
nombreuses auxquelles les funestes événemens de Varsovie ont 
donné lieu, S.M.I. continue à vouer une attention suivie aux graves 
questions que le gouvernement des Pays Bas a consenti à soumettre 
11
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à la conférence de Londres." The Russian Minister is instructed to 
assure the Netherlands Government "que les événemens de Varso-
vie ne changent point l'attitude du cabinet impérial relativement 
aux affaires de l 'Europe." 13 
These declarations could not, however, conceal to foreign 
observers the significant change which was reflected in the second 
point of the instructions to Lieven. The Netherlands Minister learnt 
of a similar dispatch on Belgian affairs, sent to Pozzo di Borgo, and 
attributed "la facilité avec laquelle la Russie est revenue sur sa 
première détermination de s'opposer constamment à l'indépen-
dance complète de la Belgique avec une couronne séparée" - a 
misinterpretation, however, of the instructions actually sent to 
Lieven - to the difficulties caused to the Imperial Government by 
the Polish rising. He could derive but little comfort from Heytes-
bury's information that the dispatch to Paris with regard to Poland 
was concluded with a kind of threat, the less so as there was no 
such threat in the expressions employed by Nesselrode to Bourgoing 
in his verbal communication on the subject, nor in the account of it 
by Bourgoing, in whose accuracy the British Ambassador put little 
faith.14 
Besides, Heytesbury too had been approached by the Vice-
Chancellor with a request to write to London to prevent any 
pronouncement in Parliament "qui pût exciter l'esprit de révolte 
des Polonais et surtout rien qui pût attaquer le caractère personnel 
de S.M. l 'Empereur." This was considered by Nesselrode as a great 
service. The Ambassador himself, in rendering the account of the 
Russian démarche to France for the second time, put his disapproval 
in still stronger terms. "This, it must be allowed, is a rather singular 
commentary upon the Emperor's ukaze from the beginning of 
November [announcing the Russian mobilization]," he wrote. " I t 
betrays too much alarm by its complete contradiction to former 
language and shows too clearly the vulnerability of this Empire. I t 
might have been impossible to conceal this secret very long but 
surely it was not prudent to proclaim it." But there were other el-
ements to be considered in the new Russian policy, namely in 
Belgium, which did not need to be regretted. Heytesbury's descrip-
18
 Nesselrode to Gourieff, 16 D e c , Ged., I l l , 440. 
14
 Van Heeckeren to Verstolk, 20 D e c , R.A.; Heytesbury to Palmerston, 
19 D e c , F.O. Russia; for last instructions to Lieven prior to the Polish revolu-
tion see above, p. 55. 
64 THE REVOLUTION IN POLAND 
tion is almost a translation of Van Heeckeren's, quoted above. 
"After all declarations previously made", commented the Ambassa-
dor, "[it] speaks a sufficiently clear language", but, "it will greatly 
tend to facilitate an arrangement of Belgian affairs and diminish the 
chances of war." 1S 
The British Ambassador enlarged on the situation inside the 
Russian Empire. No force capable of attacking the Polish army was 
to be expected at the Vistula before February. Hence, it was feared 
at St. Petersburg, the French might, in an attempt at a diversion in 
favour of the Poles, attack either in Belgium or on the Rhine. "The 
full occupation given to the Russian army by the Polish insurrec-
tion may indeed render the temptation of recovering former fron-
tiers irresistible", thought Heytesbury. And in any case, the offen-
sive power of Russia should now be considered as "more imaginary 
than real." Lastly, the Emperor Nicholas himself believed that the 
peaceable declarations of the French Minister would cease, giving 
way to a different attitude, as soon as he heard of the Polish revolu-
tion.19 
As it happened, news of a still earlier date of a seemingly dif-
ferent line in French foreign policy were about to arrive in the 
Russian capital; it will be useful, however, first to recount two other 
minor incidents, which in another way illustrate the part played 
by the distance between the Western and Russian capitals. 
During a Court reception the Emperor of Russia was said to 
have found a gracious word for every member of the diplomatic 
corps except for the French Charge d'affaires, who was told : "Je n'ig-
nore pas que ce qui vient de se passer en Pologne a eu sa source en 
France." This account passed through Berlin and in the latter half 
of December spread in the West; Grey, and even Mme Lieven 
believed and regretted this incident. In fact, much as he was 
disturbed by the Polish revolution, Nicholas liked Bourgoing, and 
the words he addressed to him were: "quant à vous, mon cher ami, 
je ne vous en parle pas, je s a i s . . . combien vous en soyez affligé; 
mais voilà ce que c'est quand une fois on commence." 17 
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A somewhat different type of evidence, and perhaps of a more 
serious character, is offered by the story of Sebastiani's dispatch of 
22nd November - at the time of Langsdorff's mission to Brussels 
in favour of the House of Orange, and upon the receipt of the news 
of the Russian mobilization- concerning, among other things, the 
French support for the House of Orange in Belgium; this dispatch 
was destined for the eyes of Nicholas. At Nesselrode's request Bour-
going omitted the phrase saying that France "ne renoncera qu'en 
désespoir de cause" her support for William I and his family, from 
the copy to be sent to the Imperial Cabinet. On hearing of the 
omission - but not of the request - Van Heeckeren hastened to 
inform the Vice-Chancellor, who replied that he was satisfied with 
such documents as might be supplied by the French mission. The 
British Ambassador, however, learnt from Bourgoing that he had 
omitted another phrase also, referring to France's intention "of 
appealing in the event of war 'aux affections populaires"' ; in doing this 
he had been following private instructions from Sebastiani, "to 
translate into the language of the Court where he was residing the plainer 
language of the constitutional Cabinet of Paris". The Ambassador won-
dered if the French Minister would concur with such an interpreta-
tion of his confidential instructions, and concluded that the French 
dispatch, mutilated to this extent, could indeed have created the 
impression that the Russian mobilization had produced a desirable 
effect in Paris.18 
Here again the British Ambassador seemed to forget that the 
interview of Bourgoing on the subject had taken place before the first 
news from Warsaw ; Nesselrode may have been convinced that the 
omission of the phrase which would unduly anger his master, could 
do no harm since in view of the pressure of thePowers France would 
not dare to oppose the Orange cause in Brussels. When the question 
came to the knowledge of Heytesbury Nicholas' attention had been 
drawn to another matter: the intercepted Polish letter caused him to 
send for General St. Aldegonde, a Frenchman decidedly of the an-
cien régime, since a long time in Russian service. St. Aldegonde would, 
in the Emperor's opinion, be the man to answer the question : could 
the French Government withstand the clamour of the public and 
abstain from interference in Polish affairs? The reply was most 
18
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satisfactory: the French Government would loyally abstain from 
encouraging the Poles.19 
Hardly two days had passed when Sebastiani's dispatch of ist 
December - quoted in Chapter I - arrived in St. Petersburg. Even 
Bourgoing realized that to say in St. Petersburg that the Russian 
army must not even enter Prussia would be greatly resented by the 
Imperial Cabinet. He therefore began by referring to the question 
of the Belgian crown. The Palais Royal would like to place it upon 
the head of the Prince of Orange's son, if, as it seemed in Paris, his 
father could not count on success. But Nesselrode disliked the idea, 
as it involved a regency for a prince who was a minor. The King 
himself or the Prince of Orange was the only solution. The in-
troduction not having been too successful, Bourgoing yet proceeded 
with his momentous declaration. As was only too likely, the Vice-
Chancellor frankly showed that he felt offended. The statement "ne 
cadre pas avec les assurances amicales qui nous sont d'ailleurs 
parvenues", he said. "L'Empereur n'admettra pas une pareille 
condition et ne voudra jamais placer sur la même ligne un secours 
qui pourra lui être demandé par ses voisins et ses alliés, et votre 
sortie de chez vous. Cinq cent Polognes se fussent-elles révoltées, nous 
n'admettrons pas cette similitude." 20 
And though Nesselrode did not say so, and perhaps failed 
immediately to realize it, further reflections on the subject and 
especially consideration of the original date of Sebastiani's dispatch 
- ist December - could not but unfold evidence of the "con-
naissance préalable qu'aurait eue le Ministère français des troubles 
survenues en Pologne; connaissance qui l'aurait déterminé à se 
dépêcher de faire cette notification pour ne pas avoir l'air de 
profiter des embarras où l'on croit la Russie actuellement engagée." 
It seemed, too, that Sebastiani had in the meantime realized that 
his declaration might produce an entirely undesirable effect at St. 
Petersburg and had requested the Prussian Government, always on 
a far better footing with Russia, to help remove this undoubtedly 
poor impression.21 
Before replying to the French declaration Nesselrode invited the 
" St. Aldegonde to Louis Philippe, 23 Dec, describing the audience on the 
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British Ambassador to an interview on the subject. "After a few 
remarks upon the extraordinary abruptness of such a declaration" 
the Vice-Chancellor developed his plan for a reply, in which 
reference was to be made to several instances of intervention in re-
cent years, and he requested Hey tesbury to write to England and try to 
counterbalance French pretensions. On 23rd December Bourgoing 
learnt of the Russian reply, in which the intervention in Belgium was 
not mentioned, but, observed the French Chargé d'affaires, this idea, 
"bien qu'elle soit toujours reléguée dans les cas éloignés et impro-
bables", was still maintained by the Imperial Government. The 
Netherlands Minister called the Russian note "digne et modérée", 
but regretted the absence of any reference to Belgium, while Heytes-
bury noted a "more guarded language" than he had expected and 
none of the instances of intervention held out to him by the Vice-
Chancellor. It will be noted that in the meantime the French 
Chargé d'affaires announced to the Imperial Government the special 
peace mission of the Duc de Mortemart, which Nicholas had called 
"une attention personnelle", and of which he would be very appre-
ciative, while during those same days Polish envoys were being re-
ceived in St. Petersburg.22 
I I 
At the same time the influence of events in Warsaw made its way to 
Paris and London, where the arrangements to be introduced in the 
Netherlands were the problem of the day. While the King of the 
French saw the Polish rising as "une sauvegarde inespérée pour la 
France", and the diplomatie corps believed in the sincerity of 
renewed French pacific professions, there were dissenting voices; 
the Dutch Minister doubted if peace would be maintained.23 
At the London Conference Talleyrand proposed to take ad-
vantage of the circumstances immediately. After achieving the 
suspension of hostilities, the Conference proceeded to try and bring 
about the re-opening of the Scheldt. The last protocol, the French 
Ambassador wrote home, would put the King of the Netherlands 
22
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" a u pied du mur" , the more so as "les mouvements de Pologne lui 
ôtent une de ses espérances." An answer from The Hague was 
expected daily, fortunately "le terns presse: tout se fera mieux et 
plus facilement pendant les troubles de Pologne", he commented.24 
The King of the Netherlands also received the friendly advice to 
raise the blockade. BernstorfF wrote about the difficulties caused to 
the Russians by the Polish rising, as well as about the troops which 
the Prussian Government felt compelled to send to watch the 
Eastern frontiers. The Prussian Minister advised the King not to 
reckon on the assistance of any single Power but to set all his hopes 
on the Conference alone. The Prussian Government tried to impress 
his conciliatory attitude on his British partner as well: Ancillon 
would not admit to Chad that Prussia might join Russia in suppress-
ing the Polish rising and this corresponded with Chad's own belief 
that Prussia, in an anxious desire to avoid war, would remain 
neutral in the Polish as well as in the Belgian question.25 
The leaders of British foreign policy also believed that negotia-
tions with William I would be facilitated by the Warsaw events, 
and that in accordance with the little faith they placed in the 
Prussian declaration. In answer to the British Ambassador's letter 
describing an audience with the King, Palmerston remarked: "The 
language of the K i n g . . . was certainly not equivocal, and proves 
that he must rely on Prussian aid ; for upon his 6.000 Dutchmen alone 
he could certainly not have found so warlike a disposition. But if the 
accounts we hear to-day from Poland prove true, Russia and Prus-
sia would have enough to do at home, without embroiling them-
selves with France for the sake of Holland." Sir Charles Bagot held 
the same opinion. A few days later, when the new Dutch pleni-
potentiary was leaving for London, it appeared impossible to the 
Ambassador for the Polish news not to influence Baron van Zuylen's 
attitude in London.26 
However, this impression soon proved wrong. The Prussian 
Minister in The Hague obtained an audience of the King and found 
him in much better spirits, as if he had arrived at a decision. The 
King complained, though, that the Conference seemed now to have 
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placed him on the same footing as his revolted subjects. He resolved, 
therefore, to save his honour by his own means, and that, the Prus-
sian Minister thought, meant letting the Belgians have a touch of 
the winter with industry stranded. This would, of course, include 
keeping the port of Antwerp idle; hence the following impression of 
the British Ambassador: "The events in Poland have not had the 
effect that I anticipated — on the contrary, the argument now is that, 
in proportion as they deprive the King of the hope of foreign as-
sistance, they throw him more upon his own resources, and make it 
more impolitic in him to surrender any advantage which he may 
now possess." 27 The Scheldt was consequently kept closed until 
January. 
This, however, would not affect the London Conference. The 
suspension of hostilities already implied the recognition of the Bel-
gians as a party, and Talleyrand pushed matters further, seeking to 
establish the principle of an independent Belgium. Less opposition 
was expected. "I l est évident que les événements du Nord portent 
leur fruit," noted the hostess of the French Embassy, "et que les 
esprits, si j ' e n excepte celui du roi de Hollande et de M. de Lieven, 
sont fort adhérents." Billow and Wessenberg did not think any more 
of supporting the cause of Nassau, she thought, and were as anxious 
as the French to settle the Belgian business. Indeed, Bülow even 
feared that the Russian Ambassador's obstinacy in insisting on the 
rights of William I might bring about a rapprochement between 
England and France ; Wessenberg's instruction allowed him great 
discretion but he spared no words to describe his reluctance in 
giving his consent to the protocol which recognized Belgian inde-
pendence. But it was Lieven who presented the real difficulty, and 
even Talleyrand expected that he would not sign the Protocol but 
take the matter ad referendum.28 
Palmerston, however, seized the proposition made to him by the 
French Ambassador as a means against a possible French agrandisse-
ment and took upon himself not only the preliminary talks with all 
the plenipotentiaries but also the formal authorship of Protocol No. 7, 
which was signed by all members of the Conference. The Foreign 
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Secretary had to find a middle way between Talleyrand's insistence 
on employing the term independence, and the opposition of the 
Eastern representatives ; Wessenberg, for once, proposed that more 
information should first be obtained from the Belgians. Out of these 
difficulties the expression "indépendance future" was coined; this 
greatly pleased Talleyrand and seemed the least offensive to the 
Eastern Powers. " I t is a great step gained", wrote Palmerston to 
Grey, "to have got Russia and Austria to admit the necessity of 
early independence." 2e 
At that moment, however, it was only Lieven, who had given 
way. "La signature de l'Ambassadeur de Russie m'était bien 
précieuse à avoir", Talleyrand prided himself, "et vous l'y verrez." 
As mentioned before, it had not been due to his effort: "The 
Conference went off extremely well", noted Palmerston. It seems 
that the expressed desire to keep the unity of the five Powers must 
have been the final argument which caused the Russian Ambassador 
to sign Protocol No. 7. New instructions which reached him well 
after 20th December allowed him to consent to the separation of 
Holland and Belgium only after William I agreed to it - a most 
unlikely result to be obtained not only at the time, but, as will be 
seen, even several months later - and thus virtually amounted to the 
exclusion of such an arrangement. On the other hand, though the 
Protocol of 20th December took account of the failure of the United 
Netherlands, it yet decided nothing about the sovereignty of the 
future Belgian State.30 
In his report the Russian Ambassador defended himself by 
referring to French annexationist ambitions. Only a close unity of 
action with Britain - which he in any case had been instructed to 
maintain - could help in trying to avoid Belgium falling a prey to 
France. Lieven even added that the British Government itself had 
become so utterly dependent on the current of public opinion, which 
clamoured for a liberal policy towards Belgium, that it not only was 
far from being able to maintain the Treaties, but perhaps could even 
easily be made to use its resources, from which Russia had so much 
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benefited during the Napoleonic war, against all the Powers who 
were endeavouring to uphold these Treaties. The Russian historian 
who records this opinion feels unable to do so without attributing a 
prophetical character to it, bearing upon the Crimean war.31 
The Protocol of 20th December came as a sudden blow to the 
Netherlands Government. In his reply to dispatches which had 
announced this unexpected decision of the Conference to him the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Verstolk, laid particular stress upon 
the unexpected consent of the Russian representative which, in his 
opinion, was in striking contrast to the views expressed by the Em-
peror Nicholas concerning the Polish rising. Speaking to the Russian 
Minister in The Hague Baron Verstolk said that the King's reply to 
the Protocol would be delayed until he had heard that the Courts of 
St. Petersburg, Berlin and Vienna approved the action of their re-
presentatives. In the meantime, the Dutch delegates formally 
protested against a decision of the Conference having been taken in 
their absence. The only comforting view which reached the Nether-
lands Government was that of Ancillon; in his dispatch, destined for 
William I, he said that the allies of the King only availed themselves 
of the expression indépendance future of Belgium to avoid the uncondi-
tional independence proposed by Talleyrand. Ancillon maintained 
that the decisions of the Conference had little binding power.32 
The Netherlands Government felt unable to accept easily the 
tenor of Protocol No. 7, and the second plenipotentiary to the 
Conference, Baron van Zuylen van Nyevelt, who had only just arriv-
ed in London to join Ambassador Falck, began by paying a series 
of confidential calls on the representatives of the Eastern Powers, 
endeavouring to obtain a positive explanation of their abandonment 
of the rights of King William I. His first visits to Biilow and Wessen-
berg proved fruitless. More satisfactory for Van Zuylen was his con-
versation with the Russian Ambassador. In view of the warm feeling 
of sympathy with which Lieven spoke of the affairs of the Nether-
lands the Dutch plenipotentiary "realized how imperative were the 
circumstances which had made Lieven accept responsibility for the 
7th Protocol." The Ambassasor further promised to try to carry the 
Conference with him in maintaining the sovereignty of the King of 
31
 Lieven to Nesselrode, 24 Dec, Martens, Recueil, XI, 445. 
32
 Verstolk to Falck and Van Zuylen, 28 Dec, Ged., IV, 387; Gourieff to 
Nesselrode, 28 Dec, Ged., I l l , 448; Ancillon to Waldburg-Truchsess, 5 Jan. 
1831, Ged., I l l , 37. 
72 THE REVOLUTION Ш POLAND 
the Netherlands in Belgium, but he did not conceal his uneasiness 
about British policy on this point. Van Zuylen, however, who had 
met Lieven during the latter's passage through The Hague late in 
November, found his opinions changed and asked the Russian 
Ambassador what consideration would be given to the interests of 
the people of the Southern Netherlands (which he, of course, consid­
ered identical with those of the l üng) . The answer was litde more 
than "we live from day to day" noted the Dutch envoy, and he won-
dered if that meant that Lieven and other representatives of the 
Eastern Powers had been promised the neutrality of Britain and 
France in Polish affairs in return for their passive attitude as 
regarded Belgium. There is little evidence to determine whether he 
had any reason to make such a conjecture. In the course of his 
letter he further says that Esterhazy considered Austria also com-
pelled to accede to Protocol No. 7 by the Polish events, and he at-
tributed to the Austrian Ambassador the opinion that Lieven had 
been assured of English and French neutrality with regard to the 
contest on the Vistula and in this way brought to sign.33 
If these findings indicated the source of the trouble, a more 
striking example of the influence of Warsaw events on the Belgian 
policy of the Powers Van Zuylen found in his second interview with 
the Prussian Minister. "Polish affairs have considerably transformed 
the respective standpoints of the representatives [at the Con-
ference]", runs the précis of Van Zuylen's conversation, "the three 
Powers thought themselves more engaged, unlike France, who found 
herself stronger than ever, through her real importance, but, above 
all, by the force of her moral influence." To support his arguments 
Bülow communicated to the Dutch plenipotentiary the first draft of 
what was later to become Protocol No. 7 made by Talleyrand. 
This project was indeed based on entirely different propositions. It 
not only implied the loss of sovereignty in Belgium by the House of 
Orange, but declared also that the Belgians themselves had achieved 
their independence. Bülow thought that this draft was only a weak 
reflection of the feeling in France, and that it was preferable to 
declare Belgium independent than to expose her to the inevitable 
annexationist ambitions of France.34 
Less apparent, perhaps, was the change which the direction of 
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Belgian affairs underwent in Paris after the Polish news. It first of 
all involved Luxemburg, which presented France with a two-fold 
problem. Firstly, the Grand Duchy was a family possession of the 
King of the Netherlands which he had obtained in 1815 in exchange 
for his Nassau lands ; it belonged to the German Confederation. But 
the majority of its inhabitants sided with revolutionary Brussels, and 
while there was no dispute about the rights of William I with regard 
to Luxemburg inside or outside the Conference, it was equally 
obvious that an occupation, or rather, in this case, a conquest of 
the Grand Duchy would hardly be allowed by France, and all 
Conference Powers were aware of this. Secondly, some places lost 
by France in 1815 — of which Bouillon was one, administratively 
included in the Grand Duchy - were now claimed by French 
public opinion. It soon became obvious that the Government was 
not averse to the idea. 
I t had been understood for some weeks that the Federal troops 
would occupy the Grand Duchy on orders given by the Federal 
Diet. The vote of excluding Nassau, pronounced by the Belgian 
Congress on 24th November, speeded the arrangements, and the 
Conference acknowledged them in its protocols of 9th and 14th 
December. These protocols arrived in Paris after the news from 
Poland, and Sebastiani then wrote to Frankfurt to ask for a delay in 
effecting the occupation, under the plea that nothing had been 
decided about the fate of Bouillon, for which a special arrangement 
was necessary. Not much pressure was required, however, because 
after the Polish news Prussia, always reluctant to assent to such a 
dangerous measure, was less than ever likely to push the matter 
through the Federal authorities.35 
A less important, though much more obvious volte-face was effect-
ed in the French tone with regard to the King of the Netherlands. 
On 7th December Sebastiani still assured the Netherlands Minister 
in Paris of "des bonnes intentions du Roi des Français et de son gou-
vernement dans la question de Belgique." Entirely different terms 
were employed by the French Minister three weeks later, after the 
Protocol of 20th December. Speaking of Van Zuylen's recent arrival 
in London he regretted that instead of bringing the news of the 
King's concurrence with the measures adopted by the Conference, 
he had reported that the Scheldt would be kept closed, thus putting 
** W. von Franqué, Luxemburg, die belgische Revolution und die Mächte, 1933, 
pp. 39 and 44. 
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new obstacles in the way of a settlement. Sebastiani permitted him-
self to add that this policy gave evidence of the King's desire for 
war, which would not be favourable to his cause "depuis que les 
Puissances l'avoient en quelque sorte forcément a b a n d o n n é . . . " , and 
even went so far as to warn: "s'il persistoit dans son système, on 
seroit obligé d'en venir à des mesures plus positives que celles, dont 
on est convenu jusqu'ici." 3 β 
Only a few days later in trying to solve the Luxemburg problem 
according to the as he thought new political configuration, Talley­
rand went much further than Sebastiani did here, and in this way 
he immediately introduced considerable coolness in the Anglo-
French relations. 
I l l 
Though the King of the Netherlands had not accepted the Protocol 
of 20th December, the Belgians, trusting in the support of the 
Western Powers, were already trying to find a Royal personage 
willing to accept the vacant throne, and able to bring about some 
stability in their country. There were voices in Belgium for the Due 
de Nemours, the younger son of Louis Philippe, and for the Duc de 
Leuchtenberg, but the provisional government of Belgium realized 
that the Conference Powers were very unlikely to accept either of 
these candidates. But there was another candidate who could com­
mand popular support whilst he was also put forward by both the 
British and the French. This was Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, 
widower of the English Crown Princess Charlotte, who had been 
resident in England for many years. Talleyrand mentioned him 
early in December, while Palmerston let it be known to Lord 
Ponsonby, representing the Conference at Brussels, that, unofficial 
as it was, " i t must end in Leopold." 3 7 
But Russia, through Lieven and Pozzo, was continually de­
claring her opposition to Prince Leopold, being moreover com­
mitted to the sovereignty of the House of Orange in Belgium as was 
3
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well known. Unexpectedly, however, when the Belgian delegation 
came to Paris late in December to seek support for Leopold's 
candidature from the French Government, Sebastiani refused to 
commit France in this question. Time was working for Belgium in 
realizing her wishes, he told the delegates. The Nemours crisis some 
weeks later seems to have brought evidence of the real meaning of 
this pronouncement.38 
This was, however, much more than the King of the French 
as well as his London Ambassador considered feasible. "Nous se-
rions parvenus, et avec beaucoup de peine", he wrote to the Min-
ister for Foreign Affairs on 3rd January, "à obtenir la souve-
raineté de la Belgique pour le Prince Leopold, marié à une Prin-
cesse de France"; but that would require France to show good 
will, and first of all, formally to refuse the candidature of the 
Duc de Nemours, since otherwise " . . .la Russie, toujours prête à 
s'emparer de la politique de l'Angleterre, profiterait de cette 
circonstance [Nemours' candidature] pour pousser à l'extrême les 
hostilités de société qui ont ici une grande influence."39 Unfor-
tunately for France, there were other difficulties as well. 
At this time Louis Philippe considered not only Russian opposition 
but the state of Belgium itself as factors responsible for the small 
chance Leopold might have ; the King was prepared to accept any 
solution which would put an end to the Belgian troubles. "Il ne 
m'est pas démontré que ce ne sera pas pour le Prince d 'Orange", 
he wrote to Sebastiani.40 
There seemed to be no one, however, to press the Prince's cause 
inside or outside the Conference. The Russian representatives cer-
tainly, apart from Princess Lieven as will be shown, did not share 
their monarch's devotion to the House of Orange. Gourieff from 
The Hague considered its cause hopeless. He pointed out the "peti-
tes vues" of William I, the loss of popularity suffered by the Prince of 
Orange, finally - as if it could have been otherwise - the insincer-
ity of France in her professed support of the Prince. As Sebastiani 
did to the Belgians, he proposed to his government to let time solve 
38
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Dutch difficulties. He would rather see a speedy crushing of the 
Polish rebellion - though, and perhaps because, he did not under­
rate the hardships of this struggle - where real Russian interests 
were involved.4 1 Lieven, as mentioned above, was no match for 
Talleyrand, and Matuszewic, the other supposed defender of King 
William I's interests and by far the ablest of the Russian members 
of the Conference, did not show much zeal. His position as a Pole 
rendered it difficult for him to use the argument of the Polish rev­
olution. To Van Zuylen he stressed the menacing attitude of France 
and Billow's readiness to follow Palmerston, factors which, backed 
by his instructions to keep the five Powers together, constituted the 
reasons for his share in allowing the Protocol of 20th December.4 2 
The initiative of an Orange restoration was taken, with con­
siderable reluctance, by Palmerston. His and Grey's opinion on 
this subject, expressed in the dispatch to Lord Heytesbury at the end 
of December, was of course influenced by the opinions of the Belgian 
delegates and of Lord Ponsonby: to try for an Orange restoration 
would mean to work for a civil war. They were also influenced by 
their view of the personality of the Prince of Orange; but they no 
doubt realized equally well that only through showing that a civil 
war in Belgium must necessarily mean a general war could they 
achieve some success in trying to make St. Petersburg renounce its 
legitimist views with regard to Belgium.4 3 Yet only a few days later 
Palmerston showed that he had his reasons in attempting to bring 
together the wishes of the Belgians and those of William I. 
O n 2nd January the Netherlands plenipotentiaries had an inter­
view with the Foreign Secretary in order to acquaint him with the 
views of their King with regard to the separation of Holland and 
Belgium. Then Palmerston asked them, " in deepest confidence", 
whether the King was interested in the choice of a sovereign for 
Belgium, and whether he would consent to cede Luxemburg to the 
Prince of Orange, if his election proved possible. Palmerston added 
4 1
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that he was perfectly aware of the many difficulties connected with 
such an arrangement. The Dutch plenipotentiaries took this propos-
al, repeatedly described as his own by Palmerston, ad referendum. 
They asked the Foreign Secretary, however, if he did not think 
that France would oppose this combination as it represented a 
possible settlement of Belgian affairs ; the Mimster replied that on 
the contrary he feared that France would consider it a provisional 
measure, agreeable to her till a more convenient occasion would ena-
ble her to annex Belgium, and that she would support its acceptance 
on that ground. The Dutchmen, naturally enough, expressed their 
doubt as to the desirability of a solution offering perhaps such a 
prospect. "Palmerston admitted that there was a considerable 
party for the Prince, but it was weak and passive, whereas men of 
ability belonged to the opposite party, which by now had been 
strengthened by the deposition of the House of Orange that had 
already taken place. He further reviewed the almost impassable 
difficulty that the Prince would experience in administering Belgium 
and the necessity to bring up his son in the Roman Catholic re-
ligion. This idea of the Prince of Orange ruling in Belgium did not 
prevent him also from advising H. M. the King of the Netherlands, 
in the strongest terms, to apply every measure to restore order in 
Luxemburg, especially to announce an amnesty and to promise a 
speedy new constitutional arrangement." In their subsequent 
dispatch of the same date the envoys wrote: "The English Minister 
repeatedly drew our attention to the provisional character of this 
information, and to the doubts whether his ideas would find enough 
support with the others for them to be adopted. He did not wish to 
accept any responsibility for this whatever." This dispatch again 
stressed the importance Palmerston attributed to the measures he 
proposed with regard to Luxemburg.44 
These confidential proceedings were not unknown at least to the 
most interested parties in the Conference. Princess Lieven knew 
that Palmerston was considering the plan of making King William I 
agree to cede Luxemburg to his son; yet she was not pleased with 
the attitude of the British Ministers towards the Prince of Orange, 
and she noted the existence of personal prejudices against him; 
nor was she herself blind to his faults.45 
It should be noted to what extent the views of William I coincided 
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with those of the British Foreign Secretary, a fact which seems 
largely to have escaped the attention of historians. I t was known 
that in his opposition to the Conference the King relied upon the 
support of Russia, though even before the outbreak of the revolution 
in Poland his principal advisers did not think any substantial mil­
itary assistance from the East likely. O n the other hand, the 
participation of Russian plenipotentiaries in proclaiming the in­
dependence of Belgium hurt feelings at The Hague very much; 
it seemed unlikely that this proceeding could obtain the full 
approval of St. Petersburg - which again was not the same as a 
disavowal of Lieven's and Matuszewic's signatures.4 8 Lastly, Wil­
liam I felt unable to agree to the state of things in his Southern 
provinces after the revolution; yet he realized the difficulties in 
continuing, or rather, as the situation was, in re-establishing his 
direct authority there. 
Minister Verstolk's instructions for the Dutch envoys in London, 
dated 31st December, 1830, were the product of the above con­
siderations. The King desired them to propose to the Conference that 
Belgium, separated from the Northern part of the Kingdom, 
should remain under his sovereignty but be governed independently 
by the Prince of Orange, as Governor-General or Lord-Lieutenant. 
Verstolk rightly pointed out that however far the Protocol No. 7 
might have gone in its disregard of the rights of the King, it did not 
prejudice the question of the sovereignty of Belgium. These instruc­
tions were supported by appendices, viz., a letter from Sebastiani to 
Bourgoing, professing the desire of France to see the Prince of 
Orange on the Belgian throne, and Nesselrode's dispatch to GouriefF, 
of 16th December, already referred to above. I t is of course improb­
able that the Dutch Government was unaware of the motives which 
had prompted Sebastiani to make such a declatarion, motives which 
no longer existed ; but it could safely assume that France had commit­
ted herself by this statement.*7 
Falck and Van Zuylen made those instructions the subject of 
their long report of 5th January, 1831. Lieven and Matuszewic, 
having expressed their entire concurrence with the project as one 
which would particularly please their Imperial master, observed at 
*· Verstolk and Van Maanen to William I, 17 Nov., 1830, Verstolk to Falck 
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the same time that, unfortunately, "le Cabinet Britannique regarde 
cette idée comme impossible à réaliser dans les circonstances actuel-
les. Y insister, ou seulement la proposer à la Conférence aurait pour 
résultat infaillible de rapprocher encore d'avantage l'Angleterre et 
la France." In consequence, in a general war Britain would be on 
the side of France.48 
Curiously enough, at this very time Princess Lieven was still 
obtaining Palmerston's assurances that he was continuing his efforts 
in favour of the Prince of Orange - though he himself did not seem 
to place any faith in them; nor did Palmerston refer to any dif-
ficulties made by the French Government but only to the Belgian 
delegate Van de Weyer's opinion "que le Prince d'Orange c'est la 
guerre; que le Prince Leopold c'est la paix éternelle..." Nothing, 
however, had been done by the Russian delegation to reconcile 
William I's opinion with the possibilities offered by their influence 
and their knowledge of the situation.49 
Instead, it was Palmerston again who took up the subject. 
On 2nd or 3rd January, about the same time that he had his con-
ference with the Dutch plenipotentiaries, he spoke to Talleyrand 
about the Belgian problem and proposed to make the King of the 
Netherlands agree to cede Luxemburg to his son on condition that 
the latter was accepted by the Belgians - an arrangement, he 
thought, "which might or might not prove practicable but which if it 
could be accomplished might remove many difficulties." "Tal-
leyrand looked very grave", observed Palmerston; instead, however, 
of referring to the difficulties of placing the Prince in Belgium, he 
referred to those which would be made by the French Government 
in connection with the strategic importance of the Grand Duchy. 
This could not be a greater obstacle in the case of Belgium than it 
was in the case of the United Netherlands, Palmerston observed. 
But Talleyrand wondered if an arrangement might prove possible 
by which Luxemburg were given to France. "I confess I felt con-
siderable surprise," wrote Palmerston to Granville a few days later, 
"at a proposition so much at variance with all the language and 
professions which he and his Government have been holding." He 
then learnt that Talleyrand had sounded the Prussian Minister on 
the subject of exchanging the Rhenish provinces for Saxony, in 
48
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which case the King of Saxony would be "transferred" to Brussels; 
and another proposal was made to himself, that France would like to 
obtain PhilippeviUe and Marienbourg in return for her support of 
Prince Leopold's candidature. The interview with the French 
Ambassador with regard to Luxemburg marks, therefore, a turning-
point in Anglo-French relations. "This is the first time that he 
[Talleyrand] has let out any distinct proposition for adding to the 
French territory", wrote Palmerston, and he commented later: "It 
looks as if France was unchanged in her system of encroachment, 
and it diminished the confidence in her sincerity and good faith 
which her conduct up to this time had inspired." 50 
For the Russian mission in London Talleyrand's slip was a 
welcome one. Princess Lieven, who made such a point of speaking to 
Grey and Palmerston of the Prince of Orange's return to Brussels, 
that "ni l'un ni l'autre n'a osé encore me nommer le Prince 
Leopold que comme une idée très en l'air", fully perceived the im-
portance of Talleyrand's having "singulièrement bien secondé" her 
efforts. She also claimed to have proved to Grey that the Belgian 
delegate Van de Weyer "a haussé le ton", trying to establish that the 
Belgians wanted to belong to France, or at least to have a French 
prince - an obvious reference to the Duc de Nemours - after he had 
conferred with the French Ambassador. "Lord Grey est furieux," 
noted the Princess, adding that Grey's insistence on a decisive move-
ment on the part of Russia in Poland now appeared stimulated 
afresh.51 
Even before this memorable and momentous interview the 
Belgian delegate in London believed that any movement in favour 
of the House of Orange would render Russia unwilling to agree to 
any other arrangement. Louis Philippe, as has been mentioned, no 
doubt à сопіте-соеит, seriously considered the possibility of an Orange 
5 0
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restoration because of the internal situation in Belgium, and no 
other view was held by Van de Weyer : Belgium was ripe for such a 
solution. "Ne nous dissimulons point," he wrote to his colleague in 
Paris, "nous sommes sur un volcan; le pays est sur le point de nous 
échapper; les partis s'agitent; l'Orangisme fait des progrès; incer-
titude sur notre avenir y jette beaucoup de monde." 52 
As may have been expected, therefore, Lord Ponsonby, the 
British member of the Conference's delegation to Brussels, also began 
to observe there "a crisis which if taken advantage of, may ensure 
the restoration of the Prince of Orange." He soon came to the con-
clusion that if the Prince could bring Luxemburg with him, his 
election in Belgium would be certain.53 
Under the influence of his interview with the French Ambassador 
Palmerston was of course only too glad that the idea he had con-
ceived seemed realizable. He could reckon on the whole-hearted 
support of the representatives of the Eastern Powers. Talleyrand, 
after his discomfiture with regard to Luxemburg, thought it better 
not to oppose the rest; in letters home he concealed his weakened 
position by attributing some influence in this question in London 
even to the Prince of Orange himself.64 
The Conference which at that time was mainly engaged in 
studying projects for the arrangements for the separation of Holland 
and Belgium, delegated Lieven, Matuszewic and Wessenberg to 
approach the Prince and ask him to issue a proclamation to the 
Belgians. The draft of this document had been written by Matu-
szewic but was subsequently altered by Grey to such an extent that, 
according to Talleyrand, "c'est lord Grey qui en est le véritable 
auteur. Il y met un tel prix et un intérêt tel que nous n'avons pas pu 
nous opposer à ce que cette tentative fût essayée." Yet Talleyrand 
himself* also helped with the preparation of the document and 
reckoned with the possibility of its success.85 
Grey thought of yet another measure. He realized that Ponsonby 
and Bresson, the British and the French member of the Con-
ference's delegation, could not assist with the proclamation. But 
the proclamation by itself was not enough: "A communication 
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made by him, if not very carefully looked after, may spoil everything", 
he wrote to Palmerston. Could there be no invitation from the 
Prince's influential friends? 5 e 
Palmerston had a plan of a slightly different nature. Through the 
intermediary of Bagot he requested the Papal Nuncio in the 
Netherlands, Mgr. Gapaccini, who had spent most of the preceding 
three months in London and, after a brief stay in The Hague, was 
about to come to England again, to use his influence with the 
Belgian clergy in favour of the Prince. The Foreign Secretary had 
seen the Nuncio before and found him kindly disposed to the cause 
of the House of Nassau; he thought therefore that the Nuncio 
would be willing to comply with this request. But Mgr. Gapaccini 
had in the meantime left The Hague and Palmerston's letter could 
not be delivered to him. 5 7 
The sending from London of the proclamation of the Prince 
which was to be distributed by the Prince's influential friends in Bel­
gium, had already taken place in the greatest secrecy in order to avoid 
offence to the French parti du mouvement as well as the impression of 
the Conference interfering with Belgian internal affairs. The King 
of the Netherlands was only informed after the attempt had been 
agreed on, and the preliminary steps had been taken. Even the 
Prince of Orange reported later to his father: " J e n'y suis que pour 
ma signature." While this was going on, Lord Ponsonby came to the 
conclusion that " t h e chances of the Prince of Orange have increased 
more than in geometrical ratio." ** 
Van Zuylen - who for the rest knew nothing of these moves -
again approached the Russian Ambassador. Stubbornly as he had 
defended the rights of the King of the Netherlands before 20th 
December, Lieven, once overridden, in the same way believed in the 
new situation, and had a flow of arguments to support him. As 
Belgium was the chief concern of England and France, he said, one 
could not insist on principles such as treaties or sovereign rights, 
because this would lead to conflict with France. " I looked in an 
entirely different way at the problem at the time of my passage 
through The Hague, and I am sorry that I then envisaged pros-
" Grey to Palmerston, 10 Jan., Howick MSS. Italics mine. 
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pects which do not exist," he proceeded. "No good is to be expected 
from a war. Views from St. Petersburg cannot be considered here ; 
after any matter has been decided upon here, 5 to 6 weeks must 
pass before an answer can arrive from St. Petersburg." His final 
declaration was still more positive. " I t is not the first time that I 
must act against my instructions," the Ambassador said, "but I am 
able to answer for it, and I am certain of the approval of my 
sovereign, who, were he here, would have given the same advice to 
your King." It will be shown that this statement presented a 
striking contrast to that made a few days later by Nesselrode to the 
French Charge d'affaires ; nor did Lieven mention the circumstance 
which he knew had changed the attitude of the British Cabinet.89 
He did do other things, however. The Russian Ambassador's 
activity in Belgium consisted in maintaining an agent, an old Russian 
diplomat, Baron Kriidener; Ponsonby contacted him as well. It was 
Lieven who informed Palmerston of the arrival of an Orangist 
delegation from Ghent. But Palmerston found the evidence of the 
Orangist movement, collected by Lieven, insufficient, and he 
also expected that William I would not allow his son to accept 
the crown of Belgium. Yet Palmerston was prepared to try to carry 
out the Prince's election: " . . .et le Roi s'y soumettra, de mauvaise 
grâce, comme à l'ordinaire." eo 
Palmerston accordingly thought he had found an opportunity 
to enlist support for the Prince by seeing the Papal Nuncio on 18th 
January, immediately after Mgr. Capaccini's arrival in London. The 
Foreign Secretary renewed his request to the Nuncio to intervene 
with the Belgian clergy on the Prince's behalf. But Mgr. Capaccini 
declined : the election of the Prince could only be made possible by a 
dissolution of the Congress, where the Catholics had a majority, and 
he, the Nuncio, could not advocate this measure which he consid-
ered would necessarily bring about another revolution. He more-
over did not believe in the Prince's success, knowing that the Prince 
was not prepared to give up his rights in Holland. Yet Palmerston 
expressed the hope that the election might prove possible without 
the dissolution of the Congress.61 
*· Van Zuylen to Verstolk, 18 Jan., R. A. Cf. below, p. 95. 
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At this time, however, unwelcome news was already on its way 
from The Hague to London. The King of the Netherlands, after 
some hesitation, refused his consent to the arrangement proposed by 
the Conference. The Conference was by then about to complete its 
other great Protocol, No. 9, of 20th January, which guaranteed the 
neutrality of Belgium ; Belgium having thus been made safe from the 
immediate annexationist ambitions of France - Talleyrand's 
opposition to the Protocol is the best evidence of this - the Orange 
candidature was for Lord Grey's administration no longer of par-
amount importance. But there is not enough evidence that the 
British interest in an Orange restoration was purely momentary. 
The Dutch plenipotentiaries, both opposed to this measure, believed 
that all the British Ministers sincerely supported the Prince. Grey 
and Palmerston may have had their doubts as to the desirability of 
an Orange restoration in the person of the Prince, yet they appre-
ciated that this would be a radical step in preventing new French 
intrigues in Belgium. It was up to the Russian representatives to 
try to reconcile the divergent views of the British leaders and 
William I ; they made no attempt to do this.·2 
It will be seen in the following chapter that the Orange can-
didature was a nightmare - real or pretended - for the French 
Government up to the beginning of April. It remains to be noted here 
that as soon as the first sign of a favourable disposition on the part of 
the Conference in favour of the Prince was shown, Talleyrand warned 
his government of the existence of a strong party for the Prince in 
Flanders. Even before official steps had been taken in Paris via the 
British Embassy Talleyrand called on Grey to express the great 
disapproval of his Government with the Conference's interference 
in favour of the Prince. Whether the French protest was dictated by 
fear of offending the parti du mouvement - or - as Princess Lieven 
suggested - by the hope that the unsettled state of Belgian affairs 
would in the near future allow a French annexation ofthat country, 
Grey did not know; he did have, however, a positive opinion as to 
the situation which made the French protests possible. "If you, and 
Prussia, and Austria were not all at this moment les mains liées", he 
wrote in answer to Mme Eleven's letter, "we might soon settle this 
'
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business." But there was as yet no such hope, he observed, since 
dispatches from St. Petersburg announced that no adequate forces 
could be expected on the Vistula before the end of February.93 
IV 
The assumption made by Van Zuylen on the Russian motives for 
their share in the Protocol of 20th December seems to have hardly 
any foundation. There is no evidence that either Talleyrand or 
Palmerston made any reference to Polish affairs in the conversations 
preceding the signing of the Protocol. There is, however, a pos-
sibility that either of them, especially Talleyrand, may have done 
so and - even in very vague terms - availed himself of the well known 
weakness of Lieven. It was the French Ambassador who on 21st 
December devoted a fairly long dispatch to the Polish commotions. 
He surveyed the course of PoUsh history as witnessed by himself and 
expressed his regret that Napoleon had failed to re-estabUsh the 
Polish state. "Il n'est personne maintenant", he wrote, "qui ne 
comprenne que le royaume de Pologne, fortement constitué, for-
merait la meilleure barrière contre les envahissements menaçants 
de la Russie." He reckoned that there would be sufficient national 
forces inside the former Polish territories, as well as supporting 
factors inside and outside the Russian Empire, to permit the crea-
tion of a Polish State, "si l'Angleterre voulait entrer franchement 
dans nos vues." Moreover, he believed that this could be achieved 
without war: "le cabinet de St. Pétersbourg, bien conseillé, céderait 
peut-être avec le temps à des démarches habilement combinées." 
Perhaps it was one of these, as yet entirely unofficial, démarches which 
contributed to make Lieven give way in the matter of Protocol No. 
7, a circumstance, according to Van Zuylen, not unknown to the 
Austrian Ambassador.64 It will be seen in the course of this section 
as well as in the following chapters that Talleyrand himself success-
fully used the Polish argument, though not entirely for the benefit 
of the Poles. 
As soon as the first news of the Warsaw riots reached Paris, 
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Prince Leon Sapieha, a Treasury official of the Kingdom of Poland, 
who at that time was staying in the French capital, went to see 
Sebastiani to learn the Minister's view on the subject. As there was 
no definite opinion as to the character of the movement, the French 
Minister said that if it were mere street rioting the best way out of it 
was a settlement by St. Petersburg alone. But if it appeared to be a 
national movement, the Poles might rely upon the support of 
France. Sapieha then asked if he might communicate this statement 
to Prince Adam Czartoryski (his brother-in-law) .e5 To this Sebastiani 
agreed. He further advised the Pole to go to England and to try to 
enlist the support of Lord Grey's administration.66 
At the same time the French Minister wrote a dispatch to St. 
Petersburg. Uncertain of the extent of the Polish movement, he 
expressed his concern and also his apprehension that, even if it spread 
beyond Warsaw, the Russian forces might still be able to suppress 
it. For the rest, the policy of France would in no case deviate from 
its peaceful direction; the Government was anxiously awaiting news 
from St. Petersburg and especially the arrival of credentials for 
Pozzo di Borgo as these were already more than two months over-
due, so as to be able to confirm its intention of sending the Duc de 
Mortemart (who before the July revolution had represented France 
in the Russian capital) on his peace mission to the Emperor.67 
The French Cabinet was wise enough to renew their pacific 
assurances and the Austrian Ambassador reported the unanimous 
agreement of the diplomatic corps on their "loyauté et courage." 
The Dutch representative, however, was far from believing that the 
warlike feeling in France had diminished. Besides the usual argu-
ments that Russian forces were being employed in Poland, and 
therefore unable to help to check the spreading of the revolution in 
the West of Europe, Baron Fagel observed that the war party, 
stimulated by this circumstance, had "un appui décidé dans un 
parti du Ministère français." 6e 
·* Prince Adam Czartoryski was the former friend of Emperor Alexander I 
and for a time Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. He was the most authorita-
tive personality in Poland before 1830, and the obvious choice as head of the 
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There were other factors as well which might warrant doubts 
with regard to the intention of the French Government. The French 
re-armament continued and was the subject of diplomatic activity 
during December, 1830; comments in Vienna and Berlin have 
already been mentioned above. Immediately after the Warsaw 
news the British Ambassador in Paris, Lord Stuart de Rothesay, 
proposed to the French Government a suspension of its military 
preparations, trying to persuade it that no dangerous measures from 
Russia would now arise. It seemed to the Ambassador that Sebas­
tiani was prepared to accept this view; but Louis Philippe believed 
that the continuation of re-armament "will produce the best 
security for the maintenance of peace." O n 24th December Sebas­
tiani repeated to Lord Stuart his fear that a bad impression would be 
produced on French public opinion by the suppression of the Polish 
revolution which, as he had already told the British Ambassador, 
was to be expected. The Minister instructed Talleyrand to enquire 
of the British Government if it would be inclined to offer to mediate 
in the contest between Nicholas and his Polish subjects before actual 
hostilities took place, Sebastiani talked about this démarche to the 
British Ambassador and stressed again his conviction that the 
Poles had no chance of success.69 
The interest which other Powers continued to take in French 
re-armament made Sebastiani inform the Prussian Chargé d'affaires 
in Paris, Baron Werther, that the French Government planned to 
reduce its armaments until a favourable reception would be accord-
ed to the peaceful declarations which the Duc de Mortemart was 
instructed to make in St. Petersburg; the ultimate news from the 
Russian capital would, he hoped, make it possible to suspend them 
altogether. The British Ambassador learnt of this interview from the 
Prussian representative but himself found that Sebastiani "held 
very different language to me, saying that it is useless to conceal 
from me his conviction that it is not expedient to suspend these 
preparations for war until he shall ascertain the course which the 
suppression of the Polish insurrection will induce the Russian 
Government to pursue." 70 It should be noted that only a few days 
later, on 8th January, Pozzo di Borgo presented his new credentials 
to the King of the French. 
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It was about this time that the Poles - Sapieha, Count Walewski, 
and Marquis Wielopolski - came to sound the attitude of the 
British Government towards events on the Vistula. The London 
press was most sympathetic about the Polish movement, but less 
positive evidence is available on the views held in Society. Greville 
took a rather serious view. " T h e affair at Warsaw seems to have be­
gun with a conspiracy against Constantine," he noted on 16th 
December, " a n d four of the generals who were killed perished in his 
anteroom in defending him. With the smallest beginning, however, 
nothing is more probable than a general rising in Poland; and 
what between that, Belgians and Piedmont which is threatened 
with a revolution the Continent is in such an imbroglio as this 
cannot be got right without a war; such a flame can only be 
quenched by blood." 7 1 
Lord Aberdeen noticed the embarrassment of Princess Lieven 
who, however, tried to spread the opinion that the rising would end 
with the incorporation of Poland within the Empire. I n answer to 
this Wellington observed that the war in Poland would be more 
difficult for Russia than Nicholas seemed to imagine, especially if 
the Lithuanian corps — the withdrawal of which had been reported 
by the newspapers - were not employed. " I f this is the case," wrote 
the Duke, " I don't think that the Emperor can now bring forward 
70.000 Russians into Poland. That number will not be sufficient. 
However, I wish that he may be able to settle this affair." " 
A similar wish was officially expressed by Palmerston. H.M. 
Government could give no instructions to be communicated to 
Russia "upon this delicate subject." However, "they cannot 
contemplate without shuddering the possible consequences of a war 
of extermination to be waged between the two nations". The 
British Ambassador might perhaps be able to help if an arrange­
ment wiis likely between the two parties. I n a private letter the 
Foreign Secretary requested Heytesbury to watch the conformity 
of any development of the Russian administration in Poland with 
the Vienna stipulations. The British Government did not intend to 
intervene in the contest. Things might be different if it appeared 
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that Nicholas' own forces were unable to cope with the threat. 
"But the case is not ripe for such a course at present", wrote 
Palmerston. A few days later, on receipt of the first dispatches from 
St. Petersburg after the Polish news, the Foreign Secretary thought 
that leaving discretion to Heytesbury as to the time and manner of 
some friendly advice to be given by the British Ambassador to the 
Imperial Government with regard to a settlement in Poland 
appeared to have been a sound course.7 3 
Grey also tried to employ Princess Lieven's influence for the 
same purpose; a war of extermination in Poland, which seemed only 
too likely, would both arouse the sympathy of all the nations for 
the Poles, and, possibly, strike a blow at Russian power elsewhere. 
"These, believe me, are not imaginary dangers," he continued, 
" a n d I earnestly hope that some means may be found of appetising 
the storm which appears to me to be so threatening." Unfortunately, 
the Princess not only held a different view on the subject, but 
conveyed abroad the impression that the British Prime Minister 
"wished for immediate suppression of the Polish insurrection", 
much to the annoyance of Grey. 7 4 
I n the meantime, in accordance with Sebastiani's advice, Prince 
Leon Sapieha came to London and went to see Grey. As he had a 
passport issued by Pozzo, and even dined at the Russian Embassy, 
Grey made no difficulty in receiving him, not expecting censure 
from Princess Lieven. Nor did he hold out to the Pole any 
views which departed from those expressed in his letters to the 
Princess. Reminded of his pamphlet on Poland, Grey said he had 
not changed in principle; but in view of the existing danger that the 
French would be driven by public opinion to attempt to annex 
Belgium, Britain must have an ally capable of counter-acting such a 
move. This could only be Russia. Less discouraging was Palmer-
ston's statement, but, noted the Polish agent, it amounted to the 
same thing. For the rest, no better prospects were held out by other 
people. Talleyrand was reported to have said that the British 
Ministers did not want to listen to any proposals concerning Poland. 
The Duchesse de Dino's comment was: " L a question polonaise qui 
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rencontre une si juste sympathie sur le continent civilisé, ici 
n'inspire rien. Mme Lieven qui domine Lord Grey se sert de tout 
son crédit pour détacher à cet égard le cabinet anglais." More 
influenced perhaps by this opinion than by what he had heard from 
Grey, Sapieha thought that it would be good enough if Britain 
were not to oppose a French intervention.75 
Princess Lieven was, however, far from content with the 
opinions prevaihng in London with regard to Poland, even before 
she learnt of the instructions on that subject sent to Heytesbury. 
Yet, apart from the Press, there did not seem to be anything in Lon-
don to take the place of the kind of speech Lafayette made in the 
French Chamber, where he said that, supported by the general 
wish in all Europe, Poland was about to become independent. The 
most characteristic pronouncement on the subject of Poland must 
be considered to be the comment which that undoubted friend of 
the Poles, Lord Holland, delivered on Lafayette's speech: " I wish 
Poland could be pacified & arranged without great military move-
ments," he wrote to Grey, "though I also wish Lafayette had re-
frained from talking about i t ."7 e 
About this time it became known through various channels that 
the Grand Duke Constantine had left all his archives at Warsaw; 
the Polish Government seized them but, contrary to Heytesbury's 
expectation, they were not published and only some of the doc-
uments were communicated abroad. Talleyrand, too, got hold of 
the news and caused Princess Lieven to make the following report. 
" M . de Talleyrand a dit hier à que lqu 'un . . . que le soi-disant 
Gouvernement de Varsovie avait transmis à Paris une lettre de 
l 'Empereur au Grand Duc Constantin, . . . , par laquelle il apporte 
que l'Empereur avait pris la ferme résolution de faire la guerre à la 
France - cette lettre renferme des détails ; il y est fait mention entre 
autres de 200 canons, e t c . . " And the French Ambassador was 
said to have commented that the Poles must be helped, "car si 
l 'Empereur triomphe d'eux, nous aurions notre tour." " 
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That news was, at any rate for the British Government out-of-
date and a different, more recent piece of news arrested their 
attention. In the second fortnight of December an account of 
Metternich's interview with the French Ambassador in Vienna 
circulated in the European capitals. The Austrian Chancellor was 
said to have regretted the error of Kaunitz in helping towards the 
partition of Poland and thus establishing a common frontier be-
tween Russia and Austria, about which the latter felt by no means 
comfortable. Other reports, too, confirmed not only that France was 
uneasy about the coming advance of the Russian forces into Poland, 
fearing that Nicholas' army, after a speedy crushing of the Polish 
resistance, would be tempted to cross the frontiers of the Empire, 
but also that Austria had speeded up the pace of her re-arming " à 
cause de la révolution polonaise dont on ne peut prévoir les sui-
t e s . . . " ; the Russian forces, collected for the purpose of suppress-
ing the Polish revolt, arrived in the neighbourhood of the Austrian 
territories. In their turn, 60.000 Austrian soldiers were sent to guard 
the frontiers of Galicia, the Polish province of Austria. In Vienna "on 
tient conseil sur conseil [the subject being the cost of troops]", 
reported the Dutch representative. Meanwhile via diplomatic 
channels Metternich's pronouncement had become common 
knowledge in governmental circles. Lord Stuart de Rothesay 
reported it from Paris; Lord Holland wondered at it, and it no 
doubt influenced his view of the rôle of Austria as he later expounded 
it to the Poles as well as to his colleagues. Biilow found it necessary to 
mention it as late as May, 1831, and Palmerston told Princess 
Lieven about it early in January, whereupon she promptly wrote to 
St. Petersburg.78 
On the other hand Palmerston made no great scruples about 
seeing Marquis Wielopolski, the official envoy of the Polish Govern-
78
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ment. Wielopolski's arrival in London (delayed, as he had been re­
fused a visa by Lord Stuart and only obtained one after producing 
a French passport, readily supplied by Sebastiani) received consider­
able publicity through the newspapers, and drew the attention of 
Greville, who noted it on 12th January. 7 9 The Foreign Secretary 
told the Polish envoy that Lieven had been informed of their 
meeting, nevertheless it would be better to arrange for a private 
interview. He then saw Wielopolski again on 24th or 25th January. 
Both interviews were limited to an exchange of information about the 
constitution of the Kingdom of Poland and the British standpoint in 
this regard, which did not go beyond what had already officially 
been conveyed to the Ambassador in St. Petersburg. The Polish 
envoy gave no account of the place of the meeting, but Van Zuylen's 
report of the end of January indicates that no particular secrecy 
seems to have been observed. " T h e Foreign Office presented on the 
25th a peculiar sight," wrote the Dutch plenipotentiary. "Upstairs 
the Conference have been sitting, including ourselves [i.e., Falck 
and Van Zuylen]. Below, Van de Weyer and Vilain X I V were 
waiting; in another room the Ghent deputation [the Orangists] and 
in still another room the Polish representative of the Insurrec­
t i o n ! ! ! " 8 0 
The mere presence of Wielopolski in London was in itself a 
problem to the Russian mission. Tirelessly watching the slightest 
appearances in favour of the Poles Princess Lieven had already be­
fore 8th January enquired of Palmerston if he had had any com­
munications with the Poles. He answered that he had not - though 
he had seen Sapieha and must have, by that time, arranged for the 
first interview with Wielopolski - but that if he should have any, all 
" Wielopolski himself requested the newspapers to announce the arrival of 
a n envoy from the National Government of Poland. Palmerston, therefore, at 
first categorically refused Sapieha's request to let h im introduce Wielopolski. 
Sapieha, Memoirs, p . 119; Greville Diary, I I , 107, refers to the arrival of an envoy 
from the Poles which " h a d naturally given umbrage to the Lievens." Hobhouse 
described a public dinner given in honour of Wielopolski, at which, to his great 
annoyance, he took the chair. " T h e Polish Marquis spoke for more than one hour 
in French. H e was in b a d spirits and told me that, al though he had letters of 
introduction to several persons connected with the government, not one of t h e m 
would receive him. Prince Gzartoryski had given him a letter to our Lord 
Chancellor [Brougham] who behaved to him like the rest ." Hobhouse, Some 
Account of a Long Life, I I , 84-5. T h e dinner was probably that held in March, cf 
below, p . 119. 
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would be arranged in a spirit of friendliness to the Emperor; and 
that meant, judging from the rest of the letter, that by restoring to the 
Poles the constitution granted to them by the Emperor Alexander, 
Nicholas would acquire "plus de gloire et de vrai pouvoir qu'en 
roulant sous ses pieds les cadavres de cinquante mille Polonais." 
But Palmerston admittted that he did not expect that his remarks 
would encounter a favourable reception.81 
Grey, according to Wielopolski, did not turn up for the meeting 
privately arranged on 8th January, and this the Polish envoy 
ascribed to a very important and very drastic conference on Belgian 
affairs, held one or two days before ; but some days later Princess 
Lieven noted the presence of Wielopolski at Talleyrand's, on which 
occasion "M. Esterhazy a causé avec le député, il me l'a dit lui-
même, Bülow prétend ne l'avoir pas fait." She learnt the fact from 
Grey, who again was at great pains to explain to her the difficulty 
of remaing silent upon the affairs of Poland. The Princess contin-
ued, however, to tell him "que le conseil le plus voilé ou le plus 
délicat" would invariably meet "une réponse sèche et désobli-
geante." The French Embassy was soon closed to Wielopolski, 
on account of Russian influence as he believed.82 
In Paris, however, the Ministers were not in a position to avoid 
contact with the Poles. During the two meetings which Sebastiani 
had with another Polish agent, Wolicki, the Minister held out no 
promises but only expressed general sympathy, whilst on the second 
occasion, 8th January, he coupled this sympathy with a vague 
utterance of the possibility of a "more decisive attitude" of France 
towards the Polish movement if it should hold out beyond ist 
March.83 Meanwhile the credentials of Pozzo had arrived, and the de-
parture of the Duc de Mortemart was decided upon ; the Ambassador 
declared to Wolicki: "Je n'ai véritablement accepté cette pénible 
ambassade que par sympathie pour votre illustre nation et dans 
81
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l'espoir d'arriver à temps auprès de votre roi constitutionnel pour 
vous réconcilier avec lui." Mortemart may have been sincere in 
making this statement- it was known that he only reluctantly 
associated himself with the Orleanist régime, while he did not 
expect that this statement would be published by a French news-
paper; on 26th January, at the time of the publication, he had just 
had his secret interview with a Polish envoy on his way through 
Prussian territory and the dethronement of the Romanovs had al-
ready been pronounced by the Polish Diet.84 
Nicholas may have hoped for a peaceful settlement with the 
Poles - on his own terms - but the feeling in St. Petersburg hardly 
allowed for a settlement as a result of French mediation. Already at 
the time of the French declaration against any Russian interven-
tion Nicholas gave the French Chargé d'affaires an account of the 
intercepted Polish letter which he considered as evidence of the 
Polish revolution having been prearranged with France, while 
Bourgoing was convinced that owing to Russian military superiority 
"la question polonaise est dès à présent jugée." This also accounted 
for Nicholas' attitude in Belgian affairs: in an audience early in 
January he seemed satisfied with France's pacific declarations, but 
the idea of armed intervention in Belgium in favour of the King of 
the Netherlands did not leave his thoughts; when Bourgoing re-
presented to him the international dangers of such a solution, Nicho-
las answered that exaggerated cautiousness accounted for the loss 
of Belgium by William I. In a subsequent dispatch, concerning 
African affairs, Bourgoing said that in view of the preoccupation of 
the Emperor with Poland and Belgium Mortemart would expe-
rience no difficulty in obtaining Russian consent to the recognition 
of the conquests in Algiers.88 
As far as Polish affairs were concerned, Mortemart could not 
expect any success. Nicholas' distrust of France received a fresh 
stimulus at the reception of some news which had very little 
foundation, namely, that as soon as the outbreak in Warsaw became 
known, a great number of French officers "s'est mis en route pour 
se ranger sous le drapeau de la révolte." As Sebastiani ostensibly kept 
aloof from the Polish movement, while French military preparations 
continued and would involve the necessity of keeping those of-
e l
 Barosz, "La révolution polonaise de 18306! la déchéance du tzar Nicolas Ier", 
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ficers at home, St. Petersburg circles considered this news as 
evidence of an organised secret measure of the French Government. 
Heytesbury, who had just received his instructions with regard to 
Poland, wrote back to say that in his opinion no interference with 
regard to Poland would meet with a favourable reception.88 
In the middle of January the news of the Belgian Protocol, No. 7, 
began to arrive. The Protocol was found unsatisfactory because it 
contained no statement with regard to the rights of the House of 
Nassau; dispatches from The Hague tended to strengthen this 
view. On 29th January Nesselrode told the French Chargé d'affaires 
that governments should not yield to the Belgian revolutionaries 
who persisted in their refusal of the Prince of Orange. Bourgoing 
then again represented the dangers inherent in all forcible measures ; 
could not the King of the Netherlands be advised by the Emperor to 
make some sacrifices in the cause of peace? The answer was quite 
positive: "Vous pouvez être persuadé que ce ne serait jamais de sa 
part que viendront de semblables conseils", said Nesselrode. Bour-
going thought he had obtained some success in having the Vice-
Chancellor agree to one of the most delicate points, that an armed 
intervention in Luxemburg by the Federal troops should take place 
"aussi tard que possible". Heytesbury, however, considered his tone 
about Luxemburg had changed a good deal in that France now 
admitted the possibility of a military action. In the meantime, the 
basic attitude of the Imperial Government remained unaltered: 
Nesselrode expressed his dissatisfaction that the Conference applied 
the same tone both to William I and to the Belgian Provisional 
Government. Lieven's signature on the Protocol of 20th December 
had only been approved because it still left open the only safe 
solution for Belgium, the placing of its sovereignty with a prince of 
the House of Nassau.87 
Some days later new reports from Lieven seemed to supply new 
evidence of French duplicity in Belgian affairs as well as in their 
pacific assurances. Sebastiani was said to have seen Pozzo on 22th 
January, and after a review of the Belgian difficulties-the weakness 
of the Orange party, and the French complaints with regard to the 
injurious treaties of 1814/15 - the Minister proposed a partition of 
" Heytesbury to Palmerston, 21, 22 Jan., F.O. Russia; Van Heeckeren to 
Verstolk, 23 Jan., R.A. 
" Heytesbury to Palmerston, 11, 19, 31 Jan., F.O. Russia; Bourgoing to 
Sebastiani, 29 Jan., A.é. Russie. 
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Belgium to the Russian Ambassador. To the further amazement 
of Pozzo di Borgo Sebastiani supported his proposal by adding 
"qu'en cas de g u e r r e . . . la France saurait trouver des auxiliaires 
dans toute l'Europe, qu'il dépendait d'elle de fomenter des trou-
bles partout où elle voudrait; qu'on est informé à Paris que toute 
l'armée prussienne est gang renée . . . " etc. Lord Heytesbury con-
sidered this to be just another example of France's taking ad-
vantage of the troubled state of Europe, quoting "the occupation 
given to the Russian armies by the Polish insurrection" as its first 
instance. The bad faith of the French Government was proved 
beyond any doubt, thought the Netherlands Minister; "L 'Empe-
reur est content de le voir jeter le masque", he wrote.88 
A few days earlier the Netherlands Minister, having completed 
his record of the protocols of the Conference up to 9th January, 
and with adequate instructions from home, went to see the Vice-
Chancellor. "Le Cte Nesselrode a commencé par me témoigner 
combien il était désespéré que les Plénipotentiaires russes se fussent 
regardés comme obligés de signer le protocol de 20 Xbre" , reported 
van Heeckeren. His reply was that he only understood that the 
plenipotentiaries had not been disavowed entirely, because there 
was no question at all of the rights of the House of Nassau in the 
Protocol ; but consent to the full independence of Belgium - con-
firmed by new instructions to Lieven sent at the end of January -
after all, gave evidence of yielding to the revolution. Nesselrode 
defended himself saying that these instructions would only be 
carried out if the King agreed; and he was sure that the King would. 
But Van Heeckeren still protested - the arrangement proved that 
Russia had given way. In reply, the Russian Minister made the 
following statement : 
"Je l'atteste devant D i e u . . . , la Russie fait tout ce qu'elle peut 
pour défendre les intérêts du Roi des Pays Bas; mais accordez aussi 
la part des événemens: de quelque coté que nous tournions nos 
regards, que voyons-nous? La France hostile, l'Angleterre plus 
qu'incertaine et sans force, la Prusse sans min is t re . . . , l'Autriche 
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faible et se taisant, nous-mêmes les affaires de la Pologne sur les 
bras et de la sorte en présence des immenses événemens; mais 
laissez-nous sortir des embarras que nous suscite l'insurrection 
de Varsovie et vous voyez si la Russie saura reprendre le langage 
qu'elle doit tenir dans les affaires de l'Europe." e9 
The weeks past had already witnessed a certain reassurance on the 
part of the Imperial Govemement, while at that time the end of the 
Polish revolt was expected, any day and with mixed feelings, in 
most European capitals. 
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If the outbreak of the rising in Warsaw complicated affairs in 
Europe, already unsetded by events in Paris and Brussels during the 
previous summer, the early months of the year 1831 brought 
further aggravation of the international situation. A breakdown of 
the Polish movement would confront Europe with large Russian 
forces, ready to march, and, it was felt, likely to be employed in 
Belgium or elsewhere in the West; a possible intervention by 
foreign Powers in Poland, such as to exclude military operations, 
and, consequently, a full Russian mobilization, was uncompro-
misingly handicapped not only by the unwillingness of St. Petersburg 
but also by the dethronement of Nicholas, pronounced by the 
Polish Diet. At the same time difficulties had arisen in Belgium 
about the election of a king. Popular feeling seemed to favour either 
the Duc de Nemours, a son of Louis Philippe, or the Due de Leuch-
tenberg, the stepson of Napoleon, neither of whom was acceptable 
to both of the Powers most interested, France and Britain; there 
existed a party for the Prince of Orange, whose candidature enjoy-
ed the special support of Russia and was greatly assisted by the 
British member of the Conference's representation in Brussels, 
Lord Ponsonby. Thirdly, in the latter half of February commotions 
began in Italy and menaced Austro-French relations. Placed in the 
midst of affairs so complicated the French Ambassador in Vienna, 
Marshal Maison, thought that war was inevitable. In this spirit he 
wrote privately to his colleague at Constantinople; and his opinions 
made General Guilleminot act in a way which caused a major 
diplomatic incident several weeks later, with repercussions in Lon-
don as well as in St. Petersburg.1 
I 
Almost at the same time as the French Government tried to raise 
1
 Maison to Guilleminot, 24 Febr., 1831, A.é. Autriche. See further below, 
P· 143. 
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apprehensions in London with regard to the consequences of a 
Russian victory in Poland, Poland was the subject of concern and 
mixed feelings on the part of the other partners of Nicholas. Lord 
Cowley, the British Ambassador to Vienna, began his dispatch of 
7th January by a review of opinions on the effect of military opera-
tions on the Vistula. Even a prolonged resistance by the Poles would 
give rise to serious disturbances in Germany and Italy, encouraging 
the people and dispersing the forces of the two great German Powers 
guarding the Eastern frontiers. On the other hand, Russian success, 
which would bring an army of 150.000 along the frontiers of Germany, 
would make the Confederation adopt much firmer language towards 
France. This success could, however, be achieved in a variety of 
ways. The Austrian Chancellor informed Cowley of his refusal of the 
secret offer of the Polish crown for the Archduke Charles; this 
refusal was coupled with the advice to the Poles to submit. Metter-
nich also said to Cowley that the Dictator Chlopicki was seeking to 
come to terms with Emperor Nicholas, and this, the Ambassador 
found out, was the opinion of many Poles in Vienna. Yet, a week later, 
he reported the Austrian view from St. Petersburg - that several 
months would have to elapse before Poland could be pacified.2 
The Polish rising caused even more inconvenience to the Prussian 
Government. The French Chargé d'affaires in Berlin, Mortier, was 
able to ascertain to his surprise that a gentleman from Prussian 
Poland, Count Raczynski, who had an established position in Ber-
lin, had approached several persons in Court and Government circles 
about the possibility of mediation by Frederick William I I I between 
Nicholas and his Polish subjects; to the even greater surprise of 
Mortier Ancillon denied Raczynski's overtures, of which the French 
Chargé d'affaires knew the Russian Ambassador in Berlin had learnt 
from the Prussian Government. I t was known in diplomatic circles 
that a senior officer, sent by the Government to Vienna under the 
pretext of presenting the King of Hungary with the insignia of the 
Order of the Black Eagle was really instructed to establish a common 
line of antagonistic policy towards Poland between the two Gov-
ernments. On the other hand it appeared to Mortier that the King 
of Prussia was almost anxious to write to his Imperial son-in-law 
upon the subject of mediation if the Poles asked for it.3 
2
 Cowley to Palmerston, 7, 15 Jan., F.O. Austria. 
s
 Mortier to Sebastiani, 11 Jan. : "V.E. sera peut-être étonné qu'un sujet du 
Roi de Prusse intervienne auprès de son Gouvernement en faveur du parti qui 
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The interest of France in the Polish question continued, though 
in a different way. The French proposal made to Britain through 
Lord Stuart de Rothesay for a joint note to St. Petersburg to estab-
lish that there would be no change in the status of the Kingdom of 
Poland as set-up in 1815 was refused; Sebastiani, however, took the 
opportunity to stress to Lord Granville, the new Ambassador, that 
the French Government appreciated the British standpoint that an 
incorporation of Poland with Russia would be inconsistent with the 
Treaty of Vienna. In his reply to Mortier Sebastiani approved 
his attitude towards Raczynski but pointed out that all Polish 
agents should be well received because of the interest and sympathy 
which their cause aroused in France; the French Government, if 
unable to act in favour of the Poles, had to reckon with public 
opinion which demanded such an action.4 
Though the French proposal had been refused, in England, too, 
some uneasiness was felt about the future status of the Kingdom 
of Poland in consequence of the approaching struggle. Princess 
Lieven reported with regret that instructions concerning Poland had 
been sent to Lord Heytesbury; this came to her knowledge the day 
after she had noted that the interest of Government circles in the 
contest on the Vistula did not stretch beyond sympathy; it was 
through her that Grey advised the observance of the Treaty of 
Vienna by no less a remark than that in 1815 a mere suggestion of 
the incorporation of Poland in Russia "very nearly produced war." 5 
If only through newspapers, the concern of Paris and London 
with the Polish question could not pass unnoticed in Berlin, and 
the Prussian Government thought it advisable to calm down what 
appeared to be public excitement. Early in February Ancillon 
assured the British Minister that the Emperor Nicholas had no inten-
tion of incorporating Poland in Russia, and as apprehensions were 
s'est emparé du pouvoir à Varsovie, et que des Princes de sa maison et des hommes 
influens de son Gouvernement prêtent oreille à ses ouvertures, surtout lorsqu'il 
n 'a pas un caractère officiel. Le fait peut paraî tre étonnant au premier abord, 
mais, si d 'un côté, on se rend compte des embarras que causent à la Prusse les 
événemens de Pologne et de son désir qu'ils ayent promptement un fin, cependant 
elle est disposée à recevoir toute communication qui annoncerait de la part du 
dictateur la volonté de réclamer sa médiat ion." O n the real purpose of General 
Roeder 's mission to Vienna : Cowley to Palmerston, 20 J a n . , F .O . Austria. 
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entertained in France and England about the fate of that country, 
he would instruct Biilow to make an appropriate statement on the 
subject to Palmerston. Notwithstanding this assurance Chad took 
another opportunity of speaking on the subject, which was supplied 
by the news of a proclamation addressed to the Poles by Nicholas. 
In an interview with the British Minister Bernstorff said that this 
proclamation amounted to the announcement of great changes in 
the governmental system in Poland. To this Chad replied that an 
incorporation within the Empire would play in the hands of France, 
who was looking for a pretext for war. The Prussian Minister did 
not directly deny this suggestion; he merely observed that France, 
professing the idea of self-determination of peoples, would be 
compelled to admit that the Poles had dissolved the Treaty obliga-
tions by their rising. Apparently, though Chad could not readily 
confirm this, Berlin was confident of the speedy suppression of the 
revolt; it was even supposed that after the defeat the Polish cavalry 
might attempt to force their way through Germany to France." 
Similar expectations were held in the other two Eastern capitals ; 
by the second half of February there was a general belief that the 
Russian forces then entering the Kingdom would soon bring an end 
to the Polish movement opening the way for all that had been feared 
in the West. "Toutes chances de succès semblent être du côté des 
Russes", wrote Bourgoing from St. Petersburg. French reports from 
Berlin, like those of Chad, were not so alarming, but both Maison 
and Cowley noted the constant increase of warlike tendencies around 
the Russian Embassy in Vienna.7 
It seemed obvious that France had to do something to avert the 
apparent Russian menace, directed - and there were no illusions as 
to this in Paris, nor elsewhere - against almost everything that the 
July revolution stood for. The mission of the Duc de Mortemart, 
planned for weeks, was designed to serve this purpose ; his instruc-
tions give ample evidence of the great concern of the French Govern-
ment with regard to Mortemart's success. His mission, it was said, 
had for its only object the strengthening of the friendship between the 
• Chad to Palmerston, 6, 16, 20, 23 Febr.; the report of the 16th reads: "The 
Russians here, tho' quite confident of victory, are not without anxiety as to the 
price at which it will be obtained." F.O. Prussia. 
7
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two monarchs and the two nations, "qui peuvent le plus influer sur 
l'avenir de l'Europe et qui sont le plus en état de lui assurer le bien-
fait de maintien de la paix. Cette mission est donc pour ainsi dire, 
Européenne", proceeds the document, "et en effet, l'Europe entière 
y est intéressée: elle en suivra les phases avec sollicitude." The back-
ground of the European situation is then immediately developed. 
"Deux questions principales et d'une nature également grave dans 
leur principe comme dans leurs conséquences fixent en ce moment 
l'attention des hommes d'état et excitent l'intérêt des peuples: je 
veux parler de la révolution de Belgique et de l'insurrection de 
Pologne." The exposé of French views concerning Belgium with 
great care aims at showing all the good will possible. The French 
Government was aware of the Belgian inclination for a reunion with 
France; it repulsed the idea entirely, yet was mindful of the in-
fluence which the state of affairs in Belgium exercised upon France. 
The Emperor of Russia should, therefore, appreciate the loyalty of 
the King of the French, who in these circumstances was determined 
to refuse the offer of the Belgian crown for his son. Events in Poland 
would not change French policy in Belgium; France wanted for 
Poland a reconciliation with the Emperor and peace. "Si nous pou-
vons contribuer à ce résultat par quelques démarches, nous les ferions 
avec empressement ; mais cette intervention tout amicale, toute paci-
fique de notre part ne saura avoir lieu qu'autant que la Russie non 
seulement y consentirait mais encore paraîtrait la désirer." 8 
At the time of writing the above Sebastiani expressed a belief 
that Nicholas was disposed to negotiate - though he would not 
make the first step - as otherwise a victory "would be dearly 
bought", but later reports show that the French Government could 
not very well expect a welcome from Nicholas to any interference 
on its part, while it was equally aware of mixed, if not depressed 
feelings at Warsaw.9 
The Poles would have been surprised to read Mortemart's instruct-
ions; they hoped much from his mission. Accordingly, a Government 
official had been sent to meet him secretly on his way to St. Peters-
burg ; the interview took place on 24th January in a stage coach 
near the Eastern frontier of the Grand Duchy of Posen, and lasted 
8
 Sebastiani to Mortemart, 9 Jan., A.é. Russie. Mortemart left Paris on the 
10th; the credentials of Pozzo were presented on the 8th; cf. above p. 88 and 94. 
9
 Granville to Palmerston, 7, 31 Jan., F.O. France; Durand to Sebastiani, 
18 Jan., A.é. Pologne; cf. below, p. 105. 
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three hours. Mortemart listened to the account of the rising, and 
himself spoke much about the situation in France and elsewhere, 
which he painted in dark colours; he advised further negotiations 
with Nicholas; he promised no help from France in the struggle. 
The only hopeful thing he said was that France would prevent 
Prussia from interfering. The Polish agent, quite disappointed, 
said that the Poles were fighting for their independence and would 
either obtain this or nothing; to this the French Ambassador 
replied : "Eh bien, je vous le dis avec douleur mais avec une profonde 
conviction: ce sera rien." 10 Yet he found the military aspect most 
important; closing his report he observed that the Poles could have 
gone unopposed as far as Dvina had they prevented in time, as they 
could easily have done, the joining of the forces of Diebitsch with 
those of the Grand Duke Constantine.11 
Sebastiani approved of Mortemart's attitude towards the Polish 
agent; he wrote in reply that a terrible struggle, which would end 
with a Russian victory, was to be expected, and instructed the 
Ambassador to seek mercy from the Emperor for the defeated.12 
France was also envisaging other consequence of the approaching 
Russian campaign in Poland ; great concern had been shown in Pa-
ris at the first news of the Russian mobilization and, as has been point-
ed out above, the reaction in St. Petersburg, in consequence of the 
French protest could not but greatly increase the apprehensions 
entertained in the French capital. London was the first to be ap-
proached on this subject; in the interview of 20th January, already 
referred to, Sebastiani pointed out to the British Ambassador that, 
if a Russian victory was rapid and decisive, "large Russian forces in 
Poland would present an attitude so menacing, as greatly to in-
crease the probablity of war." 13 Subsequently, this matter was 
raised in Vienna, now greatly embarrassed with the state of Italy, 
and in Berlin, always more sensitive as well as more vulnerable. This 
time, however, even less success was achieved in the Prussian capital. 
10
 J . Dutkiewicz, Poland and France in 1831, pp . 62-3, cf. St. Barzykowski, 
Historya Powstania Listopadowego (The History of the November Rising), Poznan 
1883-4, II» 66 sq; quotation from P. Thureau-Dangin, Histoire de la monarchie 
de juillet, Paris 1884-92, I, 168. 
11
 Mor temar t to Sebastiani, 28 J a n . (from Königsberg), A.é. Russie. T h e 
meeting of Mortemart with the Polish agent was no secret in Berlin, not even 
to the diplomatic corps, Chad to Palmerston, 30 J a n . , P .O. Prussia,cf. Hil lebrand, 
Geschichte Frankreichs, I, 169. 
12
 Sebastiani to Mortemart , 20, 28 Febr., A.é. Russie. 
13
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Metternich refused to consider disarmament as long as the 
insurrection lasted in Poland ; but he assured the French Ambassador 
that nothing was to be feared from Russia, as she would have to lead 
her armies through Prussian and Austrian lands, and the respective 
governments would not allow her to do so. But Maison observed at 
the same time : "Le langage de la Russie est on ne peut pas plus belli-
queux." On a subsequent occasion Metternich admitted that some 
uneasiness might have been felt about Russian intentions after their 
forces arrived in the very centre of Europe, but at this time he felt 
none ; yet Maison again was compelled to record warlike sentiments 
around the Russian Embassy.14 
The French Charge d'affaires in Berlin was glad to report that 
Ancillon changed his tone with regard to Belgium ; hopes and fears 
on account of the Prince of Orange's chances were reduced to "des 
regrets impuissants" ; but from the interview with Bernstorff Mortier 
drew the conclusion that the withdrawal of the Duc de Nemours had 
been, in the opinion of the Prussian Government, dictated by fear. 
Nor was the King of Prussia inclined to depart from his wish to main-
tain the House of Nassau in Belgium; he did, however, call the 
Russian mobilization "une grande imprudence" and affirmed that 
the Russian army would not be allowed to pass through his domin-
ions. Apart from this, military circles hoped for a Russian victory 
as a check against the war party in the French Cabinet, but realized 
the difficulties of the military operations.15 
In the meantime the Duc de Mortemart completed his journey, 
which took more than four weeks, and on 8th February arrived in 
the Russian capital. The audience which on 12th February 
Nicholas granted to the French Ambassador was almost entirely 
devoted to Polish affairs. "S . M. m'a, d'abord, remercié des dis-
positions que le Gouvernement du Roi apportait dans la question de 
la Pologne," reported the Ambassador, "ainsi que des efforts faits par 
l'administration pour neutraliser le fâcheux effet, qu'auraient pu 
produire sur la population Polonaise, déjà si exaltée, les excitations 
14
 Maison to Sebastiani, 15, 16, 25, 26 Febr., A.é. Autriche. 
15
 Mortier to Sebastiani, 15, 19, 20 Febr., A.é. Prusse; Gen. Wolzogen to 
Natzmer, 17 Febr . : "Dass Soult und Sebastiani den Krieg wollen, bin ich auch 
ü b e r z e u g t . . . Hoffentlich werden die Russen bald im Besitz von Warschau sein, 
obwohl die nun mit Eis gehende Weichsel viele Schwierigkeiten legen wird. 
Ist die polnische Angelegenheit beseitigt, so werden 150,000 M a n n an unsren 
Grenzen disponibel." G. E. v. Natzmer, Denkivürdigkeiten aus dem Leben des Gen. 
Oldwig von Natzmer, Berlin 1887-g, I, 262. 
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contenues dans nos feuilles publiques." Mortemart only tried to 
strengthen this impression of the Emperor. Nicholas spoke of the 
dethronement of his family, recently (on 25th January) pro-
nounced by the Polish Diet, "avec plus de regret et de pitié que 
d'indignation", so it seemed to the Ambassador. The few sentences 
concerning Belgian affairs led him to the conclusion that the 
Emperor admitted there was but little chance for the Prince of 
Orange and thought, in any case, that this matter might rest with 
the Russian plenipotentiaries at the Conference. Later, when St. 
Petersburg learnt of the refusal of the Duc de Nemours, Nicholas 
sent his principal aide-de-camp, Benckendorff, to Mortemart to 
express his approval. Unfortunately, the Ambassador had to supple-
ment his report with information about renewed hopes of the 
Emperor for the Prince of Orange's return to Brussels.18 
More detailed explanations, however, which Mortemart made 
on the ground of his later instructions, were coldly received. Nessel-
rode complained of the French refusal to accede to the Conference's 
decision with regard to the division of the debt and "de la manière 
dont les députés belges étaient reçus à Paris." Mortemart believed 
that his reply satisfied the Vice-Chancellor, "néanmoins, il n'était 
question d'aucune réponse, lorsque les nouvelles de Pologne sont 
arrivées." This was the news of the first encounter between the 
Russian and the Polish forces, the battle of Stoczek on 14th February 
which, though a comparatively minor engagement, was a complete 
Polish success. "Alors on m'annonce le départ subit d'un courrier", 
continued the French Ambassador, "pour remercier le Roi de ses 
démarches, mais, sans doute, pour une autre cause . . . " 17 
This occasion prompted Mortemart to describe at some length his 
position at the Russian Court. "Tout ici est contre nous: la diplo-
matie étrangère et les courtisans. On nous a reconnus par crainte et, 
maintenant, l 'Empereur tiendra sa parole envers et contre tous. 
Quant à son amitié, nous ne l'acquerrons également que par la 
crainte; mais nous pourrons aussi sûrement y compter." According-
ly, Mortemart saw little chance to bring about a real rapprochement 
between France and Russia, and thought it better to withdraw at 
the first appearance of failure. 
u
 Mortemart to Sebastiani, 14, 23 Feb., A.é. Russie; cf. also below, p. 110 sq. 
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 The debt was the subject of Protocol No. 9, of 27 January. Mortemart to 
Sebastiani, 28 Febr., A.é. Russie, cf. R. F. Leslie, Polwh Politics and the Revolution 
0/1830, 1956, p. 166. 
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Like his report of the meeting with the Polish agent, the conclu-
sion of his dispatch stated somewhat regretfully, the military 
position: "Les fautes du général Diebitsch sont patentes. Les Polo-
nais n'ont su en profiter. La question est encore indécise; ils seront 
néanmoins écrasés." 1 β 
A rather singular comment on the first démarches of Mortemart 
was delivered by the Netherlands Minister in St. Petersburg; 
according to him the Ambassador denied having received any 
instructions in favour of the Poles; Mortemart himself does not 
record any statement to this effect in his account of the first audience 
with the Emperor. Baron Van Heeckeren found out, however, that 
Mortemart had been trying to enlist the support of the British 
Ambassador; speaking to Lord Heytesbury the French Ambassador 
had again referred to difficulties which would arise after the Polish 
defeat; the presence of considerable Russian forces in the very heart 
of Germany "changerait entièrement la face des choses et serait à la 
longue une position que ni ces deux puissances ni la France elle-
même ne pourraient tolérer." Van Heeckeren's comment of course 
was that Russia would certainly profit from this circumstance to 
adopt an attitude more convenient for her policy "et nous verrons 
plus tard si effectivement le Duc [de Mortemart] est autorisé de 
faire des représentations sérieuses à cet égard." 1B 
Thus it appeared at least as if the Netherlands Minister attrib-
uted to France the intention of influencing the political situation 
by diplomatic steps in favour of the defeated Poles. 
The French Government, already in a difficult position with 
regard to Belgium, needed Mortemart's success badly. From Paris 
Granville was confidentially reporting repeated warnings from the 
Russian Ambassador of an imminent French attack. Eventually, it 
seemed to Granville that "Pozzo appears to wish to commit us to a 
quarrel with France," but that the Russian Ambassador's collea-
gues were less anxious to work in this direction; no doubt, thought 
Granville, because they would have to sustain a French attack first.20 
18
 Mortemart to Sebastiani, 28 Febr., A.é. Russie. 
19
 Van Heeckeren to Verstolk, 2 Mar . , R.A. 
20
 Granville to Palmerston, g, 11 Febr., Palm MSS. The letter of the gth 
reads: "Pozzo di Borgo has for some days been showing particular empressement 
to converse with me. His object means to be to convince me that Sebastiani is 
not to be believed, that the King, from his wish to be well with all parties, is 
not to be relied upon ; that war is inevitable and all the Powers of Europe should 
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The British Abassador had no more success in trying to mitigate 
French re-armament. Already at the end of January Granville 
reported that a French levy of troops, previously fixed for April, 
was to take place immediately. In the beginning of February the 
question of Nemours' election disclosed, in Palmerston's words, 
"their [French] designs upon Belgium, and the underhand proceed-
ings which they are carrying on with reference to that country. Yet, 
where nobody threatened them, their war preparations continued." 
On 22nd and 23rd February Granville devoted two interviews with 
Sebastiani to this problem. The Minister, however, declined to 
consider a suggestion of disarmament. As if he had been listening to 
conversations between Pozzo and the British Ambassador, he referred 
to the repeated attempts of Russia to create an anti-French coalition 
during the previous months. He mentioned a new levy of troops in 
Spain, and eventually, on both occasions, he recalled that the Court 
of Austria refused to reduce its armed forces whilst the state of Po-
land remained unsettled. Nevertheless, though by no means satisfied 
with French pohcy, Palmerston considered it advisable to tell Lieven 
that Pozzo's alarming reports were exaggerated.21 
Soon, however, there was enough convincing evidence that there 
was another source of trouble as well ; an anti-French coalition had 
not been a mere nightmare of Sebastiani. The information arrived 
from Vienna. Metternich had written to St. Petersburg to remind the 
Imperial Government of their promises to support Austria against 
France in Italy, where Hapsburg princes faced revolution. Now every-
thing depended upon the pacification of Poland; British policy 
could be foreseen. In view of the French re-armament, which, 
however, would not be complete before April, it was imperative for 
the three Courts (Vienna, St. Petersburg and Berlin) to reach the 
fullest agreement before that time: after the suppression of the 
Polish revolution they would have to act without delay. The British 
Ambassador succeeded in secretly acquiring this dispatch, written 
in February, at the beginning of March. He had previously asked 
Metternich whether any change would take place, "whenever the 
affairs of Poland should be settled", and was given to understand 
without delay by establishing a concert between them be prepared to resist the 
attack of France." 
21
 Granville to Palmerston, 28 Jan., 24 Febr., F.O. France; Palmerston to 
Granville, 15 Febr., Bulwer, II, 41, cf. below, pp. 130-1 ; Palmerston to Lieven 
25 Febr., Lie MSS. 
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that there would be none. He could not, however, help reporting 
"the r u m o u r s . . . still prevalent" in Vienna indicating the contrary; 
the acquisition of that confidential dispatch gave rise to his conclu-
sion about the inevitability of a continental war.22 
Whether with a view to attacking France, or being able to 
counter-attack, or simply to enable Russia to raise the standing of 
her diplomats, a victory in Poland could not but be impatiently 
looked forward to in St. Petersburg as well as in the Russian foreign 
missions. To the Belgian troubles the British Government had to add 
internal difficulties, and that, noted Mme Lieven about the middle 
of February, kept down their attitude towards France, and was 
as bad for them as for the other Powers in the Conference: "la 
France se gênera moins", she wrote, "et pour que Diebitsch tarde à 
frapper un grand coup, nous avons à avaler bien des insolences 
françaises et des poltronneries britanniques." Fortunately, she 
thought, it was just a question of time. "On admet ici que la 
Pologne est une affaire finie", commented the Princess some days 
later; "les rapports de Berlin le disent, tout le monde l'espère, 
personne n'ose le proclamer." 23 At the time of the writing the 
grand coup happened to be only a matter of days away. 
I I 
At this time Anglo-French relations were growing more and more 
difficult on account of the need of a permanent solution for Belgium. 
Count Flahaut, a friend of Talleyrand, but equally well acquaint-
ed with English Whig society arrived in London on 22nd January, 
ostensibly with no specified purpose, but alleged to have brought 
with him a plan for the partition of Belgium, an idea which in France 
seemed a likely one to solve all the problems around the revolution 
in the Low Countries. Apart from British views, even on formal 
grounds no consideration could be given to that project, as Flahaut 
arrived just after the signing of a Protocol establishing the neutrality 
of the Belgian territory which even more that the Protocol of 20th 
December became a milestone in the progress towards the inde-
pendence of Belgium. Flahaut would of course not act in any but 
22
 Cowley to Palmerston, 5, 16 Febr., 4 Mar., F.O. Austria. 
23
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a strictly confidential way, which was even more likely to give 
opportunity for comments. The Dutch plenipotentiaries observed 
that through the partition of Belgium the French Government had 
hoped to settle affairs with a view to preventing the Belgian 
Congress from proclaiming a reunion with France and also to being 
able to help the Poles. The latter intention could be considered 
self-evident from the popular feeling in France ; and Lafayette even 
approached the British Ambassador to express the opinion that a 
common action by France and Britain could save the Kingdom of 
Poland from annihilation, which was threatening that country as a 
result of the approaching contest.24 
The suggestion having once been officially refused, it was now 
again unlikely to attract the British Government, as the state of France 
and Belgium was far from promising assistance in the negotiations 
of the Conference. France feared the election of Leuchtenberg 
to the throne of Belgium - reported Granville extensively on the 
same day - who as a member of the Bonaparte family could not 
have been tolerated in the neighbourhood of Orleanist Paris; nor did 
she any longer profess support for the Prince of Orange, in the belief 
that this would mean civil war in Belgium. The French Govern-
ment succeeded in convincing the British Ambassador that this was 
its only reason.26 
But Grey, if only from his private correspondence with Flahaut, 
was entitled to hold different views on this question. On the eve of 
his arrival in England Flahaut wrote to him, pressing the question 
of the Belgian crown in such a way as to exclude all acceptable 
candidates, Leopold, "an English Prince", as well while the election 
of the Prince of Orange "would only prepare another revolution, and 
the reversion to France in two or three years." Yet an election must 
take place; "There is a revolutionary wind blowing", he wrote; 
hence all the five Governments of the Great Powers must keep the 
peace with one another, which, in Flahaut's opinion, also implied 
Nicholas' taking no offence at an offer of mediation made by 
Britain and France, and showing clemency to the Poles. 
In his answer Grey mixed strong opinions with pacific assurances. 
24
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Britain would have given up the Prince of Orange's cause, if she 
were sure that the Belgians really object to him. "But all our 
accounts represent his party as daily gaining strength, & if they 
could succeed in establishing him, tho' by a short struggle,™ I must 
think that it would be the best settlement for all parties." Then 
follow Grey's pacific assurances, not excluding, however, his 
pointing out that England's maritime power could destroy France. 
The best means for continuing cordial relations and security for 
Louis Philippe's government was the Prince of Orange in Belgium. 
"For God's sake, therefore, do not reject this hope too peremptori­
ly !" As for the Poles, Grey denounced with indignation the alleged 
influence of Mme Lieven with him, but did not see any means of 
intervention. 
Should the Orange election prove impossible, any other king 
is acceptable except one who would only be a French viceroy.27 
But Granville could only report the current news: the Belgian 
agent in France, Count de Celles, proposed Marshal Gérard or 
Lafayette to act as Regent of Belgium. Either solution amounted to a 
camouflaged reunion ; meanwhile the French Government decided 
to call up the levy of 80.000, which had previously been fixed for 
April, immediately.28 
Later reports grew more alarming. On 31st January Sebastiani 
declared that the French army would enter Belgium if Leuchten-
berg were elected; on 3rd February Louis Philippe told Granville 
that a straight refusal of the Duc de Nemours, if elected, would mean 
anarchy in Belgium, and therefore must be gradual. At the same 
time Sebastiani semi-officially informed Bresson, the French member 
of the Conference's delegation at Brussels, that the King of the 
French would allow his son to wear the crown of Belgium; and 
Bresson neither prevented the publication of this letter nor denied 
its contents. Although immediately after learning of the election of 
Nemours and - as Palmerston suspected - of the British Cabinet's 
decision "to require France to refuse acceptance at the risk of 
war" Sebastiani markedly changed his tone, mutual relations 
hardly improved. Granville headed the protest of the representatives 
of the Four Powers against Bresson's declaration to the Belgians that 
France would not confirm the protocol on the division of the debt of 
26
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the Netherlands, and Sebastiani answered that Bresson might have 
done wrong in making this declaration, but he only expressed the 
view of the French Government. When Granville complained that 
this attitude encouraged Belgian opposition to the Conference, 
Sebastiani reiterated that the Conference did not intend to enforce 
its decisions ; if that was the case, it would unavoidably also bring 
French troops into Belgium ; and it would be difficult to withdraw 
them, once they had entered.29 
Mutual opposition grew more distinct as, on the other hand, the 
French Government continued to accuse the Four Powers, and 
Britain in particular, of the will to impose the Prince of Orange upon 
Belgium. The interest displayed by Lord Grey's administration does 
not seem to have been entirely accidental ; that its attitude towards 
the French Government strengthened this impression is another 
piece of evidence of strained Anglo-French relations at the time ; and 
when the election crisis in Brussels was over, complaints from Paris 
became a frequent feature of the Conference ; for the rest soon after 
the January proclamation of the Prince his cause lost a good deal in 
the eyes of the British Government. 
After the Conference's attempt in the Prince of Orange's favour 
Grey informed Mme Lieven that the Prince had shown him letters 
from two opposite Belgian parties, both demanding his proclama-
tion to be made in the very same way. But only a few days after the 
Conference had informed the King of the Netherlands that all the 
Five Powers backed the canditure of his son, Grey wrote to the 
Princess that the Orange party seemed to be growing weaker. As the 
Protocol of 20th January - since repeatedly referred to as the "Bases 
de séparation" - had been agreed upon, whereby the neutralization 
of Belgian territory was assured, any candidate the Belgians might 
be willing to accept would be suitable to the Powers.30 
Different language was employed between Paris and London. 
Sebastiani told the British Ambassador that the Prince of Orange 
would be opposed by force, while Talleyrand, more diplomatically, 
attempted to get the Conference to exclude the Prince together with 
m
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all members of the Royal families of the Conference Powers from 
the Belgian election, again arguing that the choice of him would 
mean civil war; to which Palmerston replied that he doubted 
"whether civil war would not be the certain consequence of any 
other choice" but the Prince alone.31 
In the meantime, Lord Ponsonby increased his efforts, as did 
Lieven also. Sebastiani complained to the British Ambassador about 
Krüdener, who continued his action in Belgium. Talleyrand, too, 
made the presence of this Russian agent the subject of two inter-
views with the Russian Ambassador.32 
Krüdener did not consider his mission easy. "Le parti du 
Prince d'Orange est nombreux", he wrote on 23rd January, "mais 
comprimé par la canaille."; and two days later, "Le parti du 
Prince d'Orange est partout, mais n'ose se montrer nulle part ." On 
2nd February he thought, however, that the revocation of the 
exclusion of the Nassaus, as far as the Prince was concerned, might 
be proposed in the Belgian Congress. This would be opposed by 
France, at least by her agencies in Brussels, in so far as credence 
could be given by the Belgians to Bresson's declaration that France 
had the means to support Nemours against the whole of Europe. On 
the other hand, Krüdener could rely on Ponsonby's support; this 
envoy expressed to him his belief in the ultimate success of the 
Prince and promised his co-operation for that purpose. The hes-
itating Lieven himself was afraid, however, that although the 
Prince regulated his movements by the advice of the Conference, 
his father's interference handicapped their work.33 
It remains to be noted that at this time, between the election of 
the Duc de Nemours and the final refusal of the offer by his father, 
a singular solution was put forward by Bresson, and perhaps by 
others as well, to get rid of the Prince of Orange. Bresson wrote 
both to Sebastiani and to Talleyrand to express his belief that a 
proposal made by France to place the Prince of Orange on the 
Polish throne, even if unsuccessful, "pourra affermir le Duc de 
Nemours en Belgique". Talleyrand did not consider seriously "une 
31
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pareille absurdité", but remarked that "l 'aplomb avec lequel il la 
faisait valoir doit me faire supposer qu'il se sent appuyé quelque 
part ." This strange combination was indeed brought forward by 
the young Due d'Orléans in a conversation with the Polish agents in 
Paris, and found an echo some months later in Warsaw. Evidence is 
lacking as to whether it had originated with the Due, Bresson or 
someone else.34 
A different suggestion concerning the connection that France 
wished to introduce between Polish and Belgian affairs is reported 
by Bagot. After the election of the Duc de Nemours, de Mareuil, the 
French Minister in The Hague, repeatedly tried to impress upon 
the British Ambassador and, as Bagot believed, upon others as well 
that France, though by no means inclined to accept the Belgian 
offer, might "so far avail herself of the offer as to make it the ground 
and instrument of some negotiation as regarded Poland, and endeav-
our to couple her refusal of the Belgian throne for a French Prince 
with some effort to secure for the Poles a sort of neutrality similar to 
that proposed for Belgium." The British Ambassador considered 
the idea of some importance because of the delay made by the King 
of the French in his final refusal.35 
The King of the Netherlands also found in the French failure to 
introduce their candidate a new hope for the Nassau restoration in 
Brussels. He developed his views before the British Ambassador. 
William I thought that the Conference, as they had already largely 
intervened in the affairs of Belgium and Holland through the 
protocols concerning territory and finances, might go a step further 
and "declare that the welfare of Belgium and the peace of Europe 
forbade a longer continuance of the present state of things and 
confirming the separation of the Two Countries upon the basis 
which they had already decreed, to pronounce their federative union 
with an entirely separate administration of the Belgian provinces, 
to be permanently delegated to the Prince of Orange, or some other 
Prince of the House of Nassau in some form, similar to that which 
existed when they formed a part of the Austrian dominions." To 
this Sir Charles Bagot replied that this matter depended entirely on 
34
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the attitude of France - if she wished for peace, the King's sugges-
tion could be brought forward and he certainly favoured it. In 
his report, however, Bagot regretted that William I insisted on 
retaining the sovereignty of Belgium in his own person.36 
Palmerston, however, did not give any consideration to this 
proposition. Earlier, and even before he learnt of the election of 
Nemours, he had been afraid that the Orange party showed no 
courage and that "the Prince's chances are nearly gone" ; to Lieven 
he wrote hopefully but expressed his opinion that the Prince of 
Orange must choose between Holland and Belgium, or he would 
lose both countries - a suggestion largely opposed to William I's 
project, though not absolutely so. The Foreign Secretary took care 
to point out that Ponsonby's efforts in favour of the Prince must 
not be known. Again, a few days later, and at the very moment when 
the election of Nemours became known, Palmerston observed that 
the Prince's election would, contrary to the policy of France, tend 
to keep the two countries together. "However", he added, "the 
Orange cause seems to become hopeless " 37 
All this time the two envoys who had arrived from the City of 
Ghent to plead with the Conference for an Orange restoration were 
staying in London. They noticed the special interest of Palmerston 
and Lieven for their mission. I t was the Russian Ambassador to 
whom they addressed an exposé on the possibility of the Brussels 
Congress being persuaded to elect the Prince of Orange to the 
throne of Belgium. Lieven's agent in Belgium reported at this time 
(on the 15th) : "Je pousse aux pétitions [to the Congress] en faveur 
du Prince." 38 
Also at the same time, however, Talleyrand succeeded in ob-
taining from the British Foreign Secretary the promise that Ponson-
by would no longer interfere in favour of the Prince of Orange ; Ponson-
by had of course no instructions which would warrant his open inter-
vention for this purpose, but his sympathies for the Prince had for 
some time been undisguised, and caused much anxiety to the 
French Government. Palmerston's promise was, therefore, much 
" Bagot to Palmerston, 13 Febr., Bagot MSS. 
37
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Palmerston to Grey, 6 Febr., Howick MSS. 
39
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appreciated. Yet, when a few days later Ponsonby was the subject 
of another note from Sebastiani to the Ambassador in London, the 
latter reminded the Minister that though Palmerston did not 
believe in the Prince's success any longer, he always maintained 
that the Prince would be the best solution for Belgium. In any case, 
even Talleyrand considered his candidature as still being held under 
serious consideration.39 
The Netherlands Ambassador went even further, believing that 
serious consideration was also being given to the plan of William I, 
whereby, as stated, the sovereignty of Belgium was to remain with 
the King of the Netherlands. Falck's analysis of the situation with re-
gard to the Belgian crown ran as follows : all the four Powers would 
welcome the solution on the lines proposed by William I, but neither 
Britain nor the other three Powers were prepared to uphold it 
against French opposition, which had been growing lately in spite of 
Louis Philippe's efforts. Besides, the Eastern Powers probably want-
ed to play for time until the situation in Italy and Poland should 
clear.40 
This was not quite true with regard to Vienna where even before 
the Nemours crisis the candidature of the Prince of Orange had 
been renounced, which supplied the French Government with a new 
argument against the Prince. But the success of the firmness of 
Britain in opposing the Duc de Nemours filled the other two Courts 
with fresh hopes for the Prince's success and for the idea of the 
Belgians remaining under their lawful ruler. And Palmerston, if not 
prepared to uphold the Prince with any special efforts, was never-
theless equally convinced that by opposing the Prince France intend-
ed something else than merely studying the wishes of the Belgians. 
"France seems daily to be drawing aside the mask", he wrote to 
Grey, "in proportion as her military preparations advance." 41 
*· Talleyrand to Sebastiani, ig, i6 Febr., Talleyrand, Memoirs, IV, 67, 77-8. 
40
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But in the beginning of March Palmerston did not hesitate to 
tell even the Russian Ambassador that the Prince of Orange was 
daily losing ground in Belgium. By this time also St. Petersburg was 
about to learn from Sebastiani's dispatch that Ponsonby "a reçu de 
son Gouvernement l'ordre de ne plus s'occuper du Prince d 'O-
range." Lord Ponsonby himself, however, still believed that the Bel-
gian army was entirely for the Prince. He was surprised to see the 
Belgian Government aiming at war with Holland. But he did not 
underestimate the support the Belgians were likely to obtain from 
France — indeed his report that Belgian border fortresses were 
fully provisioned, but not garrisoned, had caught Palmerston's 
attention a few days earlier. He eventually summed up his three 
months' experience at Brussels as follows: " I strenuously recom-
mend to Palmerston to give up all idea of acting here for the present 
and to direct his whole attention to the working of Belgian affairs 
at Paris, where alone originate the difficulties in the way of the 
settlement of this country. Take away the fears of France, and I 
would not ask many days to carry any measures our Government 
might desire to have carried." 4 г At that time, at least, Palmerston's 
own experiences may also have brought him to some such conclusion. 
After the Nemours crisis was over the Belgians, aware of the 
difficulties of a Royal election, postponed the election of a King, 
and on 25th February the Congress chose Baron Erasme Surlet de 
Chokier to act as Regent of the country. 
The French Government hastened to accredit General Belliard 
to him - since Bresson, after all that had passed at the time of the 
election of Nemours could no longer continue in Brussels. This 
appointment caused some surprise. The mission of this officer was not 
"simply diplomatiek", thought Granville: no doubt, his instruc­
tions "are prepared with a view to the possibility of the Low Coun­
tries being the theatre of military operations." 4 3 Other Powers 
were not likely to follow France's example ; the Provisional Govern-
letter to Granville, of the same date, to make Sebastiani understand "that our 
desire for peace will never lead us to submit to affront either in language or act." 
Bui wer, II, 41. 
42
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ment at Brussels attempted, however, to enter into diplomatic rela-
tions with various Governments, and special envoys were to an-
nounce Surlet's appointment ; Van de Weyer, who had already been in 
London as a semi-official agent of the Brussels authorities, returned 
to the seat of the Conference. The Regency of Belgium, however, did 
not dissipate the fears of the Powers. " I suppose from him who is 
sent to England", commented Granville on the last measure of the 
Provisional Government of Belgium," you will learn in whose name 
Choquier de Surlet [sic] is regent, and whether his appointment 
supersedes the election of the Duc de Nemours." Nevertheless, the 
French Government would not admit that the belated refusal of the 
Belgian offer by Louis Philippe had not been meant to be final ; the 
British Ambassador reported in the same letter that Sebastiani 
"continues to assure me in a whispering confidential tone that he is 
quietly working for Leopold of Coburgh." 44 
This was not enough for the British Government, and Palmerston 
did not wait for Van de Weyer's arrival. He requested the Belgian 
Government to state officially whether Surlet's nomination meant the 
cancellation of the election of Nemours, and in his answer to the 
Paris Ambassador he showed his annoyance. " I wish the French 
Government would make up their mind", he wrote "to act with 
good faith about Belgium, and we should settle the matter in three 
weeks; but the men in power cannot make up their minds to be 
honest with stoutness or to play the rogue with boldness. Might they 
not be reminded that when the Russians have conquered Poland, 
which (were it not for the ill-concealed spirit of aggrandizement of 
France) I should say I am afraid they will, the tone of Russia about 
Belgium will be different from what it has been, and that Prussia 
and Austria will probably be swayed by her influence? If, therefore, 
the French ministers mean what they say about Leopold and are not 
amusing us, they had better not delay the matter till the Poles are at 
the foot of Nicholas." 45 
Evidence is lacking whether this meant that the British Govern-
ment, or Palmerston personally, were otherwise prepared, at that 
moment, to enter in some rôle in the contest on the Vistula. Though 
secretly, Palmerston still did not refuse to see the Polish envoy, 
" Granville to Palmerston, 7 Mar., Palm MSS. 
45
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Wielopolski, whose arrival in January had received considerable 
publicity. Only a few days before Palmerston wrote the above, he 
had told the Polish envoy that though generally speaking the 
Cabinet was well-disposed towards Poland, they needed the support 
of Russia against France; he also added that the friends of Poland in 
France were also the most warlike, and in this way increased the 
anxiety of other Powers.4 ' 
I l l 
In the beginning of February Diebitsch's main army crossed the 
frontier between the Kingdom of Poland and Russia, and advanced 
unopposed upon Warsaw.47 Eventually came the long awaited event : 
on 25th February the battle of Grochów, in the neighbourhood of 
the left-bank suburb of Warsaw, Praga, took place; its outcome had 
been predicted long beforehand, and all the circumstances could 
not but confirm this. The Prussian Consul in Warsaw immediately 
informed Berlin, so that on 3rd March Chad, Mortier and Traut-
mannsdorff, the Austrian Ambassador, sent couriers to their 
respective courts, informing them of the disaster to the Polish army; 
similar accounts left Vienna and St. Petersburg a few days later. 4e 
The correctness of the news was not questioned in Paris nor in 
London. The people of Paris reacted with an assault on the residence 
of the Russian Ambassador; the French Government had to take 
measures of its own as well. Sebastiani wrote immediately to Berlin, 
Vienna and St. Petersburg. The Prussian and Austrian Courts were 
requested to intercede for the defeated ; the French representatives 
were instructed to insist on the maintenance of the stipulations of the 
Treaty of Vienna concerning Poland. And Mortemart, whose task 
was the most difficult, was reminded of the "question d'une haute 
importance, quel sort Ie gouvernement russe réserve à la Pologne." 
The Minister admitted the delicacy of the subject, but insisted that 
*· Wielopolski to Plater, 19 Mar., reporting his interview with Palmerston on 
the 5th. B.P. 
47
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it must be mentioned. He also expressed to Granville his hope that 
Mortemart might be supported by Lord Heytesbury.49 
The ground was otherwise hardly prepared for co-operation. 
The news of the Polish disaster was on its way and arrived in Lon-
don on the evening of the day that Palmerston, annoyed at French 
duplicity, predicted its inevitable consequences on the fate of 
Poland and on the attitude of the Eastern Courts. The news 
could not fail to influence London. Tha t same day the City 
gave a dinner in honour of the Polish envoy. Marquis Wielopolski. 
Princess Lieven, a few days later, described it as a sort of failure: 
"Burdett qui devait y présider, n'y est pas venu. Il n'y a un de nous 
connus [sic] que Mr. Hobhouse. Lord Grey m'a dit hier", continued 
the wife of the Russian Ambassador, "qu'il lui avait destiné et 
promis une place dans le Gouvernement, mais que ce dîner rend 
impossible de la lui donner." Hobhouse himself recorded the occa-
sion and its consequences.50 
The Lievens received "bonnes nouvelles" from Alopeus, the 
Ambassador in Berlin, during a dinner at Lord Londonderry's. All 
the Tories congratulated them, also Lord Melbourne, who was 
present. Elsewhere slightly different comments were uttered. Pal-
merston on learning of the event is reported to have said that he had 
no doubts about the moderation of Nicholas, and also, that govern-
ments had to suppress their sympathy for the Polish cause under 
these circumstances when every throne and authority had been 
menaced by revolution, and when the support of Russia was 
required to check revolutionary France. Grey's alleged words to 
Talleyrand, of which Princess Lieven rendered an account to the 
Russian capital, were : "All is ended - and it is most unfortunate." 51 
49
 Sebastiani to Mortemart , Maison and Mortier, 8, 9, 10 Mar . respectively, 
A.é. Russie, Autriche, Prusse; Granville to Palmerston, 11 Mar . , F .O . France. 
s o
 Cf. above, p . 92; M m e Lieven to Alex. Benckendorff, 13 Mar. , Lie M S S ; 
Hobhouse, on the occasion of the offer of the Secretaryship for War , 31 March , 
1832, noted that he would have had it earlier " h a d it not been for my speech 
at the Polish dinner ." Hobhouse, Some Account of a Long Life, I I , 167. 
51
 M m e Lieven to Alex. Benckendorff, 13 Mar . , Lie M S S ; Falck and V a n 
Zuylen to Verstolk, 10 Mar . , R.A. ; The Lüven-Grey Correspondence, I I , 184, 
M m e Lieven to Grey, 11, 12 M a r ; Grey to M m e Lieven: "There is not one 
word of t ruth in the exclamation which is said to have escaped me. I have never 
concealed from you, however, that I feel a good deal of compassion for these 
poor Poles. But it has never influenced the conduct which my public duty 
prescribed to m e . " The Lieven-Grey Correspondence, I I , 185; the same text, trans-
lated into French, is printed in Nesselrode, Memoirs, V I I , 177. 
120 NEMOURS VERSUS ORANGE 
In the meantime, the completion of the Pohsh disaster still 
remained to be recorded. Very shortly after the first news of the 
battle, the Western capitals were to hear reports of a different kind. 
The first came from Berlin. Mortier was surprised to find that 
Praga (the left-bank suburb of Warsaw) had not yet been taken, 
and that the Polish army was ready to repel a new attack. A few 
days later he reported that Marshal Gneisenau had left for Poznan 
to take the command of the army destined to assist, if necessary, in 
the disarming of the Polish forces; but to the French Chargé d'affaires 
the news from Warsaw did not appear to warrant this step. More-
over the Russian commander, Diebitsch, had sent back some of the 
Polish prisoners, "auxquels il a donné deux ducats chacun, en leur 
remettant des proclamations, où il ne traite plus les Polonais de 
rebelles, mais parle au contraire de leur belle et valeureuse nation." 
Chad, after some confused accounts, had heard that Polish losses 
amounted to 30.000 men, but remarked that the information came 
from a source unfriendly to the Poles.62 
Accounts from St. Petersburg seemed less equivocal. Heytesbury, 
after his note of the 5th on the Russian victory, believed on 8th 
March that there was disorder and hopelessness in Warsaw. "Les 
nouvelles de France, malgré leur importance" - at that time the 
Nemours crisis was becoming known in St. Petersburg - wrote the 
French Ambassador, "semblent passer ici sans être aperçues de 
l'Empereur, tant il est préoccupé par celles de la Pologne." Of the 
ultimate result Mortemart had no doubts. He now reckoned Polish 
resistance would last another month, and foresaw heavy losses for 
the Russians. Nicholas would be glad to have the affair ended with 
a reconciliation with the Poles, but would not himself make the first 
step. The French Ambassador was anxious to avail himself of every 
opportunity to bring about a peaceful solution, "mais l'acharne-
ment des deux partis m'en présentent bien peu." A week later he 
had news of new levies of recruits : this measure, he thought, would 
empty villages and drain the financial resources of both the state 
and individuals. "Je considère la Russie comme paralysée dans ce 
moment pour les affaires de l'Europe, s'il fallait agir.", concluded 
the Ambassador.53 
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This conclusion was amply supported from Vienna by Cowley's 
report at a later time, when more information became available. 
"There are grounds to believe", wrote the British Ambassador, 
"that Marshal Diebitsch has no reason to boast of his success on the 
25th ultimo. On that day the left wing of the Russians (as I am 
assured upon the best authority) was defeated, and on the right the 
Poles had advantage until two o'clock in the day when General 
Chlopicki, being severely wounded, was compelled to quit the 
field." This caused disorder, and eventually, "a charge of the Polish 
Uhlans facilitated the retreat of the army into Warsaw, the tête du 
pont being, however, sufficiently guarded." But the Ambassador 
believed, in spite of his appreciation of the fine qualities of the Polish 
army, in the ultimate success of the Russians, "both on account of 
their superior numbers and the moral support, afforded them by the 
Austrians and Prussians, which entirely prevents the Poles from 
deriving any succours from abroad." On the other hand, the 
prolongation of the rising was absorbing enough to prevent Nicholas 
from assisting any of his allies in the event of a war with France. 
This reasoning was supported by an account of Russian losses.51 
This authoritative information could not have arrived in London 
before the end of March. Even before that, however, leading 
opinions in England seemed to be almost as cautious. Grey observed, 
within a week of the first news of the great battle, that in spite of 
victory in the field Diebitsch no longer found it possible to try to 
carry Warsaw from behind the Vistula and had to embark upon a 
long course of operations, involving the crossing of the river at a 
considerable distance from the capital of the Kingdom. Wellington 
admitted some influence of Diebitsch's operations upon the state 
of affairs in Europe, but he thought that the international 
situation urgently demanded his further action, which the 
Russian commander indeed seemed to have been preparing in spite 
of the adverse season. "Je crains que son armée n'en souffrira terri-
blement", commented the Duke to Princess Lieven, who sent his 
letter to St. Petersburg. Yet, she did not wholly perceive the warning ; 
she wrote home that the Polish affairs did not occupy the public, 
"tant il est vrai qu'ici, du moins, le succès efface tout, et que 
l'homme battu est pour les Anglais un homme mort. D'ailleurs, 
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leurs propres affaires les absorbent tout entier." It rested with 
the Russian reader to judge whether the last sentence conformed 
with the preceding.55 
If in London, occupied with the Reform Bill, comparative 
indifference with regard to Poland prevailed, this could not be the 
case in France. The French Government was already alarmed at 
the development in Italy; Louis Philippe's and Sebastiani's trying 
to abstain from a more energetic policy in that quarter was the final 
blow to the existence of the Cabinet of Laffitte,56 while general 
opinion maintained that "as soon as Russian has finished Poland, 
France will be attacked" - as the influential Rothschild put it. The 
position of the Government was undermined in the country by 
their passive attitude in Polish affairs-thought the British Ambassa-
dor - they had to do something in Italy to restore their prestige. It 
was not enough that Government circles as well as the liberal 
Sardinian Court were convinced that, whatever Nicholas' inten-
tions, he had become unable to interfere in affairs beyond his own 
empire, which again would make Austria more pacific.57 
The Polish revolution was therefore during March three times 
the subject of discussions in the French Chambers. The Warsaw 
papers of the Grand Duke Constantine were quoted as evidence of 
the Russian plans to attack France; but the Government main-
tained that this evidence was not sufficient; though it must be 
remarked that the French Consul in Warsaw, whose dispatches 
were one of the channels through which Constantine's papers 
penetrated into Paris, commented on the "Polish" debates that 
there seemed to have been no project of attacking France, but that 
Nicholas had certainly been going to intervene in Belgium, which of 
course would have forced France into war. In London as well as in 
St. Petersburg a curious story was told that during the speech of 
Lafayette Sebastiani 'tenait dans sa poche' evidence of Lafayette's 
having been the organizer of the Polish revolution; a wink from the 
speaker's podium prevented the Minister from using it, as Lafayette 
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seemed then to propose to reveal that his action was preconcerted 
with Sebastiani.58 
The parliamentary difficulties were increased by a serious 
development in Belgium with regard to the Luxemburg question. 
I t had been noted that the population of the Grand Duchy joined 
hands with Brussels, and that the Conference was unable to find a 
solution which would make the union of Luxemburg with Belgium 
possible. But the Provisional Government seized the first occasion 
to reaffirm the general will to achieve this union : one of the first 
great acts of the Regent was the proclamation to the people of 
Luxemburg saying that in spite of the decision of the Confer-
ence (the "Bases de séparation") and of the proclamation of the 
grandducal Governor, they would belong to the new Belgian State. 
This was a challenge not only to the Conference, but to the Ger-
man Confederation as well. In reply, the German Diet agreed 
immediately to send Federal contingents to occupy the Grand 
Duchy, a step already under consideration for almost half a year. 
For his part, Palmerston refused to accept the credentials of the 
Belgian envoy, Van de Weyer, and informed him that the Conference 
would no longer be able to prevent the Federal occupation. The 
French Government also disapproved of Surlet's proclamation : if the 
Federal measures were put into force, hostilities in the Grand Duchy 
were unavoidable, and that again could not be tolerated by France. 
Belliard, however, was instructed to make the Belgians understand 
that France, too, would not prevent the Federal occupation.se 
With the precarious situation in Italy and in Poland, with the 
nightmare of an Orange restoration in Belgium, the French Govern-
ment necessarily remained on the defensive in the Luxemburg 
question ; but even the new Cabinet of the moderate Casimir Périer 
could not give up the essentials of French politics since the July 
revolution. Sebastiani could only succeed in "amusing" the British 
Ambassador with the subject of Prince Leopold's candidature for 
the throne of Belgium : both Palmerston and Granville were scep-
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tical about French intentions in this regard, in so far as they 
considered Sebastiani's declarations as a French defence against the 
Prince of Orange, and accordingly Granville did not propose to 
show his support for Leopold. There was hope of a change as Périer 
was installed on 13th March. The British Ambassador was glad to 
find that the new premier's disposition was peaceful. However, 
he still saw himself compelled to record Périer's "obscure hint" that 
a little acquisition of territory could greatly strengthen the popu-
larity of the new Cabinet and the whole peace party: would not a 
part of Bouillon-which had not originally belonged to Luxemburg-
lend itself well for that purpose? eo 
Neither did Sebastiani satisfy the Ambassador by telling him that 
Belliard and Bresson had dined with the Regent on the eve of his 
proclamation to the Luxemburgers, and yet were told nothing 
about the proposed move. The Minister, on the other hand, was 
able to recount with glee the intercourse between the Regent and 
Lord Ponsonby : the British delegate was said to have complained of 
French influence with the Provinsional Government, to which 
Surlet de Chokier replied "that the influence of England being 
entirely employed to overturn the present Government with a 
view of placing the Prince of Orange on the Throne, it could not be 
expected that he [the Regent] could feel any reliance on the 
friendship of the English Government." However, to the British 
Ambassador Sebastiani dared not yet support Belliard's declaration 
that the Prince of Orange would be opposed by France by force - a 
declaration which Granville was reported to have called an act of 
interference - but he took the opportunity to mention that Ponsonby 
"was concerting with the persons in opposition to the Government of 
the Country" as if echoing the much more positive statement of the 
Belgian Regent.91 
A different tone could be used with regard to Brussels. Later in 
March, being no doubt in possession of the supplementary reports 
from Poland, Sebastiani warned the Belgians to be on their guard as far 
as the Dutch were concerned, but not to be afraid of a general war: 
"La Prusse ne veut pas la guerre. La Russie est occupée en Pologne, 
l'Autriche en Italie." France, would, therefore, oppose an Orange 
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restoration by force, but the Belgians must not start hostilities 
themselves, not intimidate the Conference - as they already had 
done by the proclamation.62 
In accordance with his view of the Eastern Powers thus ex-
pounded Sebastiani tried to influence the most interested and 
seemingly the weakest partner of the Three, that is to say Prussia. 
The French representative had already been instructed to explain 
French policy with regard to the new complications in Belgium. 
Surlet's proclamation was disavowed by France, but warlike 
projects were also entertained by the King of the Netherlands. 
France would not allow any military operations in the Low Coun-
tries. Firstly, no intervention would be tolerated in Belgium, not even 
one by the Prince of Orange, "sous quel titre qu'elle pût avoir lieu." 
Secondly - "la question du Luxembourg n'est pas moins délicate:" 
France recognized the rights of William I in the Grand Duchy -
with the notable exception of Bouillon - but hostilities on the part 
of the Dutch and Federal troops "sur un territoire aussi rapproché 
de nos frontières compromettraient véritablement le repos de 
l 'Europe." Sebastiani's overture was directed to the right quarter: 
even before this dispatch reached Berlin, Ancillon had told the 
French Chargé d'affaires that Bouillon would, for the time being, be 
exempted from military measures.63 
This was, however, only a slight concession and other Powers did 
not conceal from the French, that in their view the intensivity 
of the resistance offered by Brussels depended on the attitude of 
France. Metternich could permit himself to suggest that William I 
should be allowed to reconquer the province, but he too made an 
exception for Bouillon. Bernstorff, more cautiously but quite plainly, 
told the French Charge d'affaires that if France advised the Belgians 
to submit, he was sure that they would do so. Berlin felt the support 
of London in this question, and Mortier thought that a military 
occupation of Luxemburg could no longer be delayed.64 
The French Government was not only unable to allow military 
operations to take place in Belgium; the pressure of public opinion 
made them equally reluctant to influence the Belgians in the way the 
other Conference Powers thought necessary. Though they recog-
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nized the rights of William I to the Grand Duchy, they professed 
themselves unable to make a public declaration to this effect. 
Diplomatic interviews, therefore, continued to by-pass the real 
problems; Louis Philippe pointed out to Granville the practical 
difficulties in restoring Luxemburg to William I as it had no com-
mon frontier with Holland. The King seized this opportunity to 
mention to the Ambassador, that prior to 1815 Luxemburg and 
Belgium were always (sic) united.65 
The pressure of the other Powers grew and created an unavoid-
able dilemma for the French Government. Much as they realized 
that the Powers were not very eager to force the Belgians into 
accepting the "Bases de séparation", it was equally clear that any 
hostilities commenced by the Belgians would bring about disastrous 
results, not in the least to France herself. There seemed to be no 
possibility of a compromise, and the "Bases" had to be presented at 
Brussels as "ce qui importe à la Belgique. . . son indépendance . . . sa 
séparation de la Hollande", as important for France as they were for 
Belgium, and for that reason Sebastiani tried to argue with the British 
Ambassador against any compulsion with regard to the Belgians, 
however stubborn they might be. But Granville merely observed 
that even the independence of Belgium was as yet provisional." 
This notion, however, was only too well grounded in Paris and, 
in one way or the other might provide France with a solution. The 
idea of partition had already been put forward before ; Sebastiani, 
too, did not wait for this comment to use the argument which 
perhaps could assure the acceptance of the "Bases" in Brussels; in 
one of the interviews with the aide-de-camp of Belliard intended 
to promote this object the Minister remarked incidentally: "les 
Belges n'ont que des idées folles; qu'ils y prennent garde, on les 
partagera." The diplomats in Paris had reason to believe that this 
was not just an incidental threat, and that the King was not 
hostile to the idea. All that Sebastiani told Granville, however, was 
that the best means of preventing hostilities on either side would 
be a military occupation of Belgium by the French and Prussian 
forces. This of course was unlikely to be attractive to the British 
Government.67 
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I n the meantime the problem of the Belgian crown came no nearer 
solution. The French Government did not press this matter; but 
it was no longer prepared to compromise on the candidature of the 
Prince of Orange, not even towards Britain. All this time the pres­
ence of Ponsonby in Brussels was for Paris a source of constant anxi­
ety and frequent complaints. O n the very day that Ponsonby came 
to the conclusion that an Orange restoration in Belgium was no 
longer possible, Sebastiani denounced him as being "undefatigable" 
in his efforts to promote this cause, thus bringing about bad relations 
with Belliard. This accusation was flung at the British Ambassador 
in one of Sebastiani's bad tempers : if civil war should break out in 
Belgium as the result of this situation, he declared, the French army 
would enter the country. But Granville took as serious a view. " I 
cannot but express my fears," he told the French Minister, " that 
you would in that case find yourself at war with all the great 
Powers of Europe." β 8 
I V 
The new Polish agent in London, Count Walewski, chose this 
moment to approach Palmerston again. The substance of his state­
ment to the Pole Palmerston mentioned in a few sentences to 
Granville ; Walewski made an extensive report. The Foreign Secre­
tary explained to him that Britain would only try to maintain the 
basic arrangements of the Treaty of Vienna and could not be 
expected to help to make Poland entirely independent, weighty 
reasons preventing the British Government from a breach with St. 
Petersburg: "Aujourd'hui, ce n'est pas la Russie que nous crai­
gnons", said Palmerston, "c'est la France; nous avons même besoin 
que la Russ ie . . . soit forte et puissante pour l'opposer à la France. 
J e n'ai aucune confiance dans le cabinet Français. J ' a i eu bien de me 
convaincre de toute sa duplicité dans les affaires de la Belgique, il 
nous a appris à la connaître. II ne respire qu'agrandissement et 
esprit de conquête, et dans ce moment-ci nous ne pouvons avoir 
autre chose à la vue que de le contenir." Walewski replied that 
France was now unable to make war, but Palmerston maintained 
Frederick William III , 6 Apr., Franqué, p. 88; Granville to Palmerston, 8 Apr., 
F.O. France. 
•
e
 Ponsonby to Bagot, 28 Mar., Bagot MSS; Granville to Palmerston, 28 
Mar., F.O. France; the Prussian Minister in London believed that Britain 
"officially" supported the Prince of Orange till the end of March. Bulow to 
Frederick William III , 29 Mar., 2 Apr., Franqué, pp. 83-4. 
128 NEMOURS VERSUS ORANGE 
that if unpreparedness is the only reason for a government for keep-
ing the peace, it should be treated in the same way as if it had de-
clared war. He further said that Périer was more trustworthy than 
others in the French Cabinet, but he, Palmerston, was most suspi-
cious of the Palais Royal and of people like Soult and Sebastiani. 
"La France", continued the Foreign Secretary, "est l'obstacle qui 
avait empêché particulièrement de nous mêler de vos affaires." 
Nor was Palmerston inclined to share Walewski's opinion that 
Austria would be the first Power to be attacked ; if there was to be 
war, he thought, hostilities would begin on the Belgian border, and 
Prussia, against whom the Poles had far greater grievances than 
against Austria, was therefore to be supported by Britain. Palmerston 
closed the audience by promising further discussion on the subject 
at a later occasion. The Polish envoy then went to Talleyrand and 
confided parts of this conversation to him. The French Ambassador 
belittled Anglo-French difficulties, but left Walewski with a poor 
impression as to his sincerity." 
In the beginning of April, longer than the Palais Royal, the 
Cabinet at Westminster still remained under the influence of 
the battle of Grochów, though both Cowley's account and that of 
Walewski confirmed that the Polish defeat had not been as final as 
at first represented. Grey considered the Polish cause hopeless, as 
did Palmerston, although the latter wondered at the losses sustained 
by Russia. Grey expected prolonged resistance and greatly regretted 
the inevitable bloodshed. He somehow coupled these opinions 
with his conviction that a fair deal for Poland would check Russia's 
aggrandizement and bring reassurance to Europe on that side.70 
Though, as has already been seen, Grey continually made 
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similar hints in his correspondence with Princess Lieven, not much 
was done officially to bring about such a solution. Palmerston's in-
structions to Heytesbury, written late in March, though sent with 
a view to a speedy termination of the contest by a Russian victory, 
laid stress upon some points not yet mentioned by France. He main-
tained that a distinction must be made between a rebellion and a 
civil war, the latter being the case in the Kingdom of Poland; 
while it should likewise be remembered that the Treaty of Vienna 
also guaranteed certain national institutions to the Polish prov-
inces incorporated in Russia. Palmerston hoped that Russian 
advantages in Poland would bring about uneasiness in the two 
other Eastern Powers. Lastly, though Polish affairs required cau-
tious and confidential treatment, Heytesbury was allowed "to risk 
even a little offence", if any good for the Poles would seem likely to 
be achieved in this way. The Ambassador was also instructed to 
concert his steps with the Duc de Mortemart.71 
The substance of these instructions was soon known both to the 
French Government, which was especially expectant of British sup-
port in everything that concerned Poland, and to the Russian Embassy 
in London. It was the second time that Mme Lieven had regretfully 
to record the official interest of London in Poland, while unofficially, 
it had been a feature of her letters from Grey from time to time, and 
at a time when things in Poland looked bad for the revolted.72 
In the Russian capital some discomfort was felt both about 
politics abroad and about the state of things in Poland, since it had 
become clear that the battle of Grochów had not resulted in the ex-
pected outcome. In the second fortnight of March there was a kind 
of suspension of hostilities on the Vistula on account of bad weather; 
this situation was very much deplored by Nicholas. Neither the de-
velopments in Italy nor the slow movements of the London Con-
ference enjoyed his approval, but those questions hardly inspired 
71
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any interest because of Poland ; the growing hatred of the Russians 
towards the Poles prevented any compromise, as did, according to 
the French Ambassador, the instigations of Austria and Prussia, 
while moreover the former could not be relied upon because of the 
compromising information contained in the Warsaw papers of the 
Grand Duke Constantine. The Austrian Ambassador reported that 
the Russian Government had lost all hope of recovering those papers, 
and was therefore reluctant to make the first step towards improving 
mutual relations.73 
Reports from Vienna made this reluctance still clearer to any 
observer; Mortemart could not have known of Metternich's attitude 
in Polish affairs, when the Chancellor was approached by the French 
Ambassador in Vienna with regard to the preservation of the Treaty 
of Vienna stipulations after the Polish defeat. Metternich "s'est 
exprimé sans détour" wrote Maison, "sur la combinaison politique 
qui n'a plus fait de l'ancien Royaume de Pologne que des provinces 
Prussiennes, Autrichiennes et Russes." The Chancellor also seized 
this opportunity to inform the French Ambassador of documents he 
had in his archives proving that the Empress Maria Theresia had 
been very much opposed to the partition of Poland. Maison attached 
some importance to this statement, though the objects of his 
démarche had not been achieved, neither with regard to Poland, nor 
to disarmament, for which Metternich had a project ready of a 
congress at Prague, but only "dès que le dénouement de la lutte 
polonaise le permettrait."74 Austria did not seem likely to commit 
herself firmly to one side or to the other. 
More interesting for Nicholas were the early Polish attempts to 
sound his disposition towards a reconciliation. Those made in 
Poland received no publicity abroad. The request to the King of 
Prussia, in the second half of March, could not remain entirely 
secret. The new Commander-in-Chief, General Skrzynecki, let it be 
known that the Polish army would submit on condition that the con-
stitution of the Kingdom was maintained. Mortier must have heard 
some rumours of this attempt ; he believed, moreover, that negotia-
tions were already taking place and reported some details: con-
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stitution and amnesty were agreed upon, only the army presented a 
major difficulty.75 
There was no question, however, of any negotiations with the 
Poles in St. Petersburg when the British Ambassador received the 
dispatch concerning Poland. On its receipt he began by getting in 
touch with his French colleague. Asked about his instructions with 
regard to Poland Mortemart replied that they were of a general 
character and intended rather for the moment of Polish defeat -
"which he did not think by any means arrived", added Lord 
Heytesbury; the Netherlands Minister, who knew of the intercourse 
between the two Ambassadors, noted that these instructions, writ-
ten in Paris after the news of the battle of 25th February, were sent 
"avec telle précipitation que le Cte Pozzo di Borgo n'a eu que le 
tems d'écrire quelques lignes de sa main par cette occasion." It was 
thought natural, therefore, that Mortemart made little use of these 
instructions, though in view of Heytesbury's comment it might 
have seemed strange that he only expressed the wish "qu'après 
l'entière soumission du Royaume les formes extérieures ne fussent 
pas trop blessées", so as to avoid popular indignation in Paris 
and the troubles which would result from it for the French 
Government. Nevertheless, the British Ambassador considered 
it to be his duty to see Nesselrode on the subject of Poland. 
The reception was cold; he learnt that Mortemart did not touch 
upon the question of the Polish provinces incorporated with Russia -
the French Ambassador later confirmed this to him - and in all other 
matters the British overture met with no response. It could not, 
however, be qualified as an entire failure: Mortemart spoke on 
Poland, so did Heytesbury. "The apparent understanding between 
England and France upon this subject", concluded the British 
Ambassador, "is a much greater source of regret to this [Russian] 
Government than anything contained in the representations I was 
called upon to make." 7e 
'
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There were no doubt other grounds to strengthen the regret felt 
by the Russian Cabinet on account of the interest of the two 
Western Powers in Poland. After the Polish offensive move and two 
minor victories at the very end of March, there came in April the 
news of the rising in Lithuania, and, in the second half of this month, 
of a major success at Iganie, some 50 miles East of Warsaw. Within 
a fortnight all reports concentrated upon Lithuanian events. Great 
alarm was raised in Berlin and Vienna. Bernstorff told the British 
Minister that he would have preferred an actual and general war 
to a rising in the rear of the Russian army. Baron Van Heeckeren 
from St. Petersburg foresaw "une impression vive en Europe". 
Mortemart at first belittled the movement - and this opinion coin-
cided in time with his attitude towards the approach of Heytesbury 
described above - but before the end of the month he came to 
recognize its increasing importance. It was reported in Berlin and in 
Vienna that Lithuanian soldiers of the Russian army joined the 
Poles in bands of 200 to 300 men. On 19th April the British Am-
bassador thought that the myth of Russian power had been com-
pletely destroyed and reported that all available Russian forces were 
employed, while in a subsequent dispatch he expressed his belief 
that "a long period is now likely to elapse before any decisive blow is 
struck." " 
Before long echoes of the Polish offensive were felt beyond the 
Russian Empire. The French representative in Berlin found 
Bernstorff's opinions on European affairs very moderate and at-
tributed this chiefly to the "avantages éclatants" of the Poles. As 
mentioned above, he reported the alleged negotiations in Poland. As 
a request for assistance was expected to arrive from St. Petersburg 
in the Prussian capital Mortier expressed his conviction that it 
would not be complied with, because the Berlin Government wanted 
to exercise some influence in the Belgian affairs. Only ten days after 
Mortier had reported that the Court and diplomatic circles had 
repeatedly given evidence of high spirits caused by the [false] news 
of a revolution in Belgium in favour of the Prince of Orange, he 
heard from Ancillon that Prussia would consider the candidature of 
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Prince Leopold, "la maison d'Orange n'ayant plus de chances pour 
régner en Belgique." At the same time it was believed in Berlin that 
if Diebitsch suffered one more defeat, no new forces would be 
available on the Vistula before the autumn, and even that, if he was 
unable to win a major battle within a few weeks, the year's cam-
paign would be finished. Uneasiness was increased by Nicholas' 
ukase concerning the Lithuanian insurgents, "digne des siècles de 
barbarie", to quote Mortier, which produced a bad impression upon 
the Prussian people and thus became "un sujet de vive anxiété et de 
nombreux embarras pour la cour de Prusse: ses agens ne le dissi-
mulent pas", commented the French Chargé d'affaires.™ 
Less discouraging for the Eastern Courts was Chad's report at the 
end of April. He had spoken to Prince Anthony Radziwill, brother-
in-law of the King of Prussia, and a brother of Prince Michael, the 
Polish Commander-in-Chief up to the battle of 25th February. The 
Prince considered General Skrzynecki, the new Polish commander, 
as a Royalist and added - as he had always maintained, commented 
Chad - that the revolution was now being carried on by others than 
those who were responsible for its outbreak. The Polish nobility had 
thus been driven into battle, "with no expectation of ultimate 
success, and no other object but to avoid dishonour." The Prince 
hoped that the Emperor Nicholas would make some concessions, but 
did not conceal that the Lithuanian insurrection rendered this much 
more difficult.79 
Anxiety was also felt in Vienna, the more so as reports from Poland 
coincided in time with those from Constantinople about the French 
Ambassador's démarche to the Turkish Government with regard to 
the alleged immediacy of war. Already after the very first news from 
Poland in April Metternich feared its influence upon the other 
Polish provinces ; shortly afterwards he told Cowley that Russia's 
strenght had at all times been exaggerated. Russia now could bring no 
more than 40 to 50 thousand men against France; this remark was 
probably made in view of the development of Italian affairs, the 
main concern of Austrian foreign policy.80 
Lastly, Paris was not slow in realizing that Polish affairs "donnent 
une nouvelle face à la situation générale". According to the Nether-
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lands Minister, the stock exchange and the Parliament as well as the 
Ministry were very much engaged with the Polish news. There were 
fears that the parti du mouvement would receive a fresh stimulus. The ge-
neral excitement could not fail to impress the British Ambassador ; he 
reported, however, that military spokesmen, including Sebastiani, 
did not find any material change in the position of the Poles.81 
They had had hardly any success so far in moving the French 
Government into any diplomatic action in their favour. Following 
on the activity of a number of more or less self-appointed agents, in 
the beginning of March an official Polish mission, composed of 
Count Plater, who came from Poland, and an old Napoleonic 
soldier, General Kniaziewicz, resident at Dresden since the fall of 
the Empire, arrived in Paris.Their arrival coincided with the news 
of the battle of 25th February and Sebastiani received them coldly; 
there could be no question of presenting credentials. But in view of 
the popularity of the Polish cause they obtained a certain, almost 
semi-official, position in Paris and the French Ministers could not 
very well refuse to receive them. In the course of half a year of 
activity they had a number of interviews with Sebastiani, and 
presented various memoranda and circulars written either in Paris 
or in Warsaw. Some of these documents appeared in French and 
English newspapers.82 
The first steps of the Polish envoys in Paris were, from the diplo-
matic point of view, quite discouraging. Not only was the news 
from Poland bad in the beginning, but also the Italian crisis 
engaged the attention of the French Cabinet, while the intractabili-
ty of the Belgians presented another source of trouble. It was only 
when, to the envoys at least, Italian and Belgian complications 
seemed to be drawing to a close that at the end of March they went 
to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs with a hope of obtaining a pos-
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itive statement. Sebastiani had just received Mortemart's dispatch of 
gth March, and tried to explain to the Poles the advisability of sub-
mission. He said that Nicholas was more than ever ready to enter 
into negotiations. This was far from being the object of the mission; 
the Poles would only agree to treat with Nicholas if there was 
mediation of some kind on the part of the Powers. The subsequent 
interview with Sebastiani, held after the news of the Lithuanian 
rising, brought equally negligible results. According to Sebastiani, 
Nicholas would not hear of any mediation whilst the French Govern-
ment possessed no means of exercising any pressure upon Russia 
since Belgian affairs were about to be arranged. This suggestion was 
new and the envoys do not seem to have been au courant of the 
proceedings with regard to Belgium, since they acquiesced in 
Sebastiani's statement regarding the adjournment of the Luxem-
burg settlement for two months, but they came to the conclusion 
that as long as the affairs of Belgium remained unsettled, the French 
Government was able to influence those in Poland.83 As things were, 
however, the contrary appeared more and more to be the case. 
V 
On loth April the French representative in Brussels, General 
Belliard, arrived suddenly in Paris. Belliard not only found himself 
unable to make the Belgians agree to the "Bases de séparation", but 
was convinced of the necessity of a re-adjustment of policy with 
regard to Belgium. His arrival coincided with the reports of major 
changes in Poland. 
Sebastiani gladly seized Belliard's sudden appearance in Paris 
to review the Belgian question once more at the British Embassy. 
He pointed out at first one of the Belgian demands, Zealand-
Flanders. Then he suggested, as a measure of stability for Belgium, 
the election of a king prior to any territorial settlement. But Gran-
ville maintained that, failing the agreement on the Belgian side, the 
Federal forces should occupy Luxemburg before anything else was 
done. The French Minister protested against the war - as it seemed 
to him - being carried on so close to the French frontiers : Luxem-
burg could easily be defended. The British Ambassador merely 
answered that this difficulty might be removed by increasing the 
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force to be employed for the purpose. The interview becoming 
unpleasant, and the Minister running out of arguments, he remarked 
at last that, after all, it would have been possible to make the Belgians 
submit to the decision of the Conference, had there been frank co-
operation between the French and British representatives in Brus-
sels; now it could only be achieved by removing Ponsonby who 
had been compromised through his avowed Orangist sympathies. 
I t has been shown that, only a few days earlier, the Orange 
candidature made Sebastiani hold out the menace of armed 
French intervention; nor was this the first time that the French 
Government had requested Ponsonby's withdrawal. Palmerston, 
however, hardly took into consideration any of the proposition 
contained in the extensive report from Paris; he pointed out the 
circumstances outside Belgium, not in Belgium, as the origin of the 
new French projects. "And first I should say that I think I see in 
Sebastiani's tone the rainbow of Skrzynecky's victories", began his 
answer to Granville. "But however the French may raise their 
pretensions in consequence of the reverses of the Russians, still we 
ought to be steady to our point, since we have never required more 
than is strictly just ; and events in Poland cannot make it less so 
than it was. If the French are bent upon encroachment and war, no 
concession will keep the peace." Other foreign observers, in London 
and Paris, attributed a similar influence to the Polish events.84 
The Paris report had not come to the Foreign Secretary as a surprise. 
Some days before he had had the opportunity to expound his views 
on France again, when the former Polish agent, Wielopolski, and the 
newly arrived Walewski approached him and obtained another in-
terview. He repeated to them what he had told Walewski a week 
before. There was, in his opinion, no possibility of intervening in any 
way whatever to obtain the independence of Poland; the Poles 
could only ask for a status quo of the Kingdom, if there was a 
guarantee that in the case of foreign intervention they would submit. 
To this Walewski offered the Polish interpretation of the Treaty of 
Vienna, from which the Poles drew the conclusion that the provinces 
incorporated in Russia had also been subject to this agreement. 
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 Granville to Palmerston, n Apr. , F .O. France, Palmerston to Granville, 
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Palmerston took some notes and promised to examine the case more 
closely, but then immediately referred to his own difficulties. The 
British Government was not entirely free to act abroad, because of 
internal complications, but above all because of French ambitions 
it was essential that it should continue on the best possible terms 
with Prussia, Austria and Russia. "Dans toute autre circonstance", 
continued the Foreign Secretary, "l'Angleterre aurait tout fait pour 
voir le rétablissement de la Pologne", this being necessary for 
European equilibrium. But now, "ce n'est qu'en lui représentant les 
choses sous le point de vue de donner de la force à la Russie, que 
l'on pourrait engager l'Angleterre à faire quelque chose." This sug-
gestion did not, of course, exclude the possibility of an intervention, 
but by no means met the standpoint of the Poles, especially as it almost 
excluded the possibility of France participating in such proceedings. 
"Si les affaires de Belgique étaient tout à fait terminées", Palmerston 
went on, "nous pourrions, peut-être, entrer plus facilement dans la 
combinaison avec l'Autriche; mais dans ce moment-ci nos plus 
grandes craintes sont du côté de la Belgique, et nous aimerions 
mieux renforcer la Prussie que l'Autriche." At this point the Poles 
could not go on. Walewski tried to get something done through 
Lord Holland and visited him as well but from that interview he 
only gained the impression of "beaucoup de sentiments m a i s . . . un 
bien petit résultat." 85 
Lord Holland, however, took a fairly lively interest in Polish 
affairs, and at this very time was trying to introduce this motive in 
British foreign policy; both Grey and Granville were approached. 
Lord Holland more than any other member of the Cabinet believed 
in the sincerity of the French Government; he trusted Talleyrand. 
It was to bolster the prestige of the French Government that British 
influence should be used; were it not constantly made to suffer 
humiliation in the estimation of the public, its efforts to obtain 
compensation elsewhere would cease. Thus British mediation could 
reconcile France and Austria in Italy, where neither party desired 
war, and it could equally bring them together in their common 
interest, which was to prevent the annexation of Poland by Russia. 
And this was in the British interest as well : "Any successful interposi-
tion by treaty and remonstrance [for the Poles]", he wrote to Grey, 
"would reconcile the public opinion of all countries and contribute 
es
 Walewski to the Polish Government, 8 Apr., to Plater, 31 Mar., B.P. 
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not a little to pacific spirit in England and France." On the contrary, 
though the fall of Poland, "France will be covered by infamy & 
some portion of her disgrace would fall upon us." But Polish affairs 
had not been sufficiently explored by British foreign policy because, 
thought Lord Holland, Palmerston was more accessible to the 
suggestions of Princess Lieven - unfortunately - "for it is clearly the 
policy of Russia, if not to embroil this side of Europe in actual war, 
to prevent any cordial co-operation and success between France and 
England". Also at this time Lord Holland was enquiring about 
Polish affairs from Sir Robert Adair, whose diplomatic experience 
included a mission to Vienna in ι8ο6. 8 β 
O n the occasion of a subsequent letter to Grey in April Lord 
Holland stressed the unmistakably warlike intentions of Russia, of 
which he said there was enough evidence in her belated recognition 
of Louis Philippe, the Grand Duke Constantine's papers found at War­
saw, " a n d the unwillingness to acknowledge anything but a Prince 
of the House of Nassau" in Belgium ; whilst now, through her declara­
tion of support for Austria, she was pushing the latter to extreme 
measures in Italy. " I should hope that the events in Poland may 
h a v e . . . checked the ardour of Russia for any interference which 
would call for exertion from her", he commented, "but they will 
not have diminished her wish to see the West of Europe embroiled, if 
not in a war, in disputes and jealousies that will prevent them from 
taking much interest in the concerns ofthat country." 8 7 
There is no evidence that Palmerston was, in his Polish policy, 
guilty of partiality caused by the influence of Mme Lieven. But 
the public news from France supported the belief that the revolution 
in Poland had been directed from France - suffice it to mention the 
incident during Lafayette's speech referred to above. Whether 
sincerely or not Palmerston told both Walewski and Wielopolski 
that he considered the Polish movement to have originated in 
France. O n their replying in the negative he observed that the 
^ Holland to Granville, 8 Apr., G r a n v M S S ; Holland to Grey, 7 Apr., Adair 
to Holland, 13 Apr., an enclosure to Adair's letter to Grey ofay May (cf. below, 
p . 151), Howick M S S ; Holland's letter to Grey contains the following passage: 
" T h o s e d a m n e d Belgians are the origin of all mischief. I heartily wish they had 
been well dismembered & partitioned between France, Holland, Prussia and 
England 16 years ago & when the time comes as it inevitably will, if I a m alive, 
I shall rejoice at i t . " This passage proves not only the relative impopularity of the 
Belgian policy in England but also the belief in the fragility of the independence 
of Belgium, cf. below, p . 160. 
8 7
 Holland to Grey, 12 Apr., Howick M S S . 
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Poles in France were greatly embittered against France for her 
exhortations as regards the rising, followed by a total abandonment 
when it came. β β 
At this time, within a week from the first news about the Lith­
uanian rising, Russian difficulties received considerable publicity in 
London. Like French military circles, Wellington was reluctant to 
attach significance to the Polish victories; they had been made 
possible by the dispersion of the Russian forces necessitated by lack of 
provisions. But he believed that the rising in Lithuania had changed 
the situation. As to the general public, Princess Lieven observed 
that, fortunately, Polish affairs "se voyent au milieu de la réforme," 
but she herself found the news lamentable. Incidentally, on the 
same day Palmerston wrote to instruct Heytesbury on the subject of 
mediation. In the true interest of Russia a mediation which would 
bring an end to the struggle should, he thought, be welcomed by the 
Imperial Government. The Foreign Secretary noted that even a 
victory would not be entirely sufficient to suppress the Poles, that 
Prussia and Austria were unlikely to give assistance against them, 
for fear of France. The emperor Nicholas should therefore be more 
inclined towards a reconciliation.89 
There seems to have existed a good climate for the Polish cause in 
London. Not only Lord Holland and Adair, but also Granville and 
Palmerston did not conceal their Polish sympathies. As for the rest 
of the Ministers, Walewski reported his daily contact with them, 
whilst Mme Lieven found that he was "recherché dans la société". 
Unlike Wielopolski's arrival in January, that of Walewski had not 
been publicized by the newspapers, and this made it easier for the 
Ministers to see him; even Wesscnberg, one of the Austrian delegates 
communicated with him. All this, however, failed to bring about a 
change in official policy. Palmerston had, however, other arguments 
besides France only. At a subsequent meeting with Walewski, on 
2ist April, Palmerston referred to Sebastiani's opinion that the 
Polish victories were by no means decisive. "Je me contentai de lui 
répondre que le général Sebastiani est aussi mauvais général que 
pauvre diplomate," reported the Polish envoy. Palmerston seeming-
ββ
 See above, note 85. 
· · Wellington to Alava, 13 Apr., Wellington, Suppl. Dispatches, New Series, 
VII, 430-2; Palmerston to Heytesbury, 19 Apr., Heytesbury MSS; Mme Lieven 
to Nesselrode, 19 Apr., "J'ai tous les Dwernickis, les Uminskis, les Skrzyneckis 
sur la poitrine, ils m'étouffent." Lie MSS. 
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ly concurred with this opinion and assured Walewski that all 
English military men as well as he himself considered the successes 
decisive for the campaign, "que pourtant le moment n'était pas en-
core venu d'intervenir hautement dans les affaires de la Pologne." 
In spite of this disappointing statement the pamphlet published by 
the Polish envoy, which stated the case for intervention, enjoyed, 
according to Walewski, "assentiment" of the Cabinet, while the 
Austrian mission in London requested several copies of this paper 
for the purpose of sending them to Vienna.90 
Palmerston nevertheless was active in other ways to the advantage 
of the Poles. He warned Biilow that if Prussia intervened in Poland 
and French troops entered the Rhineland, no assistance would be 
given to Prussia by England. He also hinted to Esterhazy, the Aus-
trian Ambassador, that a Russian application for military aid would 
afford Austria a fair opportunity to offer mediation instead. "There 
will be no harm in hinting this to Apponyi, "Palmerston informed the 
British Ambassador in Paris, "though I am glad to find out that 
Austria has declined the aid which Russia has applied for." 91 
Palmerston seems to have known only of the rejection of the 
Russian request, but Grey told Mme Lieven that there had been 
some offer of mediation by Austria. Information of an attempt at 
reconciliation through Vienna came to the knowledge of the Nether-
lands Minister there. Grey showed no little astonishment at what he 
called a "mismanagement" of things by Diebitsch, and speaking of 
the supposed Austrian offer he observed to Mme Lieven "qu'il 
faudra bien finir par s'en mêler." For the rest, the Princess had no 
good news to record at all ; hardly a week had passed since the Polish 
news had been so regretfully interesting only to herself, when she 
noted that Skrzynecki's bulletin from Siedlce made even the King 
"m'en parler avec chagrin." 92 
*
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In the meantime the first Reform crisis had been overcome by 
a vote taken just at that time which, in addition to the military 
news, seemed to create better prospects for Walewski's representa-
tions. On 24th April Lords Grey and Durham put to the Polish 
envoy the straightforward question which was to be expected : what 
was France going to do for the Poles? This was a hard question to 
answer. Walewski seemed to be getting on well with Talleyrand, who 
had assured him that Polish affairs would be settled within two 
months; but Walewski possessed no official information to confirm 
this. The French Cabinet had informed the Prussian Chargé d'affaires 
that France would not suffer a Prussian intervention in Poland; 
and if Prussia considered herself bound to it by previous declara-
tions, the French Government could only reply with their counter-
statement that in such a case they would order French troops to 
march not only into the Rhineland, but further afield. This, howev-
er, Walewski heard only as 'bruits'. He believed that Heytesbury 
and Mortemart were acting jointly; it has already been shown that 
there had hardly been anything of the sort. Lastly, he knew in what 
embarrassment the French Government found itself by the unfor-
tunate step of General Guilleminot at Constantinople, not the least 
as he himself could observe, with regard to the British Cabinet. 
He had, therefore, to leave the question virtually unanswered : he 
merely said that the French Government would do nothing except 
in agreement with London, and of this intention the British Minis-
ters possessed only too much evidence. 
The opportunity to push the matter of intervention may well 
have remained unexploited, but Walewski was able hopefully to 
remark in his report that he knew on good authority that Palmer-
ston was being particularly occupied with Polish affairs.93 
If this was the result of the Russian misfortunes on the Vistula, 
Polish events also had repercussions elsewhere in Europe. 
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CHAPTER IV 
T H E E I G H T E E N A R T I C L E S 
A N D T H E I N T E R V E N T I O N I N P O L A N D 
During the month of April there was a new development in Belgian 
affairs : not only did the Belgians remain untractable, but the French 
Government seemed also to take a stronger line in their favour. For 
Palmerston, as has been seen, this was a direct consequence of the Pol-
ish events. So it was understood in Brussels where a tendency could be 
observed to underüne the change. Early in April the Belgian envoy 
in Paris took a gloomy view of the situation, as he described the 
weakness of France, her exhausted finances and the unpreparedness 
of her army; this coincided with Sebastiani's exhortations to the 
Provisional Government to accept the conditions laid down by the 
Conference. At the beginning of May, however, Count Le Hon 
reported the "general opinion" in the French capital that, owing 
to the paralysing influence of the Polish victories upon the policies of 
Russia, Austria and Prussia, "the circumstances were never so 
favourable for our establishing a Belgian State." 1 
The French Government may not have wished to avow a sudden 
change in their attitude, but suspicions were soon raised as to their 
sincerity. Thus the Guilleminot affair furnished further evidence of 
poor understanding between London and Paris. 
On 19th March the French Ambassador in Constantinople, 
Count Guilleminot, inspired by the private letter from Marshal 
Maison quoted at the beginning of Chapter I I I , submitted a note to 
the Turkish Government in which he urged it to prepare for the 
approaching war, in which France, supported by England, would 
fight against Austria, Russia and Prussia. Within a few days the 
matter became known in the Turkish capital, and some weeks later 
in those of other European states. The Ambassador was recalled. I t 
is unlikely that he had had any instructions which would warrant 
his démarche: these would have had to leave Paris in February, at a 
1
 Le Hon to Surlet de Chokier, г Apr., Th. Juste, Le comte Le Hon, 1867, p. 
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time when the French Government was on the defensive. When 
Granville, however, wanted explanations of this affair, Sebastiani 
put himself out to prove the absence of any relevant instructions to 
Guilleminot, but he only earned the following observation: " I did 
not feel myself called upon to question the validity of the proofs he 
adduced nor did I intimate that separate, private and confidential 
instructions might be given to an Ambassador." 2 
Another incident which stirred French public opinion at a later 
time showed that in spite of Mortemart's efforts, there was little 
hope of better relations between St. Petersburg and Paris. An 
article appeared in the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg" on 28th May 
which attributed to Nicholas the intention of combating French 
liberalism. When in the second half of June this news arrived in 
Paris, public indignation was so great that Pcrier invited the Rus-
sian Ambassador to an urgent interview. Pozzo's representations 
were not enough for him. The Imperial Cabinet was asked to 
furnish an official explanation, but before it could arrive the public-
ity in the matter exercised no little influence in public affairs.3 
I 
If the French Government in applying a new line in Belgian 
affairs remained within the limits created by previous develop-
ments, the Belgians, perhaps encouraged also by the self-appointed 
mission of Belliard to Paris, inclined to disregard the work of the 
Conference. Thus the Regent himself not only believed in a new 
treatment of Belgian affairs after the Polish successes, but expressed 
his conviction that the Belgians would now feel relieved of any 
special gratitude towards France for her new policy, as they would 
consider it to be a matter of course in consequence of the events in 
Poland. Similarly, the Belgian Envoy in Paris approached Gran-
ville, trying to impress on him the necessity of electing a king for Bel-
gium, prior to territorial arrangements (ensuing from the accept-
ance of the Protocol of 20th January) . But the Ambassador suggested 
that the Powers would not shrink from using force in order to 
introduce those arrangements, and at the same time France acceded 
2
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to the "Bases", having been previously bound to them only by the 
signature of Talleyrand.4 
Accordingly a Protocol (No. 22) was drawn up by the Con-
ference on 17th April which stipulated, that if the Belgians should 
not agree to the "Bases de séparation", coercive measures would be 
applied to them, whilst the independence of Belgium was stated to 
be provisional and only to be recognized after the acceptance of the 
Bases. The British Ambassador in Paris at this time could not but 
regret that Louis Philippe's address to Parliament did not mention 
the provisional character of the Belgian independence.5 
When the Protocol arrived in Paris, Sebastiani summoned a 
meeting of the representatives of the Conference Powers. He suc-
ceeded in making them accept a resolution by which French 
accession to the Protocol was registered and the date of ist June was 
set up for the Belgians to comply; this, however, was coupled with 
the understanding that the occupation of Luxemburg would also 
now be considered as a coercive measure, subject to the approval 
of the Conference. The French Minister also tried unsuccessfully to 
suggest that this occupation should be associated with the French 
entry into Bouillon. "Some surprise was expressed by my colleagues 
and myself at the novelty of the proposition", commented the 
British Ambassador.6 
Talleyrand tried to have the Paris resolution of 22nd April 
accepted by the Conference as well, which would make Luxemburg 
safe at least until ist June, but Palmerston, pretending to be in a 
hurry to leave London for his Cambridge elections, prevailed in 
having discussion on this subject adjourned. There was, therefore, no 
interference on the part of the Conference, and the progress of 
preparations connected with the military occupation of Luxemburg 
caused Louis Philippe to complain anxiously.7 
Soon, however, the next Protocol, no. 23, of 10th May, was drawn 
up in such a way as at last to break down Belgian opposition. It 
stipulated that the Belgians would have to accept the "Bases de 
séparation" before the ist of June , and that this acceptance would 
4
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imply taking preliminary steps to evacuate the Grand Duchy as 
well ; should that not be done, the Conference proposed suspending 
their relations with the Brussels authorities on the ist of June and 
agreeing to the need of military measures as contemplated by the 
Federal German Diet. An attempt at a renewal of hostilities would be 
considered as directed against all the Five Powers. But the German 
Diet would then still be requested to furnish information about the 
number of troops and their proposed action. This amounted to a 
camouflaged acceptance of the Paris resolution of 22nd April, in 
accordance with the preamble to the Protocol which affirmed the 
necessity of some action but equally stressed the consideration of the 
general peace.8 
This Protocol increased the tension regarding Belgian affairs. 
Sebastiani, with some reluctance, seemed to consider it as the 
prelude to a final arrangement though he seized the occasion to 
hint to Granville the difficulty of Luxemburg remaining in the Ger-
man Confederation. Palmerston also believed that there would be a 
speedy end to the negotiations. But the contesting parties took an 
entirely different attitude. The Hague regretted the lack of sanctions 
which would guarantee the execution of the Protocol provisions. 
Minister Verstolk attributed this omission to English internal 
difficulties and to the development of the campaign in Poland. In 
Brussels Government circles thought the publication of the Proto-
col impossible. Ponsonby decided to go to London and explain the 
situation. He arrived at the seat of the Conference to the great 
surprise of Palmerston to report in person that Belgium was on the 
verge of another revolution, the estabUshment of a Republic and 
war with Holland.9 
Palmerston at first thought that the Belgians could be induced to 
agree to the Protocol, if it were explained to them that the Confed-
eration might have the right to turn them out of Luxemburg, but 
would never do so. According to him the Confederation would not 
do the job unless paid by the King of the Netherlands, who had no 
money for that purpose, so there was no danger to the Belgians of 
1
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such an action being taken. But he soon inclined to the view that the 
acceptance of the Belgian crown by Prince Leopold was the only 
means to avoid the extremes expected by Ponsonby. He was then tem-
porarily relieved by Van Zuylen's information that King William I 
would negotiate about the cession of Luxemburg — this being the 
condition laid down by Leopold - but had to learn shortly after-
wards that that was not the case.10 
In the meantime, however, on the strength of Van Zuylen's 
advice as well as of Ponsonby's persuasions a new Protocol was 
signed which constituted a first breach in the, now of long standing, 
"Bases de Séparation". On the 2ist of May the Conference for the 
second time appointed for the Belgians the ist of June as the ultimate 
date for acceptance of the "Bases", but at the same time held out 
to them the hope that the King of the Netherlands might relinquish 
his possession of Luxemburg. "The advantages obtained by the 
Protocol," commented Palmerston, "are that the Russians have for 
the first time agreed to express a wish that Leopold might accep t . . . 
and further, that the Five Powers engage to request the Confedera-
tion to delay the march of their troops pending the negotiation 
about to be opened for an exchange for Luxemburg." But the 
Protocol was not to be communicated officially to the Belgian 
Government.11 
The Netherlands Government, however, began to lose its 
patience. The Minister for Foreign Affairs told the British Ambas-
sador that the state of affairs was becoming intolerable and that 
the King might be led to make a bilateral agreement with France. 
This would result in what Palmerston feared: the entry of the 
French and Prussian troops into Belgium and the consequent inevit-
able partition ofthat country. Bagot promptly suspected some secret 
talks going on between The Hague and Paris.12 
The ist of June had passed but on the Belgian side there was 
no sign of any conciliatory disposition; on the contrary, on the 
basis of Ponsonby's information, Palmerston thought it necessary to 
warn the Netherlands Government of the likelihood of the Belgians 
commencing hostilities. On the other hand, it eventually appeared 
that Lord Ponsonby had not considered it advisable to communicate 
10
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the Protocol of loth May, while he utilized the discretion left to 
him to interpret the not-communicable Protocol of the 2ist to 
make the Belgians believe that the Conference would obtain 
Luxemburg for them.13 
Ponsonby's conduct aroused indignation at the Conference and 
he was recalled (6th June) , but the election of Prince Leopold had 
taken place. The Dutch plenipotentiaries for the second time 
notified Palmerston that after the expiration of the term set forth 
for the Belgians the King of the Netherlands considered himself free 
to employ any means he had at his disposal to terminate the 
question. Nevertheless, they tried also to make the British Govern-
ment adopt a more sympathetic line with regard to Dutch interests.14 
Palmerston did not expect that Leopold would in these cir-
cumstances accept the crown of Belgium, and viewed the situation 
in these terms: "The great point is to keep the Dutch from beginning 
hostilities, but also to prevent them bribing the Belgians to do so. 
It is said that the late riots in Antwerp were paid for in Dutch 
coin while the Brussels disturbances were purchased in five-francs 
pieces. The only doubt we can have is whether, if war begins, the 
French Government can keep his unruly subjects out of Belgium, 
and how many volunteers the Dutch would find in the Belgian 
ranks. I fear that whatever may be the improvements of the Dutch 
army, four or five thousand French officers and men, mixed up 
with the Belgians would make the matter serious for the Dutch, and 
more than that number might probably be expected." The Con-
ference drew up a memorandum for the representatives of the 
Conference Powers resident in The Hague in order to warn the 
King of the Netherlands against a possible Belgian invasion after the 
suspension of relations with the Brussels authorities by the Con-
ference.15 
This was no less a problem for France. Sebastiani and Périer, 
through Talleyrand as well as through the British Ambassador, 
tried to impress upon London the difficult situation of the French 
Government in consequence of the development of Belgian affairs, 
13
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which inevitably led it into coercive measures against the Provisional 
Government; Périer hastened to inform Granville that he considered 
Leopold "used up" through the belated disavowal of Ponsonby.18 
These alarms were not left without evoking a response on the 
other side of the Channel. Lord Holland readily brought the fears 
of Granville to the knowledge of Grey who, however, seemed to 
have been already convinced: the French would not be mere 
onlookers in a Belgo-Dutch war. Moreover, he largely dismissed 
English obligations towards Holland: " . . . we now hear that Falck 
the organ of the Dutch Government wishes to embroil matters as 
much as he can, to defeat the combinaison Leopold..." If a war 
comes, "let the Dutch fight their own battle" and assist them only 
as far as to avoid the odium of coercing the Belgians falling on 
England. "This is evidently the object of the French Government 
and perhaps of others . . ." 17 
Palmerston, though primarily engaged in working out a formula 
of acceptance for Leopold in which the "Bases de séparation" 
would not have been abandoned altogether, answered, however, 
that the Belgian pretensions, notably to Maastricht, would lead 
to war, and a war in which Holland, backed by the Eastern 
Powers, would have to be defended by England as well.18 
Talleyrand apparently was unaware of this divergence of views. 
At this time he noted that the difficulties originated from two 
causes : The Hague's intention to engage the Powers in a war, and 
Russia's aiming at focussing the attention of the Powers on affairs 
in the West, without any definite purpose except to see if she could 
not profit from it. The French Ambassador was daily seeing the 
English Minister and Prince Leopold as he expected to find there 
a similarity of views and interests.19 
II 
During May the Polish envoys in Paris continued their efforts to 
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engage the Ministry in a more active policy with regard to Poland. 
They were encouraged by the anxiety shown by Pozzo and Apponyi. 
Nothing, however, was achieved through Sebastiani and Périer, 
though Walewski believed in the former's favourable attitude. The 
French premier received General Kniaziewicz and read the Polish 
project concerning the request for mediation; while he considered 
it moderate, he regretted at the same time his inability to lay it 
before the Council. It was thought, however, that a better reception 
would be gained from Talleyrand.20 
Grey, according to Walewski, "se tenait dans une réserve 
invulnérable." He could not acknowledge the communication from 
Prince Czartoryski, but Talleyrand told the Polish envoy that Grey 
had talked to him about that document. Lord Holland received 
it from Grey, and in his reply expressed his conviction that Po-
land could be "rescued" by common diplomatic steps by England 
and France. "Nothing but the persuasion in Russia, Austria and 
Prussia", he wrote, "that France and England never can agree to 
act in concert against the wishes of the two partitioning powers 
prevents Russia from d e c h n i n g . . . " such steps.21 
Lord Holland observed Russian fear of such an Anglo-French 
agreement even in Heytesbury's dispatch though he considered the 
latter's presence at the Russian Court a major obstacle to a success-
ful diplomatic action. But, above all, it was France whose foreign 
policy made such an action impossible. "We were all highly pleased 
with Casimir Périer", he wrote to Granville, "but wish he had a 
minister for foreign affairs with whom we had had fewer causes of 
difference and discontent . . . if we could agree cordially about all 
the matters in the west of Europe, we might by force of a drive 
& without risk of war do something for those noble fellows the 
Poles - Austria, once calmed about Italy, would follow our policy 
in that quarter. . . " 22 
Grey saw also Biré, a Frenchman who managed to get out of 
Warsaw and passed through Prussia pretending to be a British 
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subject; somewhat unfortunately he was employed by the Warsaw 
authorities. In addition to the usual assurances that St. Petersburg 
would not hear of any mediation, Grey told him that perhaps a 
major victory would furnish a pretext for a cautious attempt at 
interference. He subsequently made the same statement to Walewski, 
adding that the English Government would, in such a case, take 
the initiative. "Il m'a répété ensuite et à plusieurs reprises: ces 
quelques jours seront bien importants pour vous", wrote the Polish 
envoy. "N'oubliez pas de venir me trouver aussitôt que vous aurez 
reçu une nouvelle positive." 23 
Palmerston admitted to Walewski that he would gladly have 
a consul at Warsaw to counterbalance the reports from St. Peters-
burg, but that such an appointment under the circumstances 
constitute an act of hostility towards Russia. Walewski re-opened 
the question some days later; with some reluctance Palmerston 
agreed to see a Mr. Evans, who had come to London at the expense 
of British subjects resident in Poland to seek for them the protection 
of the Government.24 
Talleyrand counselled giving the greatest publicity to notes 
and circulars of the Polish Government. Palmerston read them; 
they appeared in many French and English newspapers. Talleyrand 
strongly recommended that Flahaut's mission to Berlin should be 
fully exploited, and Walewski, who was Flahaut's personal friend, 
came over to Paris to see him before his departure. The Ambassador 
also enlisted British support for Flahaut's mission, but the result was, 
as will be shown, rather meagre. Talleyrand told Walewski on the 
23rd that he saw the termination of the Belgian negotiations ap-
proaching, which would enable him to concentrate on Polish affairs. 
He stressed the particular importance of Flahaut's mission: he 
should not be discouraged by first impressions. Flahaut was, ac-
cording to Talleyrand, to propose mediation and the placing of the 
second son of Frederick William I I I on the Polish throne.25 
If the Press was satisfactory, there seemed to be otherwise no 
good news for the Poles. Walewski, on his departure from London, 
saw "the horizon darkening" whilst Flahaut promised to spare no 
efforts, but planned "indirect action only". Kniaziewicz and Plater, 
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who, in the second half of May, each separately saw Sebastiani, 
obtained no positive statement except compliments and some vague 
advice to annul Nicholas' dethronement.26 
Nevertheless, Sebastiani had addressed a dispatch to Mortemart 
concerning Poland. The French Ambassador was requested to 
propose mediation on the ground that the cholera epidemic was 
greatly assisted by the military operations in that country. The Min-
ister also approached Granville to assure the British Government's 
support for this démarche. The British Ambassador had already 
had a conversation on Poland with Périer. The French Premier 
believed that both Austria and Prussia would protest against the 
incorporation of the Kingdom of Poland into Russia, "but he 
thought we - England and France - ought to endeavour to obtain 
real as well as nominal independence, or obtain at least some sort 
of security for the Poles against Russian oppression. He said that his 
account from Vienna indicated that even the Government there had 
a leaning to the Poles and no very friendly feeling towards the 
Russians, that they had connived at the passage of arms through 
their territory into P o l a n d . . . " 27 
This was written on the n t h May and thus arrived in London 
at almost the same time as the news of General Dwernicki's 
defeat and his crossing into Austria, which came instead of the 
victory desired by Grey. The General's defeat also meant the 
collapse of the rising in Volhynia which was to have been or-
ganized by Dwernicki.28 
Yet Grey's interest in the question continued; he at this time 
requested Sir Robert Adair for a copy of Adair's letter on Poland, 
written to Lord Holland in April. This letter developed Lord 
Holland's familiar point, common interest of all Powers in prevent-
ing Russia's aggrandizement. " I t is fortunate", the letter said, 
"that the treaties of 1815, together with what is known to have 
m
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passed on the subject of Poland at the Congress of Vienna, furnish 
the basis of a negotiation for such an object under the mediation 
of England." Austria, according to Adair, had already shown her 
distrust of Russia. "Added to this", the letter went on, "if you 
could get Esterhazy to speak, out, you would find Austria at this 
moment very much alarmed and uneasy at large Russian forces in 
Poland and their possible increase." 29 
Unfortunately for the Poles, these suggestions were answered by 
the Austrian treatment of Dwernicki's corps. There were immediate 
requests from the Russian side to deliver the men as prisoners. The 
Austrian Government, placed in a difficulty, delivered only their 
arms and horses, refused the men, and, yielding to the Russian 
request not to let them free, put forward the condition that they 
should be maintained at the expense of Russia. Both the French 
and the English Governments prepared protests but these arrived 
in Vienna almost two months later, in considerably different 
circumstances .30 
At the end of May Sebastiani invited the British Ambassador 
to a special interview concerned with Poland. From the positions 
of both armies there he considered that the general battle which 
was imminent had already been fought ; whether gained or lost by the 
Russians, the battle would produce a crisis which France and 
England should avail themselves of in order to enter into discussions 
with St. Petersburg. Further he feared that a Pohsh victory might 
bring about Austrian intervention. But Granville, though not pre-
pared to enter into the subject at any length, doubted the possibil-
ity of an interference - notwithstanding personal sympathy for 
Poland of the members of the Cabinet - and could only hold out 
the hope of the British Government trying to mitigate Russian 
severity in case of a defeat.31 
Palmerston, however, saw Polish affairs in a brighter light. 
He believed Cowley's account making out that the prospect of a 
Russian success was very distant; he further observed that "if 
Skrzynecki succeeds in his movement upon Vilna, I shall look upon 
Russia as defeated." The Russian Embassy must have been uneasy 
about Palmerston's intentions; they noted with relief Matuszewic's 
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report that the British Government had no plan of appointing a 
consul in Warsaw.32 
The real or supposed intentions of France and England towards 
Poland received a considerable blow by the defeat of the main 
Polish army at Ostrolenka on 25th May. Yet the bad impression 
of this event disappeared much sooner than that of the battle of 
Grochów. Palmerston, Lansdowne and Holland expressed to 
Walewski their satisfaction that the issue of the battle was not so bad 
as it was represented by the newspapers ; these were also influenced 
by the bulletin of the Polish mission in Paris, drawn up in a spirit 
of depression. Palmerston, reported Walewski "convient avec moi 
que le corps lancé en Lithuanie pourrait avoir un plus grand 
résultat que deux batailles gagnées." It is worth noting that the 
same point was raised at the time in Vienna. Lord Holland renewed 
assurances of the Polish sympathies of the whole Cabinet and 
stressed his particular point: common action of France and England 
"car ce n'est qu'en agissant de concert qu'ils peuvent vous être 
utiles". But Belgium he still considered to be an obstacle, and 
in any mediation which he was prepared to do his best to bring 
about, the Polish provinces incorporated with Russia, for which 
the Poles claimed special treatment, would present a major diffi-
culty.33 
Talleyrand was more encouraging. His reports from Paris 
confirmed that Walewski's journey had influenced the instructions 
given to Flahaut. The French Ambassador insisted on raising 
the spirits of the English public very much shocked by the 
battle of Ostrolenka. But, above all, he said, he hoped that the 
Belgian affairs were on the point of being arranged. "Ou ils con-
sentiront aux protocols", he told the Polish envoy at the time of 
Ponsonby's recall, "alors, tout est dit, et si non, l'Angleterre et la 
France bloqueront l'Escaut, et il faudra bien qu'ils reviennent 
à la raison." Prussia would not be involved. But for Ostrolenka, 
he said, he would have begun his démarches, for which he had the 
fullest authorization; he would begin them, however, as soon as 
things quieted down a bit. Talleyrand sounded all the Ministers 
and found Grey the most difficult; he requested Walewski to try 
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and influence him. Less official reports from the French Embassy 
said that Grey was "moins livré à l'influence Lieven". Accordingly, 
his attitude gave Madame Lieven matter for complaint.34 
The Paris mission had so far achieved no success. Sebastiani 
had no positive statement to make to General Knaziewicz in 
their interview on 13th June except his "parole la plus sacrée" 
that the French Government was doing everything possible to help 
the Poles; in fact, he had written again on the subject both to 
Berlin and St. Petersburg but rather in the sense of preparing 
favourable conditions for submission. Talleyrand was requested to 
make the British Government agree to a joint protest to Vienna 
concerning Dwernicki's corps ; Sebastiani's dispatch anticipated the 
Ambassador's own advice. Talleyrand reported previously that 
public opinion was against Austria, and now he ascribed this opinion 
to the Government as well but observed in his reply that no great 
efforts were to be expected, "parce que le Gouvernement anglais 
ne s'occupe jamais fortement que d'une affaire" and at present it 
is overburdened with two : the Reform and Belgium.35 
The warlike feeling in France, Belgium and Holland, which 
greatly embarrassed the British Government at that time, seems to 
have been increased by division at home: the Dutch reports from 
London confirmed those by Bülow. The Cabinet was said to have 
been divided and the "as yet moderate" Ministers: Palmerston, 
Carlisle, Goderich and Grant, were on the point of resigning. Lord 
Grey took care to impress the Dutch plenipotentiaries with his 
views on popular feeling in France.36 
Bülow himself went to great lengths to explain his motives in 
making the representatives of the Eastern Powers remain at the 
Conference after ist June though no coercive measures with regard 
to the Belgians had been contemplated. Actually in spite of 
Ponsonby's recall a new Belgian delegation came to London on 
34
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8th June to offer the Belgian crown to Prince Leopold. According to 
Bülow the result of a withdrawal would be no less than Durham 
taking over the Foreign Secretaryship from Palmerston, an im-
mediate recognition of Leopold as King of Belgium by England 
and France, and a considerable change of the attitude of the Western 
Powers with regard to Poland. This report, however, crossed on its 
way to London a dispatch from Berlin in which Bülow's accession 
to the idea of a bargain about Luxemburg was severely censured ; 
in his answer Bülow merely pointed out that at the time of the 
signing of Protocol No. 23 it had been known in London that the 
Federal Diet's recess made military measures impossible for 
months.37 
The provisional Government of Belgium realized that their 
country was unlikely to profit by a renewal of hostiHties, and tried 
to prepare the ground for the acceptance of the new arrangement 
which was being negotiated. One of the members of the Belgian 
delegation in London, Count de Merode, invited Walewski to 
support their efforts. The popularity of the Polish cause in Belgium 
might warrant submission to the decision of the Conference, as 
it was generally emphasized that after the termination of the Belgian 
negotiations, a more favourable prospect would be opened to the 
Poles. Walewski then tried to ascertain whether this would really 
be the case. He addressed the question to Palmerston who strongly 
advised the Polish envoy to subscribe to the request of the Belgians. 
"Les choses parlent par elles-mêmes", he added, "tant que les 
puissances seront engagées ensemble et conjointement dans les 
négociations qu'il nous importe beaucoup de terminer, vous con-
cevez que même si nous étions décidés à prendre vos affaires en 
considération nous ne le poumons pas." Palmerston said he could 
not promise anything but did not hesitate to assure the Polish envoy 
of the genuine sympathy of the Cabinet members and even of those 
of the Conference. "Et si vous employez l'influence que vous avez 
sur les Belges pour hâter la conclusion de cette affaire", he contin-
ued, "vous agirez (je puis vous donc dire confidentiellement) contre 
les mesures de la Russie qui tendent au but contraire." In the 
course of this conversation Palmerston expressed a much more 
advanced opinion compared to what he had told Granville two weeks 
earlier, the more remarkable as the Poles had suffered a major 
37
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defeat in the meantime. "Je vous dirai entre nous, que je regarde 
votre affaire comme gagnée - il me paraît impossible que les Russes 
puissent, d'une manière quelconque, reprendre le Royaume de Pologne. 
En temps et lieu nous ferons tout ce que nous pourrons." In view of 
this statement Walewski wanted of course to reopen the question 
of a consul in Warsaw, but Palmerston disagreed, though he at the 
same time requested news from Poland as often as possible. In 
consequence of this interview Walewski promised the Belgians to 
send a person of distinction to Brussels to plead for the acceptance 
of new propositions.38 
Walewski also heard from Talleyrand that England, though 
prepared to protest in Vienna in Dwernicki's case, refused to do so 
jointly with France; yet he found "que les Anglais commencent à 
montrer un intérêt beaucoup plus vif à la Pologne et que des per-
sonnes qui étaient tout à fait indifférentes ne le sont plus." The 
same opinion the French Ambassador conveyed in his dispatch to 
Paris. Talleyrand wanted Austria to join in the offer of mediation 
at St. Petersburg and believed that he had created a successful 
opening through his interview with Esterhazy. Lastly, both he and 
Walewski observed a marked change in the attitude of the Austri-
ans in London, from Esterhazy and Wessenberg down to the sec-
retaries, towards the Polish envoys.39 
The news concerning the English attitude was welcomed in 
Paris, where a speedy termination of Belgian affairs was the order 
of the day. When the Eighteen Articles were being negotiated 
Sebastiani, unaware of their tendency hinted that in spite of all 
its inconveniences the French Cabinet would consider even the 
partition of Belgium. In any case, the French Foreign Secretary 
noted that all reports, especially those from St. Petersburg, made 
the French Government more anxious than ever to see Belgian 
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affairs terminated, "par un arrangement prompt et pacifique, et s'il 
est possible avec consentement général, mais surtout d'accord avec 
l'Angletene". The importance of this condition was made clear by 
the enclosure to Sebastiani's dispatch, an extract of the "Messager 
des Chambres" which ran as follows: " O n assure qu 'un courrier 
arrivé de Pétersbourg porte la réponse à la démarche faite par le 
Gouvernement Français pour arrêter l'effusion du sang en Pologne. 
Tout fait espérer qu'une négociation si importante amènera des 
résultats, dont la politique et l'humanité auront également à 
s'applaudir." Sebastiani received the Polish envoys; he regretted 
that the Polish corps sent to Lithuania was not marching upon 
Wilno as the Lithuanian insurrection was so important. But Poland 
was about to become a factor in European diplomacy. The month 
of July would be decisive.40 
I l l 
New negotiations in London regarding the affairs of the Low 
Countries were welcomed neither by Brussels nor by The Hague 
nor by the Eastern representatives in the Conference. The Belgians, 
however, at least their delegates in London, could see concessions 
forthcoming not only in Protocol No. 23, but also in the considera-
tion given to the extraordinary discovery of the Belgian delegate 
Nothomb, according to whom the "Bases de séparation" accorded 
the ex-Prussian territory in Limburg to Belgium. As for Prussia, not 
only Biilow, but also Werther in Paris, surveyed at great length 
in conversation with the French Minister the possibility of ceding 
Luxemburg. Eventually, Lieven and Matuszewic yielded to Pal-
merston's representations of the dangers which would result from 
the fall of Périer's administration. They accordingly agreed not to 
send the Belgian delegates away and to try to work out a formula 
of conditional acceptance by Leopold. They tried to excuse their 
action by referring to the impossibility of conducting successfully 
an inevitable general war, with Poland and other events paralysing 
Russia, Austria and Prussia, thus anticipating their new instructions 
which forbade them to agree to Prince Leopold's candidature unless 
the King of the Netherlands should have done so beforehand. They 
40
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impressed, however, upon Palmerston that not only Belgium but 
also the King of the Netherlands could reopen hostilities and this 
would bring about equally disastrous results.41 
On 22nd June the Dutch Plenipotentiaries addressed a note to 
the Conference in which they referred to the possibility of coercive 
measures expressed by the Conference in some of the Protocols, and 
informed them that the abstention of the Conference from any 
action left the King with no choice but the employment of means of 
his own.42 In spite of new negotiations having been opened under 
the auspices of warlike feeling in France and Belgium, the Dutch 
did not expect concessions at their expense; the attitude of the 
Belgians challenged the Conference and deeply offended the King of 
the Netherlands who had subscribed to the "Bases de séparation" 
several months earlier. To their regret the Dutch plenipotentiaries 
learned that the representatives of the Powers most friendly 
to their interests took it upon themselves to mediate between the 
delegates of the Provisional Government, Prince Leopold 
and the Conference. Granville, they heard, brought from Paris 
"the most anxious wish of Werther (Prussian Charge d'affaires, 
generally considered at the time as the successor of Bernstorff ) for 
the Belgian affairs to be arranged, as Prussia could not, because of 
the Polish war, risk hostilities elsewhere; and Palmerston almost 
publicly spread this news". The King's speech at the opening of 
Parliament was "the best that could be expected", wrote Falck, 
"as it did mention the unity of the five Powers, and yet the radicals 
will be dissatisfied with the weak expressions employed with regard to 
Poland." The antipathy towards Russia was growing daily, and 
Lieven became more cautious than ever. Palmerston himself 
explained to Grey that he had made Biilow and his colleagues 
more "manageable" by declaring the necessity of a bilateral 
agreement with France, should the others fail to agree in time.43 
But the other Dutch representative, van Zuylen, observed that 
new instructions obtained by Biilow and Wessenberg had shown 
them to have gone beyond their instructions in the Luxemburg 
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negotiation. That explained, he thought, why, when subsequently 
the Belgians went still further in their demands, Biilow and Wessen-
berg, in agreement with Lieven, who was mostly absent from the 
meetings of the Conference, had declared to Palmerston and to 
Leopold, "qu'ils ne se mêleraient plus de cette affaire et qu'ils 
laissaient le Prince dans toute sa liberté d'agir, sauf à l'Angleterre 
et à la France de le reconnaître à elles seules, si elles le jugeaient à 
propos. Celui-ci, étrange [sic] de cette résolution, s'est empressé 
de donner grand tort aux Belges." 44 
Biilow thought that his declaration produced a favourable 
effect; the English had begun to take the Dutch objections into 
consideration. He moreover believed that the wording of the new 
propositions, soon to be known as the X V I I I Articles, allowed of a 
"favourable" interpretation, i.e. the breaking-off of the negotia-
tion if the case for it, a better international situation, should present 
itself. A day later Matuszewic confidentially communicated the 
Articles to the Dutch plenipotentiaries, begging them to bear in 
mind that consideration given to this document did not imply its 
later acceptance ; but already on the 26th Prince Leopold received 
the Belgian Delegates in an official audience, accepting the crown 
of Belgium, subject to the Belgians agreeing to the X V I I I Articles.*6 
The Prussian Minister described the inside story of the Con-
ference. In the course of the renewed negotiations an informal 
meeting was held at Talleyrand's, with Falck and Van Zuylen 
present but without Lieven, at which Palmerston represented the 
necessity of giving up the "Bases de séparation", which the Belgians 
would not accept, since otherwise a very serious development was 
inevitable. After the meeting which lasted until three o'clock in the 
morning Palmerston took him aside to pass on to him some con-
fidential information. He told Biilow that the pressure which the 
Eastern Powers wanted to bring to bear on the Belgians was 
greatly disapproved of by the whole Cabinet, and that he was its 
only member who wished to preserve the unity of the five Powers, 
whilst all the other Ministers would welcome an arrangement in a 
liberal spirit with France alone. It had seemed to Biilow that 
Palmerston accepted his counter-arguments, such as sovereign 
rights of William I, etc. But a few hours later, on the 23rd very early 
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in the morning, the Prussian Minister received a letter from 
Palmerston in which he urged making it possible for Leopold to 
accept the throne of Belgium as the only means of avoiding Belgium 
becoming a part of France. The argument was supported by 
expressions of general principle, such as that governments were 
unable to suppress national feeling, the result being that Napoleon 
had failed wherever he had to do with nations, "que Charles a 
perdu la France, Pierre le Brésil, Guillaume la Belgique et Nicklas 
[sic] la Pologne." It is all right for Russia, wrote Palmerston, to 
wish to have things embroiled in the West to ensure that no one is 
able to mix in those in the East; but the Governments of France 
and England absolutely need peace, and one cannot sacrifice this 
out of deference to the King of the Netherlands.46 
Deference was, however, shown to other Powers. Accordingly, 
the X V I I I Articles had not been sent to Brussels by Leopold 
himself as Palmerston first suggested, since making the Prince the 
bearer of a proposal made by the Conference would imply the 
recognition of his acceptance, a course impossible for the Eastern 
plenipotentiaries; the document was appended to the Conference's 
letter to Lebeau, the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. The only 
gesture towards William I was the mission of Wessenberg to The 
Hague.47 
More intimate was Palmerston in his letter to Bagot. "The state 
of France and of other countries makes it absolutely necessary to 
bring the Belgian affairs to a close." Were the Belgians left to 
themselves, they would have asked France for some sort of reunion, 
and no French Government could possibly refuse it. Now, "if the 
French Government had accepted Belgium we must either have 
submitted to t h a t . . . or we must all have gone to war to prevent 
it ; and who would have been ready to prevent that war, not 
Russia, certainly, for she is too far and too much occupied, not 
Prussia willingly, for she would have had more to risk than to gain 
by the jeopardy of her Rhenish provinces ; as to us, we might have 
sent our fleets, but could we have sent an army, sufficiënt to keep 
the French out of Belgium?" This being impossible, the "Bases de 
séparation" had to be abandoned and the X V I I I Articles drawn 
4
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up, to enable the Prince of Saxe-Coburg to accept the Belgian 
crown immediately.48 
Biilow, however, apparently was not sufficiently aware of Anglo-
French difficulties. As the final argument, which made him take 
upon himself the bulk of the preparation of the X V I I I Articles, he 
declared that non-participation of the Eastern Powers in those 
proceedings would ensure the recognition of Poland by France and 
England. And even now, he believed that only the personal 
sympathy of Grey for Mme Lieven made Grey suppress his feeling 
with regard to the Poles.49 
Shortly after learning of the X V I I I Articles the Dutch plenipoten-
tiaries protested to the British Ministers against what they consid-
ered to be an act offensive to the King since he had subscribed to 
the "Bases de Séparation" several months earlier. They observed 
an apologetic attitude on the part of both Grey and Palmerston 
when questioned as to the contents of the new propositions. No 
easy task accordingly awaited Baron Wessenberg who was del-
egated by the Conference to bring them officially to the knowledge 
of the King. The Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs did not, 
as on previous occasions, conceal from the British Ambassador 
that not only were these propositions, as reported by Falck and 
Van Zuylen, unacceptable, but that the King, on learning of their 
contents, would, "immediately carry into effect the project which 
he had been some time under the necessity of contemplating", 
namely, to order his troops to march into Belgium and his ships 
to block the Scheldt. Arguments concerning the peace of Europe, 
which would have been threatened by coercive measures with 
regard to Belgium, had an opposite effect. "The Five Powers 
were grievously mistaken", Verstolk told Bagot, "if they supposed 
that the peace of Europe was not quite as much in the King's hands 
as in those of the Congress of Belgium." Bagot took a rather serious 
view of this conversation. Wessenberg would be received and the 
propositions heard, but if they contained anything calling for 
further sacrifices of purely Dutch interests, "they will be flatly 
refused and hostilities probably commenced." The King also 
contemplated passing on some information to the States General, 
"which would be very embarrassing to other States". 
48
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" I have, as you know, had great doubts of the sincerity of the 
threats held out to me to this effect", concluded the British Ambassa-
dor in his long account, "but though unofficially, Mon. Verstolk 
here spoke the King's sentiments and what he said to me this 
morning is seriously meant." 60 
Two days later Bagot softened his report, saying that Falck and 
Van Zuylen probably exaggerated in their accounts of the new 
propositions and that Wessenberg's explanations might be viewed 
in a better spirit. The Austrian delegate himself, almost immediately 
after his arrival, found it impossible to share this hope. In his 
first account he described the feeling in The Hague as very warlike. 
He found both people and the Government unaware of the real state 
of things. Besides, he observed "la fausse conviction que le sort de 
la Hollande sera décidé sur les bords de la Vistule" - that after 
the suppression of the Polish revolution the Emperor of Russia 
would put the whole weight of such forces as were left in favour of 
Hol land." 
At the same time diplomatic reports from Prussia, always closest 
to The Hague, said that the King of the Netherlands was unlikely 
to accept the X V I I I Articles or to consider a pecuniary indemnity 
for Luxemburg. Diplomacy, however, was then still concerned 
with the possibility of a Belgian refusal only.62 
I V 
The acceptance of the X V I I I Articles by the Belgians was no 
simple matter. According to his promise Walewski sent Count Za-
luski, related to a Belgian family, d'Aerschot, to Brussels to use 
his influence for the purpose.53 
Before the reports from Brussels warranted any hope that the 
Belgian Congress would agree to the new proposals, preliminary 
steps in the Polish affairs seemed to have been taking place. The 
50
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first encouraging news, concerning the attitude of France reached 
the Polish agents in Paris through Berlin and London. However, 
Sebastiani told Kniaziewicz that the Poles must help French 
policy by a repeal of the deposition of Nicholas. Thereafter Périer 
received the Polish envoy, who thanked him for what the French 
Government was doing for the Poles, for semi-official newspapers 
were always hinting that negotiations concerning Poland were 
being carried on. Périer gave no details, except "qu'il ne s'agissait 
pas de soumission." Kniaziewicz then said that money and arms, 
if supplied to the Poles, might make diplomatic action superfluous. 
"Cela s'arrangera", replied the French premier. Reports from 
Belgium improved. From London Walewski wrote that most of the 
Tories had lost their prejudice against the Polish revolution. He 
spoke to Aberdeen and his impression was that no opposition was 
to be expected from that quarter.54 
Before this report reached Paris, Plater and Kniaziewicz ad-
dressed another note to Sebastiani, in which they referred to his 
previous statements. On the following day, 8th July, the Minister 
received them. He proudly informed the Poles of his note sent to 
London, inviting the British Government to joint action at St. 
Petersburg. On this occasion Sebastiani had much to say. He spoke 
of Mortemart's action at St. Petersburg and of Flahaut's at Berlin. 
Disarmament, protests concerning the corps of Dwernicki, this all 
revolved around the new situation. That Palmerston did not want 
negotiations until November seemed an obstacle likely to be re-
moved. The conclusion was impressive: "Mon but est d'informer 
aussi promptement que possible le Prince Adam [Czartoryski] et 
le Gouvernement. J e veux leur donner de la force - qu'ils tiennent 
encore deux mois - c'est nécessaire pour les négociations." 55 
When the French courier had left for London, Sebastiani saw 
the British Chargé d'affaires (Granville being away in England) and 
read to him his instructions for Talleyrand. Mr. Hamilton replied 
that there was enough sympathy for the Polish cause in England 
to expect concurrence in the French proposals, were there any hope 
that they would be well received in St. Petersburg. If Nicholas ex-
pected to subdue the Poles during this campaign, he would 
not listen to any interference; it would be a different matter 
64
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should the campaign end without any positive result. The same 
answer Mr. Hamilton returned to Louis Philippe, who spoke to 
him on the subject. "If you reject the proposal", said the King, 
"it will be for you who reject it to justify such rejection to your 
Parliament and to your country; we at least shall be able to show 
that we have done what we could to avert from Poland the destruc-
tion impending over that unfortunate country." 6e 
Again, the observer from the other side saw much more in the 
French démarche. Baron Fagel, the Netherlands Minister, believed 
that the certainty of its having been made very considerably 
influenced the course of the elections which seemed to assure a 
majority for the Government. He had been assured that the Govern-
ment resolved to inform London, Berlin and St. Petersburg of its 
determination to put an end to the bloodshed between the two 
nations on the Vistula; he believed that this step had been agreed 
upon between England and France and moreover he considered 
it of importance that Kniaziewicz had paid a visit at the Palais 
Royal in uniform. The Poles themselves heard from Sebastiani that 
he expected the English reply within 5 or 6 days but thought it 
unnecessary to wait with the dispatch to Warsaw until then.57 
The first report from Talleyrand concerning the "Polish" note 
was to a certain degree encouraging. He spoke about it to Grey, 
Palmerston and other ministers. "Je me suis servi utilement de tous 
les raisonnements contenus dans votre dépêche du 7me; ils m'ont 
paru faire impression sur les Ministres." Nevertheless, the matter 
was to be considered by a Cabinet meeting. Talleyrand would do 
his best, not without some anxiety, before the meeting of the 13th. 
On the 13th it appeared that the Cabinet dealt exclusively with 
coronation arrangements. Sebastiani, however, was still hopeful 
about the English reply. The Polish envoys considered the attitude 
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of Prussia changed, when they learnt that Orlov, on a special mission 
to the Prussian capital, had to leave Berlin within a few hours 
without seeing the King; at the same time Werther and 
Pozzo heard some harsh words from the French Minister. The 
Russian Ambassador had to swallow the reproof that England and 
France could not remain indifferent to the slaughter of Poland any 
longer and that they would recognize the independence of Poland. 
Moreover, the X V I I I Articles were accepted by the Belgians which 
Sebastiani called "une bataille gagnée". The Poles knew that 
Lafayette had spoken to Périer and Soult on the subject of sending 
a naval squadron to the Baltic. Mortemart was informed that the 
acceptance of the X V I I I Articles by the Belgians enabled the 
French Government to devote their efforts to other questions. 
"Ceux qui se rapportent à la Pologne," commented Sebastiani, 
"auront, vous le comprendrez facilement, une partie principale 
dans notre sollicitude." 68 
Meanwhile, the indispensable support of England did not 
appear to be forthcoming. Grey, who openly declared the absolute 
necessity for European peace of Périer's remaining in power, was 
reminded that Périer's government would not survive the fall of 
Poland, but regretted the lack of a suitable pretext to interfere in 
Polish affairs. The only result of two Cabinet meetings was the 
request made to the French Ambassador for an official note on the 
subject and for the British Government to be confidentially informed 
what France proposed to do for the Poles. On the 15th Palmerston 
saw Walewski, and this interview clearly showed that as far as 
Palmerston was concerned only a negative answer could be expect-
ed. He promised to send to Prussia a protest against the infringe-
ment of neutrality, similar to that already sent to Vienna with 
regard to Dwernicki's corps ; but he also most clearly expressed his 
positive conviction that unless the first campaign should show the 
inability of Russia to terminate the contest by her own means, 
Britain could have no hope of a positive reply were she to offer to 
mediate. Yet Talleyrand, on learning of this interview, did not 
lose his confidence: "Je n'aurai pas de refus", he told Walewski.59 
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He had at least one convinced supporter in the British Cabinet. 
Lord Holland saw in the termination of the Belgian proceedings 
a prospect for an improvement of relations between France and 
England. He was anxious to see an agreement on common action 
with regard to Poland and considered it equally important as a 
means of strengthening the position of Périer in France and of 
Leopold in Belgium.60 
Little other evidence of a favourable reception of the French 
proposal seems to be traceable. Sebastiani pressed the British 
Ambassador, stressing the weight of representations if made at 
St. Petersburg conjointly; some effect, he believed, had already 
been produced by the French protests alone, and he added that 
France would continue along this line. He even hinted at the desir-
ability of a maritime action, an argument, it will be seen, success-
fully used by Flahaut in Berlin. Lastly, the French Minister referred 
to parliamentary difficulties. Of this there was enough evidence, 
and the Polish envoys observed that as the results in Belgium were 
not satisfactory, the Ministry needed support by the development 
of Polish affairs ; nevertheless they believed that without the con-
currence of London nothing would be done by France.61 
On the 18th Sebastiani began his conference with the British 
Ambassador "by complaining of the disinclination of H. M. Govern-
ment to join that of France in their representations in favour of 
the Poles." Any delay would be regrettably fatal. Granville was not 
impressed : if matters were so bad, he said, Russia would not suffer 
intervention. The French Minister then turned the conversation to 
Belgian affairs, arguing for a settlement concerning the demolition 
of the frontier fortresses. The reply was that there was no reason 
"that any sacrifices should be made by England because the election 
of Prince Leopold has been favoured by France." "We shall be 
attacked in the Chamber", observed Sebastiani. The same complaint 
Granville heard from Périer while enquiring about the contents of 
Louis Philippe's speech to be made at the opening of Parliament. 
The French Premier, with more than usual reserve, answered that 
nothing had as yet been decided upon. He was disappointed that 
the proposals concerning Poland were so coldly received and no 
'
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answer given. "He said the French Government must meet the 
wishes of the Chamber and of the Country, and that, although 
England might decline to join in with France, the French Govern-
ment must renew its representations to the Emperor of Russia." 
To this the Ambassador merely replied that as no excitement with 
regard to Poland existed in England, the Government was perhaps 
better placed to judge the advisability of an interference at present. 
The Polish observers in Paris and London were on the point of 
admitting the English refusal and the powerlessness of France.62 
Lord Holland seems to have been the only Minister who warmly 
advocated yielding to the French request. He believed that re-
presentations made jointly by England and France would carry 
enough weight to make Nicholas consider them very seriously. As 
regards the danger to peace, he thought that the influence of 
England would contribute to moderation in the common approach 
to Russia, while France, left to herself, might be pushed too far by 
popular feeling, especially as the Government's position was weaken-
ed by the election of Prince Leopold in Belgium. On the other hand, 
Austria and Prussia would not concur in a war against France, 
supported by England, and Russia would not wage war on her own. 
Further, Lord Holland believed that Austria and even Prussia 
would not really be opposed to the entire independence of part of 
Poland, which he considered to be the potential result of the pro-
posed proceedings. Lastly, he introduced a new view of the problem. 
Because of French interest in Poland that country was more or 
less regarded as the bulwark of France. When it should be known 
that France had shown more interest in Poland than England did, 
public opinion would compel the Government to join in the French 
intervention; but the initiative having been taken by France, 
"any Power between Germany and Russia which may be revived 
'
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in consequence of such interference will form more emphatically 
part of the French rather than English connection in Europe." β 3 
O n 18th July Sebastiani instructed Talleyrand to present to the 
British Government an official note concerning Poland, and, if 
any sign of a favourable reception were shown, to propose joint 
efforts for a suspension of hostilities in Poland. The Ambassador 
replied that he had done so, had spoken to Palmerston, Grey and 
other Ministers, but obtained no positive result: the answer was 
that the appropriate moment had not yet arrived. By the same dis­
patch he sent word that the news of the rejection of the X V I I I 
Articles by the King of the Netherlands had arrived in London. 6 4 
Yet, the other side of the Conference was by no means easy with 
regard to the attitude of the Western Powers in Polish affairs. 
Firstly, one thing was becoming clear to the Russians : the growing 
antipathy of the public towards their country ; the Russians were 
aware that the British Government had seriously to consider whether 
they were strong enough to challenge public opinion by doing 
nothing about Poland. Matuszewic, the other Russian represent­
ative had been several times attacked in the newspapers as a renegade 
Pole. The Lievens did not succeed in excluding the subject of 
Poland from the King's speech to Parliament and realized that 
Grey was concerned in it through his well-known pro-Polish 
pronouncements in the past; Mme Lieven was inclined to advise 
the Grand Duchess Helen to renounce her visit to London. 6 5 
I n France the publicity given to the article in the "Journal de 
St. Pétersbourg" provided a powerful stimulus to anti-Russian 
feeling. But since the article supplied further evidence that Poland, 
though her revolution was becoming more than ever the bulwark of 
France, this was one more reason for expecting that the initiative in 
the defence of Poland would be taken by the Paris Government. 
Matuszewic, reflecting on this article, observed that it contained 
no evidence of any definite hostile plans on the part of Russia with 
regard to France; but he connected the subject with another 
M
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report which bore reference to the policy of the British Govern­
ment. After referring to the article he noted in the same paragraph his 
meeting with two very important Tories, who had declared to him 
that they knew of the English Government's intention to get in 
touch with that of France in order to interfere in the affairs of 
Poland. Talleyrand led the intrigue, they told him, and they 
smiled at his incredulity.β β 
O n Lieven's orders Palmerston was sounded by Matuszewic 
a few days later on the contents of the above information. Matusze­
wic found the answer very satisfactory. The Foreign Secretary not 
only refrained from any comment on Mortemart's set-back at St. 
Petersburg early in June, but declared that England had neither 
the right nor the means to intervene in favour of the Poles. At the 
same time, however, Palmerston added that he did not believe in 
the ability of Russia to reconquer the Kingdom of Poland or to 
keep Lithuania. Matuszewic made an effort to show the contrary, 
and seemed confident of his success; he seized the occasion to 
point out the impropriety of an Englishman's relations with the 
Polish agents. In the same letter Matuszewic reported the departure 
of Biré and the negotiations of the Poles concerning loans, the 
purchase of arms and their transport to Poland. On the same day 
Matuszewic rendered an account of his interview with Palmerston to 
Mme Lieven; Palmerston's opinion was unequivocally put in a 
single sentence: "que l'Angleterre n'avait ni le droit ni les moyens 
d'intervenir en faveur des Polonais, mais qu'il [Palmerston] 
regardait la Pologne et la Lithuanie comme perdues pour nous." e7 
The possible intervention in Poland continued to be the current 
news throughout the first half of July. Polish reports from Brussels 
quoted Lord Erskine's opinion, made known during his passage 
to his post in Munich, that Grey would intervene as soon as the 
Belgian affair had come to a close. The Netherlands Ambassador 
in London was certain of negotiations already taking place. He 
·* Cf. above, p. 143; Dutkiewicz, pp. 109-110. Matuszewic to Lieven, undated, 
written shordy before June 25 : "Deux Torys très marquans m'ont entrepris hier 
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nos affaires et de nous imposer un arrangement. Je me suis contenté de leur 
répondre qu'ils devaient être en erreur, e t c . . . Cependant on a souri de mon 
incrédulité et on m'a fait entendre que Talleyrand est l'intermédiaire de cette 
intrigue.. ." Lie MSS. 
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considered Talleyrand's insistence more pronounced in Polish 
affairs than in the question of the demolition of the Belgian 
fortresses. The purpose of his efforts seemed to be either the sending 
of a naval squadron to the Baltic or an approach to the Emperor 
Nicholas with a view to placing a Prussian Prince on the restored 
throne in Warsaw. Additional evidence of English concurrence 
with these plans, Falck thought, was furnished by the changed 
attitude of "The Times" ; this journal, in which Brougham had 
become most influential, became pro-Belgian after the acceptance 
of the X V I I I Articles by the Brussels authorities, and this acceptance 
was the condition sine qua non for the Government to turn its attention 
to Poland. Yet, "the Russian Embassy which is informed about it", 
wrote the Netherlands Ambassador, "is much more confident about 
the feelings of Lord Grey and his colleagues, than I can afford to be, 
knowing the political opinions of the British Cabinet." e8 
A similar situation existed in Paris, where, however, the general 
opinion was that the Government must make a statement with 
regard to the intervention, even at the risk of war. The Nether-
lands Mimster believed that the King's speech at the opening of 
Parliament would be enough - for the time being. In the meantime, 
the newspapers continually reported the departure of the Russian 
Ambassador, who, however, remained in Paris.69 
By the 15th, the choice of the British Government seemed to 
have been made. Palmerston assured Princess Lieven that, even 
if intervention were possible, it would not be offered at a 
critical moment. A similar declaration was confidentially made to 
Lieven, who, however, on learning of Talleyrand's note, hastened 
to acknowledge the good faith of the British Government by 
expressing the hope that the French proposals would be formally 
refused.70 
On the 19th the Netherlands Ambassador reported that no more 
doubts were entertained as to the refusal of the British Govern-
ment. Talleyrand, wrote Falck, had expected a more favourable 
reception for his project, in return for the French acquiescence in 
Prince Leopold's election in Belgium. The French Ambassador 
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referred again to the necessity of Périer's Cabinet having to reckon 
with the opinions of the parti du mouvement; but Grey was said to 
have answered that there was no difference in the position of the 
British Government in this regard, and they felt no such necessity.71 
The preparation of an answer to Talleyrand's note engaged 
the attention of the Cabinet during two days. On the 20th Pal-
merston sent his draft for the approval of the Cabinet. Grey an-
swered the same day that, although the Ministers generally agreed 
with it, a special meeting would be held to consider a matter of 
such importance. Lord Holland as usual dissented, demanding 
that, if a refusal was unavoidable, the note should be rendered "more 
palatable to France and uncomplimentary to Russia" ; in its con-
clusion it should be said that England would gladly seize any 
opportunity, in concert with France, to stop the bloodshed in 
Poland short of one incompatible with the friendly relations with 
Russia "and the recent cooperation of that Power in adjusting the 
differences between Holland and Belgium." Here, however, Pal-
merston's view varied from that of the other Ministers. He objected 
to the passage mentioning the loyal attitude of Russia as a motive 
to refrain from intervention. Should, within 6 or 8 months, the 
intervention become necessary, he thought, Russia would then 
surely refer to it.72 
The majority view, however, was represented in the official 
reply, dated 22nd July. I t repeated to a certain extent what had al-
ready passed between Talleyrand and Palmerston, and what had 
been included in the latter's instructions sent to St. Petersburg. I t 
was emphasized that, as far as the Treaty of Vienna was concerned, 
"His Majesty could not consent to see Poland deprived of the ad-
vantages ofthat arrangement," and H.M. Government had already 
made appropriate representations to the Imperial Cabinet to that 
end. But at the same time H.M. Government feared that any offer 
of mediation would be refused, and would only leave to the two 
governments the embarrassing alternatives of either acquiescing in a 
determined rejection of their proposal or of taking measures to 
enforce it by means of a more direct and effectual interference. 
The British Government certainly was not prepared to adopt the 
latter course, "warranted neither by the effect of the contest in 
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other countries, nor by the attitude of Russia towards England ; on 
the contrary, especially in the late difficult negotiations concerning 
the separation of Holland and Belgium she acted with perfect fair-
ness and co-operation." "Under these circumstances", proceeds the 
document immediately, "His Majesty, deeply lamenting the calam-
ities of a disastrous and desolating contest, does not think the time 
has yet arrived when he could be justified in adopting a proceeding 
which, however conciliatory in form, could not fail to alarm an 
independent Power, naturally jealous of its right and sensibly 
alive to everything which might appear to effect its national 
honour." However, though the French proposal was declined, "the 
King can never look with indifference on such a state of things 
which now exists in Poland and will avail himself of any favourable 
opportunity which the friendly relations subsisting between the 
Governments of Great Britain and Russia may afford", to help 
the restoration of peace in the countries concerned.73 
The note was satisfactory to Russia in that it refused to take part 
in an intervention; considering the state of the war in Poland as 
well as for speculations on the subject in diplomatic circles, this was 
in itself a victory for St. Petersburg. At the same time, however, it 
constituted an almost public declaration of the British Govern-
ment's interest in Polish affairs in consequence of their having been 
the subject of an international agreement, a statement which met 
with a cold reception when made in a confidential way by Heytes-
bury in April. 
If, under the circumstances, this declaration attracted little 
attention, the passage referring to the part played by Russia in 
Belgian affairs could not fail to impress the parties concerned. This 
point is raised by Talleyrand in his report to Paris. Van Zuylen 
saw the connection of Belgian and Polish affairs as so obvious as to 
believe the existence of an unwritten pact of mutual non-interference 
between London and St. Petersburg. And the French contem-
porary showed offence, commenting upon the paper as "le refus 
dont la forme polie ne couvrait qu'imparfaitement l'insolence. Ici 
encore M. de Talleyrand venait d'être joué." Talleyrand indeed, 
as it has been shown above, expected no refusal. On the English 
side the paper was the subject of regret to Lord Holland.74 
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V 
The Belgian delegates in London were not unmindful of the influence 
of Zaluski in Brussels at the time when the X V I I I Articles were 
under consideration. Shortly before their return and before the 
final answer of the British Government to Talleyrand's note on 
mediation was known, Lebeau and de Merode went to see Pal-
merston. They pointed out the part played by Polish affairs in the 
discussions of the Congress. The Foreign Secretary, however, "se 
borna à répondre que c'était une question très compliquée." Grey 
abo spoke in vague terms.75 
When the British refusal became known the Polish envoys 
called on Sebastiani. The Minister tried to encourage them. The 
news from Poland was not bad and would no doubt influence Fla-
haut's activity in Berlin. Moreover, the reference to Poland in the 
King's speech would play its part in Berlin, in Vienna, and, above 
all, in St. Petersburg. In London Walewski met with an excellent 
reception from Palmerston, who explained to him the reason for 
refusing the French offer: it had no chance of being favourably 
received by the Imperial Government. But the British Government 
was following the development of events in Poland with the greatest 
attention, and as soon as an occasion should present itself it would 
gladly make use of it to act in favour of the Poles. Walewski then 
immediately referred to the neutrality of the neighbouring states, es-
pecially of Prussia. Palmerston replied that the conduct of Prussia 
had already been criticized and that the British Minister in Berlin 
had been instructed to approach the Government on the subject. 
The British Government maintained that Prussia not being at war 
with Poland, any goods which British subjects might wish to send 
to Poland, even arms and munitions, must be allowed to pass through 
Prussian territory.79 
favour of the Poles is the result of a contractus nee nominatus of facio ut facias 
between London and St. Petersburg : I will not meddle in your Polish affairs if 
you help me in my Belgian projects." Ged., IV, 537; L. Blanc, L'histoire des 
Dix Ans, 1844, II, 451 ; Holland to Granville, 28 July: "I was in hope since we 
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ville MSS. 
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The situation on the spot, however, hardly, corroborated the 
above reasoning. It has already been emphasized that Prussia 
experienced the greatest difficulties on account of the revolution 
in Poland ; from every aspect she was most interested in its termina-
tion. The Prussian Government accordingly tried every means at its 
disposal to bring about a speedy pacification of Poland. Prussian 
attempts at mediation have already been noted. Interception of cor-
respondence, obstructions for travellers, and, latterly, direct assist-
ance afforded to the Russian forces in the form of supplies had oc-
curred. These circumstances were observed by the French and British 
representatives in Berlin; Chad accumulated a good deal of evi-
dence from the reports of the British Consuls in Memel and Danzig, 
as well as from other quarters, during the spring months of 1831." 
The war in Poland made it necessary for Prussia to keep a large 
force on her Eastern frontiers. Much in the same way as Metter-
nich, Bernstorff also represented Prussian military preparedness as 
only a necessary response to the situation in neighbouring coun-
tries. When in May the French Government proposed talks on 
disarmament, the Minister expressed his regret that the state of 
affairs did not allow of such proceedings. The Prussian Government 
was most sensitive to the financial pressure created by military 
expenses and was most anxious to relieve it, but not before Belgium 
and Poland were entirely settled. It seemed that in Belgium that 
stage was about to be achieved, but not in Poland where war was 
still being carried on, much to the damage of Prussian interests. 
The result of the battle of Ostrolenka was represented as far from 
decisive. Similar opinions were held out to Chad by Ancillon who 
moreover expressed the opinion that Russia might decline disarma-
ment talks merely for fear that an assembly for that purpose might 
take up the subject of Poland. On this occasion Berlin became again 
uncomfortably aware of the British opposition to a possible Prussian 
intervention in favour of Russia. An application by Diebitsch for 
que nos sujets pourraient avoir intérêt de faire passer en Pologne même avec 
le but avoué d'aider les Polonais et sans excepter UsfusiL· et autres munitions de guerre 
y passent sans aucun embarras." B.P. 
" Mortier to Sebastiani, 9 May, A.é. Prusse; Chad to Palmerston, in particu-
lar 30 May, 5, 9 June. Consul Brockmann reported from Memel on 21 April that 
a detachment of 800 Russians marched through that town. F.O.Prussia; Mortier 
wrote on 30 April that Ancillon showed embarrassment when told that some 
Russian troops, though disarmed, were allowed to pass through Prussian 
territory. A.é. Prusse. 
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permission to make use of the bridge over the Vistula on Prussian 
territory was promptly rejected.78 
It was probably the belief that Prussia would welcome an arrange-
ment in Poland which prompted the French Government to send 
Count Flahaut to Berlin on a special mission. The idea was reflected 
in his instructions, dated 28th May. As public opinion in Germany 
was in favour of the Poles, the Prussian Government might perhaps 
be disposed to offer its good offices in St. Petersburg, which would 
contribute considerably to a settlement of this embarrassing affair. 
Moreover, there were really no common or opposed interests between 
Paris and Berlin; why should not Prussia help France with a 
problem which was a subject of constant anxiety to the French 
Government? This point was put in elaborate explanations aimed 
at showing the alleged absence of opposed interests. It is, however, 
easier to believe and indeed more likely that the French Minister 
used delicacy towards the Prussian Government by avoiding stress 
upon questions that might strike Berlin painfully.79 
Flahaut arrived in Berlin on 7th June and soon obtained his 
audience of the King. "Le Roi a parlé alors de la révolution de 
Pologne avec peine", wrote the French Ambassador. The King 
said that after the battle of Ostrolenka neither party seemed able 
to do anything, Diebitsch staying where he was and the Poles 
engaged in recovering from their great losses. Flahaut then seized 
the occasion to refer to an intervention. Considerations of humanity 
alone were no doubt likely to make Fredrick William I I I attempt to 
bring an end to this struggle, in which case the King of the French 
would be only too glad to concur. The King of Prussia seemed to 
agree, but evidently the subject was painful to him and the Ambassa-
dor thought it better to drop it. Ancillon also spoke on Poland 
regretfully but the idea of mediation was foreign to him: sub-
mission or a Russian victory were the only ways open at this stage to 
terminate this unfortunate affair.80 
After two weeks in Berlin Flahaut formed his own opinion: 
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the Prussian Government was unable to afford any more direct as-
sistance to Russia, because of the course of public opinion inPrussia 
itself. I t even made some ostensible gestures to furnish the appear-
ance of impartiality. Thus Orlov, who brought to Berlin the plan 
for the partition of the Kingdom of Poland - in itself evidence 
of Nicholas' depression - was sent away within a few hours on the 
ground of his having broken quarantine regulations. News of this 
and similar steps made its way to Paris and London, though 
perhaps it did not deceive many; Greville at least had no doubt 
that help was being given to the Russian army.81 
On the other hand, there was no question of concurring with 
any steps which aimed at altering the formal status of the Kingdom 
of Poland. Berlin was even more sensitive than St. Petersburg to 
Western interest in the subject and opposed to the idea of foreign 
interference. The King therefore advised Nicholas to grant to the 
Poles a status similar to that enjoyed in the Austrian Empire by 
Czechs and Hungarians. Though unaware of this advice Flahaut 
tried to exploit the sensitiveness of Berlin in this respect. The article 
in the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg" served as a welcome pretext and 
the Ambassador made a point of it. He told Bemstorff that this was 
a very serious matter: if there was no sufficient apology, France 
might perhaps recall her Ambassador from St. Petersburg, or even 
send a fleet to the Baltic. Flahaut was sure that the latter suggestion 
made a profound impression on the Prussian Minister.82 
The Ambassador accordingly lost no time in conveying his im-
pressions of Prussia to the knowledge of the British Cabinet, 
passing over Chad, a Tory, from whom he expected no co-opera-
tion. "Our whole conduct towards Russia has done much harm", 
he wrote to Grey. All the continental Powers were unlikely and 
unable to risk a war, and would therefore withdraw before threats. 
Russia was no longer a Power, he thought, and the Prussian Govern-
ment especially felt very strongly the truth of this for several years 
to come. 83 
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Flahaut himself might not entirely subscribe to the above view, 
but other reports from Berlin seemed to support the information he 
had sent to London. From the inactivity of the Russian army 
Berlin military circles concluded that Paskevitch was unable to 
attack Warsaw, noted Chad in the beginning of July. This was also 
a reason for Flahaut to hope that St. Petersburg might now be more 
disposed towards conciliation, he added. And the new ukase 
concerning Lithuanian insurgents led the French Ambassador to 
the same conclusion, which, however, was not shared by his British 
colleague.84 
On 14th July Flahaut began his final attack with regard to the 
Polish policy of Prussia. The Prussian Government, said Bernstorif, 
was not neutral, only inactive. Russia could have asked for assist-
ance to re-establish Nicholas' authority in Poland, and she did not. 
Now the re-establishment of the Kingdom of Poland, as demanded 
by the Poles, would cause endless troubles in Europe, as they 
would ask for Lithuania, Galicia, Thorn, Danzig etc; even if 
the Poles enjoyed the sympathy of the peoples, politicians could 
not listen to the voice of the heart. To all this the Ambassador 
replied that, on the contrary, sentiment did play a part in French 
politics at least, and among the German people as well, upon whom 
assistance given to the Russians created a poor impression. On the 
other hand, he thought that Nicholas would be glad to have medi-
ation offered by Prussia as she was on quite different terms with 
St. Petersburg than other Courts. Bemstorff did not share this 
opinion ; he thought moreover that the termination of the contest 
by a negotiation was no longer possible, in view of the extent of 
the revolution.85 
On a subsequent occasion Flahaut went even further. The 
attitude of Prussia showed more than "inactivity". He said he did 
not doubt that an armed intervention by Prussia would be counter-
acted by French military action. Then followed an exchange of 
views on non-intervention in which Belgium served as an example. 
Matters need not go that far, he hoped, to which Bemstorff replied 
that he wished that Russian successes, if necessary at all, could be 
delayed long enough for news of them not to coincide with the 
opening of the French Parliament.86 
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The British Envoy remained much more reserved. On the 
occasion of one of his interviews regarding a British subject who 
was refused passage to Poland, Ancillon tried to dispel his interest 
in Poland. Chad's modest comment was: " I do not think that Mr. 
Ancillon makes a just distinction between the insurrection in 
Belgium and in Poland, although he does justice to the bravery of 
the Poles, and I tried in vain to bring him over to my way of 
thinking upon that subject." Chad had even less success with 
Bemstorff, who told him that "Lord Grey feels upon the subject 
with all the warmth of a student." In his turn, Flahaut failed to enlist 
the co-operation of the British Minister. The Ambassador's account 
of his interview with Bernstorif was commented on by Chad as 
"warm but not hostile", and sent to England by a safe channel, 
because if it came to the knowledge of the Prussian Government, 
"an appearance of concert in the matter might arise," remarked 
Chad, "which I wish to avoid as I think the French Government 
would not be sorry to estrange Prussia from England."87 
Flahaut believed that his representations had some effect on 
the Government, but at the same time he reported that assistance 
given to Russia had been exaggerated; meanwhile, the sanitary 
cordon had made supplies almost cease. Besides, if France continued 
to press Berlin for a more pronounced attitude in the Polish question, 
Prussia might eventually turn to open assistance to Russia. Shortly 
after, however, he was assured that Paskevitch had been authorized 
to terminate the struggle in a conciliatory way, even if he succeeded 
in obtaining a major victory. This led the Ambassador to renew 
the project of mediation; but the answer was still in the negative. 
The Prussian Government, thought Flahaut, was obviously 
influenced by the English refusal to Talleyrand, the news of which 
had just arrived in Berlin. Ancillon maintained that Nicholas could 
not agree to any intervention; he could not do so because of his own 
Russian subjects: the war had become too much a conflict between 
the Poles and the Russians. More, he believed, could be achieved 
if France were to advise submission to the Poles : in this case they 
would obtain their constitution and a pardon for the past. At the 
same time Ancillon referred to his former opinion that victory or 
submission was the only means to terminate the struggle.88 
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The last encouraging comment of the French Ambassador was 
mad ein his report of the answer given by the "Preussische Staats-
zeitung" to a Warsaw newspaper which printed Skrzynecki's 
letter to Frederick William I I I , although the letter had not been 
accepted by the Berlin Chancery. Public opinion, he thought, com-
pelled the Government of a great Power to explain its action to an 
authority it did not recognize.89 
But his mission obviously was finished. The authorization to 
leave his post was dated 2nd August. His only tangible accomplish-
ment was his intervention with the Prussian authorities on behalf 
of the messenger who was the bearer of the Polish dispatch from the 
Paris mission to the Government in Warsaw with the information 
of the French démarche in London. He also had very secret relations 
with some Poles in Berlin. A likely development of his action was 
made impossible by the news of the French failure in London. 
As it happened, he only succeeded in irritating the Prussian 
Government. Chad's influence was even less than that.90 
In Vienna, too, the Polish insurrection was a subject of discussion 
and speculation. The British Ambassador referred to it again in the 
beginning of May. Two points were stressed : the inability of Russia 
to suppress the rising and her inability to incorporate the Kingdom 
of Poland within the Empire in view of public feeling in Europe. 
It was emphasized that although at the Congress of Vienna Prussia 
and Austria were opposed to the creation of a Kingdom of Poland, 
and although they did not readily admit the right of interference 
in this matter by other signatories of the Treaty, they were never-
theless opposed to the annexation of Poland by Russia now. Lord 
Cowley was sure that Metternich in particular felt very strongly 
the necessity of Poland continuing as a separate Kingdom.91 
This information was accompanied by an account of the reports 
soumettent à lui et leur nationalité restera intacte; ib obtiendront et leur constitution 
et le pardon du passé. Mais, je vous l'ai déjà dit: cette question ne peut plus se décider 
que par la soumission ou la victoire." A.é. Prusse. 
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from the Austrian officer at Diebitsch's headquarters, Col. Caboga, 
who represented the Russian army as completely demoralized. 
A later report attributed this opinion, mutatis mutandis, to Nicholas 
himself. The internment of Dwernicki's corps was, to a certain 
degree, a surprise. In their explanation the Austrian Government 
laid particular stress on the pressure put upon them by Russia; the 
relevant article in the "Oesterreichische Beobachter" was written to 
create the impression that only by the interposition of Austrian 
forces was a complete defeat of Dwernicki prevented, pursued as he 
was onto Austrian territory. It was known, however, that Dwerni-
cki's men were poorly guarded and no particular care was taken to 
prevent their movements. The French Ambassador, at the General's 
request, intervened with Metternich on his behalf, while several 
officers of Dwernicki's corps visited the French Embassy. Marshal 
Maison assured them of the genuine interest of France in the Polish 
resistance. For the time being Dwernicki's case contributed to a 
refroidissement between Paris and Vienna.92 
This question almost coincided in time with renewed French 
proposals for talks on disarmament. Metternich rejected the mere 
idea that France should take the initiative in such a matter; this 
was a task for the three Eastern Courts and since the July revolution 
he had been making efforts to bring about a renewal of their 
alliance, especially important at a time when affairs were so 
unsettled. It was the Polish revolution which accounted for his 
failure : the Eastern Powers were still trying in vain to suppress it. 
That is was Nicholas who refused an agreement on Polish affairs, 
Metternich, as it will be seen, preferred not to admit.*3 
On 26th June the special courier with the British Govern-
ment's protest against the treatment of Dwernicki's corps arrived 
in Vienna. Before the British Ambassador called on Metternich, 
he informed Marshal Maison of the contents of his instructions. 
It so happened, therefore, that the Ambassadors visited the Austrian 
Chancery one after the other. Metternich was for a moment 
confused by the appearance of an Anglo-French agreement in this 
93
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case. Yet he did not admit that Austria had committed any in­
fringement of the law of nations ; on the contrary, he told Maison 
that he had had difficulty in explaining to the Russians his disin­
clination to deliver men of Dwernicki's corps to them. A similar 
answer was given to Cowley. The Ambassador observed that no 
favourable policy towards the Poles might be expected from 
Metternich. The Chancellor did not conceal the arrival of a Polish 
agent who had already been the subject of Sir Robert Gordon's 
report from Constantinople, but did not admit that the agent had 
been seen by him; on the contrary, he maintained that he would 
not see the man. Lastly, Cowley wrote that he himself feared the 
extradiction of Dwernicki's men as Austria was anxious to win the 
gratitude of St. Petersburg; but he, too, knew that the interned 
soldiers were so poorly guarded that a considerable part of them 
had already escaped.9 4 
When the news of the French intention to begin a diplom­
atic action in favour of the Poles spread in Vienna, Cowley remark­
ed that, according to dispatches of the Austrian Ambassador in St. 
Petersburg, Nesselrode "within the period of a month repeatedly 
declared to Count Ficquelmont that the Emperor Nicholas rather 
than submit to foreign interference would abandon Poland al­
together"; and in this determination, Cowley thought, Nicholas 
was supported and encouraged by Austria. Further in the same 
dispatch he noted that Paris reports "have given rise to various 
speculations among those who were favourable to the cause of 
Poland, such as " t h a t resources in money and stores will imme­
diately be afforded to the Poles by Great Britain and France and 
that a combined British and French squadron will be sent to the 
North Sea, thus placing the Emperor of Russia in a predicament 
with respect to Poland, similar to that in which the Sultan was 
placed with respect to Greece at the period of the battle of Navarino." 
Cowley had seen a memorandum, written by a Pole, in which 
the sending of a fleet to the Baltic was represented as likely to 
achieve the deliverance of Poland without a continental war, 
whereas Austria would adopt a similar line of action to that which 
8 4
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she had followed in the Greek affair, and Prussia would follow 
Austria in that case. "They are not the avowed sentiments of Prince 
Metternich", continued the British Ambassador, "but some expres-
sions have occasionally dropped from him which might lead one to 
believe that he himself thinks that Austria may be compelled to 
adopt this course and among his confidential friends he has allowed 
himself to say that were the Emperor of Russia to be placed in the 
situation I have mentioned he would not be subjected to harder 
conditions that those which he had contributed to impose on the 
Sultan." Cowley further attributed to Metternich the opinion that 
a defeat of the Russians in a subsequent battle "would secure the 
independence of Poland", while even after the taking of Warsaw 
Nicholas would not attempt "to re-establish his authority upon 
anything like the footing on which it stood previous to the breaking 
out of the insurrection." 95 
This was as yet far from his official utterances. The French Ambas-
sador, who called on Metternich to sound him on the possibility of 
Austria joimng the Anglo-French démarche in St. Petersburg in 
favour of the Poles, found the Chancellor disagreeably surprised 
at the still clearer appearance of a concert of the Western Powers 
in Polish affairs. The Emperor of Austria could never support 
insurrection, Metternich said; such a gesture would inevitably 
excite revolutionary movements in Hungary and Bohemia. Yet the 
Ambassador's impression was not entirely unfavourable, on this 
occasion he brought to the knowledge of the French Government 
M
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some "paroles remarquables" of the Austrian Chancellor, spoken to 
him with reference to Poland some weeks earlier. "Croit-on que, 
comme homme, je puisse être insensible à la vue de tant de courage, 
et pense-t-on que, comme mimstre, je n'aimerais pas mieux avoir 
pour voisine une Pologne toujours bienveillante et toujours amie, 
qu'une Russie toujours envieuse et toujours envahissante?" 
It is difficult to see what induced Metternich to make this 
statement after the PoUsh defeat at Ostrolenka, unless assumption 
is made that he also was impressed by the extent of the Polish 
movement and its echo abroad. It was assumed in Viennese circles 
that the Polish movement, whether ending in success or defeat, was 
bound to bring about important changes. Immediately after the 
interview referred to, the Chancellor sent couriers to Berlin and 
St. Petersburg which the French Ambassador believed to a part 
of the intercourse between the three Powers on concessions which 
they might be required to make in Polish affairs, though Metter-
nich seemed to have inferred from Maison that the Western Powers 
would not push very hard ; and as for obligations under the Treaty 
of Vienna, the Poles themselves had broken the engagement by 
their act in deposing Nicholas.98 
All the evidence of interest shown by the Western Powers in 
Polish affairs presented a major problem to the Austrian Govern-
ment, or at any rate it wanted at an early stage to impress this 
upon the Russian Government. Such was the aim of Metternich's 
dispatch to the Austrian Ambassador in St. Petersburg, dated July 
8th. This document was written on account of Dwernicki's case, but 
refers to much more. Though it professes the principle that a 
sovereign and his revolted subjects cannot be treated on an 
equal footing, it nevertheless confirms at the same time by its 
contents that, in fact, circumstances compelled the Austrian Govern-
ment to act as if they were. 97 
The final echo of the supposed Anglo-French démarche on 
behalf of the Poles, was the interview between Metternich and the 
· · Maison to Sebastiani, 21 July, 3 Aug., A.é. Autriche; Gentz to Prokesch, 
17july, Am dem Nachlasse des Grafen Α. Prokesch-Osten, Vienna 1887, III , 41 ; Metter­
nich's statement is printed in d'Haussonville, Histoire de la politique extérieure du 
gouvernement français 1830-1848, Paris 1850, I, 29 and repeated by Thureau-
Dangin, Histoire de la monarchie de juillet, I, 167; but it is supposed to have been 
made early in 1831. 
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British Charge d'affaires, Mr. Forbes, in which they "exchanged" 
their respective refusals made to the French in London and Vien-
na.98 
VI 
The account of Flahaut's activity must be completed by a note on 
Palmerston's attempt to exercise pressure on St. Petersburg through 
Berlin and of Chad's findings in this affair. The subject of Poland 
was taken up by Palmerston in his private letter to Chad of 
3rd May. He first repeated what he had said to Granville on the 
attitude of Prussia and Austria towards the Polish revolution. 
Palmerston realized that the Prussian Government could not 
adopt a sympathetic attitude with regard to the Polish movement; 
yet, especially as Russian arms did not seem likely to bring the 
contest to a speedy conclusion, Berlin might be desirous to help 
to bring about a reconciliation between Nicholas and the Poles. 
Chad was therefore instructed to avail himself of every opportunity 
to offer informal advice to this effect." 
Chad was not, as has been seen, the man to influence the Prussian 
Government on a point on which they felt very strongly. He had 
already reported on the inclination of Nicholas to treat with the 
Poles as soon as he had obtained a victory. After the receipt of the 
above letter Chad succeeded in mentioning the subject to Ancillon 
and obtained the impression that Russia had probably asked 
for assistance, the more so as Ancillon, unasked, told him that Rus-
sia would oppose a conference on disarmament fearing that such a 
conference would take up the subject of Poland. Some time later 
Chad learnt from the Hessian Chargé d'affaires that the King of 
Prussia accompanied his refusal of military assistance to his son-in-
law "by an expression of his anxious desire to see the contest at an 
end, an expression calculated. . . to convey a hint of mediation 
which H.M.'s knowledge of the Emperor's feeling on this point 
prevents him from offering distincly." The French Charge d'affaires 
was said not to believe in the story; but the Hessian gentleman 
added as certain, at any rate, "that the Prussian Government had 
caused it to be indirectly insinuated to the Polish Government 
'
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that if they made an advance towards a reconciliation with Russia, 
they will be met half-way by the Emperor." 100 
This report corresponds rather with Nicholas' own letter to 
his brother and is probably based upon the incident in April, 
at the time of the beginning of the rising in Lithuania and of a 
somewhat more marked interest in Poland shown by the two Wes-
tern Ambassadors. The embarrassment at St. Petersburg early in 
May is fully treated by the Netherlands Minister. His dispatch 
surveys some events of Polish history after 1793 (the second 
partition of Poland), and of the past campaign; stress is laid upon 
the excitement of popular feeling in Poland. "Si à l'époque de 
l'invasion de la Pologne," continued Baron Van Heeckeren, "la 
Russie s'était exprimée avec plus de modération et de convenance, 
si ses agens à l'étranger surtout n'avaient point exagéré sa puissance 
et affecté, par un patriotisme mal entendu, de déprécier la Pologne 
outre mesure, en représentant l'invasion de ce pays comme une 
promenade militaire; si le Maréchal Diebitsch lui-même, pendant 
son voyage à Berlin, n'y avait constamment tenu le langage d'une 
confiance illimitée, l'état des choses. . . paraîtrait moins fâcheux." 
Moreover, Van Heeckeren contrasted the noble attitude of the 
Poles with the obstinacy of the Emperor and pointed out that the 
interest of the Ambassadors of France and Britain did not stretch 
beyond the provisions of the Treaty of Vienna, insufficient as they 
were for the Poles; these were the factors responsible for the 
"guerre d'extermination" which had begun.101 
The Western Ambassadors were not entirely idle. Mortemart, 
though not enthousiastic about the scale of Polish successes, no-
ticed the obvious embarrassment of Nicholas. He again approached 
the British Ambassador and unfolded to him a plan of negotia-
tions to be effected through the good offices of the Prussian Court, 
whereby the King of Prussia would ask the Poles to submit and 
guarantee to them equal representation in the negotiations with 
Nicholas. Lord Heytesbury, whose instructions were "à ne laisser 
échapper aucune des occasions" for a confidential offer of media-
tion, as noted by the Netherlands Minister, "paraît assez goûter 
ce projet, mais ni l'un ni l'autre des deux Ambassadeurs ne sait 
encore par quels moyens le faire agréer à l 'Empereur." The Polish 
100
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army would always remain a difficulty, as it appeared unlikely 
that Nicholas would agree to keep it in being, while the Poles 
could hardly be induced to renounce their only force. The French 
Ambassador had yet other arguments: that the war party in 
France would cause Périer's cabinet to fall in consequence of the 
prolongation of the war in Poland ; hence the necessity for Russia 
not to refuse to negotiate. If this attitude impressed St. Petersburg 
circles, Mortemart himself was not in the least assured of his 
success. His reports from the same period are couched in an 
apologetic tone with regard to the Poles: he was glad that the 
rising was holding out in Lithuania and Volhynia, and that Dver-
nicki's defeat "n 'a nullement ralenti le zèle des insurgés." On the 
other hand, he feared the consequences for the Poles of the expected 
appointment of Paskevitch.102 
The French Ambassador was also uneasy about his collaboration 
with his British colleague. It has been seen on previous occasions 
how much the French Government insisted that initiative in 
Polish affairs should come at least in appearance from London. 
Neither was Heytesbury, however, the man for the situation nor 
were the relations between Paris and London such as to lead one to 
expect frank co-operation, nor, in the last instance, were the French 
Ambassador's own views likely to bring about a positive result. 
Mortemart's attempt, described above by the Netherlands Minister, 
took a different form under the Ambassador's own pen. His 
dispatch of 4th June begins by a few flattering remarks on Heytes-
bury. He then notes that Heytesbury approached him one day 
(obviously for the second time, since more than a month had 
elapsed between the date of the dispatch and Heytesbury's first 
interview with Nesselrode) on the subject of Poland, wanting to 
know his instructions. The French Ambassador had not yet 
received his instructions of 17th May, which allowed him to act 
more freely, according to circumstances. He said that he would 
be happy to join in Heytesbury's own efforts ; but Heytesbury had 
as yet nothing in his mind. "Je lui proposai quelques insinuations 
à mettre en avant avec propos", wrote the French Ambassador, 
"il m'approuva". But it appeared that the British Ambassador had 
only once mentioned the subject to Nesselrode, and never said a 
word about it to the Emperor, in accordance with the little interest 
102
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that, in Mortemart's opinion, England took in those affairs. "J 'ai 
donc été fort étonné", continued Mortemart, "de lire ensuite que 
V.E. m'engage à entrer dans les vues de Ld Heytesbury et de donner 
une adhésion pleine de réserve aux efforts qu'il peut tenter. J e le 
répète, nos vues sont les mêmes, mais jusqu'à ce moment, seul j ' a i 
fait des efforts dont l'Angleterre veut bien recueillir les fruits, 
sans, en aucun cas, rien compromettre. J 'a i cru devoir indiquer 
sur le champ à V.E. ma position à cet égard et la mettre à même de 
prévoir la valeur de la co-opération de l'Angleterre dans l'affaire 
de Pologne." The indignation of the Duc de Mortemart is still 
better explained when it is added that he claimed to talk of Poland 
almost daily to Nesselrode as well as to Nicholas.103 
I n many other instances, however, the fear of an Anglo-French 
agreement was supported by the appearance of a concerted action. 
The subject of mediation in favour of the Poles continued to be the 
diplomatic news from the Russian capital during the month of June . 
Mortemart made his official démarche on the ground of his instructions 
of 15th May, in which the cholera epidemic served as a pretext for 
the French Government to try to bring an end to the hostilities. The 
Ambassador himself, and his British and Dutch colleagues observed 
that the offer was ill received; Mortemart thought that Nicholas 
absented himself from military parades to avoid meeting him. 
Heytesbury was perhaps more cautious in his comment : circumstances 
might perhaps compel the Imperial Government to treat; yet they 
could not think of agreeing to the independence of Poland because 
this would have been followed by the loss of all the former Polish 
provinces. Van Heeckeren reported that the Russian answer 
employed measured expressions; still he qualified it as "refus coloré 
mais formel." On the other hand, he was convinced that a Prussian 
offer of mediation would be looked upon with favour, and that the 
Prussian Government was renewing its efforts at Warsaw for that 
purpose. The situation in Lithuania was deteriorating daily. The 
insurgents were planning an attack upon Libau, "où doivent arriver 
de la France et de l'Angleterre des vaisseaux qui leur apportent des 
munitions de guerre." Finally, Podolia and Volhynia seemed by no 
means pacified.104 
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It must be noted that these reports were made at St. Petersburg 
within a fortnight of the arrival there of the news of the victory 
at Ostrolenka. The commander of the victorious army, Marshal 
Diebitsch, fell a victim to cholera, or, according to various con-
fidential reports, to poison. His successor, Paskevitch, whose reluc-
tance to take over the command had been known before, went 
"souffrant, désolé et sans confiance", taking the sea route which 
would lead him through Prussian territory (as a passage through 
Lithuania appeared unsafe); Mortemart noted that a possible 
exemption from quarantine regulations for the Russian commander 
would constitute a strong proof of the partiality of the Prussian 
authorities. A new levy of troops was announced in St. Petersburg 
and the British Ambassador reported difficulties in recruiting.105 
In the beginning of July the French Ambassador observed 
uneasiness even in the relations between Berlin and St. Petersburg. 
There were confused reports about Paskevitch, but in the end 
London knew that he was kept in quarantine. Pozzo's reports which 
now penetrated into the Russian capital, increased the fear of 
revolution in France, but instead of making the Imperial Cabinet 
more tractable - as the corresponding reports did in the case of the 
London conference - they resulted in an increase of anti-French 
feeling which only the Polish troubles prevented from fanning into 
an outbreak. On the other hand, Austrian military preparations 
at the French frontiers were denied. From Polish quarters it was 
learnt that Nicholas had written to the Emperor of Austria to tell 
him that as soon as he had obtained some military advantages he 
would treat with the Poles. Mortemart was sure that only a survey 
of the diplomatic correspondence of all the Powers concerned could 
explain various contradictions in the current news.106 
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Soon after this report cholera broke out in the Russian capital, 
accompanied by popular riots. During the first two weeks of July 
the epidemic was almost the only topic in diplomatic communica-
tions from St. Petersburg. The diplomatic corps were abandoned 
entirely to themselves. Both Heytesbury and Mortemart did not 
fail to observe that those two weeks furnished a good deal of con-
vincing proof of the weakness of the Russian Empire ; Heytesbury 
for a moment considered leaving St. Petersburg, as all communica-
tions were broken.107 
This situation immediately preceded the arrival of new instruc-
tions for the French Ambassador, dispatched in consequence of the 
French proposal to the British Government made on 7th July, and 
since then widely known in other capitals. The diplomatic corps 
expected negotiations with regard to Poland. Heytesbury awaited 
new instructions and believed that they would formally order him 
to intervene jointly with the French Ambassador, in such a way as to 
exclude any delaying measures on the part of the Russian Govern-
ment. The Netherlands Minister thought that Russia would be 
unable to refuse the offer and thereby risk a rupture with the other 
Powers. Recent events proved that the fear which Russia used to 
inspire in the other Powers had entirely disappeared. "I l est done 
naturel de croire", wrote Van Heeckeren, "qu 'un grand change-
ment se fera désormais remarquer dans le ton que prendront les 
autres cours vis-à-vis de la Russie, et dans celui qu'elle devra 
mettre elle-même dans ses réponses." Also about this time arrived 
Matuszewic's report of his interview with Palmerston in which the 
latter had told him that Poland and Lithuania were lost to Russia; 
the Austrian Ambassador in St. Petersburg lost no time in informing 
his Government of this opinion.108 
In fact, Mortemart alone received new instructions. He had 
already on several occasions spoken to Nesselrode in the same 
spirit, and now felt strengthened to pursue his own line. The Vice-
Chancellor always had the same reply: the Emperor would see 
his way to grant mercy to the Poles. For his part Nesselrode ap-
107
 Heytesbury to Palmerston, July , F .O. Russia; Mor temar t to Sebastiani, 
6, ia 16 Ju ly , A.é. Russie; Van Heeckeren to Verstolk, 19 Ju ly , R.A. 
108
 Van Heeckeren to Verstolk, 19 July, R.A. ; A. Zamoyski, My adventures, 
I , 58 : (written about August 10) " A courier from St. Petersburg brought 
Ficquelmont 's report that Matuszcwic wrote of Palmerston telling him 'que 
désormais ni la Pologne ni la Lithuanic ne pourront appartenir la Russie ' ." 
Cf. above, p . 169. 
190 THE EIGHTEEN ARTICLES 
peared to rely on Heytesbury's opinion that England would not 
press the Polish case; therefore the Russian Minister was not 
prepared to give way to French insistence alone. As for Mortemart, 
he did not want to give up ; leaving Nicholas undisturbed in his Polish 
policy would amount to the annihilation of Poland, "car la haine 
est à son comble dans le coeur du souverain." Reports concerning 
Western intervention in Polish affairs in Vienna and Berlin poured 
into St. Petersburg, but they still failed to alter the attitude of the 
Government.109 
Some slight progress was achieved by the French Ambassador 
on the 28th. In view of his new instructions he signalled to Paris 
his intention to speak plainly on Poland, and he tried even some sort 
of menace. He asked Nesselrode for a definite declaration with 
regard to Poland, written on the Emperor's instructions, as he 
himself wanted to take it to Paris on his return, his special 
mission being about to end. The Ambassador was sure that this 
proposition greatly impressed the Vice-Chancellor as an evidence 
of a possible Russo-French rupture ; the presence of Mortemart, an 
Ambassador from the Bourbon Court, was greatly appreciated in 
the Russian capital. But this interview had to remain sterile in its 
consequences : soon after this a Russian courier from London brought 
the information that Britain refused to support the French offer 
of mediation. The Vice-Chancellor hastened to send word to 
Heytesbury and thus it became known to the French Ambassador.110 
Mortemart realized that his mission, as far as Poland was 
concerned, had come to an end, and moderated his tone. He did 
not fail to note, however, that the suppression of Louis Philippe's 
speech at the opening of the French Chambers gave rise "aux inter-
prétations les plus favorables à la cause polonaise" ; these were not 
shared by himself, but the English refusal he described in terms 
showing anxiety of St. Petersburg with regard to Western interest 
in Poland.111 
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In August disturbance and later open mutiny in military colonies 
additionally embarrassed the Imperial Government; at this time 
news about hostilities in the Low Countries and of the French 
entry into Belgium began to arrive in the Russian capital. The 
Netherlands Minister wrote that, from then on, the French Ambas-
sador adopted an aggressive attitude. Lord Heytesbury noted that 
the warlike tone of the French newspapers made the ending of the 
war in Poland imperative, and added news about a new levy of 
troops throughout the Empire. Mortemart found out that Heytes-
bury took his explanations of the measures undertaken by the 
French Government in Belgium at their face value and this greatly 
contributed to calm down the feeling at St. Petersburg. The Aus-
trian Ambassador and the Swedish Minister were "les brouillards 
du Conseil".112 
The French Ambassador had his own views about the effect of his 
diplomacy with regard to the intervention in Belgium. With this news 
coincided his leave-taking audience of the Emperor and Nicholas 
was interested to know whether, after the withdrawal of the Dutch, 
the French Government would be able to keep their promise to 
withdraw their army as well. He readily accepted the Ambassador's 
affirmation, and, though in a somewhat different form, caused it to 
be known to Pozzo at Paris. "L'Empereur a été si coulant, si 
amical et si aimable que je commence à croire au bruit qui se 
répand que les affaires vont mal en Pologne." 113 
With this impression the Duc de Mortemart left St. Petersburg 
for France on 27th August. 
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CHAPTER V 
T H E " T E N D A Y S C A M P A I G N " , 
T H E F A L L O F W A R S A W A N D T H E T R E A T Y O F 
15 N O V E M B E R 1831 
The month of August, 1831, seemed to offer better prospects for 
peace at least in the Low Countries. The diplomatically trouble-
some Belgians were engaged in enjoying the first fruits of their 
apparently assured independence, giving a warm reception to the 
new King, who crossed the French border into Belgium on 17th 
July. 
Though the military situation in Poland did not warrant an 
unequivocal hope for victory on the part of the Poles, they, 
knowing nothing of what had passed on the subject of intervention 
in London, were still expecting some diplomatic steps in their 
favour. Little was known abroad about the real strength of the 
contesting parties, and the Eastern Powers were by no means easy 
about France's intentions with regard to Poland. Neither Vienna 
nor St. Petersburg were satisfied with the military situation in 
Poland; from Berlin Chad reported that the Russian passage over 
the Vistula, officially acclaimed by the "Preussische Staatszeitung" 
as a brilliant operation, was confidentially described by Prussian 
officers as very unskilful.1 
Louis Philippe's speech at the opening of the French Chambers 
on 23rd July was subjected to various comments, which showed that 
no quarter was satisfied with the expressions used with regard to 
Poland; those who knew or believed that the French Govern-
ment had no intention of intervening in Polish affairs could with 
reason fear that the days of Périer's cabinet were numbered, 
especially as it had no successes elsewhere to report. 
There was no unanimous support in London for Leopold's 
candidature to the Belgian throne, but hostile disapproval would 
be the better word to describe the feeling in Paris in this respect. 
However, Leopold was accepted in Brussels. And though the X V I I I 
Articles were rejected by the King of the Netherlands, who more-
1
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ver declared he would consider Leopold an enemy should he enter 
Belgium, little attention was paid to views originating in The Hague. 
I 
As early as the beginning of July the opinion, spread from the Berlin 
Court, which was always closest to that of The Hague, was that 
the King of the Netherlands would neither accept the X V I I I 
Articles not consider a financial indemnity for Luxemburg.2 
King William I had hoped that the Belgians would refuse the 
new propositions, thus placing him in a more favourable position. 
But they accepted. In his speech to the Belgian Congress on 5th 
July the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Lebeau, pleading for 
acceptance, included some totally unwarranted interpretations, 
as if the whole of Limburg had been given to Belgium. As this was 
not palatable to the King of the Netherlands, "il faudra que le Roi 
Guillaume fasse la guerre", he said. This speech was greatly 
disapproved of in London. Though William I, at the request of 
Bagot, delayed official announcement of his decision until he heard 
of the reactions of the Conference to Lebeau's speech, it was obvious 
that this speech sealed his determination. It must be added, however, 
that the news that the departure of Prince Leopold for Brussels 
had been agreed upon before the Conference learnt the views of the 
King of the Netherlands could not but provide further grounds 
for this decision.3 
The Conference, or rather Palmerston, was determined to send 
Leopold to Brussels as soon as it heard of the Belgian Congress's 
favourable vote. The Prince himself felt by no means comfortable 
about it and would have preferred to wait for King William's 
reply; but Matuszewic, on behalf of the Conference and more 
particularly speaking for the Eastern Powers, assured him that he 
would be recognized as King, even if the King of the Netherlands 
refused to subscribe to the Articles. This refusal arrived in London 
on the 20th July, when Leopold had already set foot on Belgian 
soil.4 
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The Prince left London without entertaining great hopes for 
his future. To Wellington he is reported to have said that his Belgian 
kingship would last only as long as the Cabinet of Casimir Périer 
in France. He took leave of the Lievens as well, who assured him 
that if an Orange restoration was impossible, Leopold's person 
would offer guarantees of stability, which would be appreciated by 
the Emperor of Russia too. Mme Lieven seized the opportunity to 
mention the presence of Zahiski in Brussels and to impress upon 
the Prince that he would also be judged in St. Petersburg by his 
attitude towards Polish agents.5 
Palmerston, however, believed that he had accomplished a 
successful step. He saw the uncertainty drawing to a close. Leopold's 
taking over of the government in Brussels was considered by him 
as a final blow to the policy of the King of the Netherlands, who in 
this way was deprived of the means of keeping affairs unsettled as 
long as the Belgian kingship remained dependent on his consent, 
and he cheerfully described the King's anger as he imagined it. The 
Minister was confident that William I would not dare to re-
commence hostilities. And Palmerston did not care whether the 
Eastern Powers would keep to their promise to recognize Leopold. 
Recognition only by England and France was sufficient, and perhaps 
even advantageous for Leopold with regard to his own subjects, 
for it made his appearance in Brussels less that of a "child of the 
Conference". " I t may not be amiss", he wrote to the British 
Ambassador at The Hague, "to hint this to the Dutch who prob-
ably think they have a great hold over him by the influence they 
might exercise over Russia if not also over the other two, to delay 
their acknowledgement of him". e 
Bagot's reports from The Hague, however, continued to describe 
warlike feeling in Government circles. "They feel perfectly at 
liberty", he wrote on 25th July, "to go to war if they please & I 
know that several of the Ministers now reproach themselves with 
not having counselled war immediately upon the receipt of the 
last proposi t ions. . . . (i.e., the X V I I I Articles)." The Ambassador 
5
 Gremlle Diary, II, 180, 5 Aug. 1831 : "Matuscewitz told me that he [Leopold] 
went on his knees to Palmerston to send somebody with him who would prevent 
his getting into scrapes, and that Falck and Talleyrand, by far the best heads 
among them, had both predicted that Leopold would speedily commit some folly, 
the consequence of which might be irreparable."; Mme Lieven to Nesselrode, 15 
July, Lie MSS. 
* Palmerston to Bagot, 25 July, Bagot MSS. 
THE "TEN DAYS CAMPAIGN" 195 
heard of the King's enquiry of the Prussian observer at Dutch 
Headquarters as to whether Prussia would come to the King's 
assistance in the event of hostilities against the Belgians. On the 
31st Van Zuylen left The Hague for London, bearing the King's 
answer to the proposal for new negotiations, and on the same day 
the Prince of Orange left the capital for Breda, reported - but 
Bagot was not sure - to have been appointed Commander-in-Chief 
of the Army.7 
On 2nd August the Dutch Army crossed the Belgian frontier. 
I t soon appeared that the Belgian army was retreating everywhere. 
King Leopold, who learnt of the Dutch attack during festivities 
at Liège in the afternoon of the 2nd, instructed Lebeau, the only 
person of distinction at his side, to write to the Belgian represent-
ative in Paris ordering him to request the immediate armed 
assistance of France, in virtue of her being a party to the agreement 
guaranteeing Belgian neutrality. The French Government hardly 
waited to receive this request. Their representative in Brussels, 
Belliard, who, incidentally, had just returned from the French 
capital, went on his own respons ability to Antwerp and succeeded 
in getting the Dutch commander of the Antwerp citadel to withdraw 
his notice of the cessation of the suspension of hostilities. In Paris, at 
the first news of the invasion - on the 4th - Marshal Gérard was 
appointed Commander-in-Chief of the "armée du Nord", and he 
left Paris that night with detailed instructions for the occupation of 
Belgium.8 
The Belgian Cabinet, however, unaware of the extreme danger, 
did not countersign the King's démarche from Liège, and instructed 
Le Hon in Paris to request that the French army be held in readi-
ness at the Belgian frontier in anticipation of the Belgian King's 
orders. When Le Hon communicated this request to Sebastiani the 
French Minister replied that the French Army would enter Belgium 
even if it had to open the gates of Mons "à coup de canon". 
Accordingly, by special orders from Paris, issued on the 5th, the 
entry of the French troops was fixed for the morning of the 7th, 
even before Marshal Gérard received the letter from the Belgian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which the latter requested notifica-
' Bagot to Palmerston, 25, 29, 31 July, Bagot MSS. 
β
 A. Martinet, Leopold 1er et l'intervention /таіцaise en 1831, 1905, pp. 104-5, 
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tion of Gerard's headquarters to which Leopold's orders, "qui 
doivent nécessairement précéder votre entrée en Belgique," β 
could be sent. 
I n the meantime, the news was reflected in diplomatic circles. 
Bagot, after sending his first account of the beginning of hostilities 
on the 2nd, wrote the next day that public opinion in Holland gave 
its whole-hearted support to this act of the King, though it was not 
unaware of the grave implications. It was by Bagot's letter that 
Palmerston was first acquainted with this extraordinary news. 
The French Cabinet resigned the day before Paris learnt of the 
Dutch invasion, but now immediately resumed office. No time was 
lost in making French intervention acceptable to the Conference 
Powers. After the appointment of Gérard the French Minister for 
Foreign Affairs summoned a conference of the representatives of 
the Conference Powers and explained to them the character of the 
French intervention which had for its only object the protection of 
Belgium from the Dutch assault. When they objected to this measure, 
which, they said, should have been decided upon by the London 
Conference, the Minister answered, that the time available had not 
allowed such a procedure. At the same time he instructed Count La 
Rochefoucauld, the French Chargé d'affaires in The Hague, to 
request the immediate withdrawal of the Dutch troops from 
Belgium, and, should this request be refused, to ask for his passport 
and to leave his post. A copy of this dispatch was sent to Talleyrand 
to be shown to the British Ministers.10 
The Dutch notification of the re-opening of hostilities was lodged 
at the Foreign Office probably only a little later than the actual 
crossing of the Belgian frontier by the troops of King William I, 
but its contents might have been known before. Its bearer, Baron 
Van Zuylen, arrived in London on 2nd August late in the evening 
and immediately informed Palmerston of his intention to call on 
him early in the morning. Accordingly, early in the morning of the 
3rd he went to Palmerston's private residence in Stanhope Street. 
9
 H.T. Colenbrander, De afscheiding van België, 1936, p. 105; Martinet, p. 138 
and 151 ; Sol to Belliard, 7 Aug., "6 heures du matin" (fromBrussels) "Lecom-
mandant de place de Mons n'a pas reçu d'ordres pour la réception des troupes 
françaises qui paraissent être en marche à l'heure qu'il est." Belliard, Memoirs, 
II, 403. 
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On handing over his dispatches to the Foreign Secretary, in the 
presence of the Austrian plenipotentiary Wessenberg, he uttered 
a single sentence: "My lord, vous verrez que nous sommes en 
guerre avec Leopold." Palmerston, however, being in a hurry, 
neither opened the dispatches nor asked for any explanations. ' O n 
Thursday evening [the 4th] when the advance of Dutch troops was 
known, Lord Grey and Lord Durham went to Stanhope Street for 
Lord Palmerston, and when they went to the Foreign Office, Lord 
Palmerston opened Zuylen's letter which communicated the inten-
tion of the Dutch Government." 11 
This singular incident delayed any measures the British Govern-
ment might have wished to adopt in order to prevent both the Dutch 
advance and the French intervention, and the British Ministers 
felt outraged at being taken by surprise, while the situation in 
itself was serious enough. That is why "if the Dutch bombard 
Antwerp I will not leave a Dutch ship on the sea" was the first 
reaction of Grey; "Is the King of the Netherlands mad or who has 
led him to such insane proceedings?" Palmerston burst out. 
In public Palmerston tried to be optimistic about peace, but he 
regretfully reminded Bagot of his having foretold the French entry — 
the first dangerous and inevitable consequence of hostilities in the 
Low Countries, while more were perhaps still to follow. To 
Van Zuylen he angrily wrote about the sending of the British 
Fleet to the Downs.12 
But the Dutch felt they had some support from the Eastern 
members of the Conference, who fully aware of the serious situa-
tion took it upon themselves to represent it as the consequence of 
arranging Belgian affairs without due regard to the interests of 
both parties concerned.13 
Nor were the French long in recognizing the favourable cir-
cumstances thus created. Talleyrand reported a difficult session of 
the Conference, when the drafting of a communication to William I, 
asking him to withdraw his troops from Belgium, met with very 
11
 H. van Zuylen van Nyevelt, Memorandum (privatelyprinted), 1853,pp. losq. ; 
Ellenborough Diary, 6 Aug., Ellenborough MSS. 
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Europe by no means hopeless." Hobhouse, Some Account of a Long Life, II, 131. 
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reluctant support from the Russian delegation; and on the same 
day Sebastiani pointed out in his dispatch to London that there 
should be advantages resulting from the expedition to the Low 
Countries, namely, the demolition of the fortresses on the French 
frontier and the recovery of territories lost by France in 1815. 
This did not prevent him from sending round an official note to the 
representatives of the Four Powers in Paris in which the re-estab-
lishing of the armistice was represented as the only object of the 
French move.14 
Not only Britain but also the other three Conference Powers 
were offended, because Leopold's request had been directed, in the 
first instance, to France only; were the French action to be presented 
as a measure adopted by the Conference, Prussia would at least have 
to be included also. Sebastiani, however, almost ironically replied 
that Leopold's delicacy would prevent him from asking the King 
of Prussia's assistance against the latter's brother-in-law, whilst 
"the contemporaneous operation of a French and Prussian army 
might give rise to a dispute about the occupation of places pre-
judicial to the maintenance of general peace." In a different way 
this view was put forward in London. Representatives of the Eastern 
Powers, notably Biilow, feared that the French by acquiring, even 
for a short time, the control over the land between the Rhine and 
the Meuse, would command "un moyen d'action sur la Prusse, 
relativement à la question Polonaise." In this connection they 
expressed their regret that King William I did not propose the 
occupation of Antwerp to Britain and that of Maastricht to Prussia 
" à titre provisoire et pour faire compensation aux forteresses 
limitrophes de la France." Van Zuylen observed that "Prussia 
found herself in a serious situation, but as Biilow was constantly 
professing the weakness of his Court, any half-measures would 
satisfy him." There was, therefore, every prospect of success for 
France. 
The Dutch plenipotentiaries were soon given supplementary 
evidence of the regret felt by the friends of Holland on account of 
the hostilities. Falck and Van Zuylen were satisfied that their friends 
in London - both English and foreign - would not concur with the 
14
 Sebastiani to Talleyrand, 5 Aug., Talleyrand to Sebastiani, 5 Aug., A.é. 
Angleterre; Sebastiani to Granville, 5 Aug., 9 p.m., enclosing a Note of the same 
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view that the other Powers had not been adequately prepared to 
expect hostilities on the Dutch side in virtue of previous notes 
from The Hague. But opinions they heard indicated that the King 
had hardly chosen the right moment. Firstly, even if Warsaw had 
already fallen - an event of international importance - time was 
required for the change thus brought about to have any effects in 
international politics. Secondly, assuming that there would be war, 
it was in Holland's interest to keep its forces intact until then.15 
II 
On 7th August reports of the supposed entry of the French troops 
into Belgium reached London. Talleyrand witnessed a wave of 
anger and apprehension. "Deux conseils du Cabinet ont été tenus 
dans la journée", he wrote. In his next dispatch, however, he 
discussed at some length the prospects opened to France by the 
situation which had now arisen. The current Protocol, No. 31, 
drawn up hastily though with extreme difficulty in order to legalize 
the French expedition as a measure approved by the Conference, 
provided that neither Maastricht nor Venlo should be occupied by 
Marshal Gerard's army. It was clear that Prussia intended to 
occupy the two fortresses and Talleyrand saw in this a means to 
weaken Prusso-Dutch relations. Yet the most important result of 
frequent communications between Paris and Berlin in consequence 
of the French forces operating in the vicinity of the Prussian frontier 
would be the creation of a situation "qui permettrait de demander à 
la Prusse d'être neutre dans le grand débat élevé entre la Pologne 
et la Russie." The Poles should then be able to draw supplies from 
abroad. " I l paraît que ce n'est que cela qui leur manque pour 
repousser les Russes dans leur territoire." And lastly, the opposition 
in France would be deprived of any pretext for accusing the Govern-
ment of "tiédeur" in the Polish question.16 
The entry of French troops into Belgium, already warmly ac-
claimed in Brussels, had not as yet materialized. To his utmost 
astonishment Marshal Gérard was informed by the Belgian Govern-
15
 Granville to Palmerston, 5 Aug., F.O. France; Falck and Van Zuylen to 
Verstolk, 6 Aug., 9 Aug., R.A. 
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 Talleyrand to Sebastiani, 7, 8 Aug., A.é. Angleterre. The Protocol is 
printed in B.F.S.P., XVIII , 824. 
200 THE "TEN DAYS CAMPAIGN" 
or of Hainaut, on the morning of the 7th, that 'the latter had not 
been authorized to allow French troops into Belgium. The Marshal 
immediately referred to Paris for further instructions. Later during 
the day the Belgian Governor's instructions were confirmed by 
Belliard himself. The 7th and the 8th of August were thus spent in 
correspondence. The French Cabinet did not alter their deter-
mination : Gérard was ordered to enter Belgium, and to by-pass all 
places where authorities were unwilling to admit his troops, and 
to get in touch with the Dutch forces as soon as possible. He did not 
need, however, to await the arrival of these instructions. The news 
of the total defeat of General Daine, commanding one of the two 
main Belgian corps, made the Belgian Cabinet request the interven-
tion of French forces. The first of Gerard's regiments crossed the 
frontier at 5.30 a.m. on the gth of August.17 
Whilst diplomacy was engaged in preventing France from prof-
iting by favourable circumstances, the Dutch Army under the 
Prince of Orange advanced into Belgium. On the 8th General Daine 
was defeated at Hasselt. Belliard, not knowing of the Belgian 
Cabinet's decision, sent a courier to Gérard, with the request for 
an immediate entry into Belgium. On the 9th the Prince of Orange's 
headquarters were at St. Trond and his troops marched on Aer-
schot. In the night of the 11 th the advance of Duke Bernhard of 
Saxe Weimar's army on Brussels was halted for a time, their 
commander agreeing to Belliard's request to him to seek new in-
structions from the Prince of Orange before continuing his advance. 
By the afternoon of the 12th the campaign was finished, the battle 
of Louvain being interrupted by the intervention of Sir Robert 
Adair, the British Ambassador, who, having only just arrived, 
exposed his life to danger by appearing in the front line. King 
Leopold, as was soon known, narrowly escaped being taken pris-
oner.18 
All the pressure which the Conference Powers brought to bear 
upon the Dutch Government was not sufficient to make it order 
17
 Sol to Belliard, 6 Aug., "à 8 heures du matin" : "la nouvelle de l'arrivée de 
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the retirement of its troops before their direct contact with the 
army of Marshal Gérard, which, as has been seen, did not enter 
Belgium until the gth. It was not until some days had passed that 
the diplomatic corps at The Hague realized this somewhat curious 
determination of William I, and the French Chargé d'affaires sent a 
courier to Marshal Gérard requesting him to get in touch with the 
Prince of Orange as soon as possible. Two days, according to 
Bagot, would have elapsed before the courier sent on the loth, could 
have reached the French headquarters. In the meantime, however, 
King Leopold agreed to Sir Robert Adair dispatching Lord 
William Russell, attaché at the British Embassy, to Dutch Head-
quarters with Adair's letter informing them of the arrival of the 
French army in Wavre. But it was not until Adair himself appeared 
before the Prince of Orange that he agreed to the suspension of 
hostilities.19 
Neither Paris nor London was as yet aware of the extent of the 
Belgian discomfiture. Orders sent from Paris on the n t h instructed 
Gérard not to harass his soldiers by precipitated marches, and, 
indeed, the French commander himself, knowing little of the real 
course of operations, was only too glad to allow his newly recruited 
soldiers to rest already in Mons. Palmerston was sure that the 
menaces held out to The Hague Cabinet would make them order 
the retreat as soon as the first news from London reached Holland. 
The Minister cheerfully wrote about the fading prospects of the 
Dutch to entangle the Four Powers in a general war against 
France. "This was not a bad speculation", he observed, "but like 
most of the Dutch plans, it comes a little too late; if they had moved 
before Leopold became King & whole Belgium was without a 
Government and chief, their plan might have answered." As has 
been seen, little had been needed at the time to make this a reality.20 
Not even at The Hague did the diplomatic corps realize what 
had really happened. The representatives of the three Eastern 
Powers sent embarrassed and disapproving reports to their Courts, 
and the Prussian Minister was very active in trying to dispel any 
hopes William I might have of Prussian assistance ; so was the King 
of Prussia with regard to the impression that might have arisen in 
19
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the mind of his Imperial son-in-law about the improvement at 
The Hague. On the contrary, "much as he was right in complain-
ing," wrote Frederick William I I I to the Empress Nicholas, at 
the close of the campaign, "his decision to open hostilities was 
incomprehensible." 21 
In the meantime, almost three days before the actual cessation 
of hostilities, the Netherlands Government announced its intention 
to withdraw the army from Belgium. It must necessarily seem 
ironical for Mimster Verstolk to declare that the campaign in 
Belgium might have been a purely domestic affair, but "concevant 
les complications qui pourraient résulter de l'entrée des troupes 
françaises en Belgique" the Dutch troops would be ordered to 
retire. This declaration relieved the tension in London; Pal-
merston himself acknowledged his fault and told Van Zuylen that 
he had understood "la guerre" in his statement of 3rd August as 
"guerre morale", and therefore made no comment. The Nether-
lands Ambassador was abundantly congratulated on the victories 
of the Prince of Orange's army. The British Cabinet could assure 
Parliament that on the withdrawal of the Dutch forces the French 
would follow the same course. It did not appear, however, that 
this was their intention.22 
On 12th August Palmerston learned of the conversation between 
Biilow and Talleyrand, in which the latter proposed a complete 
plan for the partition of Belgium, acceptable, he thought, even to 
England. The Belgians were unworthy of independence, while 
moreover there was no solution in sight to terminate the French 
occupation; their withdrawal without tangible results, such as the 
demolition of fortresses on the frontier of France, would mean the 
end of Périer's Cabinet. Prolonged occupation would bring about 
the fall of Lord Grey's administration Palmerston was surprised, 
but his information supported Billow's: he had just learned that 
Marshal Gérard had received orders to hold the Belgian fortresses 
until he should receive clear contrary instructions from the Minis-
ter of War, and the newspapers wrote "that the French Govern-
21
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ment is collecting another corps as a reserve for Gérard." "Bülow's 
notion is", wrote Palmerston to Grey, "that this move of the 
Dutch had been planned between Talleyrand and Falck, who have 
been much together [lately] and that Russia had not discour-
aged it, partly wishing to help Holland to a share of Belgium and 
partly thinking that war in the West would leave her elbow room 
in the East." Palmerston may also have had in mind Bagot's report 
of 2nd August, in which the Ambassador said that Van Zuylen, 
before he left for London with his eventful notification, had only 
communicated with the French Chargé d'affaires. The Foreign 
Secretary assured Biilow that the British Government would find a 
way to get the French out of Belgium; Biilow thought Palmerston 
relieved by Granville's dispatch received on the morning of the 13th, 
but on the same day an angry letter was sent from Stanhope Street 
to The Hague as it appeared that fighting still continued in the Low 
Countries and that this offered an opportunity for Gerard's forces to 
advance further into Belgium.23 
Grey had already become "a little anxious" with regard to French 
promises of evacuation, as the Paris Government tried to introduce 
other motives than the Dutch advance for the French occupation of 
Belgium, and reports from the British Ambassador could not but 
strengthen his and Palmerston's anxiety. Sebastiani and Périer 
immediately agreed that the French troops should avoid ap-
proaching Antwerp, Venlo and Maastricht - as stipulated by 
Protocol No. 31 - but the former raised many objections to the oc-
cupation of Maastricht and Venlo by Prussian troops, which was then 
being contemplated in London; he even suggested that Holland 
should lose those places to Belgium as a punishment for the breaking-
off of the suspension of hostilities. He even tried to make the British 
Ambassador agree to the prolongation of the stay of the French 
army in Belgium until the border fortresses were demolished or 
at least until some agreement on this subject was reached. On the 
2S
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I 4th came the bombshell : Marshal Soult, the French Minister for 
War, told his Parliament that the Dutch were leaving Belgium but 
"that the French troops would not on that account return into 
France". Only with difficulty did Granville succeed in making 
Sebastiani declare in the Chamber that the Government hoped 
also to be able to withdraw French forces soon.24 
This caused no little surprise in London but if the real purpose 
of the French Government was the enforcing of the demolition of 
the fortresses, there were other reasons also, equally well founded 
and - under different circumstances - likely to be appreciated by 
the British Government as well. In a special interview Granville 
obtained a very detailed statement on the subject from Louis 
Philippe himself, namely "that the spirit of the promise made by 
the French Government was that their troops should evacuate 
Belgium when it was secured against another sudden attack from 
Holland, for unless an engagement was entered into by the King 
of the Netherlands not to recommence war, Belgium might be 
again overrun, & the Prince of Orange proclaimed King at 
Brussels before the French Army (if situated within its own fron-
tiers) could reach that city and even the Belgick fortresses be in 
danger of being occupied by Dutch troops." 25 
At this stage, however, the Ambassador did not admit the French 
reasons, though he soon came to appreciate Louis Philippe's 
predicament. From London, however, before even Soult's state-
ment became known, Talleyrand implored his Government to 
withdraw its troops immediately. Van Zuylen was now delighted 
to report the reserved attitude of the Eastern diplomats in London: 
it was only too obvious that it was the British Cabinet which was 
compelled to seek their support, especially in view of the assurance 
given to Parliament of a speedy evacuation of Belgium by the 
French. Even Lord Holland was somewhat shaken in his French 
sympathies. The action of the French Government was a powerful 
blow both to the cause of peace and to the Reform Cabinet 
"The French must disarm this hostility to u s . . . . " he wrote to 
Granville, and he concluded : "If the French wish us to concert with 
24
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them now or hereafter about the Poles they should take care not to 
alienate the public mind here by conduct or language in Belgium." 2e 
Fortunately for France there was no official notification of the 
Dutch retreat and the Conference countersigned by their Protocol 
of 18th August the prolongation of the French occupation. Talley-
rand was only too glad for this help in continuing his "idée favorite". 
Next day, in spite of his earlier warnings, he wrote to Paris: "La 
force des choses amènera indubitablement un partage de la Belgi-
que, l'Angleterre elle-même sera forcée d'y consentir." The idea 
seemed to have gained currency in London. It was acceptable at 
the Russian Embassy. Van Zuylen believed that all the friends of 
Holland admitted the impossibility of Belgium continuing as an 
independent state, but that Grey was invincibly opposed to any 
new solutions because he was a most convinced opponent of the 
partition of Poland 40 years before.27 
In Paris Granville had no more success. Louis Philippe's con-
fidential communication was made public by the King's statement 
in Parliament that he would order the retreat of this troops from 
Belgium as soon as he obtained a guarantee "que le retour de notre 
armée n'exposera pas la Belgique à de nouvelles agressions." This 
necessarily caused Granville to protest and Sebastiani professed 
his regret at the lack of confidence in the French Government : the 
French would withdraw but they had a right to require security 
for Belgium. On 22nd August the Minister declared formally that 
the withdrawal was independent of any other consideration, but 
he could not make this declaration, he said, "without at the same 
time stating that the French Government claims the right to 
negotiate with the Belgic Government respecting the dismantling 
of the fortresses." This in his turn the Ambassador was not prepared 
to accept - the matter could only be discussed between Belgium 
and the Powers responsible for the construction of the fortresses. 
The French moderated their tone, and, in all frankness, both 
Sebastiani and Périer "earnestly begged me to consider the critical 
position of the French Government in regard to the fortresses, the 
demolition of which was pronounced in the King's speech."28 
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The second condition of the French, a special pledge from the 
King of the Netherlands not to reopen hostilities, was even less 
likely to be obtained. When the evacuation of the Dutch troops was 
known in London, feeling towards The Hague very much improved 
according to Falck and Van Zuylen; the Austrian members of the 
Conference also indicated sympathy for the Dutch cause. There 
were speeches in favour of Holland in the House of Lords. There 
was even an article in "The Times" in which the action of the Dutch 
troops was described as the result of the Conference's protocols. 
France could never, for obvious reasons, act as the Conference's 
agent: it was the French influence which brought about the sub-
stitution of the "Bases de séparation" by the X V I I I Articles. 
Louis Philippe thought it necessary to have this article refuted by the 
French Press. The diplomats of course felt differently about the 
Dutch move. Bagot did not agree with William I's methods, 
but, much as he realized that these accounted very largely for the 
insistence of the French to remain in Belgium, he nevertheless 
doubted whether the King could be induced to relinquish his 
freedom of movement with regard to Belgium. " I n marching into 
Belgium," he wrote to his colleague at Brussels, "the King com-
mitted an act of most mischievous imprudence. In marching as he 
did he was guilty of very unwarrantable duplicity. But he has 
succeeded, and however that success may anger the Conference, 
it has produced as success always will do, a great moral effect in 
his favour; - and the consequence now of any attempt, on the part 
of the Five Powers, to punish him for it, will be not to make him 
more tractable, but to engage the sympathies of mankind on his side. 
I hope that the Conference may feel this." 2e 
Indeed, this was very much the case. Though Palmerston wrote 
to Berlin that King William I lost all consideration he might have 
expected, the Protocol of 23rd August (No. 34) imposed no hardships 
upon him, the conditions being suspension of hostilities for 6 weeks 
under the guarantee of the Five Powers, and the line of demarcation 
to be that which existed before 2nd August. Palmerston lacked the 
support of the other members of the Conference; he believed 
moreover that Prussia was not against a partition of Belgium, and 
29
 Falck and Van Zuylen to Verstolk, 20 Aug., R.A.; Esterhazy and Wessen-
berg to Metternich, ao Aug., Arneth, Johann Freiherr von Wessenberg, II, 123-4; 
Louis Philippe to Sebastiani, 21 Aug., Revue des Deux Mondes, (1910) LVI, 318; 
Bagot to Adair, 20 Aug., Bagot MSS. 
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Russia would welcome any new troubles in the West of Europe.30 
Protocol No. 34 was agreed upon on the receipt of the Dutch 
notification that their evacuation would be completed by 21st 
August, and yet not a single word was said in it about the French 
troops in Belgium. And yet Granville heartily sympathized with 
the precarious situation of the French Government: if they sub-
scribe to the Protocol, he thought, they had better resign, for 
"neither the Chambers nor the public would tolerate the with-
drawal of the French troops from Belgium with no other security... 
than such as was to be derived from a mere promise of the King of 
Holland." French protests followed, as shall be seen. In the mean-
time, the first battle for the withdrawal of the French was lost.31 
Moreover, Palmerston could not be satisfied with King Leopold, 
who, to England's surprise, himself requested the prolongation 
of French occupation. In the flow of arguments urging the King to 
adopt British policy for his own, the Foreign Secretary did not 
forget to add that before long the Polish contest would finish and 
allow Russia and her allies more freedom in supporting Williaml.32 
But King Leopold was bitterly disappointed with the Con-
ference's lenient attitude towards the King of the Netherlands. 
He had already been imprudent enough to refer to the question 
of fortresses through Lebeau's letter of 2nd August, requesting 
French assistance, but "the language in which the Conference was 
pleased to remonstrate with the King of Holland was cer-
tainly not calculated to stop an army marching upon Belgium" 
and therefore he tried to retain at least his one convinced supporter. 
For the rest, the French were only too eager to fulfil this rôle. 
Adair was convinced that the French entry took place before 
Marshal Gérard obtained Leopold's invitation. Notwithstanding 
30
 The Protocol in B.F.S.P., XVIII, 830; Palmerston to Chad, 19 Aug., Palm 
MSS; Palmerston to Granville, 23 Aug.: "The French wish to stay in; the Prus-
sians do not know their own mind on the subject because they always have a se-
cret thought that if the French stay, and war ensues, the partition must follow 
and they will come in for their share, and hence it is that Werther is not very keen 
on the subject though Ancillon protests to Chad that his only wish is to get the 
French out. Austria is the nearest to us . . . Russia who, I suspect, knew more of the 
Dutch King's inroad than she would choose to own , . . . would not be sorry to see 
us quarrelling together." Bulwer, II, 121. 
81
 Granville to Palmerston, 26 Aug., F.O. France. 
32
 H.C.F. Bell, Palmerston, 1936,1, i34;cf. Palmerston to Grey, 22 Aug.,Howick 
MSS. 
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the presence of an Ambassador, another special envoy, Count 
Latour-Maubourg arrived in Brussels on 19th August to reach 
an agreement on the fortress question before the departure of 
French troops.33 
In London, for Wellington as well as for Grey this presented a 
virtual casus belli. To the slight surprise of Mme Lieven, Grey 
("qui est toujours singulièrement curieux de connaître les opinions 
du duc de Wellington et se règle constamment sur elles") main-
tained that England was prepared for a war, as she had lately been 
increasing her armed forces, only with less publicity than had the 
others. Nevertheless, Grey would have preferred diplomacy but 
realized that for Talleyrand all his arguments were placed in an 
unfavourable light by the incapacity shown by the Belgian Govern-
ment. "La combinaison Leopold pesa sur lui de tout son poids", 
observed Mme Lieven. Accounts of the Prince of Orange's success-
es, even the conduct of the Duke of Saxe Weimar with regard to 
Lord William Russell, all this completed the report of the failure 
of British policy sent to St. Petersburg: "Tout cela est fort humiliant 
pour l 'Angleterre. . . a mis dans toute son évidence la pauvreté 
des moyens de ces braves Belges aux gasconnades desquels on a 
fait tant de sacrifices, et e n f i n . . . . a amené l'armée française en 
Belgique." In these circumstances "Lord Grey me demande une 
bataille ou la prise de Varsovie avec autant d'impatience que 
j ' en éprouve moi-même," noted Mme Lieven. From London, 
however, Russian prospects were by no means clear, even to her.34 
Surprisingly enough, two days later Grey informed Mme Lieven 
that he could not refuse to see another Polish envoy, the poet 
Niemcewicz, who had arrived in London on 21st August, bringing 
a letter from the Polish Government to the King. A survey of 
Polish affairs during August will be helpful to clear this apparent 
discrepancy.36 
33
 Mart inet , p . 105, cf. above, p . 239; Leopold to Grey, 16 Aug., Howick 
M S S ; Adair to Palmerston, 11 Aug.; " T h e proof is most clear that the French 
entered those territories not only without leave but against the express will of the 
King" , as Lord William Russell found them at Mons at 2 o'clock on the day on 
which, about noon, the King had written to Gérard. Palm MSS. Neither Adair 
nor obviously Grey could have known that the French entry was first authorized 
by the Belgian Cabinet, cf above, p . 200. 
34
 M m e Lieven to Nesselrode, 22 Aug., closing as follows: "Paskévitch, est-il 
donc a t taqué et paralysé comme l'était Diebitsch?" Lie MSS. 
а
' M m e Lieven to Grey, Grey to M m e Lieven, 26 Aug., The Lieven-Grey 
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I I I 
Before the Dutch campaign Palmerston informed the Ambassador 
in St. Petersburg that the reason for refusing the French offer 
concerning Poland was his conviction that after a new battle 
which now seemed imminent, Nicholas might be more inclined to 
treat. The Eastern Courts, however, remained unconvinced about 
the likelihood of indifference on the part of Britain and France in 
Polish affairs. Metternich hoped that the Polish movement might 
collapse before "revolutionary" public opinion in England and in 
particular the fall of Périer's Cabinet would compel the two Powers 
to intervene in Poland. Militarily, he hoped, Paskevitch should 
be able to secure victory during August. Berlin seems to have 
been less confident about Russia's success; there one could more 
readily picture the military situation from first-hand accounts. 
Bernstorff would be glad if France advised the Poles to submit, 
for then, he told Flahaut, he had grounds to believe that Nicholas 
would meet them half-way.36 
In addition the Russian Government, having formally refused 
Mortemart's overtures, was by no means easy about further develop-
ments of French policy with regard to Poland. Louis Philippe's 
speech to Parliament, the pubUcation of which was suppressed in 
Russia, gave rise in government circles to the comment: "Le Roi 
des Français ajeté le masque", but the Dutch commentator, unlike 
Mortemart, saw no danger for Russia in the King's words relating to 
Poland, except in so far as they gave evidence of the abandonment 
Correspondence, II, 269-271. Grey wrote : "After having seen Walewski, after both he 
and Wielopolski had beenfrequently [italics mine] received by Palmerston I thought 
I could not very well decline an interview which was proposed to me by a person 
whom I had formerly known when he was here with Kosciusko." Niemcewicz was 
an A.D.C. to Kosciuszko, the American Independence War hero, during 
Koáciuszko's unsuccessful campaign against Russia and Prussia in 1794 (followed 
by the third partition of Poland), whereafter, after a short captivity in Russia, he 
came with Koáciuszko to England and then went to America. 
9e
 Palmerston to Heytesbury, 2 Aug., Heytesbury Papers; Metternich to 
Wrede, 2 Aug., V. BibI, Metternich in neuer Beleuchtung, 1928, p. 236; cf. above, p. 
192; Chad to Palmerston, 3 Aug., P.O. and priv.. Palm MSS. Chad was then 
instructed to protest again against the breach of neutrality, and intended to 
submit a formal note; he later refrained from doing so in the belief that France 
wanted to break the alliance of the Four Powers "& especially detach Prussia 
from England & perhaps to make use of the sympathy felt here for the King of 
Holland for that purpose." Palm MSS. 
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of Poland and might in consequence drive the Poles to desperate 
intransigence.37 
Meanwhile the French Chambers seemed to have estimated the 
King's speech above its face value, as far as it concerned Poland. 
In the long debate on the address in reply, held after the news of 
Dutch invasion and Franch intervention, the motion of Lafayette 
for the recognition of Poland was defeated by a narrow majority. 
Another motion proposed that the Chamber should see in the 
King's words the certainty (certitude) that Polish nationality 
would not perish, but eventually the weaker expression "l'assu-
rance" was adopted. Périer, according to Granville, was prepared 
to resign if these motions were carried; a special committee was 
appointed to revise the passage in question. Yet the French Premier 
remained vague about his intention of remaimng in office and the 
British Ambassador was troubled by these discussions.38 
The Polish envoys in Paris were seen by Sebastiani at the 
beginning of August. He seemed to have known nothing about the 
English démarches in Berlin with regard to Prussian neutrality, 
and he was glad to hear of them. As for himself he only expressed 
his hope that the Poles would hold out during this campaign; 
Kniaziewicz replied that this could be done, if the French Govern-
ment made a straightforward declaration in favour of the Poles. 
This remark met with no response.39 
The two envoys hardly realized the effect of the hostilities in the 
Low Countries on their cause. On the 8th, rightly, as it seemed, 
the Chamber being engaged in discussion of the "mention polo-
naise" in the address in reply, they approached Sebastiani again, 
but he refused to do anything concerning Poland at that time. 
Writing to Walewski, they were wondering if England would allow 
the French to occupy Belgium.40 
" Extracts of letters from St. Petersburg, dated 6 and ю Aug., in Van Zuylen 
Papers, R.A. The second letter reads: "Les phrases sonores qui concernent la 
Pologne ne sont autre chose qu'une ironie sanglante, elles prouvent que la mé-
diation offerte par la France a été rejetée . . . " 
38
 J . Dutkiewicz, Poland and France in 1831, pp. 128-9; Granville to Palmerston, 
8 Aug., F.O. France. The Netherlands Minister in Paris believed that an agree-
ment between the Government and the Parliament had been reached, fagel to 
Verstolk, 8 Aug., R.A. 
' · The Paris envoys to the Polish Government, 1, 9 Aug., to Walewski, 10 
Aug., B.P. 
40
 Walewski to the Paris envoys, 5, 7, 12, 17 Aug., B.P. The last letter reads: 
"Tout le monde est très occupé du discours de Maréchal Soult dans lequel il dit 
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Walewski had a clearer view of the situation. Already on the 
news of the resignation of Périer he experienced difficulty in getting 
anybody to listen to him talking about Poland, whereas in his inter-
view with Palmerston on the 7th he found the Foreign Secretary 
cold and occupied with the expectation of war because of the 
development in Belgian affairs. Palmerston again spoke about his 
demarches to Prussia, but Walewski knew from his correspondence 
with Flahaut that there was little hope of success in Berlin. "L'An-
gleterre ne fera rien", wrote the Polish envoy on the 12th. The 
same report refers to the first, very short, debate on Poland in the 
House of Commons. One of the four Members who took part in it, 
Mr. Hunt, informed the House that a memorandum, presented by 
the Westminster Union, calling the Government's attention to the 
war in Poland had not even been answered by the Foreign Secre-
tary. Mr. Hume added that "he had met no individual" who was 
not interested in the measures that the Government intended to 
adopt with regard to Poland. Col. Evans reminded the House of his 
intention to bring forward a motion concerning Poland. Following the 
speech of Sir Robert Inglis, not even a vote was taken on the 
printing of the memorandum. "Mais du moins Lord Palmerston 
n 'a rien répondu de défavorable" commented the Polish envoy 
after stating that little attention had been paid to the speeches.40 
More, of course, had been expected of Sebastiani and the 
Paris mission was greatly disappointed. They sent a memo-
randum concerning Prussia to the French Prime Minister and 
hoped for the best as three days later they received an acknow-
ledgment, the first such during their activity in the French capital. 
Then, in their 25th interview with Sebastiani every hope was 
dissipated. The French Minister not only repudiated their sugges-
tion to connect Polish and Belgian affairs, in the same way as 
Talleyrand had proposed this some days earlier - but was not 
even prepared to admit any breach of neutrality by Prussia. He 
left unanswered questions concerning his recommendation, made 
at the time of the expected Anglo-French démarche to Russia, to 
hold out for another two months so as to let negotations mature; 
on the contrary, he advised the Poles to treat with Paskevitch. 
He did not, however, fail to communicate to Granville Mortemart's 
que l'armée française ne se retirera pas de Belgique. C'est entièrement pour l'An-
gleterre un casus belli."; Hansard Pari Debates, V (3rd Series), p. 950. Cf. J. H. 
Gleason, TTte Origin of Russophobia in Great Britain, 1950, p. 121. 
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dispatch of 23rd July, expressing his hope that it might be considered 
by the British Cabinet.41 
It may be worth while mentioning at this stage that the failure of 
the Polish agents, even before it had become so obvious, was subject 
to criticism on the Polish side as well. At the end of July Count 
Jelski, a former director of the Bank of Poland, arrived in London. 
He had been interned by the Austrian authorities and had recently 
escaped from Bohemia. Jelski entirely disapproved of the action of 
the Polish envoys in Paris and of Walewski as regarded the X V I I I 
Articles, believing that the rejection of those proposals by the 
Belgians would bring England closer to France. It has been shown 
already that this reasoning had also been that of Palmerston up to a 
certain point, and that in any case Palmerston tried to impress this 
possibility upon the Eastern members of the Conference. Jelski 
developed his views to Lord Holland. He suggested that the "inac-
tive" attitude of Prussia towards the Polish revolution, announced 
to Chad, was a counter measure of the Berlin Government, showing 
their concurrence with the King of the Netherlands in his rejection 
of the X V I I I Articles. Lord Holland saw in it only a mark of defer-
ence to Nicholas; yet he believed that Prussia would not vote for 
war, if she were told by Britain that she only knew neutrality or war. 
The British Government was already working in this direction, added 
Lord Holland. The French mediation proposal had to be rejected, 
he continued, because it was not clear whether France meant war 
or not. Jelski seized this opportunity to say that the best way to 
avoid war would be to request the King of Prussia to offer mediation 
— to such an offer Nicholas might be likely to subscribe; in the 
meantime, delay could not but complicate matters, "puisque la 
France ne pourra s'empêcher de nous reconnaître au premier 
avantage remporté par nos troupes et cette démarche pourra amener 
une guerre qu'on évite avec tant de soins." Lord Holland seemed to 
agree entirely ; he requested Jelski to repeat this reasoning to Pal-
merston and promised to obtain for him an interview for this 
purpose. Moreover, he said that the recognition of the Polish 
Government by Britain seemed likely to him. "C'est un gouverne-
41
 Périer to Kniaziewicz, 13 Aug., the Paris envoys to the Polish Government, 
16 Aug., B.P. cf. above, p. 199; Granville to Palmerston, 18 Aug.: " . . .if you 
allow him [Nicholas] to do as he pleases Poland is annihilated for nothing can 
exceed the hatred against them [the Poles]". This is almost a translation of 
Mortemart's dispatch, referred to on p. igo. F.O. France. 
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ment de fait qui existe depuis huit mois, commande aux troupes, 
livre des batailles et remporte des victoires. Un gouvernement com-
me celui-là peut être reconnu à tout moment." Yet he was not 
prepared to bring the matter before the Cabinet. "Je doute pour-
tant" , he added, "que nous puissions nous refuser à le faire aussitôt 
que les événemens qui paraissent prochains auront décidé d'avan-
tage les affaires en votre faveur." This condition made a great 
difference to the Poles, who, mindful of the advice of Sebastiani, 
avoided a major battle lest it should be unsuccessful. But more 
important than that, the news of the war in the Low Countries was 
on its way to London.42 Like Walewski, Jelski did appreciate the 
effect of this event on international relations, but he failed to draw 
the appropriate conclusions. He thought that the general war 
which now appeared inevitable, would unite Britain and France on 
one side, in spite of London's fear of France, because Prussia 
would support Holland. Continuing his own reasoning Jelski now 
advised the Paris envoys that if an arrangement concerning 
Belgium should be reached without reference to Poland, the Polish 
cause would be lost. In a long letter to Talleyrand Jelski expounded 
the necessity for making the neutrality of Prussia in the Polish war 
the condition of peace. The Ambassador sent his letter to Paris and 
in his own dispatch at that time advocated such a possibility even 
without actual war. Sebastiani, as has been shown, did not accept 
Talleyrand's proposal, and before long it became clear that France 
had to keep her army in Belgium at all costs and could not make 
any conditions, the occupation itself being hardly tolerated by 
the other Powers.43 
On 16th August Jelski heard from Lansdowne that the Cabinet 
was discussing Polish affairs. The news from Poland, neither reliable 
nor wide-spread did not contain anything of importance. Chad 
reported that there was dissatisfaction with the inactivity of the 
armed forces and little confidence in the Commander-in-Chief, 
42
 Jelski to Czartoryski, 28 July, 4 Aug., B.P. For Palmerston's interview with 
Bülow in June, cf. above, p. 159. 
Although the majority of the Polish generals in the council of war on 27 July 
voted for a battle, the C.-i-C, Skrzynecki, on hearing of Sebastiani's statement of 
8 July, reverted to his former policy of inactivity. Barzykowski, Hutory of the 
November Rising, IV, 372; cf W. Tokarz, Wojna Polsko-Rosyjska wr. 1831 (The 
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 Jelski to Czartoryski, 4 Aug., to the Paris envoys, 5, 6, 8 Aug., to Talley-
rand, 7 Aug., B.P.; for Talleyrand's dispatch see above, p. 199. 
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Skrzynecki. But soon afterwards the news spread in London of 
the arrival in Warsaw of the corps of General Dembinski from 
Lithuania which, it was believed, meant a breathing-space for 
the Poles. In fact, though it could be considered a military success 
in itself, it nevertheless meant a complete failure of the rising in 
Lithuania, where there were now no regular forces left, and 
Dembinski's corps, composed of newly recruited soldiers, only 
represented a very modest contribution to the strength of the Polish 
army.44 
A few days later Niemcewicz, a very distinguished envoy, then 
in his seventies, arrived in London. The object of his mission was to 
take part in negotiations concerning Poland which the Polish 
Government thought, after obtaining information of the French 
démarche of 7th July, were about to take place in the British capital. 
Nothing of the kind was contemplated in London when he arrived 
after a journey of more than three weeks and all that could be 
undertaken was to try to present the letter from Prince Adam Czar-
toryski who, as president of the Polish Government, had written to 
the King.45 
The application from the Poles to present Czartoryski's letter 
coincided with the arrival of Chad's dispatch containing in-
formation about new disturbances in Lithuania, east of the 
provinces so far affected, and about the corps of General Rüdiger 
which was supposed to march upon Warsaw from the south, but 
had not crossed the Vistula at all.46 
In a short note, dated 24th August, Palmerston informed Grey 
of the Polish application, and of his intention to refuse the letter; 
he accordingly gave Niemcewicz no hope of the possibility of his 
being received by the King. But the mere news of Niemcewicz's 
arrival greatly disturbed the wife of the Russian Ambassador. 
She had already done her best to persuade Grey not to see the new 
Polish envoy; but on learning the envoy's name, she appeared 
alarmed: " . . . j ' a v o u e que souvent lord Grey m'a parlé de lui 
comme d'une très vieille et très intime connaissance. . . , cela 
44
 Jelski to the Paris envoys, 16 Aug., B.P. ; Chad to Palmerston, 7 Aug., F.O. 
Prussia; Van Zuylen to Verstolk, 20 Aug., R.A. 
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justifie la visite [at Grey's] mais combien je suis contrariée de ce que 
ce personnage soit ici! Il est connu personnellement de plusieurs 
ministres; et entre lui et Talleyrand ils feront la bien mauvaise 
besogne, si Paskevitch ne se hâte pas." 
Her very long letter on this subject is only the preamble to the 
statement that, short of Paskevitch's immediate success, Europe is 
lost ; this is supplemented by a remark on Grey's complaints about 
Leopold, Wellington's view that only one of the Belgian fortresses 
could be dispensed with, and Mme Lieven's own belief that the 
French would not leave Belgium.47 
About that time the Polish envoy in Brussels, Zahiski, having 
obtained a favourable reception on the part of the King, asked the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs whether the King of the Belgians could 
not be requested to write to the King of England in favour of the 
Poles. The Belgian Minister apparently avoided this embarrassing 
question, but told him in confidence that the British Ambassador 
had begged him not to make any difficulties - a clear reference to 
Leopold's request for the maintenance of a French force - as the 
British Government was only awaiting a settlement in Belgium to 
be able to intervene in Poland. These difficulties, the Minister 
thought, had ceased to exist, as on Leopold's request the French troops 
were leaving at once, "et il ne restera qu'un très petit corps sur la 
demande du Roi lui-même, et qui sera à sa disposition." *· 
The Polish envoy did not stop to consider the implications of 
this final remark, but immediately went to see Sir Robert Adair. 
The reception was friendly and warm beyond Zaluski's expectation, 
and in the course of a long conservation, in wich the Ambassador 
gave evidence of his Polish sympathies, the Polish envoy obtained 
the following statement: "Vous avez raison de désirer que la 
question Belge soit terminée, car enfin cela nous pourrait mettre dans 
le cas de nous occuper activement de la vôtre. J e ne vous dis cela 
comme une certitude, mais je l'espère et cette espérance n'ait qu 'un 
sentiment vague mais fondé sur les données." To this the Polish 
envoy repUed that English intervention had been looked for long 
47
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enough, but Adair repeated that the Belgian settlement must be 
achieved first, and added that "l'intérêt que porte tout le peuple 
Anglais à votre héroïque Nation est partagé par ceux qui sont à la 
tête du gouvernement; mais depuis que la politique de Mr. Pitt et 
tous ses successeurs, en nous ayant forcé pendant 13 ans à faire 
une guerre injuste à la France et aux principes de la liberté, nous 
a grevés dans une dette publique immense, nous sommes obligés 
à une grande circonspection" - otherwise English intervention 
would not have had to be awaited for such a long time. Adair 
went on to say that he strongly advised the Poles to try to enter 
into some negotiations with Austria. From this personal knowledge 
of the Emperor Francis he was sure that the Emperor was favou-
rably disposed toward Poland ; moreover, even now, before leaving 
London the Ambassador had, during a conversation with Esterhazy, 
become convinced that Austria would lend a willing ear to Polish 
propositions.49 
It will be noted that, although unconnected with Niemcewicz's 
visit to Grey, of which at this time neither Zahiski nor probably 
Adair could have known, Adair's statement concided with the 
Cabinet meeting devoted to the Polish letter and had only been 
preceded by a day or two by the arrival in London of Leopold's 
request for permission to keep a French force in Belgium ; this request, 
warmly supported by Talleyrand, constituted for the French 
Government the only hope of a settlement on the subject with 
Britain.50 
The meeting took place on 25th August. There are, in the Broad-
lands archives of Palmerston, the written opinions of eleven 
Ministers, nine of whom were members of the Cabinet, on whether 
the letter from Prince Czartoryski could be presented to the King. 
None of the Ministers was in favour of allowing a delegation to 
present it. Although political motives which led some of the Min-
isters to advise the acceptance of the letter are hardly to be found 
a survey of their opinions provides some reflection of the feeling 
towards the Polish movement. The list begins with Palmerston who 
took the formal view: the letter is signed by the President of a 
government not recognized by Britain, "which came in existence 
through revolt against an allied sovereign." Grey inclined, with 
some reluctance, to Palmerston's opinion; he wrote, however: 
« ibidem. 
60
 Palmerston to Grey, 22 Aug., Howick MSS; cf. below, p. 219. 
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"Might not the answer be that the letter had been delivered but 
that under the present circumstances H.M. could not receive the 
deputies or authorize his Governement to enter into any further 
communication about it? But I really should like to hear what 
others have to say before this question is decided," Lord Mel-
bourne, Sir James Graham, Mr. Stanley and Lord Goderich 
anwered decidedly : no. Lord John Russell added that the presenta-
tion of the letter would only lead to fake interpretations. "But at 
the same time the British Government was willing to admit in the 
clearest terms that the signature of the Prince Czartoryski would 
under other circumstances be entitled to the utmost regard." The 
remaining four Ministers were in favour of presenting the letter. 
Lords Lansdowne and Carlisle from motives of deference towards 
the Poles, to which Mr. Grant added: " I t might be humble request 
for mediation and give opening to peace." Lord Holland alone 
made a more extensive statement. He said that he would be in 
favour of allowing the deputation though aware that this implied 
the recognition of the Polish Government. " I think that this 
question [is] well deserving the early consideration of the Cabinet." 
Before, however, this was decided upon, the delegation could not 
be admitted to the King but the letter might be received without 
scruples.51 
The majority being against its acceptance, the letter was refused, 
though on the request of Walewski Palmerston promised to reconsid-
er this decision. For the rest, he was prepared to act immediately if 
Warsaw fell. He wrote unofficially to the missions in St. Petersburg 
and Berlin. "We are anxious for accounts from Poland" he told 
Lord Heytesbury. "The next news must acquaint us with decisive 
events." The lines immediately following reveal Palmerston's 
opinion about the state of the Polish movement. " I t is a great pity 
that the Emperor's proclamations are not calculated for Poland 
instead of Petersburgh. To call upon an armed nation to submit at 
discretion upon a mere promise in a general form of clemency and 
pardon, may serve some purpose, but cannot possibly have the 
slightest effect upon the Poles ; nor could any man in his senses do 
what those proclamations require. If the Emperor stated what he 
would do when the Poles should have submitted and engaged to 
secure to them the constitution and privileges, the violation of 
61
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which was the cause of revolt, then indeed a promise of p a r d o n . . . . 
might tend to some good." It was evident, however, that Nicholas 
wanted to abolish the constitution. Should the Poles be defeated, the 
Powers who were parties to the Treaty of Vienna must watch the 
situation to prevent this abolition. The Minister in Berlin was again 
informed that the British Government knew of the assistance in 
every form given by Prussia to the Russian army; Chad was 
therefore instructed to explain to the Berlin Government that this 
activity would encourage other governments to help the Poles. 
Palmerston added also complaints about British passports not 
having been respected and passage of goods disallowed - this again 
had reference to Poland.52 
However, there was no difference in the attitude towards the 
Polish envoys in London, and their report to Paris, dated 29th 
August, indicated that they acquiesced in their failure to obtain 
some favourable action on the part of the British Government. 
They had been seen by Palmerston, and Niemcewicz also obtained 
interviews with Grey and with Lansdowne. "En résumé, cela 
revient toujours à la même chose" they wrote. "Si nous sommes 
victorieux, si cette campagne finit à notre avantage, on ne laissera 
pas recommencer une seconde; si nous sommes vaincus, on inter-
viendra en notre faveur et on demandera l'exécution des traités de 
Vienne, mais avant l'un ou l'autre de ces événemens on ne fera 
rien." The letter to the King would not be accepted and no more 
would be done with regard to the neutrality of Prussia. As it 
happened, at this time another report on the subject was on its 
way from Berlin.53 
Only a day after Walewski and Niemcewicz had written their 
report unhappy news from Warsaw spread in London. On 15th and 
16th August riots had taken place in Warsaw, accompanied by 
atrocities against Russian internees and Polish prisoners suspected of 
treason. These events had a disastrous effect upon the Polish 
cause in England. Van Zuylen and Greville, as well as Mme Lieven 
and Countess Nesselrode, all stated that the Poles thus lost 
most of the goodwill prevailing in London with regard to their 
52
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struggle; at the Russian Embassy considerable political con-
sequences were attributed to the news of the Warsaw riots. As 
much could be said on the other side. Grey found Niemcewicz in 
total despair, and believed that "this unhappy business" must already 
be settled by this time. News of a different nature was yet to 
come, but the general view that at the end of August the revolt 
was about to destroy itself was apparently established.54 
IV 
In the meantime the question of the evacuation of the French from 
Belgium dragged on. The route from Calais to Paris might have been 
covered by couriers with instructions to Granville "de ne laisser 
à M. Casimir Périer trêve ni repos" until he should have issued the 
order of withdrawal to the French troops - as Palmerston colour-
fully put it to the Dutch - but this obviously did not amount 
to much; moreover Leopold considered himself obliged to request 
the assistance of a French force. At this time Grey seemed 
apologetic in his letter to the Belgian King, whilst professing 
his readiness to help him against the Dutch invasion-had he known 
of it ; it was only because "a fleet not being so easily effected or put 
into action as an army already in state of preparation on the frontier of the 
wounded country" that there was no help from England. The more 
merciless for King Leopold must have been Grey's stress on a speedy 
evacuation of Belgium by the French forces.56 
Indeed, apart from all other considerations, the French fears with 
regard to the security of Belgium were justified. To Granville the 
parliamentary difficulties for the French Cabinet regarding the ques-
tion of evacuation were already becoming obvious. Their anxiety 
was conveyed to Talleyrand in most alarming expressions. After 
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observing that the Dutch had an army of 100,000 men and the 
Belgians "n'ont rien, absolument rien à leur opposer", Louis 
Philippe continued: "En vérité, mon cher Prince, je dois vous dire 
avec toute la f ranchise . . . . , que je ne comprends pas comment 
cette situation de la Belgique, comment celle de mon gouvernement 
et la mienne vous ont échappé à tel point que vous n'ayez fait 
nulle difficulté de signer ce singulier protocol" (N0. 34). Sebastiani, 
just as much alarmed, went into details: "La Belgique est dans 
l'anarchie, son armée est dissoute; le roi Leopold ne peut réorga-
niser ni son armée ni l'administration publique, s'il n'est pas pro-
tégé par une force quelconque" 5e 
Besides, was he supported by England? The whole diplomatic 
corps at The Hague, complained the French Minister, including 
Sir Charles Bagot, had congratulated the Princess of Orange on the 
victories of the Prince's army. Consequently, in a most friendly 
way, Sebastiani tried to impress upon the British Ambassador that 
under such circumstances King Leopold would have no solution but 
to abdicate, "if he shall find that his demands for a division of 
troops to remain during a short time for his protection be rejected 
by the Conference." This was serious enough; General Baudrand 
who, as aide-de-camp to the Due d'Orléans, had been in Belgium 
during the recent campaign, was sent to London on a mission to 
explain the French views to the British Government.67 
In London current diplomatic news equally reflected the gravitiy 
of the situation. Informing Greville of the purpose of Baudrand's 
mission, the Austrian Ambassador told him that war was becoming 
inevitable. "He considered that the Polish business was over", 
noted Greville, "at which he greatly rejoiced." Falck and Van 
Zuylen reported that the two ships, recently added to Sir Edward 
Codrington's squadron and sent to the Downs, had taken troops on 
board. "La grande confusion en Europe est à la veille de com-
mencer", commented Mme Lieven. "Cependant, elle commence 
sous de bons auspices: l'Angleterre est dans nos rangs." 58 
From Whitehall things did not look so precarious. Baudrand's 
reasoning was rejected in the first instance by Grey, but Talleyrand 
56
 Louis Philippe to Talleyrand, 27 Aug., Sebastiani to Talleyrand, 27 Aug., 
Talleyrand, Memoirs, IV, 276-7 and 280-1. 
57
 Granville to Palmerston, 27 Aug., F.O. France. 
58
 Greville Diary, 31 Aug., II, 191 ; Falck and Van Zuylen to Verstolk, 30 Aug., 
R.A. ; Mme Lieven to Ncsselrode, 1 Sept., Lie MSS. 
THE "TEN DAYS CAMPAIGN" 221 
was able to report that no particular stress had been laid upon the 
date of evacuation. Indeed, Grey would rather wait for Leopold's 
declaration. Talleyrand then adopted a less co-operative attitude : 
he hesitated to sign a minor protocol, ordering the cessation of 
military preparations on both sides at Antwerp. "But Warsaw had 
already begun to tell with Prussia", observed Palmerston, and 
Biilow, becoming aggressive, said that he would propose to the 
Conference "to make a formal demand for the immediate retreat 
of every French soldier from Belgium." Palmerston then referred 
to the Protocol of i8th August (N0.33), (which provided for the 
withdrawal of the French after the Dutch should have done so). 
"All this brought Talleyrand to his pen and ink." 59 
The tension increased in Paris. On 3rd September, when Sebas-
tiani informed the British Ambassador of his intention to leave 
12.000 men at the disposal of Leopold, Granville answered that 
the British Government was not prepared to support the King of 
the Belgians against his own people. On a subsequent occasion 
Sebastiani argued that the security of Belgium had not been ad-
equately provided for by Protocol N0.34. To Talleyrand he wrote that 
in view of the situation in Poland, William I might again try to 
entangle Europe in a general war; the French army should, 
therefore, stay in Belgium. Eventually, on the 7th Sebastiani told 
Granville that the re-establishment of the Kingdom of the Nether-
lands, whether by a Dutch invasion or by "intrigues of Holland" 
could not be allowed by France. The Ambassador protested sharply 
against France thus breaking the principle of non-intervention, 
but was satisfied that France meant war if the new régime in 
Belgium should be altered. Soon after the diplomatic corps in 
Paris had begun to deposit very formal notes on the Minister's desk, 
urging the withdrawal of the French troops notwithstanding Leo-
pold's request, Sebastiani and Périer fixed in an interview with 
Granville the date of 30th September for the completion of the 
evacuation of Belgium.60 
The Conference took up the subject of the evacuation with a 
renewed insistence after Protocol No. 37 on 31st August had coun-
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tersigned the suspension of hostilities for six weeks. To begin with, 
as Palmerston explained to Grey, the French betrayed themselves: 
they professed their intention to stay until Leopold should have re-
organized his army, but Baudrand told the Foreign Secretary that 
this could not be achieved within six weeks. Moreover it had become 
obvious to Palmerston that the Belgians wanted to keep the French 
army not so much for their protection but as a means of upholding 
their own pretensions in the forthcoming negotiations; they even 
succeeded in making Adair agree to the dismantling of a fortress as 
a gesture towards the French Government. No wonder, therefore, 
that the Eastern Powers pressed for a formal Protocol on French 
evacuation. With considerable difficulty the Foreign Secretary 
made them agree to Talleyrand's request to accept a non-publish-
able memorandum by the French Government on their intention to 
evacuate Belgium as a basis for the representatives of the Four 
Powers in Paris, where, after all, the final decision had to be taken. 
But no more time was allowed to the French Cabinet than was 
necessary for the return of a courier.61 
It was Grey who tried to extract first from Leopold himself the 
declaration that he could dispense with the French troops, and 
this was only fair since their prolonged stay in Belgium was im-
plicitly tolerated by the Conference on account of his request. 
Grey's insistence, to an inconsiderable degree shared by Palmerston, 
was only partially successful: at the same time that Granville was 
able to report that the French had given way, Leopold announced 
to Grey his intention of writing to Louis Philippe with the request 
for a complete withdrawal of all French troops from Belgium. 
" I t is better that we should be somewhat exposed to danger," 
commented the Belgian King, " than that the harmony between 
England and France should be endangered." e2 
Neither he, nor Talleyrand, nor the other parties in the Con-
ference were aware of this intercourse between Grey and Palmer-
ston, and the French Ambassador, though persisting in his "système 
de retraite lente," sent repeated warnings to Paris. On the 5th it 
was "Les embarras du Ministère Anglais, résultans de la présence 
des troupes françaises en Belgique, semblent augmenter chaque 
jour ." Van Zuylen and Esterhazy believed that the British Govern-
" Palmerston to Grey, 3 Sept. (three letters), 5 Sept., Howick MSS. 
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ment had abandoned the idea of keeping Périer in power as he 
seemed unable to control public opinion in France with regard to 
Belgium. On the gth Talleyrand reported that the Cabinet in 
London, though resolved not to allow a new attack on Belgium by 
Holland, refused to request the King of the Netherlands to reduce 
his troops. The other French observer, the Duchesse de Dino, 
supplemented this statement by saying that the protection so far 
afforded in Belgium rendered it impossible for Grey to continue 
in office, and that war against France was expected.63 
A somewhat different comment was supplied from Russian 
sources. "Les Ministres sont impatiens de nous voir terminer nos 
affaires", wrote Mme Lieven. "C'est tout sincèrement qu'ils sou-
haitent que Paskévitch se presse et finisse." Leopold was disliked 
now as he seemed to side with France. Sebastiani's arguments 
with regard to the security of Belgium and his reference to "mena-
cing" words of Verstolk, conveyed to London through Granville and 
Talleyrand, made no difference, and on 15th September, soon 
after the confidential communication to the British Ambassador, 
the French Government was made to yield completely : a Protocol, 
No. 41, "civil" as Palmerston called it, recorded the French 
declaration; an undoubtedly strange note was struck after six 
weeks of very irksome negotiations by saying that "the pleni-
potentiaries requested the Prince of Talleyrand to be persuaded 
that their Courts would know how to appreciate at its just value 
the resolution taken by the French Government." 64 
Also on the same day, in Paris, a telegraphic dispatch brought 
the news of the taking of Warsaw by Russian troops. This was 
known in London on the 16th; in Paris only after extensive meas-
ures of security had been taken, the news was released to the public 
on the 17th. 
V 
While the London mission was concentrating on getting everything 
*
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possible out of the presence of Niemcewicz, the Poles in Paris did 
not remain idle. As it seemed that little was to be achieved through 
Sebastiani they tried other channels. From Soult they heard that 
they could hardly reahze how much had been done for Poland. 
Lafayette promised to approach the King and Périer again. For 
want of a better solution the envoys wrote even to the Comte de 
St. Leu - the future Napoleon I I I , then living in Switzerland -
begging him to accept the command of a naval expedition which 
was about to depart from Le Havre for the Baltic. Fortunately, 
Louis Napoleon replied that he was fully aware that all governments 
would equate his name alone with a new wave of revolutions all 
over Europe, and that, if it were connected with him, the Polish 
cause would once and for alle be lost in the eyes of diplomats.65 
Little as it meant to do on its own, the French Cabinet nevertheless 
was continually applying to Britain to join it in its efforts. Morte-
mart's report of the serious character of the mutiny in the Russian 
military colonies was immediately referred to Granville. Renewed 
instructions were sent to Talleyrand, who spoke about Poland to 
Palmerston on 4th September, but without success. Palmerston 
pretended not to share the opinion of French diplomats that 
Austria might be inclined to favour remonstrances to St. Petersburg 
concerning Poland. Talleyrand could not understand why the 
British Ministers, "faisant cependant des voeux pour les Polonais", 
maintained their inactive attitude. He admitted, however, that the 
pro-Polish tone of the Press found no reflection in Parliament. 
Col. Evans' motion was supported by Sir Francis Burdett and 
O'Connell, but no further action was undertaken. Niemcewicz's 
next visit to Palmerston was equally fruitless, except for an 
almost irrelevant assurance by Palmerston, that Prussia would not 
intervene in case of a Polish victory.68 
Reports from Poland were, as usual, unreliable, and military 
reports, for obvious reasons, scarce. The more importance was 
therefore accorded to other, not always relevant information. 
Late in August Heytcsbury's report of a new levy of troops in Russia 
M
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arrived in London. Chad wrote that he knew on good authority, 
that the Russians had no suitable artillery to attack Warsaw. 
Flahaut reported that the King of Prussia was strongly impressed 
by an address from the City of Koningsberg to the effect that 
intercourse with the Russians was censured as being the source of 
spreading of the cholera epidemic. In its relations with foreign 
missions, however, the tone of Berlin changed a good deal. The 
question of passports to Poland had become irrelevant, said An-
cillon, since Warsaw was cut off from the West by Russian forces. 
The King of the Netherlands would not be allowed to reopen 
hostilities ; yet, pressed for the recognition of Leopold which had been 
promised by the Conference in July, the Prussian Minister said 
that Austria and Russia should take the lead in this matter. When 
Chad repeated Palmerston's protest with regard to Prussian 
supplies for Paskevitch's army, Ancillon retorted that Prussia only 
allowed the private export of provisions, whereas arms and muni-
tions were arriving from England, without which the Polish revolt 
would have been suppressed long before. And yet, on the same day 
Chad reported the unexpected news, which even got into the "Preus-
sische Staatszeitung", that the Russians were retreating from before 
Warsaw. Only a few days later this appeared to have been partly 
true, and on the n t h Chad sent his first account of the taking of 
Warsaw.97 
This information was not what was expected and the cir-
cumstances were entirely different from those at the time of the 
battle of 25th February. None of the interested parties had foreseen 
such a speedy outcome, and that explains perhaps why at that 
time the Poles were still able to secure quasi-diplomatic interven-
tion on the part of Austria, an intervention counselled by many, and 
which had been long diligently sought. 
During July and August the Polish agent Count Andrew 
Zamoyski was once more in Vienna. I t was still thought that 
Metternich and Gentz were favourably disposed towards Poland, 
and the agent again managed to be introduced to the Chancellor 
in great secrecy. In an interview on 19th August Metternich 
assured him that it was too late for any intervention, even for an 
· ' Heytesbury to Palmerston, 18 Aug., F.O. Russia; Chad to Palmerston, 28, 
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offer of submission to be made through the good offices of the 
Emperor Francis; some days later, however, he agreed to give 
Zamoyski a letter containing the Emperor's advice to submit. The 
Russian Ambassador concurred in this step, which in itself was 
evidence of the eagerness of his Court to come to terms, and a 
secretary of the Russian Embassy accompanied Zamoyski to 
Warsaw, where, unfortunately, they arrived after the entry of the 
Russians. Answering the British Charge d'affaires' question concern­
ing this journey Metternich said that Russia "was as convinced 
as himself of the importance of not proceeding to extremities." 
From other sources it would appear, however, that Metternich, 
having always tried in vain to step into the Polish question, seized 
this opportunity as his last chance.β β 
It may well be assumed that, if Zamoyski's overture stood a 
chance of success at Warsaw, some negotiations with Paskevitch 
might at least afford a breathing-space to the Poles. For at St. 
Petersburg as late as 14th September, that is after the actual entry 
of Paskevitch into Warsaw which took place on the 8th, it was 
feared that the arrival of Ramorino's corps in Warsaw might render 
the capture of the city impossible. Paskevitch possessed instructions 
which ordered him, after one unsuccessful attack, to retreat 
westwards to winter quarters supported by supplies from Prussia." 
Lastly, whatever the official attitude, pro-Polish feeling existed 
in Prussia not only among the liberal bourgeoisie but in higher 
circles as well, and this, as has been shown, was not without influence 
upon the Government. 7 0 
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Under the circumstances, the first accounts after the taking of 
Warsaw represented the situation as if it had not been a definite blow 
to the Poles. Chad suggested that the fall of the city was due to the 
concealed treason of the Polish commander. The British Chargé 
d'affaires in Vienna reported that the Polish army which was re-
treating northwards was still strong and capable of action.71 
When the fall of Warsaw was known in London Talleyrand 
observed "une douleur profonde; cependant personne ne désespère 
ici; Varsovie n'est pas la Pologne." This opinion was not shared by 
Palmerston: the Polish case "had become for some time hopeless", 
he wrote to Granville. " I f they could not defend Warsaw, what 
can they do at Modlin or Plock?" 72 Greville noted that since the 
deposition of Skrzynecki - known in London for some weeks — 
sympathy for Poland had decreased, while Mme Lieven delivered a 
comprehensive comment: "Les Ministres sont fâchés et honteux. 
Lord Grey qui [sic] se montre convenablement, mais je crains que 
cela ne soit par le sentiment personnel plutôt que politique. Le 
public est assez froid, les Torys sont dans l'enchantement et la 
presse est détestable. Voilà où nous en sommes au second jour de 
la nouvelle de la prise de Varsovie."73 
Another important commentator, Wellington, said that the 
Polish revolt had shown the weakness of Russia, "which was in-
capable of any great independent effort." But this would make the 
French more tractable ; on the other hand, Prussia and Austria had 
been financially so exhausted by military expenses "that they could 
hardly hold out a month longer."74 
The consequences of the breakdown of the Polish movement were 
almost immediately felt in the various capitals. Flahaut reported 
upon the taking of Warsaw: "I quite see that it is to Prussia's advantage to settle 
this Polish business, but my heart bleeds for Poland and I grudge Russia the 
triumph!" Gabrielle von Billow, Memoir compiled from Family Papers, 1897, pp. 
204-6. 
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renewed remonstrances by the Prussian Government for the 
withdrawal of the French forces from Belgium (they did not yet 
know of any arrangement) and for the maintenance of Maastricht 
and Venlo within the new frontiers of Holland. At The Hague both 
La Rochefoucauld and Bagot feared that the difficulties, raised by 
William I, would be increased by the renewed hopes he might 
entertain with regard to the improvement of his position in the inter-
national sphere after the victory of the Russians. Nor did Palmerston 
fail to observe that the Belgians would regret their opposition to the 
negotiations, because delay thus caused put them in an unfavourable 
position so that they would begin at an unpropitious moment 
"since the success of the Russians gives advantage to the King of the 
Netherlands." 78 
The Dutch plenipotentiaries realized this immediately and Van 
Zuylen seized the opportunity of an incidental call on Lieven, just 
after the latter had received the happy news, to ask for a new effort 
by Russian diplomacy in their favour. He noted, somewhat sourly, 
"plenty of delightful promises". But even less was achieved with 
Biilow, and the plenipotentiaries felt slightly uneasy about any 
new prospects. A few days after the receipt of the Warsaw news 
they devoted a major part of their dispatch to the influence of 
the Polish question upon the work of the Conference. They began 
by stating that the Press and society were surprised at the news 
of the surrender of Warsaw, as were the Ministers, especially 
Palmerston and Grey, the more so because until recently they 
had been convinced that Poland was lost to Russia. "Bien que 
personne ne se dissimule que cet événement doive nécessairement 
influer sur la négociation qui nous concerne", the dispatch went 
on, "il est évident que l'on veut ne pas se l'avouer." Yet, after 
receiving the Warsaw news the Russian plenipotentiaries declared 
to Palmerston and Talleyrand that this event would not change 
Russia's policy in the Belgian question. This declaration, the 
Dutchmen believed, constituted an acknowledgement to Britain 
in return for her cautious attitude in the Polish question, which 
had made France abstain from a more active policy in this matter. 
On the other hand, as the representatives of Russia, Austria 
and Prussia constantly maintained that for them war in Poland 
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was the main obstacle to their adopting a positively pro-Dutch 
line at the Conference, Falck and Van Zuylen seized the present 
opportunity to remind them that, the main obstacle having been 
removed, the just claims of the King of the Netherlands should 
now be supported.76 
After his verbal declaration Lieven called on Talleyrand again, 
to renew his former declaration, made after his return from Russia 
just after the news of the outbreak of the revolution in Poland, 
with regard to his Court's desire to maintain friendly relations 
with France. This gesture impressed Talleyrand who, considering 
the radical change brought about by events in Poland, attached 
great importance to the words of the Russian Ambassador: "elles... 
peuvent contribuer à rassurer sur les intentions que quelques 
personnes paraissent encore attribuer à la Russie." " 
At the same time Bagot was afraid that there were political motives 
behind the congratulations which the Prince of Orange received 
from the Emperor of Russia; early in September Esterhazy received 
Metternich's letter with the information that Nicholas did not 
conceal that he would have helped the King of the Netherlands in 
his campaign had he not been handicapped by the Polish revolt. This 
might not have been widely known, but the British Ambassador 
preferred to comment on the Prince's departure for the army, with 
no intention to recommence hostilities: "as he said." No wonder 
that the utterances of the "Journal de la Haye", considered as a 
semi-official organ of the Netherlands Government, increased the 
apprehensions of the French. Sebastiani referred to the increased 
warlikeness of this newspaper and stressed to Talleyrand the impor-
tance of presenting a firm opposition to any attempts at concessions 
in favour of Holland.78 
The person most of all affected was King Leopold. He could 
only partially rely on France, as at that stage the prolonged 
occupation of Belgium by French forces was causing a conflict 
between France and England, his most obvious ally. Giving up 
French protection therefore, he wrote to Grey in what seemed to be 
the utmost despair: " I beseech y o u , . . . do what is right by Holland 
7
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but do not maltreat this country which really does not deserve it 
now, whatever it might have done before." This letter, written 
before the news of the fall of Warsaw, ended with an expression of 
Leopold's belief that the Russians "will do everything in the world 
to keep this negotiation open till they can come into play." 79 
Like the Belgian King, Louis Philippe also foresaw great 
difficulties menacing the new State. As the Conference abstained 
from requesting the King of the Netherlands to reduce his forces, 
while no peaceful assurances could be obtained at The Hague, it 
did not seem unlikely that the Belgians might feel provoked to new 
hostilities, which from Holland would derive even more advantages 
than from the August Campaign; reports from The Hague of the 
way in which the surrender of Warsaw was considered, could 
not fail to alarm the French mission. The "Journal de la Haye" 
wrote: "Cet événement était immense par le résultat qu'il doit avoir 
sur les affaires de l'Occident de l'Europe, par la liberté d'action 
qu'il rendait à la Conférence de Londres." Accordingly, William I 
was believed to contemplate a new invasion of Belgium and an 
Orangist revolution there. Besides, whoever might be better in-
formed about the state of affairs in London, The Hague could rely 
on the "Journal", for Gourieff, the Russian Minister, affirmed that 
an application for assistance to Russia would not be made in vain, 
"et que, rendue à toute liberté d'action par la soumission de la 
Pologne, la Russie ne peut manquer d'appuyer de sa puissante 
influence la cause du Roi Guillaume dans la Conférence de Lon-
dres." 80 
There is ample evidence that these words had not been spoken 
in vain. While the Conference resumed its work on the new Treaty 
proposals, an extension of the armistice which was to expire on 
loth October was badly needed. Palmerston agreed with Grey to 
send "a few ships" to the Scheldt to impress the Dutch, but at the 
same time noted that "Biilow, Wessenberg and the Russians make 
themselves partisans" of the Dutch cause. In the meeting on 28th 
September Biilow "vehemently" opposed an extension of the ar-
mistice ; Palmerston was unable to make the Eastern representatives 
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agree to an extension of the armistice for one month; all that could 
be achieved was to request Van Zuylen to ask for a date at The 
Hague, but no more than two weeks' extension was thereby 
anticipated.81 
On the same day Palmerston informed Grey that Talleyrand 
requested a special Cabinet meeting on Polish affairs, to consider 
what steps should be taken in defence of the Polish institutions. 
Though it had been clear that the French Government experienced 
the greatest internal difficulties on account of Poland, Grey had 
some criticism of its Polish policy. Some days before Greville, in-
forming him of the depressed feeling at the French Embassy, was told 
that "the French Ministry had been very imprudent about Poland." 
Greville was surprised : there was no access to Poland except through 
Prussia. Grey then continued: "They might have sent a fleet to the 
Baltic with our concurrence though we could not urge them to do 
so." In view of the Paris events Grey expected that a "ministry of 
Lafayette, Lamarque and all that party" would lead France into 
war, whereas " R u s s i a . . . . powerless, crippled by this contest and 
under the necessity of maintaining a great army in Poland", and 
Austria, and Prussia, also weakened and with a population liable 
to be revolutionized by the French, accounted for a fair chance of 
success for France in such a contest.82 
Things looked black in Paris those days, but Grey's worst 
expectations were not realized. There were riots at the news 
of the taking of Warsaw. Granville reported on the i6th that 
they were under control, but on 19th September he regretted to 
say that "the state of things is very alarming, a general impression 
seems to prevail that some change is impending. The Ministers 
seem to have lost all influence in the Chamber of Deputies." The 
National Guard, unlike on other occasions, dealt very reluctantly 
with the rioters. The Russian Ambassador was requested by the po-
lice to leave his house, because they were unable to protect him. " O n 
s'attend à des séances orageuses et difficiles pour les ministres", 
wrote the Dutch Envoy, as Lafayette requested the Government to 
furnish an explanation with regard to a written assurance given to 
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the Polish mission that Poland would obtain assistance within two 
months.83 
On 2 ist September Granville reported the restoration of law 
and order. This relieved the anxiety of Grey : if Périer's Cabinet 
remained in office, the peace of Europe was saved.84 
VI 
There was considerable delay in the progress of the work of the 
Conference owing to the unco-operativeness of the Belgians, and the 
protest against this, officially made at Brussels by Adair and Belliard, 
coincided with the Warsaw news and the first reactions to it. In the 
new negotiations, therefore, the tide turned positively in favour of 
Holland. Talleyrand, who was now taking a much lesser part in 
the work than he had done before, did not particularly like the 
tone adopted by the Russian plenipotentiaries, but was satisfied 
that their hostility would not exceed "quelques formes d'arrogance." 
Reports from Berlin and Vienna confirmed that the aftermath of 
the Polish war was still felt; Prussia was full of refugees, and so was 
the Republic of Cracow, the temporary occupation of which by 
Russian troops, greatly disapproved of by Bernstorff, was the subject 
of talks held in Berlin in great secrecy; the Dutch Minister there 
was confused into believing that it concerned "une déclaration 
énergique relativement à la Belgique et au Luxembourg." 85 
On 15th October the Conference produced a new project for 
arranging Belgian affairs, hereafter known as the 24 Articles. 
They were largely based on the X V I I I Articles ofjune, but the ambig-
uous points were fully worked out and put in favour of Holland. 
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Both Bagot and Palmerston, therefore, the latter on the authority 
of Van Zuylen, at first believed that Holland would now agree. 
In the secrecy of the Council Verstolk, the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, advocated acceptance, arguing, as another Minister, 
V a n Maanen, had done a fortnight before, that the three Powers 
friendly to Holland continued to profess their intention to follow 
England.88 
At the same time Palmerston did not overlook measures of 
security. As the armistice by then had officially expired he instruct-
ed Bagot to make it quite plain in The Hague that the renewal of 
hostilities would not be tolerated but news poured into London, 
indicating not only the Dutch preparations, but also movements of 
Prussian troops on the Belgian frontier, while Bernstorif refused 
to consider a reduction in the Prussian armed forces as long as 
Belgian affairs remained unsettled. Eventually, the Foreign 
Secretary thought it advisable to inform Van Zuylen that the 
squadron of Admiral Warren, now put in a state of readiness, 
could act on direct orders from the British Ambassador in The 
Hague.8 7 
The Belgians acquiesced in their defeat and subscribed to the 
new project; King Leopold considered himself exploited by the 
Powers, and to Adair as well as to others spoke of abdication. 
Granville regretted that the Minister for Foreign Affairs, intro-
ducing the project in the Belgian Chamber, explained the modifi-
cation in favour of Holland as the result of the failure of the revolu-
tionary movements in Poland and Italy. The French Chambers, 
he thought, would gladly seize the argument to make trouble.88 
At The Hague the situation soon "cleared" and the British 
Ambassador observed the usual hesitant and speculative attitude. 
On yth November he was positive about William I's refusal, in 
which he would be supported by his subjects. "The King believes", 
Bagot wrote, "that he has the means of maintaining the burden 
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of his present position for two years longer, and perhaps for more."8 9 
Meanwhile the project sent to the Courts friendly to Holland 
was being considered by them. Ancillon wrote to the Prussian 
Minister at The Hague to warn the King that in case of his refusal 
coercive measures might be applied by England, France and 
Prussia jointly. He told Chad that William I had nothing to expect, 
but that the object of his delay was to see what would be the reaction 
of his friends, and this delay was liable to be prolonged extensively 
in view of the distance between St. Petersburg and the capital of 
Holland. As the interview went on, the Minister revealed "the 
secret thought" of the Prussian Government: the Republicans, the 
Orangists, and the French Party, he said, together with his unsettled 
international position, would present Leopold with so many 
difficulties that he might abdicate, thus giving an opening for a 
partition of Belgium.90 
There remained Vienna and St. Petersburg. Metternich was at 
first not opposed to the new arrangement. There was, as usual, the 
greatest delay in news from Russia. Hey tesbury delivered a peculiar 
introduction to what was to be expected from the Imperial Cabinet. 
He heard of Nesselrode's approval of Lieven's declaration to Pal-
merston and Talleyrand that Russian policy would undergo no 
change "in consequence of the success which had attained the 
Emperor's arms" in Warsaw; special reference was made to the 
moment chosen by Lieven. The British Ambassador heartily 
concurred: "The policy of this Governmen t . . . . is at this moment in 
the strictest sense conservative, not aggressive." Nothing could play 
better into William I's hands; meanwhile, at the end of October 
Nicholas left for Moscow, partly at least with the intention of 
avoiding diplomatic intervention in favour of Poland, and commu-
nication with the Russian Government became even more dif-
ficult.91 
On 15th November, at Bagot's suggestion, the representatives 
of the Five Powers in The Hague called on the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs to demand from him an official reply to the Conference's 
proposals. The British Ambassador reported: " In the course of our 
conversation the Ministers of Austria and Prussia and the Chargé 
89
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d'affaires of Russia severally took occasion to express in the strongest 
manner to M. de Verstolk the entire and unqualified adhesion of 
their respective Cabinets to every part of the arrangement now 
determined by the Conference." 92 
The Conference, however, did not await the effect of this and 
similar steps undertaken by members of the diplomatic corps at The 
Hague, and on 15th November the delegates of the Five Powers 
signed the Treaty of 24 Articles with the King of the Belgians. In 
December the King of the Netherlands sent his official refusal to 
agree to the October project of the Conference. 
The ultimate date for the ratification of the Treaty which 
commanded "the entire and unqualified adhesion" of its signatories 
was fixed for 15th January, 1832; but it was not before May ofthat 
year that the three Eastern Powers sent their consent supplemented 
with reservations which angered the other two, and troubled King 
Leopold. Part of the proceedings which preceded these steps will 
be examined here. 
As soon as the Treaty had been signed, Palmerston stressed to Chad 
the importance of Prussian ratification. "The nearness of Berlin to 
Brussels enables the Prussian Government to take lead in this 
measure and I am convinced that such a measure would have a 
powerful effect upon the determination of the King of the Nether-
lands." 93 
The news of the Treaty having been signed arrived in Berlin 
on 24th November. Ancillon regretted that no time had been 
allowed for Nicholas to dispel "les dernières et chimériques espé-
rances" of William. I. Nicholas, who had declared long ago that he 
would consent to no agreement which had not been previously 
accepted by William I, might feel offended at an attempt to force 
his hand and might refuse to ratify it. The King of the Netherlands 
had not yet been able to learn Nicholas's opinion about the project 
itself. "II est à croire que M. de Nesselrode serait sacrifié," as Bresson, 
now Chargé d'affaires at Berlin, hastened to sum up a view spreading 
in the Prussian capital.94 
To Chad Ancillon said that Billow's powers were not extensive 
enough to allow him to sign such a treaty, and if Prussia chose to 
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take the formal view, she might refuse ratification on that ground 
alone.96 
No apprehensions with regard to the career of Nesselrode were 
entertained at the Prussian Embassy in London. Early in December 
Biilow told the Dutch plenipotentiaries that Prussia advocated 
acceptance of the Treaty; and as Russia needed Prussian assistance 
for her policy in Poland, she would not alienate Prussia by adopting 
a different line in the Low Countries. The Minister also told 
Talleyrand that the Prussian ratification was on its way to London. 
The French Ambassador believed the same about the Russian and 
Austrian documents, and tried to calm Paris down, whence the 
application of coercive measures against Holland had been put 
forward. After Biilow had shown him his dispatches, he became 
quite positive about the decision of the Prussian Government and 
more assured of that of Russia. Prussia inclined to follow Russian 
policy in Poland, where Russia was supposed to have predominant 
interests, the document said, whereas Belgium was far more a 
concern of the Berlin Government than one of St. Petersburg, and 
the latter would certainly appreciate that fact.98 
Yet, on the receipt of the refusal of the l ü n g of the Netherlands, 
which arrived in London on 14th December, even Grey thought 
that Russia had encouraged it. No wonder that Palmerston had to 
reckon with the French Government as well as King Leopold 
fearing an attempt at a new invasion of Belgium or at an Orangist 
revolution there.97 
Then the news from Russia began to arrive. Before he had seen 
either the project or the Treaty, Nesselrode warned the Ambassador 
in London against consenting to "des mesures trop fortes" against 
William I. The first news obtained from Berlin read: "L'Empereur 
ne consentira jamais à des mesures coercitives contre le Roi de Hol-
lande"; but Nicholas advised King William to accept the project 
of the treaty - the 24 Articles themselves - as a basis for nego-
tiations. Bemstorif then commented to Bresson that this meant 
that Nicholas had renewed his former declaration - as had been 
apprehended by Ancillon - and that the Treaty itself was in danger : 
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non-ratification by even one of the parties concerned would inval-
idate it.98 
The British Minister also heard a statement which indicated 
some hesitation. On hearing the early Russian news Ancillon told 
Chad that Prussia would ratify, but not before the others had done 
so, and in the meantime would employ her persuasion to make them 
agree.98 
Meanwhile, instructions from Russia sent after the news of the 
October project, could only strengthen the impression of Russian 
partiality for the King of the Netherlands. Nicholas not only 
deplored the fact that his representatives had agreed to the 24 
Articles but instructed them to defend the King against coercive 
measures which might be applied against him if he refused this new 
project and reopened hostilities: the Conference should in such a 
case proclaim its neutrality! "La cause du roi Guillaume est trop 
juste pour être laissé sans défense; sa dignité trop élevée pour être 
méconnu, enfin son infortune trop grande pour ne commander le 
respect," wrote the Vice-Chancellor to London.99 
Of these instructions little seems to have penetrated into diploma-
tica! circles in London except the non-ratification, of which there 
could be no doubt. Heytesbury's report of his interview with 
Nesselrode after the latter had learned about the Treaty breathed 
moderation. The Vice-Chancellor merely said that the Conference 
acted too hastily, and he first wanted to know William I's opinions. 
And indeed, the official answer of Nicholas to the King did not 
avow any other object in his delay in ratification than to show defer-
ence to the wishes William I might have with regard to the Treaty. 
" . . .je ne saurais nourrir l'espoir de faire adopter la même résolu-
tion par mes alliés", he wrote. "Dans cet isolement, je n 'aurai 
offert à V.M. qu'une preuve nouvelle de l'amitié que je lui porte, 
sans pouvoir me dissimuler qu'elle aura été en quelque sorte stérile 
si elle ne servait pas à lever les obstacles qui s'opposent encore 
à un arrangement à l 'amiable." The mission of Orlov, Nicholas' 
principal aide-de-camp, to whom the King would have to make clear 
his objections to certain points of the Treaty, had for its main 
object to explain to William I the uselessness of further delay.100 
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Months had to elapse, before this determination of Nicholas was 
fully understood by the other parties of the Conference. In the privacy 
of his study Nicholas went even further; in a personal memorandum 
for his own use on the international situation, he noted his intention 
to postpone recognition of Leopold - though he was far from agree-
ing with William I's political methods - but he admitted the 
impossibility for Russia to oppose any coercive measures with 
regard to Holland, should the Western Powers resolve to apply 
them.101 In December, however, nothing but the refusal of Russia 
was known, and this caused great confusion in Berlin and London. 
On 17th December the British Minister called on Ancillon to 
talk about Portuguese affairs but found him extremely embarrassed 
by the Russian refusal to ratify the Treaty. Bemstorff at first 
believed that this refusal constitued another mark of deference 
towards the King of the Netherlands, as Nicholas only learned of the 
conclusion of the Treaty after he had advised William I to subscribe 
to the October project and before he knew his opinions upon it. 
But Ancillon surprised Chad by stating that not only did he consider 
the refusal absolute but that in view of the dissent of one of the con-
tracting parties the Treaty itself became null and void. Some 
days later BernstorfF also arrived at the same conclusion.102 
In London the negotations between Belgium and the Four 
Powers with regard to the fortresses had reached a critical point and 
much harm was expected by the delay in ratification. Both Russian 
plenipotentiaries were rather worried. Nicholas's advice to The 
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Hague with regard to the 24 Articles was known; Talleyrand did 
not believe in an absolute refusal of ratification by Russia. He ad-
vised his government, therefore, not to press the matter of the 
fortresses which necessarily divided Britain and France: the Polish 
question united the three Eastern Governments and it was then of 
great importance for France to continue on the best possible terms 
with Britain. The ratifications were anxiously awaited in London.103 
This situation affected the French Cabinet most of all, while the 
further reports made neither the Russian intentions nor those of the 
other two Eastern Powers clear. Bresson, with his usual haste, con-
cluded that the advice given to William I meant nothing when 
accompanied by delay in ratification. He attached importance to 
the opinion of the Grand Duchess Helen, at that time visiting Berlin 
after a short stay at The Hague, that Lieven and Nesselrode might 
fall in disgrace. Sebastiani professed to be offended because Nicho-
las had explained his delay to all members of the Conference except 
France. Maison reported the refusal of Vienna, though Metternich 
would not admit to him that he did not dare to ratify alone. 
The Chancellor sent a letter of strong disapproval to London on 
account of the part that Wessenberg and Esterhazy had played in 
accepting the Treaty. Ancillon admitted the likelihood of new 
complications about Belgium; he regretted, however, that Prussia 
could do nothing without reference to St. Petersburg. However, 
Chad believed that the prospects of war and similar consequences, 
which had been under serious consideration in Prussia as possible 
results of the failure of the Belgian Treaty, might prove successful 
arguments for ratification with some members of the Prussian 
Government and certainly with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
who did not conceal his embarrassment. "Je tremble de recevoir 
des nouvelles de Londres", he told Chad, "je crains des mesures 
violentes." 104 
However, no energetic measures could have been contemplated 
in London. The Convention on the Belgian fortresses had just been 
signed and could not but contribute to the irritation of public 
opinion in France ; it was believed in London that in the question of 
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the ratification of the Treaty of 15th November the existence of 
Périer's Government was again at stake. A mere reference to any 
coercive measures against William I could but too easily excite the 
French, who would be happy to use any pretext to enter Belgium. 
Much as the British Government was affected by the delay in the 
ratification it could not think of trying to speed up matters by 
force.105 
Hence Palmerston's violent letter to Chad, full of anger at 
Ancillon, having "upon the first rumour of the refusal of the Em-
peror Nicholas" eaten all his words concerning Belgium. " I see 
nothing that can prevent a war except the ratification of the Trea-
ty", wrote the Foreign Secretary. "If Prussia refuses, one or other 
of the two things will be demonstrated : either that in spite of her 
pacific professions Prussia is panting for war, or else that she is not 
an independent agent and is dragged by Russia at her chariot 
wheels. You must insist upon having an immediate answer, yes 
or no, will Prussia ratify or not, and it should be given in a Prussian 
note in order that it may be produced, if it should become nec-
essary to do so, if the Papers are laid before Parliament, which 
upon all occasions of unsuccessful negotiations [they] invariably 
are." l o e 
It was clear that Palmerston lacked an argument; his reasoning 
did not question any of the points raised in Berlin, and besides, 
if Prussia - or France - would really not shrink from war, it was 
equally clear that Palmerston's diplomacy in forcing the Treaty 
upon the Conference only hastened the moment from which there 
was no withdrawal. On the other hand, the state of France might 
well be seen with different eyes from Berlin, and this, according 
to Chad, was very much the case. Threats held out from London 
would lack force.107 
Palmerston's concluding sentences ran as follows: "Tell M. 
Ancillon that we are beginning to regret that we did not take a 
more decided part in Polish affairs before the capture of Warsaw, 
we might have done some good in Poland and have less trouble with 
this Treaty." 
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At that time those words hardly had the air of a menace. 
The last months of 1831 and the beginning of 1832 witnessed 
some diplomatic activity with regard to Poland, directed towards 
Russia as well as towards Prussia, where refugees presented a 
considerable problem; if on no other account, financial reasons 
were enough to make the Prussian Government deliver the people in 
question to the Russian authorities. Otherwise the most prominent 
of the refugees made their way to England and France. Among 
them was Prince Adam Czartoryski, who narrowly escaped arrest 
when the Russian forces unexpectedly invaded the Republic 
of Cracow. On the express orders of Metternich he was supplied 
with an Austrian passport and escorted into Austrian territory. 
Czartoryski's visit to London in the beginning of 1832 created 
a slight diplomatic incident between the Russian Embassy and 
the British Government; Grey in a more intimate and undiplo-
matic way commented upon the effect of the Polish defeat. "It is 
really heart-breaking to see him", Grey wrote to Brougham in his 
New Year letter, "& now these d . . . . d Russians are doing all 
they can to throw the whole Belgian affair into confusion. It is to 
be regretted that we had no power of sending a fleet into the Baltic 
last summer to settle the matter of Poland."108 
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 Cf. Webster, 1,190; Grey to Brougham, 1 Jan., 183a, Lord Henry Brougham, 
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C O N C L U S I O N 
The year 1832 began with the question of the ratification of the 
Belgian Treaty still unsettled; the King of the Netherlands con-
tinued refusing even to consider the recognition of Leopold's 
kingship in Brussels. William I was, however, unable to make the 
special envoy of Nicholas, Count Orlov, a partisan of his cause. 
Orlov spent some weeks in The Hague during February and March, 
1832, trying to convince the King of the necessity of coming to 
terms with Belgium. He had no success, but neither did the King 
succeed in winning the Russian envoy to endorse his own stand-
point: that he had never given up the sovereignty of Belgium. 
Nevertheless, the King's failure with Orlov did not prevent the 
latter's Imperial master to send in his ratification of the Treaty 
with the reservation that "the consent of the King of Holland 
must be obtained to the question on which he was still in dispute 
with the Conference" This was a very meagre result for William I, 
but in the meantime Palmerston himself had had time to become 
convinced that the Belgian Treaty needed revision - after he had 
succeeded, with considerable difficulty, in getting the Belgian 
delegate to agree to accept, in April 1832, the Russian ratification 
so reserved.1 
King Leopold, a more experienced man, saw a better chance 
of settling the affairs of his new kingdom. In the beginning of 
April news came to the West of Europe of the announcement in 
Warsaw of the "Organic Statute" for the Kingdom of Poland in 
lieu of its former constitution ; Leopold equated this measure with 
the incorporation of the Kingdom into Russia, which, in his 
opinion, would please neither Paris nor Berlin or Vienna. " I t is 
a great event from which a great deal may be made in favour of the 
conclusion of the Belgian business", he wrote to the Belgian Min-
ister in Paris. "This act of Russia is contrary to all stipulations; 
1
 Smit, p. 174-5 ; Webster, I, 154-5, whence the quotation is taken. 
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Prussia and Austria must be hurt by it. If the Powers adhere to it, 
they ought to exact from Russia a frank adhesion to 24 Articles." 2 
But Palmerston prevailed on the Conference to accept the Russian 
ratification in London and thus he kept them together. 
Still, it was little more than sitting together, since the whole 
Conference, except the Foreign Secretary, did not care for Belgium ; 
moreover, as he knew, the Russian plenipotentiaries "want to 
recommend themselves to their Emperor and to win orders and 
recompenses and make atonement for the crime of having signed 
the Treaty of November".3 Something had to be done to make the 
proceedings of the Conference more efFective. In the summer of 
1832 Lord Durham was sent to St. Petersburg with instructions to 
try to have Nicholas agree to the necessity of coercive measures 
with regard to Holland. Should he not concur, at least he ought 
not to oppose them. Since, however, Durham's departure from 
London coincided with a wave of public indignation in Britain on 
account of Russian measures in Poland and the envoy himself was 
considered to be a partisan of the Polish cause, his mission was 
acclaimed by "The Times" as an intervention on behalf of Poland. 
In fact, Durham's mission was far more a personal affair within the 
Whig Party, as Grey wanted to offer him some distraction after his 
daughter's death. The mission itself did not affect Belgium and Poland 
very much and, because of Durham's character, its influence was felt 
in Whig relations rather than in international politics. 
For the rest, linking up Polish and Belgian affairs no longer 
seemed possible ; Nicholas did not admit any right of interference 
with regard to Poland on the part of the Western Powers, and the 
British Ministers, in spite of all the parliamentary difficulties created 
by the news from Poland,4 were well aware that their protests to 
Russia lacked strength. Nevertheless, such protests continued to 
be made throughout the better part of the X I X century, especially 
in 1836, 1846 and 1863, though with no force to support them they 
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carried little weight; there had been no Polish army on the Vistula 
since 1831. 
Belgian affairs which had progressed rapidly in 1830 and in 1831 
became the subject of a slow process of negotiations. After the 
breakdown of the Polish movement, Matuszewic, the second 
Russian plenipotentiary, became "la bête noire" of the Conference 
for the British Ministers;5 the other Eastern representatives too 
took a much firmer line in favour of Holland during the negotia-
tions that followed than they had previously done. During the 
early months of 1832 considerable delay in ratification of the Treaty 
gave rise to some false interpretations, but no other encouragement 
weis afforded to the King of the Netherlands; his representative 
in London, Van Zuylen, had already in November, 1831, predicted 
such a development and attributed the absence of such assistance 
as the King would desire to the exhaustion of Russia caused by 
the Polish war 6 ; indeed, the three Eastern Powers did not object 
to the expedition of a French force which, at the end of 1832, be-
sieged and captured the Antwerp citadel, held until then by the 
Dutch army. 
After the Convention of 2ist May, 1833, which provided for a 
modus vivendi without the recognition of King Leopold by The 
Hague, the Conference adjourned nne die and the affairs of the 
Low Countries were left to take their own course. The final set-
tlement took place six years later. In the negotiations, renewed 
about a year earlier, the Belgians were not allowed to draw any 
advantage from the fact that during the intervening years they 
had held portions of territory assigned in 1831 to Holland; they 
were compelled to abandon them. It remains to be noted that 
public indignation in Belgium at the prospect of giving up what 
was considered an integral part of the national territory rose to 
such a height that the Government seriously reckoned with the 
possibility of being forced into war, and hastily made such improve-
ments in its armed forces as were possible within so short a time ; in 
these measures the appointment of a number of Polish officers, 
who went into exile after 1831, was included and among them was 
General Skrzynecki, the Polish Commander-in-Chief in 1831. 
The withdrawal of the Austrian and Prussian Ministers from 
6
 Neumann to Metternich, яб Oct., 1832, quoted by de Larmoy, p. 55. 
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Brussels - Russia had yet no representative there - made it impos-
sible for Skrzynecki to continue, and he offered his resignation. 
It is sufficiently established that the British Government was 
mainly responsible for the recognition of the Orleans Monarchy 
in Europe and for arranging an assembly of the Great Five to 
discuss the affairs of the Low Countries. The views originating 
in London and Paris supplied the basis for the existence of the 
Belgian State, in spite of any differences on this account between 
the two governments. The question necessarily arises why the other 
three Powers, Austria, Prussia and Russia, parties to the arrange-
ment in virtue of which the united Kingdom of the Netherlands 
had been created, exercised so comparatively little influence in 
bringing about a new settlement in the Low Countries; and the 
answer is that they were more than handicapped by the Polish 
revolution. I t hits been at times underlined by historians that the 
outbreak of the revolution in Poland, which considerably embar-
rassed the three Eastern Governments, enabled the Governments 
of France and Britain to obtain the London Conference's agreement 
on the independence of Belgium. This opinion slightly exaggerated 
the importance of the Protocol of 20th December, in which the 
term "indépendance future" with regard to Belgium was employed 
for the first time. An attempt has been made here also to stress 
the haste with which this measure was adopted and the fear of the 
French Government that it still might be undone by an untimely 
failure of the Polish movement. Hence the attempts of the French 
Government to draw the attention of Britain to Poland. Hence, too, 
its aquiescence in the candidature of the Prince of Orange for the 
throne of Belgium, though its success would tend to maintain the 
link between the two parts of the former kingdom of William I, 
contrary to the wishes of France. Lastly, efforts made from Paris 
to bring the Belgians to agree to the "Bases de séparation" areto 
be ascribed to the same cause; these efforts continued to be made 
until April, 1831. 
For the rest, the influence of the events in Poland upon the 
course of the Belgian policy of the Eastern Powers is better known, 
chiefly because of the work done on the subject by German histo-
rians. One of the main questions which I have tried to answer 
was whether the obvious divergence of views between Britain and 
France in the affairs of the Low Countries was also responsible for 
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their policy, and especially for the policy of Britain, towards the 
revolution in Poland. More attention is given here to this problem 
as, unlike the Belgian affairs, it has so far only been examined to an 
inconsiderable degree. 
The outbreak of the revolution in the Kindom of Poland, and later, 
in other parts of the former Polish State, could not fail to attract the 
attention of the British Government ; Poland was one of the key 
problems at the Congress of Vienna. Moreover, there was wide-
spread sympathy for the Polish movement in Britain also, though 
this was not comparable to the excitement prevailing in this 
respect in the French capital. Little as the British Government 
was in a position to afford even a minor quarrel with Russia over 
Poland, some representations concerning Polish affairs were nev-
ertheless made in St. Petersburg by the British Ambassador, and 
they seemed there to be the result of a suspected common policy of 
Britain and France in this respect. In April these coincided, too, 
with bad news for Russia from the theatre of military operations. 
The interest of France in Poland was not unexpected by the three 
absolutist governments ; that of Britain caused them some surprise, 
especially as they were aware that Britain was opposed to France 
over the Belgian question. They realized, however, that, on the whole, 
London was closer to Paris than to the other Courts, or at least 
likely to be so, and therefore in order to prevent the British Govern-
ment drawing too close to the Palais Royal at the time of the Belgian 
crisis in June, 1831, they had given way at the expense of William I. 
Yet, only a few weeks later, after Belgium appeared to be appeased, 
and whilst the French invitation to Britain to join in a diplomatic 
intervention in St. Petersburg in favour of the Poles was being 
discussed in London, the Prussian observer there was convinced 
that war because of Poland was inevitable.7 In July, too, diplomatic 
circles in St. Petersburg smelled intervention. 
In fact, the Poles had received no promises from the British 
Ministers on which to base any hope for assistance except Pal-
merston's statement that he considered Poland lost to Nicholas. 
This statement seems to have made considerable impression upon 
the Eastern Governments ; its echoes circulated there during August, 
7
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when the Russian army was about to lay siege to Warsaw. The 
possible effects of such an impression, even if caused by an Anglo-
French demarche, were not appreciated in London, although it 
does not seem that Palmerston made his statement without a 
purpose; if what he told Walewski was meant to bring about a 
Polish intervention in Brussels for the sake of the XVIII Articles, 
the words spoken to Matuszewic were destined for St. Petersburg. 
At this time, however, the majority of the Cabinet believed that 
an offer of mediation could only result in an open breach with 
Russia. As Lord Holland put it, when writing to Granville : "You 
all seem to me to underrate the authority with which Great Britain 
and France when acting conjointly can spreak to other Powers, and 
Russian particular." 8 
The French initiative was therefore rejected. It is clear that the 
still unstable state of Belgium contributed to furnish ground for 
this decision; to what extent, it is difficult to assess. The official 
reply spoke of the loyal attitude of Russia in the Belgian negotia-
tions; it has been shown that Palmerston disagreed with his col-
leagues and did not want to have this motive included in the doc-
ument sent to Paris. 
How far was St. Petersburg prepared to tolerate interference? 
The official attitude left no doubt: Poland and especially the 
constitution of the Kingdom as granted by the Emperor Alexander, 
was Nicholas's concern alone. It seems that in the beginning 
Nicholas might have been willing to make some political declara-
tion, if the Poles were to submit; the first audience of Mortemart, 
as well as letters to the Grand Duke Constantine at a later date 
provide some evidence for this attitude.9 But it was fairly unlikely 
that the Poles would adopt such a course. In May and June the 
military position of Russia deteriorated and Nicholas had second 
thoughts on the ultimate fate of his Polish possessions. He considered 
a partition of the Kingdom of Poland as a means which, apart 
from its political significance for Russia herself, might bring about 
the armed assistance of other interested Powers, Prussia in partic-
ular. 
At that time, however, there was no likelihood of moving the 
Prussian army across its Eastern frontiers : not only was it obvious 
in Berlin that France would in such a case try to seize the Rhine-
8
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land, but as the activity of the Polish agents in Paris and London 
grew, the Prussian Government found itself confronted with 
protests regarding its neutrality in the Polish war only on account 
of supplies afforded to the Russian army. The special Ambassador 
of France, Flahaut, was convinced that public opinion in Germany 
alone would suffice for the Berlin Government to keep clear of 
the Polish war. 
There was no likelihood of Austrian assistance either. Though Pal-
merston made much of Dwernicki's case10 that Austria favoured 
Nicholas, Vienna was far from being prepared to compromise 
herself on account of Poland: on the one hand, Italian affairs 
affected her much more than the others; moreover many persons 
in the Court and Government circles were sympathetic to Poland, 
among them the Governor of the Polish province of Austria, 
Galicia; in addition the Hapsburg Empire was hardly able to bear 
the strain of military expenses already upon it. Besides, in Metter-
nich's view, the Polish revolution led by the aristocracy, headed by 
Prince Czartoryski, could not be blamed for carbonarism. But if 
there was no certainty that the Western Powers had made up their 
minds to intervene decisively in Polish affairs, the Chancellor 
could not be expected to jeopardize his relations with Russia and 
Prussia by showing sympathy towards the Poles. Hence the obvious 
inconsistency of the views of Mettemich, as ascribed to him by the 
British Ambassador, especially in his reports during July, 1831. 
Nicholas accordingly made no request for assistance to Austria; 
but he declared to the Austrian Ambassador that rather than 
submit to foreign interference, he would abandon Poland altogether 
- by which he meant the t<Congres"-Kingdom only - as if he knew 
that in many a project of intervention the participation of Vienna 
was envisaged. 
There is a document showing that the abandonment of Poland 
seriously occupied Nicholas' mind. 
In May, when the military position appeared rather gloomy, 
Nicholas wrote a personal memorandum concerning Poland. 
The Kingdom had to be conquered, he noted: the dignity of 
Russia could not remain intact after such blows as she had alrea-
dy suffered; but there were really no advantages in keeping 
Poland. This Kingdom should therefore be partitioned between 
10
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CONCLUSION 249 
Prussia, Austria and Russia; that part which would be Nicholas' 
should keep the name of Poland in order that conflicts be excluded 
which might follow if one of the other parts assumed that title.11 
The memorandum showed confusion in the Emperor's mind 
since the carrying out of the project would require the co-operation 
of the other two Powers, and yet the condition made that the name 
of Poland should remain with the Russian portion, lest it were 
used by one of them, indicated that they were not to be trusted. In any 
case, when Orlov brought this plan with him to BerUn in June, he 
obtained no official reply and indeed the Prussian Government 
did not seem to have considered it seriously. The importance of 
Nicholas' project, however, lies in that part of the document in 
which he put forward his reasons why it should be accepted: not 
only was the possession of Poland useless, but dangerous, even 
menacing as well: "Only to glance at the m a p " wrote Nicholas 
"is to be horrified at the sight of the Polish boundaries: they 
extend to the Oder, whilst at the sides they reach behind the Nieman 
and the Bug in order to touch the Baltic near Polangen and the 
Black Sea by the estuary of the Danube." 
This opinion, in itself explicit enough considering that it was 
destined for foreign eyes as well, seems to leave a door open through 
which to introduce Talleyrand's advice of the previous December 
that the Imperial Government might, in time, be brought to yield 
" à des démarches habilement combinées." 1 г Nesselrode's influence, 
just as in the autumn of 1830, might perhaps have been used 
for this purpose. However, difficulties in the way of such dé-
marches as suggested by the French Ambassador in London were 
considerable. To begin with, any diplomatic intervention was very 
seriously handicapped by the dethronement of Nicholas by the 
Pohsh Diet, in January, 1831, and still more, by the fact that in the 
course of the revolution the Poles insisted on claiming not only the 
independence of the Kingdom of Poland, but also that of the 
Polish provinces incorporated in Russia as well. Once the principle 
of non-intervention seemed in 1830 to have been accepted, there 
was very little room left for meddling in the affairs of Poland which, 
moreover, were really those regarding all the former Polish terri-
tories; it necessarily would lead to some sort of breach with Russia. 
11
 Schiemann, Geschichte Russlands, III, lao. 
1 г
 Cf. Chapter II , above, p. 85. 
250 CONCLUSION 
Even were it taken into account that the Treaty of Vienna provided 
for special treatment of those territories by all the partitioning 
Powers, the act of the Congress at the same time stated that the 
"Congress"-Kingdom - let alone the other provinces - was 
"irrevocably tied" to Russia. But at the time in July, when the 
intervention was likely to become a reahty, the Polish Government 
might more easily have been brought to a compromise than half 
a year earlier. 
The British Government could not, and would not, face the 
likelihood of a serious breach with the Eastern Powers ; it was already, 
as Talleyrand put it, overburdened with two important questions, 
Belgium and the Reform. Belgium would in any case remain a 
problem even if frank co-operation existed between Paris and 
London. But neither were the Eastern Powers in a position to risk a 
war, whether against both the Western Powers, or against France 
alone. It took time before the two Powers became aware of this 
fact; it may well be assumed that the interest of the French Govern-
ment in the Polish question during the winter months of 1830/1831 
was primarily directed by consideration for its own safety. France 
herself did not need to be afraid of a war: with feelings all over 
Europe stirred up by the "trois glorieux" in Paris, Prussia and 
Austria realized that war against France was only too likely to be 
supported by revolutionary movements in other countries, possibly 
in Germany as well. But the Orleanist régime, and especially the 
"Bourgeois-King" himself were aware that such a war would bring 
a speedy end to their weak authority ; but that did not need to be a 
reason to prevent them from using threats of such a war in their 
relations with Berlin, Vienna and St. Petersburg13; more than that, 
the less faith the Eastern Governments placed in the sincerity of 
the pacific assurances of the French Government, the more likely 
were they to believe in such an eventuality even without the threats 
actually being held out to them. 
As is known, all that the Palais Royal did for the Poles was 
literally forced upon them by the public opinion.14 Not only did the 
Polish mission in Paris have to be "managed", but Polish radicab 
staying in France associated themselves only too easily with extreme 
elements there; Palmerston complained about it to Walewski. 
That explains why the invitation to Britain to join in an interven-
" Cf. above, p. 96, reference to the alleged interview of Sebastiani and Pozzo. 
14
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tion on behalf of the Poles was made in July; at the same time the 
French Government badly needed some popular success since 
Leopold's arrival in Belgium had put an end to whatever plans were 
entertained in various circles in Paris with regard to the North-
Eastem frontiers of France. 
The attitude of the British Government was much more frank. 
The British Ambassador in St. Petersburg received instructions 
on the subject of the "Polish" stipulations of the Treaty of Vienna 
not only before the arrival of Mortemart but even before the actual 
beginning of hostilities on the Vistula, as though the British Govern-
ment recognized the violation of the constitution which was put 
forward by the Poles as the cause of the rising. Until April, however, 
no more was done since the military operations did not warrant 
the hope that the Polish movement would maintain itself against 
the Russian onslaught. From April onwards London seemed to be 
prepared to act only as the result of a decisive Polish success - at 
least the continuance of the movement throughout the summer -
since this would imply the prolongation of the war in Poland beyond 
1831 and cause unavoidable repercussions elsewhere. 
Unfortunately, the very important interview of Walewski with 
Palmerston in June created a false impression for the first time. 
Without saying that he would intervene Palmerston stated that 
Belgian affairs prevented such an intervention. All the more dis-
appointing, therefore, appeared to be the British refusal to join in 
an intervention, proposed in July, at a time when Belgium had 
obtained what seemed to be an appropriate solution, and at a 
time when public opinion in Britain had become a factor under-
lining the need of a more active policy. 
The state of affairs in Poland was by no means satisfactory for 
the insurgents ; but it is hardly to be assumed that this contributed 
considerably to the British Government's decision, as it no doubt 
might have done if London had had accurate accounts ; as it was, 
news from the theatre of military operations was scarce and hardly 
reflected the real situation, while diplomatic reports from the 
Russian capital, which in July concentrated on the effects of the 
cholera epidemic, could only strengthen the impression of the 
weakness of the Imperial Government. As previously stated, it 
is difficult to give an opinion on the part played by Belgian affairs 
in bringing the British Government to refuse the French overture. 
It is clear, however, that London's reference to the Belgian policy of 
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Russia neither approved of it nor constituted a declaration against 
the Poles but was pointed against the Belgian policy of France. As 
for Poland, the British note distinctly stated that the Government 
would try to intervene in such a way as would be consistent with 
its relations with St. Petersburg. 
If the possibihty of further comphcations in the Belgian business 
was sufficient to make the British Government abstain from 
straining its relations with the Eastern Powers, it need not be further 
explained that the renewal of hostihties in the Low Countries 
and the subsequent entry of a French army into Belgium put 
further active interest on the part of London in Polish affairs 
entirely out of the question. Suggestions made by Talleyrand 
with regard to linking the French occupation of Belgium and the 
Polish war missed any prospect of reahzation; and if they were 
brought forward at all, they only provide evidence that the 
French Ambassador's "idée favorite" - the partition of Belgium -
obscured his better knowledge of Britain. The British Government, 
if compelled to agree to such a solution, as, according to Palmerston 
view in June, they might have to under certain circumstances, 
would do it only as the very last concession; Polish affairs hardly 
would be expected to play a rôle at all in such a bargain. 
It may be observed that the Belgian inability to deal with the 
Dutch attack provided quite a sound argument for the French to 
keep their army in Belgium. The British Government was unable 
to expose France's bad faith except by such slips as the French 
Ministers might make in their relations with their foreign colleagues. 
The necessary conclusion appears to be that uneasy relations be-
tween Britain and France were responsible for the absence of any 
intervention in Poland, an intervention which was loudly demanded 
by public opinion, was likely to bring some results for Poland and 
- which unfortunately was not sufficiently appreciated - was one 
that involved no great risks. It is beyond the scope of this work to 
analyse how far the situation in Poland could be adapted to meet 
such an intervention ; it is sufficient to state that the news of it would 
strengthen the moderate elements, perhaps to the extent of making 
the August riots impossible. 
Finally, Grey's remark about sending a fleet to the Baltic by 
France must be mentioned. Evidence is lacking to explain the 
absence of any such step. The French Government apparently did 
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not dare to intervene on its own; as explained above, by so doing 
it would probably undermine its own existence, since a distant 
foreign expedition, with the possibility of involving hostilities 
against all the three Eastern Powers, might necessitate appealing 
for popular support. The present study hardly gives an answer to 
the question why there was no hint from London to Paris regarding 
a naval expedition on behalf of Poland. Such a hint would dismiss 
the fear of a large scale war. A similar hint, Palmerston's declaration 
that Britain would not support the Eastern Powers against France 
if they intervened actively in Poland, obviously greatly contributed 
in making them abstain from offering military assistance to Russia. 
The appearance of a French fleet in the Baltic would undoubtedly 
have brought Prussia and perhaps Austria to interpose their 
mediation, not only in order to avoid a possible general war, but 
even to prevent the Poles obtaining supplies via the sea route; 
the French Government would have been equally eager not to get 
involved in actual hostilities. The effect of such mediation cannot 
be dwelt upon here; this would of course also be influenced by 
the last stage of the military operations in Poland, a subject which 
goes beyond the aim of the present study. 
A P P E N D I X I 
Count Matuszewic to Count Nesselrode, 8th October, 1830 
Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague. Ref. Aanw. 1918/xi, 
no. 30. Enclosed to the dispatch of Baron Van Heeckeren, 
dated St. Petersburg 1/13 November, 1830, under the title: 
"Extrait d'une dépêche du Cte de Matouchewic du 26.IX/ 
8.x. 1830, no. 207." 
Le système que vient d'adopter le cabinet de St. James me paraît 
se réduire aux termes suivans: 
Le cabinet 1 de St. James croit ne pouvoir refuser au roi des Pays 
Bas le conseil et le secours que ce monarque réclame aujourd'hui 
de la part de l'Angleterre, de la Russie, de l'Autriche et de la Prusse. 
Il regarde comme dangereux d'accorder immédiatement des 
secours militaires, ou l'impossibilité de rendre ces secours assez 
considérables pour en assurer l'effet. 
Il juge indispensable à sa position et à ses nécessités parlemen-
taires comme au bien général, d'épuiser toutes les chances de paix, 
en essayant d'associer le gouvernement Français aux délibérations 
qui auront pour le but le nouveau mode de coexistence de la Belgi-
que avec la Hollande. 
Dans cet arrangement, il est décidé à n'admettre ni une sé-
paration de Dynastie ni aucune combinaison qui placerait à la 
disposition de la France, la barrière de forteresses érigée contre elle. 
Si la France veut soutenir maintenant le principe qui excluerait 
à l'avenir toute intervention militaire, toute mesure coercitive, 
l'intention du cabinet de St. James est, non de souscrire à cette 
demande, ou de laisser croire que jamais il y souscrira, mais 
d'ajourner la discussion, en la déclarant prématurée. 
Si cette demande se reproduit, quand il s'agira de mettre à 
exécution les conditions nouvelles arrêtées avec le Roi des Pays Bas, 
1
 The following paragraphs, translated into English, are included in the 
dispatch of Lord Heytesbury, dated St. Petersburg, г 2 October, 1830, F.O. Russia. 
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le cabinet de St. James opine à passer outre, alors, et à n'en tenir 
aucun compte, en cas que les Belges refusassent à se soumettre aux 
décisions de l'alliance.2 
Il est évident que les premières réponses du cabinet Français et 
surtout les termes dans lesquels sera ajournée la question des 
mesures coërcitives, vont résoudre le grand problème qui nous occupe. 
Si le gouvernement Français consent à l'ajournement de cette 
question, sans emporter le principe qu'il soutient jusqu'à cette heure, 
il aura fait évidemment un pas rétrograde, il se sera rapproché des 
doctrines des 4 cours et il aura de la peine à faire revivre plus tard 
ses étranges prétentions. 
S'il veut dès à présent que l'Angleterre s'y soumette, j'aime à 
espérer que M. de Talleyrand trouvera dans le caractère vigoureux 
du premier ministre anglais toute l'opposition que j'attends de ses 
maximes, de la haine pour les révolutions et de la gloire dont il s'est 
couvert en les combattant. 
* Here ends the part included in Heytesbury's dispatch, cf. note 1. 
A P P E N D I X I I 
Nicholas I to his sister, Anna, Princess of Orange, 
16th December, 1830 
"Copie d'une lettre autographe de l'Empereur à la Princesse 
d'Orange." Lieven MSS at the British Museum (Add MSS 
47398). 
St. Pétersbourg, le 4/16 Xbre 1830 
Il part un Courrier dans quelques heures. . . 3 et je veux néanmoins 
te dire que j ' a i reçu tes deux lettres par Trubetzkoï et par Courrier, 
je ne puis assez te remercier et te dire combien j 'apprécie l'amitié 
que tu me témoignes. Voilà donc que la révolution et tout ce qui 
s'en suit nous a atteints aussi comme je le prévoyais. Tu sais déjà 
tout [ce] qui se passe en Pologne, il y a demain 7 jours que je ne 
sais rien de Constantin, on le dit parti avec les troupes russes pour 
rentrer dans l'Empire. Tu peux penser la besogne que j ' a i sur les 
bras, mais je me rends avec confiance à la volonté de Dieu 
qui m'a tiré de position plus difficile que celle-ci. J'espère qu'il nous 
protégera et me fera m'acquitter de mes devoirs pénibles qu'il 
m'inspirait. Sans cet aide tout puissant je ne saurais rien faire 
mais avec lui j'envisage le danger de sang froid. Nos troupes 
marchent; dans quelques semaines je devrai les rejoindre. Le reste 
est écrit là haut et je m'y soumets d'avance. Mes principes sont 
irrévocables et j e périrai plutôt que transiger avec la révolution. 
Tu conçois que dans des momens pareils l'on ne peut qu'être 
laconique et tu ne m'en voudrais pas. Mille & mille remercimens 
pour tous les voeux que tu fais pour moi à l'occasion de ma fête et 
pour le charmant achat. 
Si Guillaume est près de toi, embrasse le moi, ainsi que les 
autres. Adieu, pense à nous et que Dieu te conserve avec les tiens. 
à toi pour la vie 
ton dévoué frère et ami 
3
 Two words illegible. Nicolas 
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Protocol No. 7 of the London Conference on Belgian Affairs 
A. D R A F T M A D E BY T A L L E Y R A N D 
An enclosure to the dispatch of the Netherlands plenipoten-
tiaries A. R. Falck and Baron H. van Zuylen van Nyevelt, 
of a8th December, 1830 (Algemeen Rijksarchief, The 
Hague, Ref. A. I l l , no. 9.) 
Les Puissances signataires du Traité de Vienne avaient à remplir 
les unes envers les autres et envers toutes celles dont l'Europe 
Chrétienne se compose la 1ère et la plus grande des obligations -
celle de favoriser dans tous les Etats avec le progrès de la civilisation 
l'accroissement et la durée du bien-être dont elle est la source en 
assurant la plus longue paix pour l'établissement d'un équilibre, 
si non parfait, du moins aussi réel que pouvait permettre l'état 
respectif des possessions que 22 années de guerre avaient amené. 
L'union des nations Belge et Hollandaise en un seul peuple sous le 
régime libre et sous le Gouvernement de la Maison de Nassau 
avait paru et dû nécessairement paraître une condition principale 
et pour ainsi dire nécessaire à l'équilibre à établir et cette union fut 
sanctionnée dans l'intime persuasion qu'elle serait également utile 
et bientôt également agréable aux deux nations; car rien alors 
n'avait fait. . .* et personne ne pouvait imaginer qu'il y eut entre 
elles une incompatibilité que le tems ne pouvait vaincre et telle 
que l'ont révélée les événemens des trois derniers mois. 
Tout en regrettant que cette union n'ait mieux répondu aux 
espérances dans lesquelles elle avait été conçue, les Puissances 
signataires du Traité de Vienne se regardent comme entièrement 
libérées, par nature même de l'obstacle imprévu contre lequel elle 
One word illegible. 
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n'a pu se soulever, de toutes obligations résultans de la combinaison 
qui avait d'abord été adoptée. 
Mais libres du devoir qu'elles s'étaient imposées elles s'en sont 
trouvées un autre qui est devenu plus impérieux par cette circon-
stance même. 
Gardiennes 6 du repos de l'Europe les Puissances signataires du 
Traité de Vienne n'ont voulu employer vis-à-vis d'autres voyes que 
celle d'une intervention toute pacifique, ni d'autres forces, que celle 
de la raison dont elles ne se doutaient pas qu'elle ne fut tout puissant 
sur l'esprit des états investis de la confiance des populations Belges 
et sur ces populations elles-mêmes. 
Leur attente n'a pas été trompée. Les Belges ont sentí que situés 
au coeur même de l'Europe leur nouvelle existence devait porter à la 
grande famille Européenne de la sécurité et non de l'inquiétude. 
Le principe monarchique a été conservé. Déférant ensuite avec 
empressement à l'armistice qui a été proposé par la conférence 
de Londres ils ont mérité qu'on eût en eux actes de confiance que 
les Ambassadeurs des cinq puissances déclarassent à l'Europe qu'elle 
avait acquis un nouveau royaume et que les Belges étaient indépen-
dants. 
Art. i. Les cinq grandes puissances réunies à Londres accèdent 
aux voeux des Belges et les reconnaissent comme un peuple formant 
un état séparé de tout autre et indépendant. 
Art. 2. La Belgique étant appelée à prendre rang parmi les 
Etats Européens devra, dans l'organisation définitive qu'elle 
donnera à son gouvernement monarchique, avoir ainsi en vue de 
n'inquiéter aucune des puissances au milieu desquelles elle va se 
trouver placée. 
Art. 3. Tout ce qui tient aux difficultés relatives à la séparation 
de la Belgique et de la Hollande sera réglé par des Commissaires 
respectivement nommés, avec recours, en cas de différence, aux 
commissaires des cinq puissances médiatrices. 
Art. 4. Il est entendu qu'il n'est par la présente reconnaissance 
rien s ta tué 6 qui puisse affecter les droits que la Confédération 
Germanique et le Roi de Hollande peuvent avoir sur le Grand 
Duché de Luxembourg. 
5
 The remaining part of this document is printed in a footnote to p. 84 of Fl. de 
Lannoy's Histoire diplomatique de l'indépendance belge, 1930. 
• In print "établi". 
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В. P R O T O C O L S I G N E D O N 2 0 T H DECEMBER, 1830 
From Recueil des pièces diplomatiques relatives à la séparation de 
la Belgique d'avec la Hollande [by J . G. Verstolk van Soclen], 
La Haye 1832, I, 44-46. 
Les plénipotentiaires des cinq cours ayant reçu l'adhésion formelle 
du gouvernement belge à l'armistice qui lui avait été proposé et que 
le Roi des Pays Bas a aussi accepté, et la conférence ayant ainsi, en 
arrêtant l'effusion de sang, accompli sa première tâche, qu'elle 
s'était imposée, les plénipotentiaires se sont réunis pour délibérer 
sur les mesures ultérieures à prendre dans le but de remédier au 
dérangement que les troubles survenus en Belgique ont apporté dans 
le système établi par les traités de 1814 et 1815. 
En formant, par les traités en question, l'union de la Belgique 
avec la Hollande, les puissances, signataires de ces mêmes traités, 
et dont les plénipotentiaires sont assemblés dans ce moment, avaient 
eu pour le but de fonder un juste équilibre en Europe et d'assurer le 
maintien de la paix générale. 
Les événemens des quatre demiers mois ont malheureusement 
démontré que "cet amalgame parfait et complet que les puissances 
voulaient opérer entre ces ceux pays", n'avait pas été obtenu; qu'il 
serait désormais impossible à effectuer; qu'ainsi l'objet même de 
l'union de la Belgique avec la Hollande se trouve détruit, et que 
dès lors il devient indispensable de recourir à d'autres arrangemens 
pour accomplir les intentions, à l'exécution desquelles cette union 
devait servir de moyen. 
Unie à la Hollande, et faisant partie intégrante du Royaume des 
Pays Bas, la Belgique avait à remplir sa part des devoirs européens 
de ce royaume, et des obligations que les traités lui avaient fait con-
tracter envers les autres puissances. Sa séparation d'avec la Hol-
lande ne saurait la libérer de cette part de ses devoirs et de ses 
obligations. 
La conférence s'occupera conséquemment de discuter et de 
concerter les nouveaux arrangemens des plus propres à combiner 
l'indépendance future de la Belgique avec les stipulations des 
traités, avec les intérêts et la sécurité des autres puissances et avec 
la conservation de l'équilibre européen. A cet effet la conférence, 
tout en continuant ses négociations avec les plénipotentiaires de 
S.M. le Roi des Pays Bas, engagera le gouvernement provisoire de la 
Belgique à envoyer à Londres le plutôt possible des commissaires 
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munis des instructions et des pouvoirs assez amples, pour être 
consultés et entendus sur tout ce qui pourra faciliter l'adoption 
définitive des arrangemens dont il a été fait mention plus haut. 
Ces arrangemens ne pourront affecter en rien les droits que le 
Roi des Pays Bas et la Confédération Germanique exercent sur le 
Grand Duché de Luxembourg. 
Les plénipotentiaires des cinq cours sont convenus que le présent 
protocole serait communiqué au plénipotentiaire de S.M. le Roi 
des Pays Bas, et envoyé en copie à Lord Ponsonby et à Monsieur 
Bresson, moyennant la lettre ci-jointe, dont ils donneront connais-
sance au gouvernement provisoire de la Belgique. 
A P P E N D I X IV 
Viscount Palmerston to Lord Ponsonby, Foreign Office, 
January 4th, 1831 
Broadlands Archives 
Private. 
My dear Lord Ponsonby, 
We had a Conference today at which the Dutch Plenipotentiaries 
communicated a long protest by the King against our 7th Protocol, 
requesting that this document should be annexed to a Protocol of 
our proceeding. 
But the document is so worded as to make it impossible for us to 
comply with this request, unless it is materially altered. They then 
stated that the King proposes to take off the Scheldt blockade on 
the 20th of this month, hoping that by that time the material points 
of the arrangement for the separation of the two countries may be 
settled and they stated his notions of such an arrangement to be as 
follows. 
1. That the territory of Holland should be that which she 
possessed in 1794, before the conquest by France, but that ex-
changes should be made between her and Belgium so as to get rid of 
some of t he . . . 7 and to give to Holland a military road to Maes-
tricht. 
2. That the debt should be divided, each party taking which 
belonged to them before the union and their just proportion ofthat 
incurred since the union. 
3. That if Belgium will further take upon herself a larger portion 
of the debt, the amount of which increase shall be hereafter fixed, the 
King will give to Belgium the same privileges of commercial inter-
course with the Dutch colonies which is enjoyed by his own Dutch 
One word illegible. 
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subjects and still further allow free navigation of the Scheldt to 
Antwerp. 
4. These heads of arrangement seem to be fair enough and we 
are going to consider them, and hope in the course of next week to 
settle something about them. 
Van de Weyer and his colleagues have powers to discuss only 
and not to conclude, we must therefore settle the territorial question 
for the two parties and when that matter and the fortress question 
are arranged, the Sovereign may be chosen forthwith. 
Van de Weyer told me today that Cobourg was going down and 
Nemours getting up. 
I told him that the Allies never would consent to Nemours. But 
said he, what if the Congress were to chuse [sic] him? Isaid that it 
would then become a question between us and France. That we 
should expect France to refuse her assent, or that war between 
France and the rest of Europe might be the necessary consequence. 
It may be well for you to hold the same language, and with regard 
to the chance of France hazarding such a war it should be remem­
bered that the events of the last ten days at Paris 8 have given the 
King and his Government great additional powers of restraining 
popular feeling, by having much strengthened their authority. 
That Russia will probably make some amicable arrangement with 
Poland and be ready therefore to act in case of need, and that our 
disturbances in England have been pretty well mastered, and that 
Ireland will I trust be kept quiet. That the ballot and training of 
the militia will give us 50,000 available men and that consequently 
the forces with which France would have to contend in case of a 
war about Belgium are more formidable that they were a fortnight 
ago. Talleyrand showed his cloven foot in a conversation I had 
with him the day before yesterday. I said an arrangement had 
occurred to me which might or might not be practicable but which 
if it could be accomplished might remove many difficulties - "Why 
should not the Belgians take the Prince of Orange on condition that 
the King made over to him his rights on Luxembourg"? 
Talleyrand looked grave, said he doubted whether his Govern­
ment would agree, that Luxembourg was too near to them and ran 
β
 Reference is m a d e to the process of the Ministers of Charles X . Louis Philippe 
withstood popular pressure which demanded passing the death sentence on t h e m ; 
the King went so far as to remove Lafayette from his post of C o m m a n d e r of the 
National G u a r d . 
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into their frontier. - " N o t more said I, as attached to independent 
Belgium than as belonging to the United Netherlands", "Aye 
said he, let us have no town, then our frontier is open and exposed;" 
"why, said he, could not some arrangement be made by which 
Luxembourg might be given to France"? I told him at once that never 
could be, we could not agree to it, we wish to be well with France, 
but it could not remain so, were France to aggrandize herself in that 
direction, that it is an Enghsh interest that Belgium should be 
independent, and for that same reason France could not have 
Luxembourg. 
This is the first time he had let out any distinct proposition for 
adding to the French territory, although one saw clearly that his 
proposal of the Saxon arrangement β would, if agreed to, have led 
to some proposition or other of this kind. 
I conceive the Prince of Orange to be completely out of the 
Question, and that Leopold is the best candidate, but Russia has 
positively forbidden his Minister here to consent to any Sovereign 
not a Nassau; Prussia has left her full discretion by giving no 
instructions. 
If we settle other matters as I hope, the Sovereign may be 
managed - I do not think that you can mention the Dutch prop­
osition as one coming from the King, but we might, if you think 
it would be useful, hint that such an arrangement is what the 
Conference is aiming at. 
We hear that when it was supposed that the Conference had 
decided that Luxembourg was to be immediately given up the 
deputies from the Duchy were on the point of retiring from the 
Congress, not to create unnecessary difficulties. Do you believe 
this to be true? It is quite certain, however, that Luxembourg is 
settled by too many treaties to make it possible to give it to Belgium, 
except by the consent of all the parties interested. 
My dear Lord Ponsonby, 
Yours very sincerely, 
Palmerston 
• Talleyrand's proposal made to Biilow whereby Prussia would acquire Saxony, 
referred to above, pp. 79-80. Cf. W. von Franqué, Luxemburg, die belgische Revolution 
und die Mächte, 1933, p. 261. 
A P P E N D I X V 
Viscount Palmerston to Sir Charles Bagot, 12th January, 1831 
Bagot MSS. Levens Hall, Westmorland. 
F . O . I 2 j a n y 1831 
R. Ja y 15 at 3 PM by Mess. Tricker 
My dear Bagot, 
We have pretty authentic information that a considerable change 
of public opinion has lately taken place in Belgium and that the 
Orange Party begins to shoot ahead. The Prince has in consequence 
been advised to prepare a sort of proclamation if it can be so called 
and to send it to some of his confidential friends at Brussels that 
they may spread it as far and as soon as they can. I send you a copy. 
The Prince has also written to the King a letter sent off last night10 
to tell the King that he may probably have the Crown of Belgium 
offered to him and to express his hope that in such an event the 
King will not oppose any obstacle to his accepting it. Such an 
arrangement holding out the best prospect of a speedy settlement 
of Belgium and the only chance of retaining the country for the 
House of Nassau. The whole of this matter and proceeding have been 
kept strictly secret, in so much that no communication has been 
made about it either to Falck or Zuylen. But the Conference have 
requested me to write confidentially to you to beg you to obtain 
without delay a private audience of the King for the purpose of 
expressing to His Majesty the earnest hope of the Five Powers that 
if there should appear to be any chance of the election of the Prince 
of Orange to the throne of Belgium, His Majesty may be induced 
to afford every facility in his power to such an arrangement. The 
King may at one time have entertained a belief that it was still 
possible that the two crowns might be united upon his own head 
but the Conference are persuaded that such an arrangement has 
10
 This letter is printed in F.G. Gerretson, Muiterij en scheuring, 1936, I, 96. 
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long become impracticable and must see that by pursuing in 
impossibility He may lose to his son and his throne that possibility 
which if it be not grasped at the moment may rapidly become abo 
an impossibility. 
The Conference wish you moreover in the strongest manner to 
impress upon His Majesty that nothing would afford to the Prince 
of Orange a better Prospect of success than his being authorized 
to declare on the part of the King that the Grand Duchy of Luxem-
bourg should either now or hereafter be made over to him; the 
importance of that Duchy or Belgium is sogreat and so deeply felt 
that the certainty of having it attached to Belgium provided the 
Prince of Orange were elected would of itself almost secure H.R.H. 's 
election. To Holland the Duchy is of comparatively trifling impor-
tance, being cut off from it by the interposition of Belgium, and 
to the King himself the revenue to be derived from it cannot be 
considerable and might be made subject of a pecuniary arrangement 
with Belgium. 
Of course I do not propose that Luxembourg should cease to 
form a part of the Germanic Confederation to which on the 
contrary it is most important that is should continue to be attached. 
It is most essential that is should not be known that the Conference 
had anything to do with the steps taken by the P. of Orange, be-
cause the mere knowledge of that fact might perhaps lead the Bel-
gians to reject him and this is the reason of the great secrecy we 
recommend. But if the thing takes in Belgium and you find that any 
considerable party declare in the Prince's favor, some public act 
by the King relinquishing his rights in favour of his son; and 
promising friendship and good neighbourhood and commercial 
facilities to Belgium would probably be very useful. The King is I 
presume not in the best of humours with respect to our last protocol, 
but that does not signify, it is all for his own good and our present 
suggestion ought to convince him of this, as it certainly is a proof 
that all the Powers are sincere in wishing well to the House of 
Nassau. 
Zuylen hinted to me that the Scheldt might be opened to all 
vessels bearing a recognized flag, I told him it was not worth while 
to 11 . . .about the question of flag; he had just told me that when 
at sea a Dutch ship of war met a Belgian flag, the Dutch man shut 
11
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his eyes, I told him they had better do the same in their coast 
batteries on the Scheldt. 
I forgot to request you to give notice to our consuls and merchants 
that the Scheldt would be opened on the 20th of this month, pray 
do so. 
My dear Bagot, 
Yrs sincerely, 
Palmerston 
You may tell them that the insurrection of the clods in the South of 
England is over, as it is said, for half a century to come, and that the 
Irish Rebellion is put off sine die. 
A P P E N D I X V I 
Viscount Palmerston to Sir Charles Bagot, 13th January, 1831 
Bagot MSS. Levens Hall, Westmorland. 
F.O. 13 J a n y 1831 
reed. J an . 16 1 PM 
My dear Bagot, 
is Capaccini still at The Hague, it occurs to me that if he is, he 
might if willing, be of great use to the P. of Orange. 
When he was in London last I saw him and had some conversation 
with him on the affairs of Belgium; I inferred from what he said that 
he was friendly to the House of Orange, though fully alive to all the 
faults of conduct and character of the King, and convinced at that 
time that the P. of Orange had no possible chance of retaining 
Belgium without civil war. He however said that he thought the 
Belgians would have no objection to a Protestant prince and that a 
Uberai Protestant for the very reason that he was a Protestant be 
perhaps more indulgent to the Catholic Church than some Catholic 
might be disposed to be. 
I apprehend than in what he then said, he alluded to P. Leopold 
whom however I purposely abstained from mentioning to him. But 
Capaccini said he had gone to Brussels with the Prince out of personal 
regard. - Now it occurs to me that if Capaccini is aware of the great 
change which is said to have happened lately in opinion in Belgium 
as to the Prince, and if he knows that the general disposition of the 
nation is in his favor, he might perhaps be persuaded to use his 
influence with the priesthood to assist the Prince's cause. 
You might therefore do well to have an interview with him as 
soon as possible and sound him on the subject. You will tell him 
that you had good reason to believe that the Orange party has 
gained great strength in Belgium, that all the Five Powers would 
gladly see the Prince elected as the speediest mode of arranging 
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this very difficult and complicated affair. That hardly any other 
choice is in point of fact left; each court having some almost in-
surmountable objection to every other candidate and there is the 
greatest danger that if this question remains unsettled much longer 
it may involve Europe in war. That consequently in promoting 
this Orange arrangement he would be labouring in his own vocation 
as a peace maker and be rendering a most important service to 
Europe - The fact is that difficulties as to other choices have greatly 
assisted the Prince of Orange. The French party are to a certain 
degree defeated by the peremptorily [made] refusal of France to 
accept Belgium or to give Nemours ; The Bavarian party find they 
cannot have P. Otto; Leopold is objected to by France; the Nea-
politan Prince would not suit, and in the meantime during the 
time that these discussions are going on, distress increases, sufferings 
augment, and the Belgians wish for any settlement rather than none. 
If you find Capaccini well disposed you might suggest to him 
that Brussels lies not much out of his way to England or Paris, to 
one of which places he said he meant to go when he should have 
finished his affairs at The Hague ; and if he was willing to espouse 
the cause in any way you might shew him the Prince's letter or 
proclamation whichever it might be called which probably would 
satisfy him as to the Prince's views and intentions should he be 
called to govern Belgium. 
Esterhazy who is with me while I am writing has promised to me to 
write a few lines to the same effect to Capaccini which he will in-
close to you. 
I see all the objections to the Prince on the score of his personal 
character and have great doubts whether the arrangement would 
last, but for the present it would preserve peace and that is a matter 
of much importance. 
There will be many things to be settled besides, the commercial 
relations of the two countries, the exchanges of territory to be made 
for their mutual advantage and other matters of the same kind and 
the more discretion the King gives on those points to Falck and 
Zuylen the sooner and better the settlement can be made. 
A P P E N D I X V I I 
Sir Charles Bagot to Viscount Palmerston, i8th January, 1831 
Bagot MSS. Netherlands Correspondence Vol. IX, Levens 
Hall, Westmorland. 
The Hague, Jany 18, 1831 
My dear Palmerston, 
The messenger Flicker arrived here at three o'clock in the afternoon 
of Saturday last, and delivered to me your letter of the 12th inst. 
On the following day at one o'clock Havilland arrived with your 
letter of the 13th. Halfan hour after I received the latter, I had a 
private audience which I had previously requested of the King 
and which lasted one hour and three quarters. - This morning I 
have had a second, which lasted three hours and a quarter and in 
which I conscientiously believe that I have urged every argument 
which could be adduced in order to persuade The King to accede 
to the wishes of the Conference expressed in your two letters to me.-
All has been in vain, and neither you, nor the Plenipotentiaries 
of the other Powers, nor the Prince of Orange must now calculate 
upon the possibility of the King being ever induced to renounce in 
the Prince's favor the sovereignty of Belgium. — Not only will 
he not do it contingently, and in the event of the crown being 
offered to him - but he will not do it at all. 
It would be difficult and it would perhaps serve no end to attempt 
to report to you in detail the substance of two conversations which 
together lasted five hours, and in which there was I believe no point 
of the King's real or supposed position left untouched by him and by 
me. 
In my first conversation with him I laid before him, in the strongest, 
and I believe the clearest terms the situation in which he stood - the 
absolute necessity of deciding instantly whether or not he would lend 
himself to the only project which could save the crown of Belgium 
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to his family and the general wish of all the powers that he should 
do so. - I told him everything without the smallest reserve and I 
left him with a hope that I succeeded in making some impression 
upon him. - This hope weis much strengthened by his sending M. 
Verstolk to me the next morning to say that he would see me again 
at 12 o'oclock today, and that he had been charged, in the mean-
time, to have some conversation with me as to the suggestions 
which I had thrown out to the King respecting compensation and 
the cession of Luxembourg to the Prince with a view to its incor-
poration with Belgium, - as well as to enquire of me whether I 
meant that my injunction of secrecy to The King should extend to 
M. Falck and M. de Zuylen. 
In this conversation I explained in the fullest detail the wish and 
views of the Five Powers as regarded Luxembourg but told him that 
I had no distinct instruction as to the nature of the compensation 
in other respects which it might be in contemplation to propose 
for the advantage of both Parties. - I t is true that your letter 
adverted to pecuniary compensation,but seeing as I thought, a 
disposition to yield Luxembourg I thought it prudent not to chill 
this disposition by crushing all hopes of territorial compensation, 
if such an idea should be in the King's mind. That it was in his 
mind I soon collected from M. Verstolk who threw out that for 
Luxembourg the King might be willing to take the Province of 
Limbourg, certain parts of Liège - containing the coal and iron 
mines nearest to his frontiers and whose chief débouché for their 
product was Holland - and the Forts of Lillo and Liefkenshoek on 
the Scheldt which originally belonged to Holland, and had been 
ceded to Austria by the Treaty of Fontainbleau - All this of course 
I took ad referendum and without observation - but I own that I 
flattered myself with having brought matters into a train of negotia-
tion which might lead to some good issue as regarded Belgium and 
the Prince's cause. 
My audience of today has dissipated every hope that I had. - You 
will scarcely credit it, but the King is at this hour as far from 
having divested himself of the idea of its being possible that he 
should yet retain, in his own person, the sovereignty of Belgium, 
as he was on the 25th of last August. He will write to the Prince 
(I believe to night) to tell him that he is at liberty to do what he 
pleases, or what he can, in Belgium, as his Lieutenant General 
Provisoire - but beyond this nothing will induce him to go. He never 
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adverted again either to Luxembourg or compensation, or any of the 
points respecting which he had charged M. de Verstolk to talk with 
me excepting indeed as regarded his communicating upon the 
subject of Prince of Orange's matters with M. Falck and M. de 
Zuylen which I told him that he was certainly at liberty to do, and 
that indeed the Plenipotentiaries anxiously desired that they should 
be furnished by His Majesty with the fullest instructions, discretion 
and powers upon every point which could come into discussion. 
Whether this change of the King's mind from what it appeared 
to be to me on Sunday was to be attributed to the arrival of the 
Queen with whom he may have conversed — or to the information 
which he had perhaps (though I do not think he had) received at 
the time of the proceeding at Ghent, and to a printed address in 
his favour from the Town of Liège which lay upon his table and 
which he begged me to read, I do not know - but you may rely 
upon it that his mind is made up to take all chances rather than 
listen to any voluntary renunciation of his Belgian Sovereignty. - He 
was in several parts of the conversation affected deeply and to tears. 
The most remarkable observation which fell from him were that 
perhaps the better course would be to abdicate entirely in his son's 
favor - as in that way he might still preserve unimparted to his fam-
ily the rights of his House - and at one moment he said "Why not 
throw myself into the arms of France? - she might have pity for me. 
Successful examples of such a proceeding are not wanting even in 
modem history. The Elector of Bavaria and the Grand Duke of 
Wurtemburg acted so in regard to Napoleon, followed him in his 
career and preserved their thrones." - Can it be that this is the 
secret hope and purpose of the King? - God knows - nothing is 
clear to me but my entire failure in the business which the Con-
ference have confided to me. The King is inmoveable. 
You will have learnt soon after you despatched your letter that 
Capaccini was in London. I return enclosed Prince Esterhazy's 
letter to him. 
This is a very hurried - perhaps a very confused le t te r - but I am 
writing against time — as I wish to despatch one of the Messengers 
by Calais with duplicates of what I send by the post. - I shall 
most probably redespatch the other Messenger to morrow night. 
Charles Bagot 
A P P E N D I X V i l i 
Viscount Granville to Viscount Palmerston, 25th March 1831 
Broadlands Archives 
Private Paris, March 25, 1831 
My dear Palmerston, 
It was quite amusing to me this day to hear Sebastiani taking 
credit to himself for having brought to maturity his Leopold project; 
you see, said he, with what steadiness I pursue any plan which I 
have taken in hand ; and dites à Lord Pal-mer-ston that I have the 
greater gratification in proposing it at this moment, because it is 
calculated to fortify the administration in England in the crisis 
in public affairs caused by the division of a majority of one on the 
great question of Reform. 
There are rumours that an explosion is about to take place at 
Antwerp in favour of the Prince of Orange; and the extreme 
anxiety which the French Government now shows to hasten the 
election of a Sovereign by the Congress, and the perfect confidence 
they feel that Prince Leopold will be elected by that Assembly, 
indicate pretty plainly that they apprehend an Orangist movement. 
- The proposal of Leopold will not be popular here and the 
Ministers are expecting to be furiously attacked by the Press and 
in the Chamber for their adoption of it ; but I really believe they 
think it will facilitate the preservation of peace. - All the Belgian 
provinces bordering upon France will resist the attempt of Antwerp 
and Ghent to place the Prince of Orange on the throne; the French 
Government, if it does not openly interfere in favour of the neigh-
bouring provinces, will connive at assistance being given to them, 
because the elevation of the Prince of Orange would be under 
present circumstances the defeat of the French party; and the result 
will be a general war, or a partition of Belgium, by which France 
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would acquire an extension of territory in Flanders, Holland would 
gain in Brabant, and Prussia obtain a slice on the side of Liège and 
Luxembourg. - I apprehend, tho', the whole négociation will be 
left very much in the hands of Talleyrand. Baron Louis in speaking 
to me last night on the Luxembourg question said, we had better 
leave it to be settled by the Conference in London. 
Bresson is now at Paris — he explained to me of the embarrassing 
position, in which he had been placed at Brussels; the instructions 
he observed which Lord Ponsonby received from his Government, 
accorded entirely with those, which in his character of Commissary 
he received from the Conference, whilst those which were sent to 
me from Paris, directly contradicted those which came from London. 
- 1 had to choose which I would obey; and I thought it my duty to 
execute the orders which came immediately from my own Govern-
ment. 
I am much pleased with your instructions both to Lord Cowley 
and to Lord Heytesbury; but if it be true that the Austrians are 
taking possession of Bologna, they are treating the Government 
most scurvily, and acting on a system of policy which may end ill 
for them. Why should Prussia, why should Russia assist them, when 
rejecting the moderate propositions of France, and heedless of the 
advice of England, they go on obstinately lending their military 
aid to keep in abject subjection the whole Italian Peninsula. 
I believe that Austria, Prussia and France, all concur in the 
opinion stated in your Despatch to Lord Heytesbury regarding 
the incorporation of Poland with the Russian dominions. 
You will see Walewski in England, he showed me a despatch 
from Nesselrode to Grand Duke Gonstantine, which had been left at 
Warsaw, in which speaking of King Leopold being named King of 
Greece a year ago, he says, "Loin d'avoir contracté avec [sic] affec-
tion pour l'Angleterre, il désire la quitter parce que ses relations 
avec le Roi, le Ministère, et les Pays Bas en général sont pénibles et 
fausses." Perhaps as the two former have been changed, he may not 
be at present anxious to be seated on a foreign throne. 
Yours ever sincerely, 
Granville 
A P P E N D I X I X 
Viscount Palmerston to Mr. G. W. Chad, 3rd May, 1831 
Broadlands Archives 
Private Cambridge, May 3. 1831 
My dear Sir, 
I avail myself of the departure of Mr Magenis to write to you a 
few lines, though in the midst of the occupations consequent upon 
a contested election, and although I am unable to give, what I 
have to say the shape of an official dispatch, without detaining 
Magenis some days longer. 
The Government are led to think that it may not be impossible 
that the Emperor of Russia should make some proposition to 
Prussia to afford him military aid against the Poles, and it is needless 
to say, that we feel anxious to dissuade the Prussian Government 
from giving such assistance if it should be asked to do so. - We 
know from Vienna that Count BernstorfF would be disposed to 
comply with it, and that Prince Metternich leans to the same 
opinion, but that the majority of the Austrian Cabinet decided 
upon remaining neutral. We wish you to endeavour to ascertain 
whether any such proposal has been hinted to Prussia by the 
Russian Government, and if we should have reason to think it 
has been or may be made, you will represent in the same friendly 
manner to the Prussian Government the tendency which such an 
interference on their part, beyond their own territories, in Po-
land . . . 1 2 to embroil them with France or to produce commotions 
in the Rhenish provinces; and you will say how much concerned 
we should be to see a rupture between France and Prussia upon 
such grounds, because with all our desire to assist Prussia and our 
12
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deep sense of the importance of maintaining her in her present 
territory, we fear the public opinion in England would render it 
absolutely impossible to go to war with France, in order to leave 
Prussia free to join Russia in crushing the Poles. I mentioned this 
view sometime ago to Baron Bulow, and begged him already to 
explain to his Government that if they were to involve themselves 
in war in consequence of their assisting the Poles 13, no English 
Government would be able to afford them any assistance, and there 
is scarcely anything which would be more painful to the present 
administration than to see Prussia involved in difficulties with 
France and yet be unable to give her any support. Baron Bulow 
said he would report what I said to his Government not in the shape 
of a communication to them, but as a statement made by me in 
conversation to him; and if you should have an opportunity of 
making these remarks to Count Bernstorff, it is desirable you should 
do so. I had a similar conversation with Prince Esterhazy before I 
received Lord Cowley's letter informing me that Prussia had sounded 
Austria upon the question of interference, and that Austria had 
declined, I represented to Prince Esterhazy in the same manner as to 
Baron Bulow the embarrassments which might arise to Europe 
from their interference by arms in the Polish war and how desirable 
it was for them having just got out of the Italian question not to 
invite new difficulties for themselves about Poland. I also suggested 
to him for the consideration of his Government that if the Emperor 
of Russia should ask for military aid, the Austrian Government 
might very properly avail itself of the opening which would be thus 
afforded to offer mediation instead of arms ; and I wish you would 
hint the same thing to the Prussian Cabinet. 
Let it not be supposed that the English Government is hostile to 
Russia because we wish to prevent the extremities to which the war 
in Poland has a tendency to go ; we think we should be doing great 
service to Russia, could we bring about an accomodation which 
would restore things to the state in which they were previous to the 
revolution, by a treaty or peace negociated by the intervention of 
friends. When a whole nation rises in arms and fights a campaign 
the matter ceases to be an insurrection which is to end by submission 
and punishment, it becomes a war which can only be terminated by 
treaty and concessions, and the dignity of the Emperor would not 
13
 Cf Chapter III, above, p. 140. 
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allow him to negocíate with those he considers as rebels, the in-
tervention of friends might save his honour. That mediation howev-
er cannot be afforded until some appUcation for assistance or 
intervention is made by the Emperor, or at least till the experience 
of a longer period shall have shown that Russia is unable without 
enormous sacrifices to reconquer the Poles. An accomodation upon 
the footing that on the one hand the Emperor should forgive men 
and restore institions, and that on the other the Poles should resume 
allegiance and return to obedience would give to Russia all she 
could legitimately obtain by the present success because she could 
not consistently with the Treaty of Vienna place Poland in a 
secure state of dependance upon an incorporation with Russia 
than to make it attached to Russia by its constitution with a separate 
administration. But to re-establish this order of things by force of arms 
upon the principles laid down by Russia, which is, that the Poles 
must submit unconditionally and trust to the meicy of their con-
queror, a thing they never can be expected to do till driven to the 
verge of extermination. To accomplish this, I say, by arms, will 
cost Russia an enormous sacrifice of blood and treasury as she must 
remember that in this encounter like in an aimaible suit in Chancery 
the costs on both sides really fall on her : because if she is to possess 
Poland in the end, every waste of Polish resources is a loss ultimately 
to Russia. 
The Prussian Government feel differently upon this question from 
the Austrian - Austria would be glad to see an independant Poland, 
and would probably sacrifice Galicia to obtain it, however different 
her language may be at present for the purpose of keeping fair 
with Russia. But Russia surrounds her frontier upon so many points, 
that it would be a great relief to her to get a new neighbour, at 
least upon one side. 
Prussia, on the other hand looks I conceive to Russia, more as a 
support than as a source of danger; she never contemplates the 
possibility of being able to cope with Russia, and is prepared to 
follow the Russian pol i t ics , . . . M upon the Emperor as a sure ally 
in the always probable event of a quarrel with France. Prussia 
therefore would think it a loss to have interposed between her and 
Russia a constitutional Power, upon which she could not equally 
count, and whose sympathies would be more likely to be with 
One word illegible. 
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France than with Prussia. The Prussian Government would also 
fear that if Poland were to become independant the Duchy of 
Posen would sooner or later be united to it, and then old Prussia 
would be cut off from the rest of the Prussian dominions. But all 
their considerations ought rather to incline the Prussian Govern­
ment, if well advised, to desire the contest brought to an end by 
accommodation, upon the footing of restoring things to the condition 
in which they were before the revolution, because they ought to 
feel that every month the war continues, the chances of an issue 
adverse to Russia encrease - besides the military difficulties in 
Poland which augment with time, because the Poles get more 
organised, better armed, more deeply and universally pledged, 
while the Russians suffer from wear and tear at a distance from 
their resources; besides these things must be considered the chances 
of further insurrection in Russian Poland, and even in Russia 
itself.. . 1 5 the possibility of a change of policy in France leading the 
French Government to some positive demonstration moral or 
physical in favour of the Poles. Still we fully acknowledge that in 
the present state of this business it would be unbecoming for other 
Governments to offer to interfere, but everybody knows, how a 
few words incidentally thrown in, in casual conversation may 
convey an opinion which could not be stated formally without 
offence. 
Sebastiani throws upon Guilleminot the blame of the intrigue at 
at Constantinople 1 β against Russia, but it seems doubtful whether 
dates will beat him out. 
My dear Sir. 
Yours faithfully, 
Palmerston 
1 5
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" The démarche of the French Ambassador in Constantinople, Guilleminot, 
is described in the introduction to Chapter IV, see above, p. 143. 
A P P E N D I X Χ 
The interview of Viscount Palmerston and the Polish agent in 
London, Count Alexander Colonna-Walewski on 15th July, 1831 
Extract from a letter of Walewski to the Polish Government, 
dated July 18, 1831. (MSS of the Bibliothèque Polonaise in 
Paris, Diplomatic Documents vol. XI, Cat. No. 355). 
Je commençai à lui représenter de la manière la plus vive combien 
nous avait été nuisible la manière dont la Prusse manquait à la 
neutralité à laquelle elle s'était engagée à notre égard. Je lui assurai 
que sans partialité de cette puissance depuis longtemps le théâtre de 
la guerre ne serait plus Pologne et qu'enfin, si une guerre générale 
venait à avoir lieu à cause de la Pologne c'est tout à fait à la Prusse 
et à l'Autriche qu'on devrait s'en prendre pour n'avoir pas tenu 
et peut-être aussi à l'Angleterre pour avoir laissé faire. J'ai trouvé 
Lord Palmerston assez bien préparé et disposé à ce sujet; il est 
entré dans toutes mes raisons et a ajouté: "Dans ce moment nous 
avons une bonne entrée en matière, car différentes réclamations 
nous sont parvenues sur la conduite de la Prusse envers nos propres 
sujets, nous allons nous servir de ce prétexte pour faire des représen-
tations qui j'espère seroient fructueuses. Nous en avons faites de 
très positives à l'égard du Gal Dwernicki mais jusqu'au présent pas 
de réponse." Je lui parlais alors de la conclusion des affaires de 
Belgique et de l'influence que nous y avons exercée. Je lui rappelais la 
conversation que j'avais eue avec lui à ce sujet et lui demandai si le 
moment n'était pas venu enfin d'intervenir, de médiatiser dans les 
affaires de la Pologne. J'ajoutai enfin qu'entre mille autres raisons, 
il y a une qui me donnait l'espoir qu'enfin l'Angleterre parlerait 
car c'était un seul moyen d'empêcher une guerre Européenne. Vous 
connaissez, lui dis-je, la position de la France, vous devez savoir 
tout aussi bien que moi qu'aujourd'hui à la question polonaise est 
attachée l'existence du ministère actuel. Le ministère renversé, 
vous ne pouvez douter d'une guerre générale. Dans le cas contraire, 
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si la France est obligée d'agir seule à la Pologne, cette intervention 
inspirera des craintes à l'Autriche et à la Prusse et encore guerre 
générale s'en suivra, mais si au lieu de cela, de concert avec le 
cabinet français, vous élevez la voix d'une manière ferme et décidée, 
je ne doute pas que la Russie ne cède à vos démarches, quelques 
dures qu'elles puissent lui paraître; si non, au moins l'Autriche et la 
Prusse ne se mêleront de rien n'ayant plus rien à craindre de la 
propagande française, puisque vous qui seriez à la tête de cette 
intervention, soit qu'elle devienne armée, soit qu'elle soit pacifique. 
Palmerston me répondit: "C'est la raison principale qui nous 
engagerait à intervenir dans vos affaires, nous y avons pensé; nous 
y pensons encore; mais nous croyons que le moment n'est pas tout à 
fait propre. S'il ne s'agissoit que d'envoyer un courrier à St. 
Pétersbourg, comme l'a fait la France dernièrement, pour offrir à 
la Russie nos bons offices, nous le ferions demain, mais qu'en 
résulterait-il? nous aurions la même réponse que a eu [sic] la France, 
et nous ne voulons nous exposer à avoir une pareille réponse. 
Quand nous pourrions dire à la Russie (et mon opinion personnelle 
est que cela arrivera incessamment) : Vous avez déployé en Pologne 
toutes vos forces ; elles ont été infructueuses pour arrêter insurrection. 
Vos troupes, malgré tous les renforts que vous leur avez envoyés, 
ont été forcées d'évacuer le pays; des insurrections dans toutes les 
provinces Russo-Polonaises et même dans l'intérieur de votre empire 
rendent tous les jours votre position plus critique; enfin il y a 
incompatibilité et vous n'avez plus la force nécessaire pour faire 
rentrer dans l'ordre ceux de vos sujets qui se sont révoltés. Une se-
conde campagne ne peut pas avoir lieu. L'Europe ne peut pas voir 
se déchirer ainsi deux nations à l'existence desquelles elle est intéres-
sée et nous sommes obligés d'intervenir. Quand nous pourrons tenir 
ce langage à la Russie le moment d'intervenir sera venu, mais 
aujourd' hui si nous le fassions la Russie nous dira: nos ressources 
sont loin d'être épuisées, quelques semaines encore et tout sera fini, 
de nouveaux renforts viennent d'arriver au nouveau chef et dans 
peu nos troupes seront à Varsovie. J e crois donc, a ajouté Lord 
Palmerston, que pour agir avec droit, il faut que nous attendions 
encore quelque tems. J e lui représentai alors combien tout délai 
était déplorable pour l 'humanité entière, etc. etc. Mais tous mes 
raisonnements ont été inutiles, il est revenu au mêmes arguments. 
Enfin je tâchais de pressentir si le Cabinet Anglais laisserait agir 
librement la France. 
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J'ai cru apercevoir qu'oui, quoique Lord Palmerston m'ait dit 
que cela dépendrait pourtant du genre d'intervention que voudrait 
entreprendre le Cabinet Français. En me quittant il me renouvela 
la promesse de s'occuper sans relâche de la Prusse et me répéta 
l'assurance de tout l'intérêt personnel qu'il prenait à la cause polo-
naise. "Je vous assure", m'a-t-il dit, "que je n'ai pas besoin d'être 
poussé." 
Quand je rapportai cette conversation au Prince de Talleyrand, 
en partie du moins, car je ne lui dis rien de ce qui avait rapport à 
laisser agir la France seule, il frappa sur la table et me dit: "Les 
Anglais sont toujours les mêmes, toujours la même politique mais 
cela ne fait rien. Il faut qu'ils nous répondent et je n'aurais pas de 
refus." 
A P P E N D I X X I 
Lord Holland to Viscount Granville, 19th July, 1831 
Granville MSS at the Public Record Office, London, Ref. 
No. P.R.O. 30/29/9. 
My dear Granville, 
I cannot agree with you on the impropriety and still less on the 
hazard of some joint representations about the Poles to Russia. 
You all seem to me to underrate the authority which France and 
England when acting jointly can speak to all other Powers and to 
Russia in particular and on this side of the water dv not think as 
strongly as I do that we are bound in honour and in policy to do all 
that we honestly can to strengthen Casimir Périer and to counteract 
the loss of popularity he may have sustained by the election of 
Leopold and they are not aware of the assistance which anything 
like co-operation about Poland would offer him in conciliating 
publiek opinion. France must say or do something on that subject 
whether we do so or not, - but if we will act conjointly with her, she 
will no doubt regulate her language and actions in a very great 
measure by or wishes. Is that not a great advantage? - and is it not 
more likely to preserve peace than leaving her to act alone with no 
other direction but that which the current of popular breath may 
give her? And will not concurrence with her on this point make it 
easier for her to yield to, and give us greater authority in making any 
representation which the state of her relations or hostilities.. . " 
may require? It does not appear to me that an offer of mediation or 
a friendly admonition to Russia implies war in case of refusal, 
though it may inquestionably suggest to the mind of the Emperor 
the wholesome hint of consequences which war, if ultimately 
provoked by his conduct in Europe, would inevitably produce. We 
17
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offered to mediate between Spain and her colonies. - We apprized 
her that if she declined, recognition of those colonies by England 
might be the consequence - Spain refused — recognition not war 
was the only result. Why would not France and England jointly 
follow the same course about Poland and Russia - I believe, if they 
did, the permanent independence of part of Poland would be the 
consequence and I further believe that Austria and perhaps Prussia 
would not in her heart be grieved at the result - I am confident 
they would not advise or concur in a war against France acting 
with England and I am equally confident that without their 
assistance Russia neither would nor could undertake it. When it is 
known, as known it will be, that France shows at St. Petersburgh 
more interest about the Poles than we do, the publiek opinion in 
favour of our joining their councils will be so strong that those who 
are most averse to it now, will be quite unwilling to resist it - but 
then France not England will have all the grace of mediation and 
any power between Germany and Russia which may be revived 
in consequence of such interference will form more emphatically 
part of the French rather than the English connection in Europe. 
I have been bound to bore you with a long argument but I am 
growing very eager on the subject - nor have I quite given up the 
reciprocal search - Talleyrand says we ought to have it. - Carlisle 
has gout and does not look well. 
Yours ever 
Vassall Holland 
A P P E N D I X X I I 
Lord Holland, memorandum for the Cabinet meeting on 
25th August, 1831 
Broadlands Archives, File 3. Cabinet Ministers. 
It is I think clear that the King cannot receive the Deputies and 
the letter which they wish to present to him without a virtual 
acknowledgement of the provisional Government of Poland, I 
cannot say that he therefore should be advised not to receive them 
because I am not prepared to say that in the present circumstances 
he ought not to recogmze that Government, and place this country 
in diplomatiek or at least commercial relations with Poland, and on 
the contrary I think that this question [is] well deserving the early 
consideration of the Cabinet. - Till, however, we have determined 
on that step we cannot advise to the King to receive the letter from 
the hands of these deputies to whom it has been entrusted. How 
far there is a difference in receiving it when transmitted through 
other hands or how far the bare receipt of a letter signed by a person 
in a particular capacity can be construed as an acknowledgment 
of his title to that character is a nice question which must depend 
upon diplomatiek usage and construction and on which I do not 
venture to give an opinion. - In common sense, however, there 
seems to me to be this obvious distinction. By receiving a person 
avowedly deputed by another and still more by receiving from that 
deputation so avowed a formal letter or message I imply that I 
recognize the authority of the person who had sent it, but by 
receiving a letter through an unknown or unauthorized channel 
I cannot express any opinion of the character or capacity in which 
it is written for I am not reasonably supposed to know either the 
contents or the writer till I have read it. 
I therefore should after declining to receive the deputies feel no 
scruple in receiving the letter. 
A P P E N D I X X I I I 
A.R. Falck and Baron van Zuylen to Baron Verstolk van Soelen, 
aoth September 1831 
Extract from a dispatch of the Dutch plenipotentiaries at the 
London Conference on Belgian affairs, Ambassador A. R. 
Falck and Baron H. van Zuylen van Nyevelt to the Nether-
lands Minister for Foreign Affairs, Baron J . G. Veretolk 
van Soelen. (Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague, Ref. No. 
1696 (B.Z., Conferentie Londen). 
No. 81 Londres, 20 septembre 1831 
La nouvelle de la prise de Varsovie donne matière à de chaleureux 
articles dans presque tous les journaux, destinés a manifester le plus 
vif intérêt pour la cause des Polonais et à inculper plus ou moins les 
Ministres de l'avoir abandonnée. En général, le succès de la 
Russie a fait une impression d'autant plus vive sur eux que jusqu'il 
y a peu de tems, ils étaient persuadés que la Pologne était perdue 
pour Elle. Lord Grey et Lord Palmerston surtout ne cachaient pas 
leur sentiment à cet égard. Bien que personne ne se dissimule que 
cet événement doive nécessairement influer sur la négociation qui 
nous concerne, il est évident que l'on veut ne pas se l'avouer. 
Aussi nous apprenons qu'une de premières démarches des Pléni-
potentiaires Russes, après la réception de la nouvelle, a été de 
témoigner à Lord Palmerston et à M. de Talleyrand, que cet 
événement ne changerait en rien les dispositions de la Russie dans la 
question Belge. 
Cette déclaration verbale est peut-être justifiée par les ménage-
mens que l'Angleterre a mis dans sa protection en faveur des Polo-
nais, ménagemens qui ont vraisemblablement retenu la France à 
intéresser pour Eux d'une manière plus énergique : sous ce rapport, 
elle serait dans les formes de diplomatie, mais il nous reste à désirer 
qu'elle ne soit pas suivie à la lettre. Aussi, depuis que par hasard 
nous en sommes informés, nous nous efforçons de rappeler à nos 
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amis que pendant neuf mois les affaires de la Pologne nous ont été 
représentées par Eux comme la cause directe et principale des 
empêchemens de l'Europe à nous favoriser; qu'il était donc naturel 
qu'un événement qui remettait la Russie, la Prusse et l'Autriche en 
état de faire agir des armées paralysées jusqu'ici, nous donnait 
l'espoir de voir ces puissances, non pas précisément revenir sur ce 
qui était déjà accompli, mais soutenir nos justes prétentions dans les 
futurs arrangemens définitifs. 
Il nous semblerait effectivement fort dur, après avoir été victime 
de leur faiblesse, de la devenir maintenant de leur générosité. 
A P P E N D I X X I V 
Viscount Palmerston to Mr. G.W. Chad, 30th December, 1831 
Broadlands Archives 
Private Foreign Office, December 30th 1831 
My dear Sir, 
I never was much more surprized than I was at the receipt of your 
last dispatches, informing me that upon the first rumour of the 
refusal of the Emperor Nicholas to ratify the Treaty, M. Ancillon 
was preparing to eat up all his words and to back out of all his 
engagements about Belgium. - He certainly has a difficult task 
to perform in this respect, and would deserve some applause if he 
could acquit himself with decent success, but what he has under-
taken is beyond the powers of man, for no human ingenuity could 
invent a plausible pretence upon which Russia could now refuse to 
ratify the Belgian Treaty. 
I know not who furnished M. Ancillon with his new dictum about 
treaties, nor whether he gave it to some, from whom he have [sic] 
heard it in this Town within the last four or five days, or whether 
they suggested it to him, but the proposition is untenable, but who 
may be its author. 
The first sentiment it produced was extreme indignation, the 
next a feeling not so nearly balanced with respect. You are authoriz-
ed to communicate to M. Ancillon the whole of my dispatch, and 
it is even desirable that you should ; and if he wishes it, you may 
even leave him a copy of it. You will tell him that Parliament meets 
on the 17th of January, that it is absolutely necessary we should be 
able on that day to inform the two Houses, how we stand with our 
Allies in respect to the ratification of the Treaty, the signature of 
which was announced in the speech from the Throne at the opening 
of the session; England cannot refuse to ratify. There is no pleading 
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for her that instructions have been contravened or powers over-
stepped, and it is only upon those grounds that an honourable 
Government can refuse to ratify a treaty. — 
Notwithstanding the little breeze we have had about the Fortresses 
I have no doubt whatever that France will ratify also - England, 
France and Belgium, then will have to carry into execution the 
stipulations of the Treaty -
What will Prussia do? will she oppose them and range herself 
under the banners of Holland, to prevent the execution of an 
arrangement which she has pronounced to be equitable and just 
and which she has even promised to ratify - this is not very probable. 
Will she stand by then an inactive spectator and incur all the odium 
of broken faith, without any advantage to the Party, on whose 
behalf she would have violated her engagements? These are ques-
tions which M. Antillen ought seriously to consider because they 
will very shortly force themselves upon him. — 
I see nothing that can prevent a war except the ratification of the 
Treaty. - If Prussia refuses, one or other of two things will be dem-
onstrated ; either that in spite of her pacific professions Prussia is 
panting for war; or else that she is not an independent agent, and 
is dragged by Russia at her chariot wheels - You must insist upon 
having an immediate answer, Yes or No, will Prussia ratify or not, 
and it should be given in a Prussian Note in order that it may be 
produced, if it should become necessary to do so, if the Papers are 
laid before Parliament; which upon all occasions of unsuccessful 
négociations [they] invariably are. 
As the time is barely long enough to admit of a courrier going 
and returning, I have settled with Talleyrand, that in a matter of 
common interest to France and England we shall have the use of the 
French telegraph from Strasburg through Paris to Calais. Talley-
rand writes to Bresson to desire him to communicate with you and 
tell you how it is to be done; but I imagine that you will send to 
Strasburgh a short message, such as a telegraph can readily work 
such as "Prussia ratifies immediately", your dispatch will come in 
the usual way, but the telegraph message will probably reach 
London some days before your courrier. -
You will not keep your courrier till you can say that Prussia has 
her ratification made out, but get a short Note stating in writing 
her intention, and send off your messenger as soon as you get it. -
We are preparing an answer to the long Note of the Dutch 
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plenipotentiaries and I have no doubts of our being able successfully 
to refute all their assertions. 
Tell M. Ancillon that we are beginning to regret that we did 
not take a more decided part in Polish affairs before the capture 
of Warsaw, we might have done some good in Poland, and have had 
less trouble with this Treaty. -
My dear Sir, 
Yours sincerely, 
Palmerston 
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S T E L L I N G E N 
I. 
De politiek van Rusland in 1830 zou tot een Europese oorlog geleid 
hebben indien er in Polen geen revolutie was uitgebroken. 
I I . 
Aan de invloed der gebeurtenissen in Europa op de scheiding der 
Nederlanden in 1831 is in de Nederlandse geschiedschrijving te 
weinig aandacht geschonken. 
I I I . 
De internationale aspecten van de candidatuur van de Prins van 
Oranje (Koning Willem II) voor de Belgische troon in 1831 zijn 
niet voldoende onderkend. 
IV. 
Sir Charles Webster is in zijn toelichting op de houding van de 
Britse regering inzake de candidatuur van de Prins van Oranje in 
België onvolledig en misleidend. 
С. К. Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston, 1830-1841, 
London 1951, vol. I, pp. 123 sq. 
V. 
De studie van Dr. Leslie over de Poolse omwenteling van 1830 
geeft blijk van een bevooroordeelde houding van de schrijver ten 
aanzien van de sociale ontwikkeling in Polen. 
R. F. Leslie, Polish Politics and the Revolution of November 
1830, London 1956 (University of London Historical Studies, 
vol. I l l ) 
VI. 
De begrippen „Oost-Europa" en „West-Europa" kunnen uit his­
torisch oogpunt niet nauwkeurig worden omschreven. 
VII . 
De betekenis voor Europa van de Pools-Russische oorlog van 
1919/1920 verdient nadere bestudering. 
V i l i . 
Naast onderwijs in de nieuwste geschiedenis behoort op middelbare 
scholen ook onderwijs in internationale vraagstukken („Current 
Affairs") te worden gegeven. 
IX. 
Het is vanuit Christelijk standpunt gewenst dat aan de maat-
schappelijke ontwikkeling in Oost-Europa meer aandacht wordt 
geschonken. 
X. 
De spellingwijziging van 1954 beantwoordt niet aan de eisen van 
het onderwijs. 


